DIGEST OF CASES.

Banking—Authority of Cashier-Course of Business-Presumptions.— A banking corporation, whose charter does not otherwise provide, may be represented by its cashier in transactions outside of his ordinary duties, without his authority to do so being in writing, or appearing in the records of the proceedings of the directors. His authority may be by parol, and collected from circumstances or implied from the conduct or acquiescence of the directors. It may be inferred from the general manner in which, for a period sufficiently long to establish a settled course of business, he has been suffered by the directors, without interference or inquiry, to conduct the affairs of the bank when, during a series of years, or in numerous business transactions, he has been permitted, in his official capacity, and without objection, to pursue a particular course of conduct, it may be presumed, as between the bank and those who in good faith deal with him upon the basis of his authority to represent the corporation, that he has acted in conformity with instructions received from those who have the right to control its operation. That which directors ought, by proper diligence, to have known as to the general course of the bank's business, they may be presumed to have known in any contest between the corporation and those who are justified by the circumstances in dealing with it upon the basis of that course of business. Martin v. Webb. U. S. S. C., Jan. 7, 1884. 17 Rep. 161.

Champerty-Whether Conveyance to Attorney is.-1. A party claiming the undivided half of a tract of land in the adverse possession of another, employed counsel to examine into the facts, and bring and conduct a suit for his interest, and in payment of them for such services, and perhaps others, conveyed to them a part interest in the land. The attorneys did not undertake to pay any of the costs or expenses in the maintenance of the suit: Held, that the conveyance to the attorneys was not a champertous contract. 2. To make a case of champerty it is not sufficient to show that a part of the thing recovered was paid or agreed to be paid as an attorney fee. It must also be shown that the costs and expenses of the suit, or some part of them are paid, or agreed to be paid, by the champertee. West Chi. P. Com. v. Coleman. Ill. Sup. Ct., Jan. 23, 1884. 16 Chicago L. N. 169,

Corporation-Stockholders—Personal Liability.—Under a statutory provision, making the stockholders of a private corporation individually responsible for an amount equal to the amount of stock held by them respectively, in case of the failure of the corporation to make payment of any debt, etc., the stockholders are in effect made partners, and are consequently jointly and severally liable to the creditors of the corporation who are not also stockholders themselves, to the amount of stock held by them respectively. Thompson v. Meisser. Ill. Su . Ct., Jan..22, 1884. 16 Chicago L. N. 171.

Constitutional Law.-Eminent Domain.-A statute which assumes to limit or direct the compensation to be paid for private property, when taken for public or private use, is in so far unconstitutional. Trippe ▼. Overracker. Col. Sup. Ct., Dec. 1883. 4 Col. L. Rep. 405.

Extradition-Arrest Under United States Laws-Habeas Corpus-Duty of Custodian.-1. The governor of a state, in issuing a warrant for the arrest of a fugitive from justice, the officer who makes the arrest, and the party commissioned to receive the fugitive and deliver him to the authorities of the state where the offense is charged to have been committed,in pursuance of the provisions of sections 5278 and 5279 of the Revised Statutes of the United States, act under the authority of the laws of the United States, and pro hac vice are officers or agents of the United States. 2. Where a petition for a writ of habeas corpus, presented to a state judge or court by a party in the custody of one claiming, in good faith, to be authorized to deliver him to the authorities of another state, as a fugitive from justice, in pursuance of the provisions of said sections, shows upon its face that the petitioner is so held in custody, under such claim made in good faith, the state judge or court has no jurisdiction to issue the writ. The jurisdiction, in such case, is exclusively in the courts of the United States. 3. Where a writ of habeas corpus has been issued by a state judge or court, and been served on the party having the custody of such alleged fugitive, it is the duty of such custodian to make full return to the writ as to the authority under which he holds the prisoner, and to exhibit to the court the original papers evidencing his authority, and respectfully decline to produce the body of the prisoner; and if it appears from said return, or said petition and return, that the prisoner is claimed to be held in good faith, in pursuance of the provisions of said statute, the judge or court issuing the writ has no jurisdiction or authority to proceed further, and no jurisdiction or authority to compel the production of the body of the prisoner, or to commit the party holding him for contempt in thus respectfully declining to produce the prisThe effect of the production of the prisoner would be to place him in the physical control of the court, and to deprive himself of all power to execute the superior commands of the laws of the United States, to which he owes obedience. In re Robi U. S. C. C. D. of Cal., Jan. 19, 1884. 1 West Coast Rep. 439.

oner.

