Opinion of the Court. (1) That when he accepted the appointment of cadet midshipman he became an officer of the navy, and, as such, entitled to the benefits of section 1229, and Art. 36 of section 1624, (which is to the same effect,) of the Revised Statutes; that such acceptance constituted a statutory contract with the United States based on a valuable consideration, under which he was entitled to hold the office for life, unless removed by sentence of a court-martial, or in commutation thereof; (2) That he was not, therefore, discharged by competent authority because, first, since the reënactment by Congress in 1874 of section 1229 and Art. 36 of section 1624 of the Revised Statutes, neither Congress, the Secretary of the Navy, nor any department of the government was competent in time of peace to discharge an officer from the naval service; (3) That, independently of the act of July 13, 1866, 14 Stat. 92, c. 176, § 5, (section 1229 and Art. 36 of section 1624 aforesaid,) the act of 1882 is unconstitutional, as applied to him, for the reason that he held an office by contract with the United States, and was entitled on graduation to be a midshipman to serve for life or during good behavior; (4) That not only was the act of August 5, 1882, inoperative, as to him, for the reason stated, but also for the further reason that to apply it to his class would be to make Congress appoint to the office of naval cadet all such students as were in his situation; but that while Congress had the power, under the Constitution, to create the office, it did not have the power to designate the officers, that being the constitutional duty of the executive; and (5) That the case of appellant did not fall within the terms of the act of 1882; that he was not at the date of its passage an undergraduate of the academy, but had graduated; and that, therefore, his discharge was not authorized by that act. Mr. H. O. Claughton (with whom was Mr. Rodolphe Claughton, on the brief) for appellant. Mr. Assistant Attorney General Maury for appellees. MR. JUSTICE LAMAR, having made the foregoing statement, delivered the opinion of the court. Opinion of the Court. The primary question in this case, one which underlies the first, second and third of appellant's propositions stated above, is, whether an officer appointed for a definite time or during good behavior had any vested interest or contract right in his office of which Congress could not deprive him? The question is not novel. There seems to be but little difficulty in deciding that there was no such interest or right. The question was before this court in Butler v. Pennsylvania, 10 How. 402, 416. In that case Butler and others, by virtue of a statute of the State of Pennsylvania, had been appointed canal commissioners for a term of one year, with compensation at four dollars per diem; but during their incumbency another statute was passed, whereby the compensation was reduced to three dollars; and it was claimed their contract rights were thereby infringed. The court drew a distinction between such a situation and that of a contract, by which "perfect rights, certain definite, fixed private rights of property, are vested." It said: "These are clearly distinguishable from measures or engagements adopted or undertaken by the body politic or state government for the benefit of all, and from the necessity of the case, and according to universal understanding, to be varied or discontinued as the public good shall require. The selection of officers, who are nothing more than agents for the effectuating of such public purposes, is matter of public convenience or necessity, and so, too, are the periods for the appointment of such agents; but neither the one nor the other of these arrangements can constitute any obligation to continue such agents, or to reappoint them, after the measures which brought them into being shall have been found useless, shall have been fulfilled, or shall have been abrogated as even detrimental to the well-being of the public. The promised compensation for services actually performed and accepted, during the continuance of the particular agency, may undoubtedly be claimed, both upon principles of compact and of equity; but to insist beyond this on the perpetuation of a public policy either useless or detrimental, and upon a reward for acts neither desired nor performed, would appear to be reconcilable with neither common justice nor common sense. The establishment of such Opinion of the Court. a principle would arrest necessarily everything like progress or improvement in government; or if changes should be ventured upon, the government would have to become one great pension establishment on which to quarter a host of sinecures. It follows, then, upon principle, that, in every perfect or competent government, there must exist a general power to enact and to repeal laws; and to create, and change or discontinue, the agents designated for the execution of those laws. Such a power is indispensable for the preservation of the body politic, and for the safety of the individuals of the community. It is true, that this power, or the extent of its exercise, may be controlled by the higher organic law or constitution of the State, as is the case in some instances in the state constitutions, and as is exemplified in the provision of the federal Constitution relied on in this case by the plaintiff's in error, and in some other clauses of the same instrument; but where no such restriction is imposed, the power must rest in the discretion of the government alone. We have already shown, that the appointment to and the