ON WRIT of Certiorari to the United the First Circuit to review a judgment States Circuit Court of Appeals for denying interest in favor of claimant in 945 (modifying (1924; D. C.) 300 Fed. | which the court observed that where in827, certiorari denied in (1927) 274 U. terest is allowed, except in cases of conS. 753, 71 L. ed. 1333, 47 Sup. Ct. Rep. tract where there is a provision to pay 765); Texas Co. v. United States (1927; interest, it is allowed for delay or deC. C. A. 2d) 16 F. (2d) 948 (affirming fault of the debtor; and that delay or (1926; D. C.) 11 F. (2d) 981, certiorari default cannot be attributed to the govdenied in (1927) 274 U. S. 752, 71 L. ed. ernment, but it is presumed to be al1332, 47 Sup. Ct. Rep. 765). ways ready to pay what it owes. The Director General of Railroads during Federal control is not such an instrumentality or agency of the Federal government as to be exempt from interest on a judgment rendered against him, in view of the Federal statute providing that the carriers, while under the Federal control, are subject to "all laws and liabilities as common carriers." Standard Oil Co. v. Payne (1922) 220 Mich. 663, 190 N. W. 769 (writ of error denied in (1923) 263 U. S. 699, 68 L. ed. 513, 44 Sup. Ct. Rep. 5). Interest cannot be allowed against the United States in an action under the Tucker Act for damage to a barge. Warren Gordon Lighterage Co. v. McAllister Towing & Transp. Co. (1926; D. C.) 12 F. (2d) 779. In suits against the United States under special acts, unless it is specifically provided for, interest cannot be allowed against the United States. Whitelaw v. United States (1925; D. C.) 9 F. (2d) 103. The mere fact that the United States collects interest from a depositary upon funds paid into court by private litigants raises no implied obligation upon the government to deliver it to the own The rule of sovereign immunity from liability for interest does not apply in a suit against the Federal government to recover damages because of breach of contract by an alien enemy whose proper of the funds, which will sustain a erty is in the possession of the Federal government. Miller v. Robertson (1924) 266 U. S. 243, 69 L. ed. 255, 45 Sup. Ct. Rep. 73. The exemption of the United States from the recovery of interest on its contractual obligations unless there be an authorized stipulation to pay interest, or a statute permitting its recovery, does not extend to the Mountain Branch of the National Home for Disabled Volunteer Soldiers as a governmental agency. National Home v. Parrish (1913) 229 U. S. 494, 57 L. ed. 1296, 33 Sup. Ct. Rep. 944. The general rule applicable to the United States, as hereinbefore stated, has been applied in the following cases. A judgment against the United States in connection with the sinking of a steamer in collision with the pier of a dam owned by the United States, rendered by the court of claims under a special act, does not bear interest until it is paid, where interest is not provided for in the act. Bunton v. United States (1894; C. C.) 62 Fed. 171. The United States is not liable for interest on a judgment obtained against a special agent of the Treasury Department from the time it was