Such exclusion can not be limited to particular classes or descriptions of commercial subjects. It may embrace manufactures, bullion, coin, or any other thing. The power once conceded, it may operate on any and every subject of commerce to which the legislative discretion extends. U. S v. Marigold, 9 How. 560.

This power authorizes all appropriate legislation for the protection or advancement of either interstate or foreign commerce, and for that purpose such legislation as will insure the convenient and safe navigation of all the navigable waters of the United States, whether that legislation consists in requiring the removal of obstructions to their use, in prescribing the form and size of the vessels employed upon them, or subjecting the vessels to inspection and license in order to secure their proper construction and equipment. The Daniel Ball, 10 Wall. 557; S. C. I Brown, 193.

Commerce with foreign nations and among the several States means nothing more than intercourse with those nations and among those States, for the purposes of trade, be the object of that trade what it may, and this intercourse must include all the means by which it can be carried on, whether by the free navigation of the waters of the several States, or by a passage over land through the States where such passage becomes necessary to the commercial intercourse between the States. It is this intercourse which Congress is invested with the power of regulating, and with which no State has a right to interfere. Corfield v. Coryell, 4 Wash. C. C. 371; Moor z. Veazie, 31 Me. 36o; S. C. 32 Me. 343.

It can not be properly concluded that, because the products of domestic enterprise in agriculture or manufactures, or in the arts, may ultimately become the subjects of foreign commerce, that the control of the means or the encouragement by which the enterprise is fostered and protected, is legitimately within the import of the phrase "foreign commerce," or fairly implied in any investiture of the power to regulate such commerce. A pretension as far reaching as this would extend to contracts between citizen and citizen of the same State, would control the pursuits of the planter, the grazier, the manufacturer, the mechanic, the immense operations of the collieries and the mines, for there is not one of these avocations the results of which may not become the subjects of foreign commerce, and be borne either by turnpikes, canals or railroads from point to point within the several States towards its ultimate destination. Veazie v. Moor, 14 How. 568; s. C. 32 Me. 343.

A license to prosecute the coasting trade is a warrant to traverse the waters washing or bounding the coasts of the United States. Such a license conveys no privilege to use, free of tolls or of any condition whatsoever, the canals constructed by a State, or the watercourses partaking of the character of canals exclusively within the interior of a State, and made practicable for navigation by the funds of the State or by privileges she

《、

may have conferred for the accomplishment of the same end. Veazie v. Moor, 14 How. 568; S. C. 32 Me. 343.

The coasting trade means commercial intercourse carried on between different districts in different States, between different districts in the same State, and between different places in the same district on the sea coast or on a navigable river. Steamboat Co. v. Livingston, 3 Cow. 713; S. C. I Hopk. 150; People v. Railroad Co. 15 Wend. 113.

An enrollment and license confer no immunity from the operation of the valid laws of a State. If a vessel of the United States, engaged in commerce between two States, is interrupted by a law of a State, the question arises whether the State had the power to make the law, by force of which the voyage was interrupted. This question must be decided in each case upon its own facts. Smith v. State, 18 How. 71.

The commerce among the States, which Congress has the power to regulate either directly or incidentally, is that commerce which may be carried on by vessels regularly licensed by the laws of Congress. Steamboat Co. v. Livingston, 3 Cow. 713; S. C. I Hopk. 150.

The commercial power can only be exercised and carried out by legislation. There is no common law in regard to regulations of navigation. In this respect the legislation of Congress is the only remedy known to the Constitution. U. S. v. Railroad Bridge Co. 6 McLean, 517.

