the liability of an indorser, and nothing! more; but this presumption may be con- trolled by parol evidence, showing that he 18. in fact intended to assume the liability of a maker, in which case he will be regard- ed as a joint maker.--Sill et al. v. Leslie,
10. Where a party is shown to have signed a note as a surety, he may be charged as Ibid. a joint maker. 11. E., as trustee of Indian Creek Township, having obtained a judgment against F. and G., upon which an execution had been is- sued and a levy made, took from them and others, as their sureties, a note for the amount of the judgment, conditioned that the sale on the execution should be post- poned until the maturity of the note, and that payment of it should satisfy the judg ment. Held, that the trustee, being in- trusted by statute with the management of the pecuniary concerns of the township, had power to make the agreement.-Phil- ips et al. v. Eust, Trustee, &c.,
15. The expression, "chartered bank," was inadvertently used in Mix v. The State Bank, 13 Ind. 521, in stating what notes are put by the statute on the footing of inland bills of exchange. Ibid.
16. Where the names of indorsers appear upon a note, without any date, the in- dorsements will be presumed to have been Ibid. made at the date of the note.
17. Where, at the time of the execution of a note not governed by the law merchant, but still negotiable, third persons place their names on the back of it, in the ab- sence of the prior indorsement of the payee, their liability is, prima facie, that of in- dorsers; and there would be no variation
in this rule when applied to notes nego- Ibid. tiable by the law merchant.
Where indorsers place their names upon the back of a negotiable note at the time of its execution, in the absence of the prior indorsement of the payee, perhaps parol evidence is admissible to rebut their prima facie liability as indorsers, and show it to be that of makers; but where the payee first indorses the note, evidence is not ad- missible to rebut such prima facie liability Ibid. of the subsequent indorsers.
19. Suit by the assignee of a promissory note against his assignor, alleging the in- solvency of the maker. A judgment had been obtained on the note against the ma- ker, and executions returned nulla bona, but due diligence had not been used in bringing the suit. Answer: that dili- gence had not been used against the maker of the note, who, long after the time when a judgment might have been ob- tained against him, had property subject to execution. The executions issued on the judgment against the maker, and the returns of the oflicer were offered in evi- dence, and objected to by the assignor, on the ground of irrelevancy. Held, that as it does not appear but that the judgment on which the executions issued was given in evidence without objection, and as the exe- cutions and returns might tend to show insolvency at a given, though immaterial, time, the Court can not say the evidence did any harm.-Dawson v. Walls, 269 20. As the evidence is not in the record, this Court can not say that any thing was shown tending to impeach the returns, and if not, they might, when legitimately in evidence, be taken as conclusive, in the given case. Ibid. Suit upon a promissory note. Answer: that the note was given to the payees thereof, at the request of one A., in settle- ment of an affair of bastardy, she, the said A., being then pregnant with a child be- gotten by one of the makers of said note; that a large sum, to-wit, $500, had already been paid, and that said bastard child died at birth. Held, that the mother, being pregnant at the time of the execution of the note, had then a present right of action, and her promise not to bring the action was a good consideration for the note, which the death of the child did not in any degree affect.-Harter et al. v. Johnson,
22. Where an assignee takes a note upon the representation of the maker that it will be paid, or is good, the latter is estopped to defend against the payment of the note. -Wright v. Allen, 284
23. The possession of a note by the payee, is prima facie evidence that he is the owner of it, although there may be on the note a special indorsement of it by him to a third person; and he may, if he thinks proper, strike the name of such indorsee from the note.-Mendenhall et al. v. Banks,
24. Suit upon a promissory note. Answer: that the note was given for a part of the purchase money of a saw mill, and the as- signment of a subscription for the purpose of rebuilding the same; that the vendor represented that the mill and machinery were perfect, and the subscription valid, and worth $300; that in fact, the mill, machinery and subscription were of no value to defendant, and that the note sued on was the last one given. Held, that the answer was bad, on demurrer.-Thomp- son v. Voss,
25. Where promissory notes are pleaded as a set-off, a replication denying the de- fendant's title to the notes, and particularly setting out the facts showing the title to be in another, is good.-Reilly et al. v. Rucker, Executrix, &c., 303
26. Where a lease of land is for a term within the statute of frauds, and for that reason required to be in writing, and the lessee executes notes to the lessor for the rents, and takes possession of and occu- pies the premises leased during the term, the question whether the contract could have been enforced if either party had re- fused to perform it before the expiration | of the term, is not involved, and the lessee is liable to pay the notes.-Gibson et al. v. Wilcoxen, 333
promise could not have been intended to induce the purchase, even though it should appear that the note was not, in fact, pur- chased until afterward. Ibid.