obtained until a certificate of probable cause was issued by the circuit court some five years later. United States v. Sherman (1879) 98 U. S. 565, 25 L. ed. 235, in suit against the government under the Tucker Act. United States v. Minnesota Mut. Invest. Co. (1926) 271 U. S. 212, 70 L. ed. 911, 46 Sup. Ct. Rep. 405. Interest cannot be allowed against the United States by a district court, under a special act giving it jurisdiction to determine the damages caused by a collision between a United States gunboat and a private brig, where the special act authorized the court to apply the rules as in other cases of admiralty between individual owners of colliding vessels, and made no other express declaration as to interest. Pennell v. United States (1908; D. C.) 162 Fed. 75, the court observing that, as a general principle, it has become the established rule of the Supreme Court that interest is not allowed on claims against the government, whether such claims originate in contract or in tort, and whether they arise in the ordinary business of administration or under private acts of relief passed by Congress on special applications; that the only recognized exceptions to this rule are where the government stipulates to pay interest, and where interest is given expressly by act of Congress, either by the name of interest or under that of damages. The filing of a cross libel by the United States in a proceeding against it to recover damages for a collision, under a special act conferring jurisdiction to en 14 Ga. L.R.A. 438, holding that a state, in the absence of a special provision, is not rendered liable for interest by permitting itself to be sued. a proceeding against the United States, | ages for a collision, which was appealed under a state statute, to recover dam- from a decree of the District Court for ter judgment for the amount of such | R. Co. v. Georgia (1891) damages and costs as shall be found to be due, upon the same principles and measures of liability as in like cases in admiralty between private parties, does not render it liable for interest on the damages awarded. United States Commonwealth & Dominion Line (1929) 278 U. S. 427, post, —, 49 Sup. Ct. Rep. 183 (reversing (1927; C. C. A. 2d) 20 F. (2d) 729, on the authority of the reported case [BOSTON SAND & GRAVEL Co. v. UNITED STATES]). V. III. States. Subject to the exceptions hereinafter stated, the same general rule which applied to the United States applies to a state, so that a state is not liable for interest unless it is made so by statute or contract, or has otherwise consented to be liable. UNITED STATES.-United States V. North Carolina (1890) 136 U. S. 211, 34 L. ed. 336, 10 Sup. Ct. Rep. 920. ARKANSAS.-Jobe v. Urquhart (1912) 102 Ark. 470, 143 S. W. 121, Ann. Cas. 1914A, 351. CALIFORNIA. Sawyer v. Colgan (1894) 102 Cal. 283, 36 Pac. 580, 834; Molineux v. State (1895) 109 Cal. 378, 50 Am. St. Rep. 49, 42 Pac. 34. FLORIDA.-Hawkins v. Mitchell (1894) 34 Fla. 405, 16 So. 311. GEORGIA.-Western & A. R. Co. v. Georgia (1891) Ga., 14 L.R.A. 438. INDIANA.-Carr v. State (1891) 127 Ind. 204, 11 L.R.A. 370, 22 Am. St. Rep. 624, 26 N. E. 778. MISSISSIPPI.