tion-picture purposes. When the appellant's agent, Letendre, desired to have Carpentier sign a letter giving the appellant the copyright privilege for the photographs, instead of presenting this letter to Carpentier or his manager, who were both present at the time, it was presented to Adolfi, which is a significant fact that the appellant regarded Adolfi as the person in charge of the enterprise. After the photographs were taken, the finished prints were sent to the Robertson-Cole Company, although at that time no arrangement had been made as to price for the work. The Roberston-Cole Company paid the sum of $809.50 for 3,190 copies of the finished photographs. It is thus apparent that the Robertson-Cole Company bought the photographs and paid the customary price therefor. It also appears that $57 were paid for developing negatives of photographs, which were later used by the Robertson-Cole Company.

This testimony disproves the claim of the appellant that the photographs were taken at his expense. There is in the record an admission by the appellant that the photographs belong to the Robertson-Cole Company. The pugilist's manager understood that the pictures were taken for the Robertson-Cole Company. He did not understand that the appellant secured a copyright. After Adolfi left the studio the appellant and his agent prepared another letter for Carpentier to sign, and on April 3 they went to Baltimore, and there endeavored to induce the pugilist's manager to sign this letter authorizing the appellant to copyright the pictures. Such a letter was signed, but it is not clear that the pugilist or his manager, neither of whom could speak English, had knowledge of the contents or the effect of the letter.

The testimony of the appellant and his agent, Letendre, in endeavoring to maintain his claim that he, by consent of Carpentier, took the pictures at his expense with the right to copyright the same, is unsatisfactory. In the affidavit submitted on an application for a preliminary injunction, Lumiere maintained that he received no compensation for taking the photographs. On the trial, he admitted receiving $866.50, including $57 for services for retouching. Letendre, in an affidavit, said that he told Adolfi that the Robertson-Cole Distributing Corporation (the appellee) could use the photographs, but must reproduce the copyright mark of the appellant. On the trial he denied that the name of the Robertson

Cole Distributing Corporation was mentioned in his talk with Adolfi and said that Adolfi denied expressly that Letendre mentioned copyright to him. In the affidavit appellant said he entered into an express agreement with the pugilist whereby the appellant was to take photographs and copyright the same. On the trial it appeared that neither had ever seen or been in communication with Carpentier or his manager before they came to the studio to have the photographs taken. In the affidavit the appellant said he solicited the pugilist at cost and expense. On the trial it appears that he neither directly nor indirectly spent anything to get Carpentier to come to the appellant's studio. In the affidavit it is said that the consent in writing to copyright the photographs was obtained by the appellant from the pugilist's manager. On the trial it was testified that no consent to copyright was given by the pugilist's manager; that the word "copyright" was not mentioned to Descamp in the French language. The letter was obtained from the pugilist's manager several days after the pictures had been actually taken.

While the testimony in the case is in severe conflict, the foregoing statement, we believe, constitutes the facts. The relief sought by the appellant is that the appellee be restrained by injunction from offering for sale or otherwise distributing copies of the photographs of Carpentier in various poses and that damages suffered for alleged wrongful publication be awarded to the appellant.

[1] On these facts the appellant is not entitled to the relief which he seeks. The usual contract between a photographer and his customer is one of employment. The production of the photograph is work done for the customer, not for the photographer, and the sitter is entitled to all proprietary rights therein. The work is done for the person procuring it to be done and the negative, so far as it is a picture, or capable of producing pictures of that person and all photographs so made from it, belong to the person. Neither the artists nor anyone else has any right to make pictures from the negative or to copy the photographs, if not otherwise published, for anyone else. (Press Pub. Co. v. Falk (C. C.) 59 Fed. 324; Altman v. New Haven Union Co. (D. C.) 254 Fed. 113; Lumiere v. Pathé (C. C. A.) 275 Fed. 428.)

103300°-26- -17

[2] This court announced the above doctrine as against this very appellant. Lumiere v. Pathé, supra. Where a photographer takes photographs of a person, who goes or is sent to the photographer in the usual course, the photographer is paid for the photographs and his services in taking the photographs, the right of copyright is in the sitter, or in the person sending the sitter to be photographed, and it is not in the photographer. (Moore v. Rugg, 44 Minn. 28, 46 N. W. 141, 9 L. R. A. 58, 20 Am. St. Rep. 539; White v. Dreyfoos, 156 App. Div. 762, 142, N. Y. Supp. 37.) But where a photographer solicits persons to come to his studio and takes photographs gratuitously, for his benefit, and at his expense, the right to copyright is in him. (Lumiere v. Pathé,

supra.)

[3, 4] Announcing, as we do, that the pictures of Carpentier were taken at the instance of the RobertsonCole Company, and for pay received by the appellant from the Robertson-Cole Company, the proprietary right, and, under the agreement above mentioned with Carpentier, the right to copyright the same, resided in the Robertson-Cole Company. (Boucas v. Cooke et al., L. R. 2 K. B. 227.) The photographs which were delivered to the Robertson-Cole Company belong to it, for they were paid for. They are free from any copyrights which the appellant may have obtained in having issued to him the copyright grant. Section 1 of the copyright act (Comp. St. sec. 9517) provides that "any person entitled thereto upon complying with the provisions of this act," etc., is entitled to a copyright. Where no valid copyright has been obtained, the producer has no exclusive right in the production of his artistic skill. (Bamforth v. Douglass (C. C.) 158 Fed. 355.) It follows that the decree below must be affirmed. Decree affirmed.