29. Suit against the owners of a steamboat upon certain bills and notes made and ac- cepted by the master, and purporting to have been given for the use of the boat, for insurance, &c. Held, that prima facie the master had no authority to bind the owners to the payment of the bills or notes.—Holcroft et al. v. Wilkes, 373 30. He had no right as master, though him- self a part owner, to insure for the other joint owners.
Suit against the makers and indorsers of a promissory note, made, and payable, in Illinois. Held, that as the note was not payable to order or bearer in a bank in this State, no cause of action was shown, under our law, against the indorsers.— Brown v. Bunn,
27. Where the maker of a promissory note, being informed that a third person is about to purchase the note, promises to pay it within a given time, and thereby induces the purchase, he is estopped from contest- ing its validity.-Morrison et al. v. Wea-36. ver et al.,
28. But where the maker is informed that the note has been already purchased, and promises the assignee to pay it, he is not estopped to contest its validity, as the
Suit by an assignee upon a promissory note. The complaint averted that the defendant executed the note to the payee, who indorsed it to the plaintiff. Answer: That the indorsement of the note was without consideration, and for the purpose
of avoiding answers to interrogatories, and p that the plaintiff had no interest in the note. Held, that the legal conclusion from the averments of the complaint, was that the legal ownership of the note was in the plaintiff, and it was not enough for the defendant to controvert this legal con- clusion, without specially controverting the facts upon which it rested, or showing other facts inconsistent there with; as that the real interest remained in the payee, or had passed from the plaintiff to a third person.-Eller v. Smith, 466
37. Suit by the State Bank of Indiana, for the use of the Branch at New Albany, upon a promissory note. Before the determination of the suit, the charter of the State Bank expired; but before that time, the Bank of Salem had become the purchaser of the note sued on. A supplemental complaint was filed, show- ing the transfer, and alleging that the note was given for the purchase money of a certain lot, sold by the State Bank to the defendant, and that a deed has been tendered before suit was brought, which had been handed over to the Bank of Salem. Held, that the right to keep up and make good the tender, by a delivery of the deed, passed to the Bank of Salem as an incident to the assignment of the note.-The Bank of Salem v. Caldwell,
38. Suit upon notes made in Ohio, and payable with 10 per cent. interest. Judg- ment for the amount of the notes with the stipulated interest. Held, that as the notes were payable generally, they were payable everywhere, and not specially at the place of residence of the makers.- Engler et al. v. Ellis, 475
39. If the notes were payable in this State, they would still be good for the stipulated interest, unless that rate was prohibited by the law of Ohio, which was not made to appear.
40. Where the indorsee of a promissory note alleges, in his complaint, that the note was indorsed to him by the payee, and sets out a copy of the note, with a blank indorsement, he may, on the trial, fill up the indorsement, or may recover without filling it up.-Moore v. Pendleton et al., 481 41. Suit by an indorsee of a promissory note
against a remote indorser, alleging the insolvency of the makers. Answer: that at the time of making the indorsement, defendant took from his indorsee a writ- ing, showing that the note was assigned without recourse. The Court instructed the jury that a party receiving a negoti able note or bill of exchange, before maturity, in good faith, in the usual course of business, and without fraud, is not bound by equities which exist between the parties of which he had no notice. Held, that the instruction was erroneous. March et al. v. Sheldon, 491
3. Information in the nature of a quo war- ranto, against a plank-road company, charging a forfeiture of its franchises. The information did not give the date of the organization of the corporation, or show under what statute it was organ- ized and acting. Held, that when a cor- poration does, or omits, acts which amount to a forfeiture of its charter, or exercises powers not conferred by such charter, an information may be sustained against it. -Danville, &c. Plank-road Co. v. The 456 State ex rel., Sc.,
7. Present insolvency, alone, is not suffi cient to support an information in the nature of a quo warranto against a corpora tion. Ibid.
8. It is not necessary that relief should be prayed at the close of each paragraph of an information, but the prayer at the close of the information will be taken distributively, and applied severally to the paragraphs. Ibid.
2. The grant of a charter to those who have not applied for it, is a mere offer on the 9. part of the State, and may be withdrawn at any time before it is accepted by the corporators. Ibid.
3. If the charter of The Fort Wayne and Southern Railroad Co., approved January 15, 1849, was not accepted by the persons named as corporators prior to the taking effect of the new Constitution, it could not afterward be accepted nor any corporation organized under it; as § 13, art. 11 of the Constitution prohibits the creation of any corporation through, or by virtue of, any special act or charter. Ilid.
4. Suit for the value of animals killed by the cars of the railroad company. The evidence showed that the animals were killed between two named geographical points, and upon some railroad, by the rolling stock thereof, but did not show, in terms, that they were killed in Shelby county, nor by the railroad company defendant. Hell, that as the Court below knew judicially the boundaries of the county, it will be presumed that the first point was correctly determined.--Indianapolis, &c. Railroad Co. v. Moore, 43 5. As the evidence tends to support the finding in relation to the killing by the cars of defendant, the judgment will not be reversed. Ibid.