-State v. Mayes (1855) 28 Miss. 706; Whitney v. State (1876) 52 Miss. 732. But see contra Swann v. Turner (1852) 23 Miss. 565. NEBRASKA.-Peterson v. State (1926) 114 Neb. 612, 209 N. W. 221 (reversing on rehearing (1925) 113 Neb. 546, 203 N. W. 102). See Chadron v. State (1927) 115 Neb. 657, 215 N. W. 137, holding state liable for interest where it consented to be sued. NORTH CAROLINA.-Atty. Gen. v. Cape Fear Nav. Co. (1843) 37 N. C. (2 Ired. Eq.) 444. OHIO.-State ex rel. Parrott v. Bd. of Public Works (1881) 36 Ohio St. 409. And it is said in Respublica v. Mitchell (1789) 2 Dall. (Pa.) 101, 1 L. ed. 307, that the state was liable to pay interest, as well as individuals; and that the court would add it under the circumstances of the case, although the referees had not expressly given it in their report. In Bledsoe v. State (1870) 64 N. C. 392, where a claim was made for fuel and provisions furnished to the State Insane Asylum, on a written contract with the superintendent, and a claim was made for interest from the time of delivery in 1863, the court said: "It was decided by this court in Atty. Gen. v. Cape Fear Nav. Co. (1843) 37 N. C. (2 Ired. Eq.) 444, that the state is not bound to pay interest, unless there is a special contract to that effect. The contract, in this case, must be understood to have been made with reference to the law as it then stood. But because of the changes in and the disturbed condition of the government, and because payment has been delayed for a long time, we recommend a departure from the rule, so far as to allow interest from the end of the war, say May 1, 1865, until January 1, 1869, when the plaintiff presented his claim to the general assembly." And in Swann v. Turner (1852) 23 Miss. 565, the court allowed a judge interest on his salary from the time he made a demand for it until it was paid. The court quoted Judge Story, in Thorndike v. United States (1819; C. C.) 2 Mason, 1, Fed. Cas. No. 13,987: "The United States have no prerogative to claim one law upon their own contracts as creditors, and another as debtors. If, as creditors, they are entitled to interest, as debtors they are bound also to pay it." In accordance with the general rule hereinbefore stated, it has been held that a state is not liable for interest on bonds after they are due, although the bonds bear interest until due, in the absence of express statutory provision. United States v. North Carolina (1890) 136 U. S. 211, 34 L. ed. 336, 10 Sup. Ct. Rep. 920. Under a statute whereby a state consents to be sued, it has been held that interest is recoverable against the state. Com. v. Collins (1876) 12 Bush, 386; Chadron v. State (1927) 115 Neb. 657, And where the state has contracted 215 N. W. 137. But see Western & A. to pay interest, it is not liable for com the District of Massachusetts allowing recovery Affirmed.1 See same case below on first appeal, 7 F. (2d) 278; on second appeal, 19 F. (2d) 744; on third appeal, 23 F. (2d) 839. The facts are stated in the opinion. Mr. John W. Davis, of New York city, argued the cause, and with Mr. Foye M. Murphy, of Boston, Massachusetts, filed a brief for petitioner on both original argument and reargument: Interest as awarded in collision cases in admiralty between private parties is damages within the proper legal meaning of that term. Sedgwick, Damages, 9th ed. 552, 553; Sutherland, Damages, 4th ed. pp. 936, 939, 940; The Santa Maria, 10 Wheat. 