tenure of an office created for the public use, and the regulation of the salary affixed to such an office, do not fall within the meaning of the section of the Constitution relied on by the plaintiffs in error; do not come within the import of the term contracts, or, in other words, the vested, private personal rights thereby intended to be protected. They are functions appropriate to that class of powers and obligations by which governments are enabled, and are called upon, to foster and promote the general good; functions, therefore, which governments cannot be presumed to have surrendered, if indeed they can under any circumstances be justified in surrendering them." The case of Newton v. Commissioners, 100 U. S. 548, 559, is in point. That was a controversy over the projected removal of a county seat; and the statute relied on by the objectors provided that before the seat of justice should be considered as permanently established at the town of Canfield, the citizens thereof should do certain things, all of which were admitted to have been duly done. The objectors, therefore, claimed a contract right that the county seat should remain Opinion of the Court. at Canfield. This court said: "The legislative power of a State, except so far as restrained by its own constitution, is at all times absolute with respect to all offices within its reach. It may at pleasure create or abolish them, or modify their duties. It may also shorten or lengthen the term of service. And it may increase or diminish the salary or change the mode of compensation. The police power of the States, and that with respect to municipal corporations, and to many other things that might be named, are of the same absolute character;" citing Cooley Const. Lim. pp. 232, 342; The Regents v. Williams, 4 G. & J. 321 [Que. 9 G. & J. 365]. "In all these cases there can be no contract and no irrepealable law, because they are 'governmental subjects,' and hence within the category before stated. They involve public interests, and legislative acts concerning them are necessarily public laws. Every succeeding legislature possesses the same jurisdiction and power with respect to them as its predecessors. The latter have the same power of repeal and modification which the former had of enactment, neither more nor less. All occupy, in this respect, a footing of perfect equality. This must necessarily be so in the nature of things. It is vital to the public welfare that each one should be able at all times to do whatever the varying circumstances and present exigencies touching the subject involved may require. A different result would be fraught with evil." In Stone v. Mississippi, 101 U. S. 814, 820, considering the power of a legislature to grant an irrepealable charter, for a consideration, to a lottery company, the court said: "The power of governing is a trust committed by the people to the government, no part of which can be granted away. The people, in their sovereign capacity, have established their agencies for the preservation of the public health and the public morals, and the protection of public and private rights. These several agencies can govern according to their discretion, if within the scope of their general authority, while in power; but they cannot give away nor sell the discretion of those that are to come after them, in respect to matters the government of which, from the very nature of things, must Opinion of the Court. 'vary with varying circumstances."" See, also, Hall v. Wisconsin, 103 U. S. 5; United States v. Fisher, 109 U. S. 143. Nor is the holding of this court singular. Numerous decisions to the same effect are to be found in the state courts. The People v. Morris, 13 Wend. 325; Commonwealth v. Bacon, 6 S. & R. 322; Commonwealth v. Mann, 5 W. & S. 403, 418; A. J. Hyde v. The State, 52 Mississippi, 665; The State of Mississippi v. Smedes and Marshall, 26 Mississippi, 47; Turpen v. Board of Commissioners of Tipton Co., 7 Indiana, 172; Haynes v. The State, 3 Humphrey, 480; Benford v. Gibson, 15 Alabama, 521. In Blake v. United States, 103 U. S. 227, the fact is adverted to and the opinion of the Attorney General in Lansing's case, 6 Opinions Attys. Gen. 4, quoted approvingly to the effect that in this respect of official tenure there is no difference in law between officers in the army and other officers of the government. Applying the above principles, it remains to say that we know of no instance in which their assertion is more imperatively demanded by the public welfare than in this case, and such others as this. If the position taken by the appellant is correct, then a logical and unavoidable result is, that our country, if ever we are so unfortunate as to be again involved in war, will be compelled, after the treaty of peace, to maintain the entire official force of the army and navy, and a host of sinecurists in full pay so long as they shall live; either that or to disband the army and navy before the peace shall be made, even this wholly inadmissible alternative being legally possible from one of appellant's positions. It is impossible to believe that such a condition of affairs was ever contemplated by the framers of our organic or statute law. The effect of the authorities cited above, is in no respect modified by section 1229 or by Art. 36 of section 624 of the Revised Statutes. In the first place, if it were granted that those sections mean what appellant claims for them if they mean beyond question that one appointed as a cadet shall never be dismissed by authority of either the executive or the legislature, or by both in conjunction yet that fact would |