Fraudulent Conveyances-Two Grounds for Holding Contracts Such.— 1. There are two distinct grounds upon which conveyances and other contracts will be deemed fraudulent as against creditors; first, such as are entered into with a fraudulent intent, and second, such as from the terms of the agreement, or the nature of the transaction itself, are deemed so as a mere inference of law without regard to the motives or actual intentions of the contracting parties. 2. In the first class of cases the fraudulent intent is always a question of fact to be established by extrinsic proofs, while in the other the contract or transaction under the circumstances shown, may be deemed fraudulent, although the parties may have acted in the best faith. Lawson v. Funk. Ill. Sup. Ct., Jan. 23, 1884. 16 Chicago L. N., 168.

Infant-Liability for Goods Purchased.-An infant who purchases goods on credit and does not return them, is liable for so much of the price as is equal to the benefit derived by him from the purchase. The question of the amount of benefit received by the infant is one of mixed law and fact, to be found by the tribunal trying the facts. Merrimack v. Butterfield. N. H. Sup. Ct., Jan. 1884. 16 Chicago L. N. 177.

Insurance-Competency of after Health of Insured.-The health of the insured not being misrepresented in his application, evidence of his health later, and as to the disease of which he died, is immaterial. Morris v. Wis. Odd F. Mut. L. Ins. Co. Wis. Sup. Ct., Jan. 8, 1884. 18. N. W. Rep. 13.

Libel-Agency-Malice-Damages.-1. The liability of the proprietors of a newspaper, for the act of an agent, to whose management they have entrusted the paper, or a department or column thereof, is broader than that of the ordinary employer for the act of his employe. 2. If the proprietors of a newspaper give to an employe charge and control of an editorial column, reserving no supervision, they practically authorize him to write and publish therein any article he thinks proper, and if he, without their knowledge, write and publish a libel, they are responsible for the wrong, whether it results from his mere negligence or from a wanton and reckless purpose to accomplish the business in an unlawful manner. 3. Such responsibility is not limited to compensation for actual damages. The employer is liable for the wanton and malicious act of the employe in the execution of the authority given him, and in all such cases the wantonness and malice of the employe may be shown to enhance the damages. 4. Want of knowledge on the part of the proprietors of a newspaper of a libelous article before its publication, and efforts by them afterwards to make amends and reparation, may be shown to be considered by the jury in mitigation of damages, but it is error to charge, as matter of law, that such want of knowledge and efforts in good faith to make amends will protect such proprietors from punitive damages, where an employe has wantonly or maliciously written and caused to be published a libel. Bruce v. Reed. Pa. Sup. Ct., Jan. 1884. 14 Pitts. L. J. 245.

Municipal Corporations - Proof of Existence - Foreign Statutes must be Pleaded.-1 When the question of the incorporation of a city arises collaterally, it is only necessary to show that the city is de facto a corporation. 2. To prove its existence it is sufficient to produce the charter and prove acts done under it, and in conformity with it. Written proof that all the preliminary steps were taken, is not necessary. 2. Foreign statutes or the laws of other states must be pleaded, but such statutes are not required to be stated in hæc verba. It is sufficient to state the substance of so much of the statute as is relied on, conciseness in pleading being commendable. When the statute is not the foundation of the action, but comes in collaterally as evidence, the same degree of strictness in pleading the same is not required. L. N. A. & C. Ry. Co. v. Shires. Ill. Sup. Ct., Jan. 23, 1884. 16 Chicago L. N. 169.