431, 445, 6 L. ed. 359, 362; Williams v. American Bank, 4 Met. 320; Dana v. Fiedler, 12 N. Y. 40, 62 Am. Dec. 130; Parrott v. Knickerbocker Ice Co. 46 N. Y. 361; The Umbria, 166 U. S. 404, 421, 41 L. ed. 1053, 1062, 17 Sup. Ct. Rep. 610; The Scotland, 118 U. S. 507, 518, 30 L. ed. 153, 155, 6 Sup. Ct. Rep. 1174; The America, 10 Blatchf. 155, Fed. Cas. No. 284; The Rhode Island (D. C.) Abb. Adm. 100, Fed. Cas. No. 11,740a; GuiThe George Bell (D. C.) 5 Hughes, 172, 3 Fed. 581; Farre v. Cunard S. S. Co. 3 C. C. A. 534, 1 U. S. App. 614, 53 Fed. 288; The Rabboni (C. C.) 53 Fed. 952; The Reno, 67 C. C. A. 479, 134 Fed. 555; Re Great Lakes Dredge & Dock Co. (D. C.) 250 Fed. 916, 168 C. C. A. 3, 256 Fed. 497; New York & C. Mail S. S. Co. v. United States (C. C. A. 2d) 16 F. (2d) 947; The Dundee, 2 Hagg. Adm. 137, 166 Eng. Reprint, 194; The Hebe, 2 W. Rob. 530, 166 Eng. bert v. Attention is called to Marine Trading Co. v. Philippine Islands (1918) 39 Philippine, 29, where the court observed that the government of the Philippine Islands was not liable for interest on its debts, unless it expressly engaged to pay interest. The court cited and quoted from United States ex rel. Angarica v. Bayard (1888) 127 U. S. 251, 32 L. ed. 159, 8 Sup. Ct. Rep. 1156. R. L. M. 1 Mandate granted December 5, 1928. Reprint, 855; The Kate, L. R. [1899] Prob. 165; The Kong Magnus L. R. [1891] Prob. 223; Roscoe, Damages in Maritime Collisions, 2d ed. 5, 41; Benedict, Adm. 5th ed. 495; Straker v. Hartland, 2 Hem. & M. 570, 71 Eng. Reprint, 584; Frazer v. Bigelow Carpet Co. 141 Mass. 126, 4 N. E. 620; Manauga Nav. Co. v. Aktieselskabet Borgestad (C. C. A. 5th) 7 F. (2d) 990; The America (C. C.) 10 Blatchf. 155, Fed. Cas. No. 284; The Abbotsford, 98 U. S. 440, 444, 25 L. ed. 168, 169; Kepner v. United States, 195 U. S. 100, 124, 49 L. ed. 114, 122, 24 MerSup. Ct. Rep. 797; United States v. riam, 263 U. S. 179, 187, 68 L. ed. 240, 244, 44 Sup. Ct. Rep. 69; Lincoln v. Claflin, 7 Wall. 132, 139, 19 L. ed. 106, 109; District of Columbia v. Robinson, 180 U. S. 92, 107, 45 L. ed. 440, 447, 21 Sup. Ct. Rep. 283; Drumm-Flato Commission Co. v. Edmisson, 208 U. S. 534, 539, 52 L. ed. 606, 609, 28 Sup. Ct. Rep. 367; United States ex rel. Angarica v. Bayard, 127 U. S. 251, 260, 32 L. ed. 159, 162, 8 Sup. Ct. Rep. 1156; T. M. Duche & Sons v. The John Twohy, 255 U. S. 77, 65 L. ed. 511, 41 Sup. Ct. Rep. 251; United States v. The Thekla (Luckenbach S. S. Co. v. The Thekla) 266 U. S. 328, 69 L. ed. 313, 45 Sup. Ct. Rep. 112; The Nuestra Senora de Regla, 108 U. S. 92, 27 L. ed. 662, 2 Sup. Ct. Rep. 287; The Habana, 189 U. S. 453, 47 L. ed. 901, 23 Sup. Ct. Rep. 593; Porto Rico v. Ramos, 232 U. S. 627, 58 L. ed. 763, 34 Sup. Ct. Rep. 461; Ex parte Colombia, 195 U. S. 604, 49 L. ed. 338, 25 Sup. Ct. Rep. 107; United States v. North American Transp. & Trading Co. 253 U. S. 330, 64 L. ed. 935, 40 Sup. Ct. Rep. 518; United States v. Sherman, 98 U. S. 565, 25 L. ed. 235; United States v. North Carolina, 136 U. S. 211, 34 L. ed. 336, 10 Sup. Ct. Rep. 920; The Baltimore, 8 Wall. 377, 385, 19 L. ed. 463, 465; The Gertrude, 6 Asp. Mar. L. Cas. 315-C. A.; The Apollon, 9 Wheat. 