and obstruction which is likely soon to savor of intimidation. The nearer this is to the place of business, the greater the interference with the business and especially with the property right of access of the employer. Such an attempted discussion attracts the curious, or, it may be, interested bystanders. They increase the obstruction as well as the aspect of intimidation which the situation quickly assumes.

In the present case, under the conditions which the evidence discloses, all information tendered, all arguments advanced and all persuasion used were intimidation-they could not be otherwise.

It is idle to talk of peaceful communication in such a place and under such conditions. The numbers of the pickets in the groups constituted intimidation. The name "picket" indicated a militant purpose, inconsistent with peaceful persuasion. The employees were made to run the gauntlet. When one or more assaults or disturbances ensued, they characterized the whole campaign, which became effective because of its intimidating character, in spite of the admonitions given by the leaders to their followers as to lawful methods to be pursued, however sincere.

Our conclusion is that picketing thus instituted is unlawful and cannot be peaceable, and may be properly enjoined by the specific term of "picketing" because its meaning is clearly understood in the sphere of the controversy by those who are parties to it. We are supported in that view by many well-reasoned authorities, although there has been contrari ty of view. A restraining order against picketing by that name will advise earnest advocates of labor's cause that the law does not look with favor on an enforced discussion of the merits of the issue between individuals who wish to work and groups of those who do not, under conditions which subject the individuals who wish to work to a severe test of their nerves and physical strength and courage.

Regarding as primary the rights of the employe s to work for whom they will, and to go freely to and from their place of labor, and keeping in mind the right of the employer incident to his property and business to free access of such employees, what can be done to reconcile the conflicting interests.

Each case must turn on its own circumstances. It is a case for the flexible remedial power of a

court of equity which may try one mode of

restraint, and if it fails or proves to be too drastic, may change it.

The appeal came to the Supreme Court of the United States from the Federal Circuit Court of Appeals of Illinois, 238 Federal Reporter 728, where the case is fully reported.

I have referred to what I consider to be the law on this subject and to jurisprudence showing how the law has been interpreted and applied and I

come back to the question: Were the means used by defendants lawful? All the surrounding circumstances have to be taken into consideration. There was peace in plaintiff's factory up to 9th November, when the strike was called by defendants' circular to the workers in the industry exhorting them to "quit the shops to the last man, be united and the bosses will be compelled to yield and recognize our just demands"

"as without it there can

be no peace in the industry" and proclaiming that the Union intended to energetically carry on the strike until their aims were realized. That was a plain declaration of war against all who failed to comply with the Union's demands and an attempt to form a combination of union and non-union workers for the purpose of compelling the employers to submit to the dictation of the Union. The circular calling out the workers was couched in language calculated to intimidate and coerce workers and employers alike and to incite violence, and went far beyond a peaceable argument for any lawful claims which could be advanced in the interest of the Union or its members. It was a direct invitation to breach of contracts of engagement. Nearly all of plaintiff's workers were working under weekly engagements terminable on a week's notice. Only two left the plaintiff's factory, the balance wished to continue in his service. This was followed by instructions issued at the Union headquarters to a thousand strikers to go on picket around the factories in the industry. Pickets in large numbers were posted in the immediate vicinity of plaintiff's establishment, followed by acts of violence, threats of bodily harm and warnings of danger, the following of workers on the streets and to their homes, and requests to cease work and join the Union. These were overt acts committed by the defendants' pickets. The City police warned the pickets and the defendant Golberg, that their tactics were not peaceful but intimidating, and resulted in a police cordon closing the street in front of plaintiff's factory for part of a day. The public were ob

structed in the free use of the sidewalk and plaintiff's workers had to run the gauntlet of passing through a line of pickets. Some of the workers had to leave by the back door to avoid molestation at the front and plaintiff had to engage private detectives to protect his workers, some of whom had to be conveyed to and from their work in taxis, and others had to be furnished with escorts to their homes. Plaintiff was put to expense in thus protecting his

business and his workers. His freedom

to carry on his business was infringed, and the interference and annoyances were serious and injurious to him as an employer of labour and as a manufacturer. It is idle for defendants to say that they only sought to further their own interests. They must be held to have intended what was the plain effect of their conduct. If things done or words spoken or written are such that they will excite fear or a reasonable apprehension of fear or danger and so influence those for whom intended as to prevent them from freely doing what they desire and the law permits, they may be restrained and the Courts are entitled to look beyond the mere letter of the act or word into its spirit and intent. It is apparent from the manner in which the strike was inaugurated and the subsequent picketing was conducted, with deliberate and relentless vigour regardless of annoyance and inconvenience to plaintiff and serious interference with his business, that the picketing was not for the purpose of peaceable persuasion, but for the purpose of compulsion by coercion and intimidation and that the means adopted were not lawful or justified and went beyond anything permitted by the civil or criminal law. The massing of a large number of pickets is in itself intimidating to workers, and, as Chief Justice Taft, says, the name "picket' indicated a militant purpose inconsistent with peaceful persuasion. The strong persistent and organized picketing, making the condition of plaintiff and his workers disagreeable and intolerable, accompanied by hints of injury, veiled threats, abusive and offensive language and