LUMIERE v. MAE EDNA WILDER (INC.)

Argued January 18, 1923. Decided February 19, 1923

261 U. S. Rep. 174.

1. COURTS-CORPORATION CAN NOT BE SUED IN DISTRICT IN WHICH IT IS FOUND BY SERVING EXECUTIVE OFFICER THERE TEMPORARILY.

Jurisdiction over a corporation can not be acquired in a district in which it has no place of business and is not

found merely by serving process on an executive officer temporarily therein, even if he is there on the business of

the company.

2. COPYRIGHTS-SERVICE IN COPYRIGHT SUIT ON PRESIDENT, WHILF TEMPORARILY IN DISTRICT, NO SERVICE ON "AGENT."

Within act March 4, 1909, section 35 (Comp. St. sec. 9556), providing that copyright infringement suits may be instituted in the district of which defendant or his agent is an inhabitant, or in which he may be found, service of process on the president of a corporation in a district in which the corporation transacted no business, and in which he was not in any way representing it, was not service upon an "agent," as the meaning of the word as used in a statute is to be determined from the context and the subject matter.

Appeal from the District Court of the United States for the Southern District of New York.

Suit by Samuel Lumiere against Mae Edna Wilder (Inc.). From an order quashing the service on motion, plaintiff appeals. Affirmed.

Mr. W. S. Evans, of New York City, for appellant. Mr. F. F. Church, of Rochester, N. Y., for appellee. Mr. Justice BRANDEIS delivered the opinion of the court: The venue of suits for infringement of copyright is not determined by the general provision governing suits in the Federal district courts. (Judicial Code, sec. 51; Comp. St. sec. 1033.) The copyright act provides that suits "may be instituted in the district of which the defendant or his agent is an inhabitant, or in which he may be found." (Act of March 4, 1909, c. 320, sec. 35, 35 Stat. 1075, 1084; Comp. St. sec. 9556.) Whether under this section a valid service was made upon defendant is the only question for decision.

New York is divided into four Federal judicial districts. (Judicial Code, sec. 97; Comp. St. sec. 1084.) Lumiere, a citizen and resident of New York City, in the southern district, brought, in the Federal court for that district, this suit to enjoin the infringement of a copyright by publications in that city. The defendant, Mae Edna Wilder (Inc.), is a New York corporation, with its place of business in Rochester in the western district. It was not an inhabitant of the southern district. It had no place of business there. It had no agent or employee there authorized to carry on business on its behalf. It transacted no business there. The only service of process

made was by delivering to Mr. Adkin, who was its president, a copy of the summons while he was temporarily in New York City. He was not an inhabitant of the southern district, and it was not shown that he was there on business of the company. The defendant, appearing especially for the purpose of objecting to the jurisdiction of the court, moved to quash the service on the ground that it was not amenable to process. The motion was granted; and the case is here on appeal under section 238 of the Judicial Code (Comp. St. sec. 1215), the question of jurisdiction having been duly certified.

[1, 2] That jurisdiction over a corporation can not be acquired in a district in which it has no place of business and is not found, merely by serving process upon an executive officer temporarily therein, even if he is there on business of the company, has been settled. (Philadelphia & Reading Ry. Co. v. McKibbin, 243 U. S. 264, 87 Sup. Ct. 280, 61 L. Ed. 710; Rosenberg Bros. & Co., Inc., v. Curtis Brown Co. (No. 102, decided January 2, 1923), 258 U. S., 43 Sup. Ct. 170, 67 L. Ed.; Bank of America v. Whitney Central National Bank (No. 205, decided this day), 258 U. S., 43 Sup. Ct. 311, 67 L. Ed.) The contention here is that jurisdiction was obtained over the defendant because its president is an agent within the meaning of the statute and was personally found in New York City. If such facts are sufficient to give jurisdiction, a suit upon a copyright may be brought in any district of the United States in which one who is an officer or an agent of the defendant is served with process, although neither plaintiff nor defendant has his residence or place of business there, and although the copyright was not infringed there. It is not to be lightly assumed that Congress intended such a thing. (Compare In re Keasbey & Mattison Co., 160 U. S. 221, 16 Sup. Ct. 273, 40 L. Ed. 402; Macon Grocery Co. v. Atlantic Coast Line R. R. Co., 215 U. S. 501, 30 Sup. Ct. 184, 54 L. Ed. 300; Ladew v. Tennessee Copper Co., 218 U. S. 357, 31 Sup. Ct. 81, 54 L. Ed. 1069.)

Ordinarily a civil suit to enforce a personal liability under a Federal statute can be brought only in the district of which the defendant is an inhabitant. (Judicial Code, sec. 51.) In a few classes of cases a carefully lim