362, 6 L. ed. 111; Frazer v. Bigelow Carpet Co. 141 Mass. 126, 4 N. E. 620; The Amalia, 34 L. J. Prob. N. S. 21; The Dundee, 2 Hagg. Adm. 137, 166 Eng. Reprint, 194; The Mary J. Vaughan, 2 Ben. 47, Fed. Cas. No. 9,217; Parrott v. Knickerbocker Ice Co. 46 N. Y. 361; Mailler v. Express Propeller Line, 61 N. Y. 312; The J. G. S. S. Corp. v. Great Lakes Dredge & Gilchrist (D. C.) 173 Fed. 666; Eastern Dock Co. 168 C. C. A. 3, 256 Fed. 497; The Connors [1927] A. M. C. 1713 (C. C. A. 2d); The Ressapeage [1925; S. D. Ga.] A. M. C. 1537; The James A. Hoyt (Interlake S. S. Co. v. 251,000 Bushels of No. 2 Mixed Corn) [1927] A. M. C. | 779 (D. C.) 18 F. (2d) 291; Seaboard Air Line R. Co. v. United States, 261 U. S. 299, 304, 67 L. ed. 664, 669, 43 Sup. Ct. Rep. 354; The Vaughan (The Telegraph v. Gordon) 14 Wall. 258, 20 L. ed. 807; Brooks-Scanlon Corp. v. United States, 265 U. S. 106, 123, 68 L. ed. 934, 941, 44 Sup. Ct. Rep. 471; Liggett & M. Tobacco Co. v. United States, 274 U. S. 215, 220, 71 L. ed. 1006, 1008, 47 Sup. Ct. Rep. 581; Phelps v. United States, 274 U. S. 341, 344, 71 L. ed. 1083, 1085, 47 Sup. Ct. Rep. 611. If the use of the word "damages" in the enabling act here in question leaves any doubt as to the intention of Congress, the other provisions of the statute certainly set such doubt at rest. Atty. Gen. Wirt, 1 Ops. Atty. Gen. 268; United States v. McKee, 91 U. S. 442, 23 L. ed. 326; Coggill v. Lawrence (C. C.) 2 Blatchf. 304, Fed. Cas. No. 2,957; Kneass v. Schuylkill Bank (C. C.) 4 Wash. C. C. 106, Fed. Cas. No. 7,876; O'Neil v. Kansas City, S. & M. R. Co. (C. C.) 31 Fed. 663; Tesla Electric Co. v. Scott (C. C.) 101 Fed. 524; Bone v. Walsh Constr. Co. (D. C.) 235 Fed. 901; The Wanata, 95 U. S. 600, 615, 24 L. ed. 461, 465; United States v. Trans Missouri Freight Asso. 166 U. S. 290, 41 L. ed. 1007, 17 Sup. Ct. Rep. 540; Mitchell v. Great Works Mill. & Mfg. Co. (C. C.) 2 Story, 648, Fed. Cas. No. 9,662; Duplex Printing Press Co. v. Deering, 254 U. S. 443, 474, 65 L. ed. 349, 359, 41 Sup. Ct. Rep. 172; Omaha & C. B. Street R. Co. v. Interstate Commerce Commission, 230 U. S. 324, 57 L. ed. 1501, 46 L.R.A. (N.S.) 385, 33 Sup. Ct. Rep. 890; Aldridge v. Williams, 3 How. 9, 24, 11 L. ed. 469, 475; United States v. Union P. R. Co. 91 U. S. 72, 79, 23 L. ed. 224, 228; Banco Mexicano de Commercio é Industria v. Deutsche Bank, 263 U. S. 591, 602, 68 L. ed. 465, 469, 44 Sup. Ct. Rep. 209; Mutual Ben. L. Ins. Co. v. Duffy (D. C.) 295 Fed. 881; Penn Mut. L. Ins. Co. v. Lederer, 252 U. S. 523, 537, 64 L. ed. 698, 704, 40 Sup. Ct. Rep. 397; Middelton v. United States (D. C.) 286 Fed. 548; Comus v. Lake Frampton [1927] A. M. C. 1713. The weight of authority, dealing with similar statutes, supports the petitioner and not the government. The Commonwealth (D. C.) 297 Fed. 654; Alaska Commercial Co. v. United States [1925] A. M. C. 1269; Commonwealth & Dominion Line v. United States (C. C. A. 2d) 20 F. (2d) 729; The Friedrich de Grosse [1926] A. M. C. 36. The allowance of interest is necessary to a full and fair reparation for the government's tort. Murray v. The Charming Betsy, 2 Cranch, 64, 2 L. ed. 208; The Sybil (D. C.) Blatchf. Pr. Cas. 615, Fed. Čas. No. 13,706; The Anna Maria, 2 Wheat. 