a multitude; yet not so numerous as to be incapable of pursuing the objects of its passions, by means which reason prescribes; it is against the enterprising ambition of this department, that the people ought to indulge all their jealousy, and exhaust all their precautions.

The legislative department derives a superiority in our governments from other circumstances. Its constitutional powers being at once more extensive, and less susceptible of precise limits, it can, with the greater facility, mask, under complicated and indirect measures, the encroachments which it makes on the coordinate departments. It is not unfrequently a question of real nicety in legislative bodies, whether the operation of a particular measure will, or will not extend beyond the legislative sphere. On the other side, the executive power being restrained within a narrower compass, and being more simple in its nature; and the judiciary being described by landmarks, still less uncertain, projects of usurpation by either of these departments would immediately betray and defest themselves. Nor is this all as the legislative department alone has access to the pockets of the people, and has in some constitutions full discretion, and in all a prevailing influence over the pecuniary rewards of those who fill the other departments; a dependence is thus created in the latter, which gives still greater facility to encroachments of the former.

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I have appealed to our own experience for the truth of what I advance on this subject. Were it necessary to verify this experience by particular proofs, they might be multiplied without end. I might collect vouchers in abundance from the records and archives of every state in the union. But as a more concise, and at the same time equally satisfactory evidence, I will refer to the example of two states, attested by two unexceptionable authorities.

The first example is that of Virginia, a state which, as we have seen, has expressly declared in its constitution, that the three great departments ought not to be intermixed. The authority in support of it is Mr. Jefferson, who, besides his other advantages for remarking the operation of the government, was himself the chief magistrate of it. In order to convey fully the ideas with which his experience had impressed him on this subject, it will be necessary to quote a passage of some

length from his very interesting "Notes on the state of Vir"ginia," p. 195. "All the powers of government, legisla"tive, exccutive, and judiciary, result to the legislative body. "The concentrating these in the same hands, is precisely the "definition of despotic government. It will be no alleviation "that these powers will be exercised by a plurality of hands, "and not by a single one. One hundred and seventy three "despots would surely be as oppressive as one. Let those "who doubt it, turn their eyes on the republic of Venice. As "little will it avail us, that they are chosen by ourselves. An "elective despotism was not the government we fought for; but (6 one which should not only be founded on free principles, but "in which the powers of government should be so divided and "balanced among several bodies of magistracy, as that no one "could transcend their legal limits, without being effectually "checked and restrained by the others. For this reason, that "convention which passed the ordinance of government, laid "its foundation on this basis, that the legislative, executive, " and judiciary departments, should be separate and distinct, "so that no person should excrcise the powers of more than 66 onc of them at the same time. But no barrier was provided "between these several powers. The judiciary and executive "members were left dependent on the legislative for their sub"sistence in office, and some of them for their continuance "in it. If, therefore, the legislature assumes executive and "judiciary powers, no opposition is likely to be made; nor, if "made, can be effectual; because in that case, they may put "their proceedings into the form of an act of assembly, which "will render them obligatory on the other branches. They

"have accordingly, in many instances, decided rights, which "should have been left to judiciary controversy; and the direc"tion of the executive, during the whole time of their session, is becoming habitual and familiar."

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The other state, which I shall take for an example, is Pennsylvania; and the other authority the council of censors which assembled in the years 1783 and 1784. A part of the duty of this body, as marked out by the constitution, was "to inquire, "whether the constitution had been preserved inviolate in "every part; and whether the legislative and executive branches of government had performed their duty as guar

"dians of the people, or assumed to themselves, or exercised "other or greater powers than they are entitled to by the con"stitution." In the execution of this trust, the council were necessarily led to a comparison of both the legislative and executive proceedings, with the constitutional powers of these departments: and from the facts enumerated, and to the truth of most of which both sides in the council subscribed, it appears, that the constitution had been flagrantly violated by the legislature in a variety of important instances.

A great number of laws had been passed, violating, without any apparent necessity, the rule requiring that all bills of a public nature shall be previously printed for the consideration of the people; although this is one of the precautions chiefly relied on by the constitution against improper acts of the legis lature...

