distinct ballots the

consequence of this, the Constitution was so amended that the electors should name in their ballots the person voted for as President, and in person voted for as Vice President. They are also required to make distinct lists of all persons voted for as President, and of all voted for as Vice President, and of the number of votes for each. These lists they are required to sign and certify, and transinit sealed to the seat of government, directed to the President of the Senate. Neither the Constitution nor the amendment requires that more than one copy of these lists shall be made or sent, nor does either fix the time at which they shall be sent. It has been provided by law, however, that three copies of the lists should be made. One of these is to be sent, by express, to the President of the Senate, at the seat of government, before the first Wednesday in January next ensuing the election. Another is to be directed to the same officer, at the same place, and forwarded forthwith, by mail; and the third is to be delivered to the Judge of the district in which the electors assembled. These provisions, though not specially authorized by the Constitution, are justified by their necessity, and their propriety will always command their respectful observance. The same law requires that Congress shall be in session on the second Wednesday in February, when the President of the Senate, in the presence of both houses of Congress, is to open the certificates received, and count the votes. The person having the greatest number of votes for President, is declared to be elected, if such number be a majority of the whole. But if no person have such a majority, then the House of Representatives are im

mediately to choose a President, by ballot, from those persons having the highest numbers, not exceeding three on the list of those voted for as President. According to the original plan, the number from which the House was to elect was five, instead of three. In the amendment of this part of the plan, it is remarkable that no provision has been made for a case where an equal vote is given for two or more within the constitutional number. Such a case, it is quite probable, may occur, and would be likely to create serious dissensions. On the occasion of an election by the House, the votes are to be taken by states, the representatives from each having one vote. There appears no propriety in this change, as to the influence of the states, from what it ordinarily is in the case of a choice by the electors. It is perhaps but the arbitrary effect of compromise, and intended as a compensation to the smaller states for their loss in the primary election. It has been said by an ingenious commentator (Rawle), in defence of this part of the plan, that if the people do not elect a President, there is a greater chance of electing one in this mode than there would be by a mere representative vote according to numbers, as the same divisions would probably exist in the popular branch as in their respective states. This, however, is but an empty and inconsiderate assertion, and is fully met by its denial. Moreover, it by no means fits the case. The question

is not whether the chance of electing by states is greater than it would be by a mere representative vote according to numbers; but whether it is greater than the chance of electing by a vote according to the influence of the states in the primary election. That in

fluence is not in proportion to their number of representatives, but in proportion to the number of repre sentatives and senators. A quorum for the purpose of election by the House, consists of a member or members from two-thirds of the states, and a majority of. all the states is necessary to a choice. The election is required, by the amendment, to be made before the 4th day of March then next ensuing. In event of its failure to be made within the time thus limited, the Vice President is to act as President, as in case of his death or constitutional inability.

The amendment further provides that the person having the greatest number of votes for that office shall be vice-president, if such number be a majority of all the electors appointed. If no person have such majority, then from the two highest on the list the Senate are to choose a Vice President. A quorum for the purpose consists of two-thirds of all the senators, and a majority of the whole number is necessary to a choice. no person ineligible to the office of President can be elected to that of Vice President. The Constitution as amended does not specify the time when the choice of Vice President shall be made in case it should devolve on the Senate. But it is certainly a reasonable construction that it is to be made within the time limited for the choice of President.

But

The policy of the alterations effected by the amendment is by no means unquestionable. While some of our distinguished jurists and statesmen have regarded it as a substantial improvement, others have held it to be inferior to the original. The reduction of the number of candidates from which the House of Represent

atives are to choose a President is undoubtedly an improvement. Besides, under the original plan the action of the Senate was necessarily delayed until the House of Representatives had made their selection. By the amendment they may immediately after the votes are counted proceed to elect a Vice President. Under the original plan the election by the House might have been delayed until the term of the preceding President and Vice President had expired. In such a case it is thought the government would be left without an executive officer, and a suspension of its powers would ensue. By the amendment the new Vice President would probably in such a case be ready to act. Thus far the amendment is certainly superior to the original plan. On the other hand, it undoubtedly diminishes the dignity of the Vice Presi dency. Though the duties of the office and its responsibility remain as formerly, the candidate for it is no longer a competitor for the presidency or selected as possessing equal qualifications with the candidate for that office. Moreover, it is by no means doubtless that the facility afforded by the amendment for party organization, and the selection of mere party leaders is less an evil than that it was intended to guard against. To provide a security against such an evil was one of the prime purposes of the original regulation, and being defeated in this, its chief excellence has been destroyed. However, be the amendment wise or unwise, from the exposition we have made of the plan of election as it now is, it appears to be still defective in several material points. And though other defects have not been unveiled, and those which have

been, have not been presented as forcibly as they might be, still the propriety of a further reform is evident.

It is notorious, too, that in practice the plan has completely failed. Some of its wisest purposes have been frustrated. The enlarged and elevated views of those who framed it, and the high expectations of those who defended it, have by no means been realized. It was expected, as we observed in the commencement, that the election would be made under circumstances favorable to deliberation and by those capable of analyzing the qualities adapted to the station.

It was expected that the electors would have been men of an independence of character, worthy the representatives of freemen. It was hoped they would possess the wisdom and fortitude to resist the bias of party and the allurements of present temporary applause. That their ambition would be that lofty ambition that scorns the popularity of a day, and seeks that more enduring fame which is the reward only of a firm, steady and unyielding pursuance of the true interests of the people at any and every hazard. It was hoped, too, that hereby disorder and tumult might be shunned, and insuperable obstacles opposed to cabal, intrigue, and corruption. But how are all these high hopes frustrated! Need it be told that the electors are compelled to surrender their independence as a price for their office? That they are chosen wholly with reference to particular candidates-that these are designated by self-constituted conventions, and they too composed of party leaders, office holders, officeseekers, and a variety of other demagogues, among