some instances of assault and personal violence-all of which conditions are shown in the evidence of this casediscloses conduct on the part of defendants which passed beyond that of the peaceful purpose of promoting the lawful aims of the Union and its members and entered the unlawful stage of wrongful injury, without just cause or the law and where picketing is carried on excuse, to rights fully protected by by intimidation, threats, coercion or violence- -as has been done in this caseit has been held in every jurisdiction, where the question has been raised, that such conduct on the part of pickets is unlawful and will be enjoined.

I am of the opinion that the picketing carried on by defendants and their pickets was wrongful and without lawful authority and amounted to a common law nuisance and violation of 1053 of the Civil Code, as well as a breach of the criminal law.

Counsel for defendants submitted that, if the conduct of the pickets and strikers was a violation of the Criminal Code, the plaintiff should be limited to his remedy before the Criminal Court and that he had no remedy by injunction. In my opinion, that proposition is untenable. In every jurisdiction where this question has a isen the right to injunctive restraint has been recognized. In our Courts the same right has been frequently applied where there has been violation of 1053 of the Civil Code and the remedy in damages was inadequate. The Union defendant has no property in Canada and a judgment for damages against it would be useless. The defendants threaten to continue and repeat the wrongful acts complained of and damages for injuries already suffered even if collected would not protect plaintiff in the future. It is apparent that the only adequate and effective remedy to meet the circumstances disclosed in this case is to permanently enjoin the defendants from their unlawful conduct under all the penalties provided by law.

(Signed) F. S. MACLENNAN,
J.S.C.

In connection with a strike conducted by the Tri-City Trades Council against the American Steel Foundries of Granite City, Illinois, the employers obtained an injunction against the Trades Council to restrain them from picketing. The Federal Court of Appeal of Illinois set aside this injunction and the employers appealed to the Supreme Court of the United States.

In the judgment of the Supreme Court the appeal of the employers was sustained and a definition was given of what constitutes lawful and unlawful picketing. The injunction forbids the union in any manner whatsoever by use of persuasion, threat or personal injury, from interfering with any person engaged in the employ of the American Steel Foundries in connection with its business or with any person desiring to be employed by the foundries, from congregating in the neighbourhood of the foundries for the purpose of aiding or encouraging others in these things and for maintaining at or near the premises any pickets to interfere with the foundries in the free and unrestricted control and operation of its plant.

With regard to this injunction Chief Justice Taft said in part:

words 'peaceable' and 'lawful' throughout the phrases which were used. We do not think that these declarations introduced any new principle into the equity jurisprudence of the Federal courts. They are merely declaratory of what was the best practice always...If in their attempt at persuasion or communication, those of the labour side adopt methods which, however lawful in their announced purpose, inevitably lead to intimidation and obstruction, then it is the court's duty-and the terms of Section 20 do not modify this— so to limit what the propagandists do as to time, manner and place as to prevent infractions of the law and violations of the right of the employees and of the employers for whom they wish to work. In going to and from work, men have a right to as free passage without obstruction as the streets afford, consistent with the right of others to enjoy the same privilege. We are a social people and the accosting by one of another in an inoffensive way and offer by the one to communicate and discuss information with a view to influencing the other's action, are not regarded as a violation of that other's rights. however, the offer is declined, as may rightfully be, then persistence, importunity and following do become unjustifiable annoyance and obstruction which is likely soon to savour of intimidation. The nearer this is to the place of business, the greater the interference with the business and especially with the property right of access of the employer......It is idle to talk of peaceful communication in such a place and under such conditions. The number of the pickets in the groups constituted intimidation. The name 'picket' indicated a militant purpose, inconsistent with peaceful persuasion. The employees were made to run the gauntlet. When one or more assaults or disturbances ensued, they characterized the whole campaign, which became effective because of its intimidating character, in spite of the admonitions given by the

"This is a picketing case. Only two men in the employ of the foundries had responded to the calling of the strike by the Tri-City Council. They were picketers, were defendants, and were enjoined. Only one of them was a member of a union of that council. The case involves, as to them, the application of Section 20 of the Clayton Act, of which the provisions material here are those which forbid an injunction in behalf of an employer against, first, persuading others by peaceful means to cease employment and labour; second, attending at any place where such person or persons may lawfully be for the purpose of peacefully obtaining or communicating information; third, peacefully assembling in a lawful manner and for lawful purposes. The Act enphasizes the