The constitutional trial by jury had been violated; and powers assumed, which had not been delegated by the constitu

tion.

Executive powers had been usurped.

The salaries of the judges, which the constitution expressly requires to be fixed, had been occasionally varied; and cases belonging to the judiciary department frequently drawn within legislative cognizance and determination.

Those who wish to see the several particulars falling under each of these heads, may consult the journals of the council, which are in print. Some of them, it will be found, may be imputable to peculiar circumstances connected with the war: but the greater part of them may be considered as the spontaneous shoots of an ill-constituted government.

It appears also, that the executive department had not been innocent of frequent breaches of the constitution. There are three observations, however, which ought to be made on this head: First, A great proportion of the instances were either immediately produced by the necessities of the war, or recommended by congress, or the commander in chief: Second, In most of the other instances, they conformed either to the declared or the known sentiments of the legislative department: Third, The executive department of Pennsylvania is distinguished from that of the other states, by the number of members composing it. In this respect, it has as much affinity to a

legislative assembly, as to an executive council. And being at once exempt from the restraint of an individual responsibility for the acts of the body, and deriving confidence from mutual example and joint influence; unauthorized measures would of course be more freely hazarded, than where the executive department is administered by a single hand, or by a few hands.

The conclusion which I am warranted in drawing from these observations is, that a mere demarkation on parchment of the constitutional limits of the several departments, is not a sufficient guard against those encroachments which lead to a tyrannical concentration of all the powers of government in the same hands. PUBLIUS.

No. XLIX.

BY JAMES MADISON.

The same subject continued, with the same view.

THE author of the "Notes on the state of Virginia," quoted in the last paper, has subjoined to that valuable work the draught of a constitution, which had been prepared in order to be laid before a convention expected to be called in 1783, by the legislature for the establishment of a constitution for that commonwealth. The plan, like every thing from the same pen, marks a turn of thinking original, comprehensive, and accurate; and is the more worthy of attention as it equally displays a fervent attachment to republican government, and an enlightened view of the dangerous propensities against which it ought to be guarded. One of the precautions which he proposes, and on which he appears ultimately to rely as a palladium to the weaker departments of power, against the invasions of the stronger, is perhaps altogether his own, and as it immediately relates to the subject of our present inquiry, ought not to be overlooked.

His proposition is, "that whenever any two of the three "branches of government shall concur in opinion, each by the "voices of two thirds of their whole number, that a conven"tion is necessary for altering the constitution, or correcting "breaches of it, a convention shall be called for the purpose." As the people are the only legitimate fountain of power, and

it is from them that the constitutional charter, under which the several branches of government hold their power, is derived ; it seems strictly consonant to the republican theory, to recur to the same original authority, not only whenever it may be necessary to enlarge, diminish, or new-model the powers of government; but also whenever any one of the departments may commit encroachments on the chartered authorities of the others. The several departments being perfectly coordinate by the terms of their common commission, neither of them, it is evident, can pretend to an exclusive or superior right of setthing the boundaries between their respective powers and how are the encroachments of the stronger to be prevented, or the wrongs of the weaker to be redressed, without an appeal to the people themselves, who, as the grantors of the commission, can alone declare its true meaning, and enforce its observance ?

There is certainly great force in this reasoning, and it must be allowed to prove, that a constitutional road to the decision of the people ought to be marked out and kept open, for certain great and extraordinary occasions. But there-appear to be insuperable objections against the proposed recurrence to the people, as a provision in all cases for keeping the several departments of power within their constitutional limits.

In the first place, the provision does not reach the case of a combination of two of the departments against a third. If the legislative authority, which possesses so many means of operating on the motives of the other departments, should be able to gain to its interest either of the others, or even one third of its members, the remaining department could derive no advantage from this remedial provision. I do not dwell, however, on this objection, because it may be thought to lie rather against the modification of the principle, than against the principle itself.

In the next place, it may be considered as an objection inherent in the principle, that as every appeal to the people would carry an implication of some defect in the government, frequent appeals would, in a great measure, deprive the gov ernment of that veneration which time bestows on every thing, and without which perhaps the wisest and freest governments would not possess the requisite stability. If it be true that