The word "among" means intermingled with. A thing which is among others is intermingled with them. Commerce among the States can not stop at the external boundary line of each State, but may be introduced into the interior. Commerce among the States must of necessity be commerce with the States. The power of Congress, whatever it may be, must be exercised within the territorial jurisdiction of the several States. Gibbons v. Ogden, 9 Wheat. 1; S. C. 17 Johns. 488; 4 Johns. Ch. 150; Steamboat Co. v. Livingston, 3 Cow. 713; S. C. 1 Hopk. 150; Brown v. State, 12 Wheat. 419; Moor v. Veazie, 31 Me. 360; S. C. 32 Me. 343; Gilman v. Philadelphia, 3 Wall. 713; contra, Livingston v. Van Ingen, 9 Johns. 507; North River Co. v. Hoffman, 5 Johns. Ch. 300.

Whenever an article has begun to move as an article of trade from one State to another, commerce in that commodity between the States has commenced. The fact that several different and independent agencies are employed in transporting the commodity, some acting entirely in one State, and some acting through two or more States, does in no respect affect the character of the transaction. To the extent in which each agency acts in that transportation, it is subject to the regulation of Congress. The Daniel Ball, to Wall. 557; S. C. 1 Brown, 193.

The lightering or towing of vessels is but a prolongation of the voyage of the vessels assisted to their port of destination, and the vessels so en

gaged are entitled to the privileges of vessels engaged in the coasting trade, although they are employed only within the limits of the State. Foster v. Davenport, 22 How. 244.

Congress has the power to regulate an agency employed in commerce between the States, whether that agency extends through two or more States, or is confined in its action entirely within the limits of a single State. The Daniel Ball, 10 Wall. 557; S. C. I Brown, 193; vide The Bright Star, Wool. 266.

The exercise of this power is not limited by bounds of any State. Vessels may be authorized to navigate waters within the bounds of a State, and to pass through a State, if it be practicable to do so, while employed in commerce with foreign nations or among the States. The power was conferred without regard to the jurisdiction of the States. The limits of a State do not constitute any portion of the elements by which the extent of the power is to be ascertained and determined. Moor v. Veazie, 32 Me. 343; S. C. 31 Me. 360.

The transportation of a passenger is not complete until he is disembarked, and any law which prescribes the terms on which alone a vessel can discharge her passengers, is a regulation of commerce. Henderson v. Mayor, 92 U. S. 259.

The power extends to every part of the voyage, and may regulate those who conduct or assist in conducting navigation in one part of a voyage, as much as in another part or during the whole voyage. Cooley v. Philadelphia, 12 How. 299.

Congress has the power to prescribe all needful and proper.regulations for the conduct of the traffic over any railroad which has voluntarily become part of a line of interstate communication, or authorize the creation of such roads when the purposes of interstate transportation of persons and property justify or require it. Clinton Bridge, 1 Wool. 150; S. C. 10 Wall. 454.

The power to prescribe the conditions upon which a vessel shall be employed as an instrument of interstate and foreign commerce necessarily carries with it the power to modify the rights of those who use it, whether for the purposes of domestic commerce, or for the purposes of interstate or foreign commerce. Lord v. G. N. & P. Steamship Co. 14 Pac. L. R.

297.

The power to regulate commerce does not include the means by which commerce is carried on within a State. Canals, turnpikes, bridges and railroads, are as necessary to the commerce between and through the sev eral States, as rivers, yet Congress has never pretended to regulate them.

The Passaic Bridges, 3 Wall. 782; Veazie v. Moor, 14 How. 568; s. c. 32 Me. 343; Withers v. Buckley, 20 How. 84; S. C. 29 Miss. 21.

In regulating commerce with foreign nations, the power of Congress does not stop at the jurisdictional lines of the several States. It would be a very useless power if it could not pass those lines. The commerce of the United States with foreign nations is that of the whole United States. Every district has a right to participate in it. The deep streams which penetrate the country in every direction, pass through the interior of almost every State in the Union, and furnish the means of exercising the right. If Congress has the power to regulate it, that power must be exercised whenever the subject exists. If it exists within the States, if a foreign voyage may commence or terminate at a port within a State, then the power of Congress may be exercised within a State. Gibbons v. Ogden, 9 Wheat. 1; S. C. 17 Johns. 488; 4 Johns. Ch. 150.