If,

leaders to their followers as to lawful methods to be pursued, however sincere. Our conclusion is that picketing thus instituted is unlawful and cannot be peaceable, and may be properly enjoined by the specific term of 'picketing' because its meaning is clearly understood in the sphere of the controversy by those who are parties to it... A restraining order against picketing by that name will advise earnest advocates of labour's cause that the law does not look with favour on an enforced discussion of the merits of the issue between individuals who wish to work and groups of those who do not, under con

ditions which subject the individuals who wish to work to a severe test of their nerves and physical strength and courage. But while this is so, we must have every regard for the Congressional intention manifested in the act to the the principle of existing law which it declared that ex-employees and others properly acting with them shall have an opportunity, so far as is consistent with peace and law, to observe who are still working for the employer, to communicate with them and to persuade them to join the ranks of his opponents in a lawful, economic struggle."

IN the issue of the LABOUR GAZETTE for

November, 1921, on page 1372, an account is given of the issuing of an injunction in the United States District Court, Indiana, ordering the discontinuance by coal mine operators of the "check-off" system of collecting union dues and prohibiting the unionization of mines. On application to the United States Circuit Court of Appeals at Chicago by the United Mine Workers of America, this injunction was suspended and a final decision with regard to it was given by this court on December 15. The opinion of the Court was in part as follows:

"The Borderland Coal Corporation sought and obtained a decree enjoining the performance of the existing contracts between the operators and their union employees in the Central Competitive Field with respect to what is called the 'check-off' provision. So far as the contracts themselves and this record discloses, the 'check-off' is the voluntary assignment by the employee of so much of his wages as may be necessary to meet his union dues and his direction to his employer to pay the amount to the treasurer of his

union. In that aspect the contract is legal; and quite evidently there are many lawful purposes for which dues may be paid.

"If nothing else should prevent the Borderland Coal Corporation being given that part of the decree now under consideration [the check-off], the lack of injury to the Borderland Coal Corporation by the existence of the 'checkoff' contracts would suffice. The injury to the Borderland Coal Corporation property rights in interstate commerce of which the Borderland Coal Corporation was apprehensive was that it would be coerced into paying the high cost of production prevalent in the Central Competitive Field and thus be unable to meet, or at least to meet so profitably, the existent competition in interstate commerce. As long as the Borderland Coal Corporation is assured, as it now is, that it will have full protection in operating its closed nonunion mine and in marketing its coal in interstate commerce without interference, the Borderland Coal Corporation should rather pray that all the elements causing the high cost of pro

THE
HE British Columbia Legislature en-

acted several important measures relating to labour during the second session of 1921, which began on October 18, and concluded on December 3. The acts passed in the course of the first session were reviewed in the LABOUR GAZETTE for June, 1921, (page 784). It will be remembered that a series of measures were passed at the first session, in order to give effect as far as possible to the so-called "Washington Conventions", or recommendations of the first meeting of the International Labour Organization (League of Nations), these acts, however, to come into force concurrently with the enactment of similar measures by the other provinces. During the second session bills were introduced to have these acts made operative in 1922, but only one of these bills was enacted, namely, that to amend the Maternity Protection Act, this act now coming into force on January 1, 1922. (The other acts referred to are the Employment of Children Act, the Hours of Work Act, the Night Employment of Women Act, and the Night Employment of Young Persons Act.)

A number of important amendments were made to the Mothers' Pensions Act. The administration of the Act was placed in charge of the Workmen's Com

pensation Board instead of being as under the original act assigned to a minister specially designated to this duty. Domicile in Canada was added as a qualification on the part of the husband of a woman benefitting under the Act, such domicile being required at the time of his death, or of his committal to a penetentiary or asylum for the insane, or of his total disablement, or of his desertion of his wife. Any other cases than those specially provided for may be assisted at the discretion of the Board. The functions of the Superintendent of Neglected Children under the original act were also transferred to the Workmen's Compensation Board. The Board is further given the right of appointing local advisory boards, which were previously appointed by the Lieutenant-Governor in Council. The revising Act came into force by proclamation, on December 9, 1921.

Several amendments were made to the Boilers' Inspection Act. "Certificates" as defined by the act now include engineers' certificates as well as certificates of inspection issued by inspectors. In the definition of low pressure heating plant the maximum allowable working pressure for cast iron boi'ers is raised from five to ten pounds per square inch. All railway locomotives are now