The directors of the corporation, alone, are authorized to receive real estate, and hence it would seem that real estate subscriptions can not be taken upon the preliminary articles of association; but, perhaps, the board after it is constituted, may receive real estate in payment of such preliminary subscriptions. Ibid.
Corporations can only consolidate with the consent of the Legislature, and when a consolidation is thus effected, it amounts to a surrender of the old charters, and the formation of a new corporation out of such portions of the old as enter into the
11. Those stockholders in the old who do not enter the new, are entitled to withdraw their shares, and may enjoin till Ibid. they are secured.
The laws providing compensation to the owners of animals killed or injured by the cars of any railroad company are police regulations, which the Legislature had the right to impose upon existing corporations, as well as upon those thereafter to be formed. — Indianapolis, &c. Railroad Co. v. Kercheval,
13. There is nothing peculiar in the charter of The Indianapolis and Cincinnati_Railroad Co. which would prevent the Legis lature from requiring her to pay for the killing of animals upon her road, in default of keeping it fenced.
14. The cost of making and keeping the fences in repair, or the amount paid in the way of damages for stock killed, does not "detract from or affect the profits of the corporation," in the sense intended by her charter.
6. As the Secretary of State was directed by a joint resolution of the Legislature, of June 9, 1852, (Acts 1852, p. 178,) to publish the General Railroad Law, with four other laws, as soon as convenient, it will be presumed that he acted in accordance with this instruction; and as, by reasonable diligence, the Secretary could have caused their legal distribution before February 25, 1853, it will be presumed 15. The act of 1853 (Acts 1853, p. 113.) the acts mentioned were in force before authorized suit to be brought before a
16. The act of 1859 is prospective, only, in its operation, and hence only applies to animals killed or injured after the passage of the law. Ibid.
17. Where the owner of land through which a railroad runs has received from the company, in the assessment of damages, an agreed compensation for erecting and maintaining fences between the road and his land, and fails to maintain such fences, he can not, if by reason of such failure an animal is killed by the cars of the com- pany, recover for the same, without proof of negligence.-Terre Haute, &c. Railroad Co. v. Smith,
23. A resolution of the board of directors requiring the stockholders to pay an in- stallment of 10 per cent. every thirty days, on all cash subscriptions, until the whole is paid, and that due notice thereof be given, is admissible evidence to show a call for payment of an installment in thirty days from date, and every thirty Ibid. days thereafter.
The word "month," in the proviso of the 8th section of the general railroad law, is used to express the same time as the words "thirty days," in the body of the section. Ibid.
25. Where the law requires notice, as a condition precedent to suits for install- ments of stock, and there is no waiver of the condition, notice, as required, must be given. Ibid.
102 18. There never having been (according to 27. the answer in this case) a corporation in this State, acting under color of authority, by the name of the "Fort Wayne and Southern Railroad Company," a convey- ance to such supposed corporation did not divest the grantor of his title.-Harriman v. Southam,
19. Where the secretary of a railroad com- pany, in response to a demand for a copy of a written contract of subscription, shown to have been in the possession of the com- pany, answers that it has been lost, proof of his answer is, prima facie, sufficient to entitle the party making the demand to give oral proof of its contents, in a suit against the company.--Indianapolis, &c. Railroad Co. v. Jewett,
20. It is to be presumed, from the character and ordinary duties of the officer who made the admission of its loss, that he was the custodian of such writings, and therefore his admission was competent evidence against his employer. Ibid.
21. Courts will judicially take notice when the general railroad law went into force. -Heaston v. The Cincinnati, &c. Railroad Co., 275
The general railroad law does require notice, or a personal demand, before pro- ceeding to forfeit the stock, but not before suit to recover installments. Ibid. Subscribers must take notice of the acts of directors, as to calls. Ibid.
To constitute legal notice, under the general railroad law, one and the same notice, fixing the same time for payment, must have been published in a newspaper in each of the counties, in which one is published, through which the line of the railroad extends. Ibid.
When suit is brought upon the prelim- inary articles for subscription of stock, they constitute the cause of action, and a copy of the articles of association, cer- tified by the Secretary of State, may be given in evidence to prove the existence of the corporation. Ibid.
30. Under the general railroad law, suits against subscribers of stock on the pre- liminary articles, or articles of subscrip- tion of stock, and not on the articles of association, were contemplated; but the articles of subscription and association may be combined, and where they are so, and the articles of association contain an express or implied promise to pay the sums annexed to the names of subscribers, suits may be maintained upon the latter. Ibid.
31. An animal was killed by the freight Ibid. train of the railroad company, at a place
22. A tender of a certificate of stock, before suit brought, is unnecessary.
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