dom, and indispensable to our general prosperity. It gives that dignity and importance to the office, so well calculated to induce the selection of men possessing, in a high degree, that virtue, firmness and intelligence, which raise them beyond the control of party spirit, and make them worthy depositories of a trust so high. But in order more fully to guard against the evils of sudden change, it was determined that in consequence of the first election, the Senate should be divided as equally as possible into three classes. The seats of the first class to be vacated at the expiration of the second year, of the second class at the expiration of the fourth year, of the third class at the expiration of the sixth year, so that one-third may be chosen every second year. This is in imitation of one of the few good provisions of the Virginia constitution. It is indeed a wise one, and constitutes the Senate a sure and steadfast anchor of our ship of state, when tossed about by the storms of political fanaticism, upon the danger. ous sea of popular excitement. For while it is calculated to infuse into it, biennially, a proper degree of popular influence, it secures us against the mutability and vacillation in legislation, incident to a change of legislators, so inimical to a steady and persevering industry, and destructive of confidence, both at home and abroad. The deplorable condition of our own country, under the confederation, presents a striking example of these evils. In referring to that sad state of affairs, which was the consequence of mutability in her councils-the Federalist remarks, "she finds that she is held in no respect by her friends-that she is the derision of her enemies, and that she is a prey to every

nation which has an interest in speculating on her fluctuating counsels and embarrassed affairs."

"If vacancies happen, by resignation or otherwise, during the recess of the legislature of any state, the executive thereof may make temporary appointments until the next meeting of the legislature, which shall then fill such vacancies."

The qualifications of a senator are the same as those required for a representative, except as to a more ad. vanced age, and a longer period of citizenship-this difference was naturally induced from the weight and delicacy of the trust, and the superior dignity and importance of the senatorial office.

The Vice-President of the United States is constituted the presiding officer of the Senate, but they elect for themselves all their other officers, as well as a president pro tempore in the absence of the vice-president. The original draft adopted by the convention, authorized the Senate to elect their own president, but it was intended for that officer, in case of the removal of the President of the United States, to exercise the functions of his office. At a later period of the session, however, it was deemed expedient to create the office of vicepresident, and to retain that officer as president of the Senate this alteration was made by a vote of eight states to two. Some slight objections were made to it in the state conventions, which I deem unworthy of notice. He possesses the full powers of a presiding officer, virtute officii-subject only to be restricted by such rules as the Senate may, from time to time, prescribe. In 1826, during the winter session, the vicepresident decided that he possessed no power to call

any member to order, except so far as it was given him by the express rules of the Senate. The subject elicited much discussion till 1828, when it was finally settled and decided otherwise by the Senate, who established a rule, that "every question of order shall be decided by the president without debate, subject to appeal to the Senate."

Upon this branch of the legislature depends the solemn duty to try all impeachments. Considering the age of the senators, the manner of their election, and the duration of their office, we may fairly presume they will possess in an eminent degree those high qualifications which a just exercise of this power requires. Wisdom, virtue, independence, and impartiality are the essential requisites of a tribunal for this purpose; and no where in the whole range of government can we more reasonably presume them to exist than in the Senate. When sitting as a court for this purpose, its members are on oath or affirmation. When the President of the United States is tried, the chief justice presides. The propriety of this is very obvious; for in case of his conviction, the vice president would succeed to his office, and it could not be expected he would be entirely unbiased and impartial. The concurrence of two-thirds of the members present is necessary to a conviction. The judgment does not extend farther than to remove from office, and disqualification to hold and enjoy any office of honor, trust, or profit, under the United States But the party convicted shall, nevertheless, be liable and subject to indictment, trial, judgment, and punishment, according to law.

SEPARATE HOUSES.

THE time, place, and manner of election of the members of this, and the other branch, are "prescribed in each state by the Legislature thereof," &c. Thus each state can regulate its own elections as it deems best. But in case they night neglect or improperly exercise this privilege, so as to leave the union without a legislature, "Congress may at any time, by law, make or alter such regulations, except as to the place of choosing senators." The place of choosing them was excepted, because Congress, by determining this, would determine, necessarily, where the Legislatures should hold their sessions; for the senators are elected by them, and it might thereby greatly control and impede the operation of state governments by deciding their Legislatures should meet at inconvenient places. This was one of the charges preferred against the British crown in the Declaration of Independence. By the next clause it is required that Congress meet annually on the first Monday in December, unless they shall by law appoint a different day. The people of England, as well as the Colonies, had for a long time esteemed annual parliaments as a favorite practice, and great security to their liberties. This provision was no doubt a consequence of these opinions, and annual sessions were thus placed beyond the control of faction or party caprice.

Each house is constituted "the judge of the elections, returns, and qualifications of its own members, and a majority of each shall constitute a quorum to do business; but a smaller number may adjourn from day to day, and may be authorized to compel the attendance

of absent members, in such manner and under such penalties as each house may provide. Each house may determine the rules of its proceedings, punish its members for disorderly behaviour, and, with the concurrence of two-thirds, expel a member. Each house shall keep a journal of its proceedings, and from time to time publish the same, excepting such parts as may in their judgment require secrecy; and the yeas and nays of the members of either house on any question shall, at the desire of one-fifth of those present, be entered on the journal. Neither house during the session of Congress shall, without the consent of the other, ad journ for more than three days, nor to any other place than that in which the two houses shall be sitting."

The unquestioned propriety and obvious necessity of these provisions render it unnecessary to comment upon them at large. The power to judge of their elections, &c., is so clearly and absolutely necessary for the preservation of justice, order, purity, and independence-yea, even for their existence, that it might have been justly implied, had it not been specially delegated. If it did not exist, any bold intruder might usurp a seat in Congress, and exercise its powers, while none could question his authority; and thus it would become, instead of a purely elected representative body, an assemblage of usurpers.

This clause also declares a majority of each house shall constitute a quorum to do business. The propriety of this is quite obvious, since otherwise the most important interests of the country might be decided by a minority. In England but a small number of the commons is necessary for a despatch of business, and