Rivers.

The power comprehends the control to the extent necessary for the purpose of regulating commerce of all navigable waters of the United States, which are accessible from a State other than those in which they they lie. For this purpose they are the public property of the nation, and subject to all the requisite legislation of Congress. Corfield v. Coryell, 4 Wash. C. C. 371; Bennett v. Boggs, Bald. 60; Pollard v. Hagan, 3 How. 212; Gilman v. Philadelphia, 3 Wall. 713.

The exercise of the power is not restricted to waters in which the tide ebbs and flows. There may be commerce and navigation with foreign nations and among the States upon the fresh water lakes and rivers, and to the regulation of such navigation the power will extend. Moor v. Veazie, 31 Me. 360; S. C. 32 Me. 343.

The extent to which the power of Congress to regulate navigation has been conferred, and to which it may be exclusively exercised, is ascertainable by ascertaining the simple fact whether a vessel can be navigated from a port or place within a State, to a port or place within a foreign country or within another State. Moor v. Veazie, 31 Me. 360; S. C. 32 Me. 343.

The power is confined to those streams which are channels of commerce between the States-such as are navigable in fact for vessels of commerce coming out of and returning into the navigable waters of other States by continuous voyages. Neaderhouser v. State, 28 Ind. 257.

Wherever a stream in its course ceases to be a public highway for the commerce between States, at that point its national character terminates,

and above that it is within the exclusive jurisdiction of the State. Neaderhouser v. State, 28 Ind. 257.

Streams, where they are only navigable for certain kinds of inferior craft, or for certain distances within the State, and where they are not visited by vessels of commerce coming from and going to the navigable waters of other States by continuous voyages, are subject only to the jurisdiction of the State. Neaderhouser v. State, 28 Ind. 257.

It is not every ditch in which the tide ebbs and flows through the extensive salt marshes along the coast, and which serve to admit and drain off the salt water from the marshes, that can be considered a navigable stream. Nor is every small creek in which a fishing skiff or gunning canoe can be made to float, deemed navigable, but in order to have this character it must be navigable for some general purpose useful to trade or business. Withers v. Buckley, 20 How. 84; S. C. 29 Miss. 21; Boykin v. Shaffer, 13 La. Ann. 129; Groten v. Hurlburt, 22 Conn. 178; Wethersfield v. Humphrey, 20 Conn. 213; Depew v. Trustees, 5 Ind. 8; Glover v. Powell, 10 N. J. Eq. 211; Neaderhouser v. State, 28 Ind. 257; Rowe v. Granite Bridge, 38 Mass 344; Butler v. State, 6 Ind. 165.

Rivers are navigable waters of the United States, in contradistinction from the navigable waters of the States, when they form in their ordinary condition by themselves or by uniting with other waters, a continued highway, over which commerce is or may be carried on with other States or foreign countries, in the customary modes in which such commerce is conducted by water. The Daniel Ball, 10 Wall. 557; S. C. I Brown, 193.

The doctrine of the common law as to the navigability of waters, has no application to this country. Here the ebb and flow of the tide do not constitute any test of the navigability of waters. The Daniel Ball, 10 Wall. 557; S. C. 1 Brown, 193.

The true test of the navigability of a stream does not depend on the mode by which commerce is or may be conducted, nor the difficulties attending navigation. The capability of use by the public for purposes of transportation and commerce, affords the true criterion of the navigability of a river, rather than the extent and manner of that use. If it is capable in its natural state of being used for purposes of commerce, no matter in what mode the commerce may be conducted, it is navigable in fact, and becomes in law a public river or highway. The Montello, 20 Wall. 430.

Those rivers are public navigable rivers in law which are navigable in fact. The Daniel Ball, 10 Wall. 557; S. C. I Brown, 193.

Rivers are navigable in fact when they are used, or are susceptible of being used in their ordinary condition as highways for commerce over which trade and travel are or may be conducted in the customary modes