THE ATTACK ON ALEEPORE.

11

detachment, was the point of attack. Here they thought to intercept our convoy of-so city report said-11 lakhs of treasure, besides other desirables from Ferozepore, and to kill all our sick. However, the sick had passed on the day before, and the convoy had been delayed one day on the road, so the rebels were doubly disappointed, and could only vent their fury on the poor Sikh guard, and punish the loyalty of the villagers by plundering and then burning their houses to the ground. But they were soon avenged. The next morning brought in tidings of the attack, and off started a second column, consisting of the wing of H. M. 61st, with Coke's Rifles and the Guide Cavalry, all under Major Coke. They came upon the rebels while leisurely retiring to the city, had a severe encounter, killed about 200 with trifling loss to themselves, and, having recovered and regarrisoned Aleepore, returned that night to camp. Before daybreak on the morning of the 6th, a small force of some 300 men, under Captain Brookes of H. M. 75th, went out to meet the convoy, and escorted in in safety the treasure and ammunition which had had so narrow an escape of falling into the hands of the rebels.

This attack on Aleepore, while it showed that the rebels, finding themselves unable to make any impression on our front, were beginning to turn their thoughts again towards our rear, made the authorities realise more fully the danger which threatened us from that quarter. The whole road, above 70 miles in length, which connected our camp with Kurnal, and was in

12

THE LINE OF COMMUNICATION IN DANGER.

reality the main artery of our military system before Delhi, was only protected by a few Sikhs, some Jheend Horse, some newly-raised police, and a few guns, distributed in small detachments at the several campinggrounds along the line of road. During the latter part of June the constant passage of troops had kept the road comparatively safe; but now that the stream of reinforcements had wellnigh spent itself, the danger was becoming imminent. Had the rebels once gained a footing at any point, our communication with the Punjab would have been at an end, our supplies would have been cut off, the besiegers have become in reality besieged, and the army starved out. That the rebels did not at this time organise such an attack can only be accounted for by a recognition of the intervention of that Providence which had favoured us throughout. No such attack was made in this our time of weakness; and when it was attempted, in the month of August, we were happily in a position to avert the danger. However, the only precautions we now could take were taken, if not to prevent, at any rate to render the attempt less easy. The canal from the Nujjufghur Jheel, running nearly parallel with the main road for many miles, presented itself as our natural ally, which we might call in to our aid. It was crossed at various points by bridges of massive stonework, and by blowing up these the canal would present an almost impassable barrier; so a strong engineering party was sent out to destroy all these bridges for some miles, only retaining the one at the rear of the camp for our own use.

THE BUSSAYE BRIDGE BLOWN UP.

13

The most important of these was the one called the Bussaye Bridge; this was destroyed on the 8th of July.

This," said one of the party, "was the most fatiguing day's work we had yet had." A strong force of all arms, comprising twelve guns, two squadrons of cavalry, detachments of H. M. 8th and 61st, the 2d battalion of Fusiliers, and Coke's Rifles, in all above 1500 strong, under Brigadier Longfeild of H. M. 8th regiment, went out as escort to the engineering party. After marching for two miles along the road, they crossed the canal and turned off to the left; and then began the labour. The rain had fallen very heavily for some days, and the waters were out on all sides; five miles did the force drag itself along over those flooded ploughed fields, the infantry ankle-deep in mud, the cavalry up to the saddle-girths in water, and the guns perpetually brought to a stand-still in the furrows. However, on they pushed in spite of water below and a scorching sun overhead, and accomplished their task without seeing a single enemy.

for

On returning to camp in the afternoon, they learned how it was they had met with no opposition. The rebels had been otherwise engaged. The departure of so large a body from camp could not fail to be observed or reported by the spies in the city; and under the belief that nearly our whole force had gone out, and that all our guards and batteries had been greatly weakened, Pandy thought to make easy work of the few that remained; so they poured out in full strength, and made a desperate attack on the Subzee Mundee

14

ATTACK ON THE SUBZEE MUNDEE PICQUET.

picquet. However, a steadier resistance awaited them than they anticipated. From its extremely exposed position, this picquet was always strongly held, and four companies of the 2d Fusiliers turned out to receive them. Supports of the 60th Rifles and of 1st Fusiliers soon came down to their help, and a hard fight ensued. The rebels had been deluded into coming too near, and they paid dearly for their rashness by leaving some 400 on the field. One party, about 160 in number, thought to take shelter in a serai, but soon found out their mistake. The Europeans forced the gate, rushed in, and not a man escaped; while the loss on the part of our troops was comparatively slight.

Another piece of engineering work was achieved about the same time. One of the greatest monuments of a bygone Mohammedan period is a gigantic aqueduct, by which water was brought a distance of many miles into the heart of the city. It crosses the canal by a bridge known as the Pool-Chuddur, by which horsemen were enabled to pass to our rear. This was also blown up, and a double end thereby gained; the passage of the horsemen obstructed, and the water cut off from the city; though the latter was a matter of less importance, from the city being on the banks of a river, and also abounding in wells.*

An event, however, had in the meanwhile occurred in camp, which demands especial notice. It has been mentioned that from the very first, cholera, that scourge of India, had made its appearance among the troops. It

* NORMAN'S Narrative.

DEATH OF SIR H. BARNARD.

15

had been committing its ravages with more or less severity ever since the advance from Umballa. One of its earliest victims had been General Anson, who died at Kurnal while marching down to Delhi; and now General Sir H. Barnard, who had succeeded to the command of the force, was destined to add another to the long list of its victims. On the morning of Sunday the 5th July, the first symptoms of the disease manifested themselves, and by three o'clock in the afternoon he had succumbed to its violence. Rarely has a general been followed to his grave with deeper feelings of personal respect than was Sir H. Barnard. "Brave, kind-hearted, and hospitable, it is doubtful if he had an enemy; he was regretted by the whole force, and most by those who knew him best." So wrote one who, from his office, and from the ready zeal and judgment with which he throughout performed its duties, was among those who knew him best.* "He was a high-minded excellent officer," wrote the leading civilian in camp, "and on European ground, and in a European war, would have done the State good service." But in that camp it was felt by all, and perhaps by none more so than by the General himself, that he was in a false position. His whole military experience had been confined to the few months of the Crimean war. Of even ordinary service in India,

+

*Lieut. Norman, in his Narrative.

+ GREATHED's Letters, p. 94.

+

"A Crimean education is not the best for this service. Having the sea close at hand, there was no care about communications; and