Master and Servant-Who are Fellow-Servants of Same Master.-To const.tute servants of the same master "fellow-servants" within the rule, respondeat superior, it is not enough that they are engaged in doing parts of the same work, or in the promotion of the same enterprise carried on by the master, not requiring co-operation or bringing them together or in such relations as that they may have an influence upon each other; but it is essential that at the time of the injury, they shall be directly co-operating with each other in the particular business in hand, or that their usual duties shall bring them into habitual consociation, so that they may exercise an influence upon each other promotive of proper caution. C. & N. Ry. Co. v. Maronda. Ill. Sup. Ct., Jan. 23, 1884. 16 Chicago L. N. 168.

Parent and Child-Emancipation of Child-Wages of Minor-Assignment.-1. The right of a parent to the custody and personal services of a child, is simply incidental to the duty of discipline and direction. A child is not the mere servant of the father, nor is the father bound to work the child for the benefit of his creditors, but may let him go when he will, whether he be solvent or not. Emancipation may be as perfect when they live together as if they were separated. 2. The right of a parent to the services of minor children is not, as such, absolute; but his right to their wages is vested, if the labor has been performed without any previous agreement or understanding to the contrary. 3. The release by a parent of his right to the wages of a minor child, executed to such child after a general assignment by the father and his partner in an insolvent firm for the benefit of its creditors, is of no validity as against such creditors. Beaver v. Bare. Pa. Sup. Ct., Oct. 2, 1853. 18 Cent. L. J. 95.

Pardon-Effect.-A pardon by the governor relieves the offender from the punishment annexed to the offense; and from all penalties and consequences growing out of the conviction and sentence, except political disabilities. It does not restore offices forfeited nor rights vested in others in consequence of the conviction and sentence. Edwards v. Commonwealth. Virginia Sup. Ct. of App., Nov. 15, 1883. 8 Va. L. J. 22.

Will-Construction-Descent and Distribution-Heirs at Law-Conflict of Laws.-1. Personal property which is given in trust, with power to convert the same into realty for the "heirs at law" of the settler, will be distributed among those entitled to real property by descent, and not in accordance with the statutes of distribution. 2. Where a deed of trust is executed in one state for the benefit of the "heirs at law" of the settler, who afterwards becomes domiciled in another state, where he dies, the laws of the latter state will govern as to who were contemplated as "heirs." 3. Although the laws of the latter state do not permit the descent of property, which has been acquired by an intestate from his father, to his mother. Held: That the settler did not intend that this rule should defeat his mother's rights, and, there being no issue, it should go to his mother. Merrill v. Preston. Mass. Sup. Jud. Ct. 18 Cent. L. J. 74.

WILL-ADOPTED DAUGHTER-SET-OFF.
(Ohio Supreme Court. December 4, 1883.)
TAYLOR v. ELDER

The will of T. was duly admitted to probate, and was in the following words:

"In case of any accident with me, Igive all my property and money to my wife, Rhoda Ann Taylor.

"With this proviso: That she, my wife, provide for my adopted daughter, Mary Frances Boyle Taylor, adopted in the month of February following, being year 1863. Dated this day, November

25, 1873."

The adopted daughter from the death of the testator to the time of her marriage, was supported by the widow, who had elected to, take under the will. The adopted daughter was after her marriage supported by her husband, and the testator's widow refused further to provide for her.

Held:

The adopted daughter is not entitled to have set off to her any share of the estate: nor is she, while otherwise provided for, entitled to claim support from the testator's widow.

ERROR to the Superior Court of Cincinnati.

On the twenty-sixth day of October, 1876, Mary F. B. Elder filed in the Superior Court of Cincinnati the following petition:

"Mary F. B. Elder, plaintiff, v. Rhoda Ann Taylor, defendant : Petition.

"Now.comes the plaintiff herein and says that she was the adopted daughter of the late P. N. Taylor, of Cincinnati, and of Rhoda Ann Taylor, his wife, the defendant herein, although such adoption was not by virtue of any proceeding in the probate court of this or any other county. That she was born on the seventh of June, 1855, was adopted by said P. N. Taylor.