327, 335, 4 L. ed. 252, 253; The Amiable Nancy, 3 Wheat. 546, 560, 4 L. ed. 456, 459; The Apollon, 9 Wheat. 362, 377, 6 L. ed. 111, 115; The Nuestra Señora de Regla (United States v. The Nuestra Señora de Regla) 108 U. S. 92, 104, 27 L. ed. 662, 667, 2 Sup. Ct. Rep. 287; The Habana, 189 U. S. 453, 467, 47 L. ed. 901, 904, 23 Sup. Ct. Rep. 593; The Labuan (D. C.) Blatchf. Pr. Cas. 165, Fed. Cas. No. 7,964; 6 Moore, International Law Dig. p. 1029; Erskine v. Van Arsdale, 15 Wall. 75, 21 L. ed. 63; Miller v. Robertson, 266 U. S. 243, 69 L. ed. 265, 45 Sup. Ct. Rep. 73; Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 267 U. S. 76, 69 L. ed. 519, 45 Sup. Ct. Rep. 211; Seaboard Air Line R. Co. v. United States, 261 U. S. 299, 67 L. ed. 664, 43 Sup. Ct. Rep. 354; Brooks-Scanlon Corp. v. United States, 265 U. S. 106, 123, 68 L. ed. 934, 941, 44 Sup. Ct. Rep. 471; Liggett & M. Tobacco Co. v. United States, 274 U. S. 215, 220, 71 L. ed. 1006, 1008, 47 Sup. Ct. Rep. 581; Phelps v. United States, 274 U. S. 341, 344, 71 L. ed. 1083, 1085, 47 Sup. Ct. Rep. 611; Compagnie General Transatlantique v. United States [1927; Ct. Cl.] A. M. C. 485; United States v. The Thekla (Luckenbach S. S. Co. v. The Thekla) 266 U. S. 328, 69 L. ed. 313, 45 Sup. Ct. Rep. 112; The Barendrecht (D. C.) 11 F. (2d) 377; United States v. Rogers, 255 U. S. 163, 65 L. ed. 566, 41 Sup. Ct. Rep. 281. Assistant Attorney General Farnum argued the cause, and, with Solicitor General Mitchell and Mr. John T. Fowler, Jr., all of Washington, D. C., filed a brief for respondent on both original argument and reargument: Interest may not be awarded against the United States independently of express statutory authority. United States ex rel. Angarica v. Bayard, 127 U. S. 251, 260, 32 L. ed. 159, 162, 8 Sup. Ct. Rep. 1156; United States v. North American Transp. & Trading Co. 253 U. S. 330, 336, 64 L. ed. 935, 938, 40 Sup. Ct. Rep. 518; Seaboard Air Line R. Co. v. United States, 261 U. S. 299, 304, 67 L. ed. 664, 669, 43 Sup. Ct. Rep. 354. The statute does not authorize allowance of interest. Nippon Yusen Kabushiki Kaisha v. United States (1926; E. D. N. Y. not reported); Watts v. United States (D. C.) 129 Fed. 222, 226; Pennell v. United States (D. C.) 162 Fed. 75, 76; Nantasket Beach S. B. Co. v. United States (D. C.) 297 Fed. 656; Whitelaw v. United States (D. C.) 9 F. (2d) 104; Long Island R. Co. v. United States (1926; E. D. N. Y.) [1926] A. M. C. 1011; New York & C. Mail S. S. Co. v. United States (D. C.) 300 Fed. 827; Commonwealth & Dominion Line v. United States (C. C. A. 2d) 20 F. (2d) 729; Alaska Commercial Co. v. United States (N. D. Cal.) [1925] A. M. C. 1269; Long Island R. R. Co. v. United States (1926; E. D. N. Y.; not reported) [1926] A. M. C. 1011; Sewing Mach. Cos. Case (Grover & B. SewingMach. Co. v. Florence Sewing-Mach. Co.) 18 Wall. 553, 584, 21 L. ed. 914, 921; United States v. Merriam, 263 U. S. 179, 187, 68 L. ed. 240, 244, 29 A.L.R. 1547, 44 Sup. Ct. Rep. 69; The Maggie J. Smith, 123 U. S. 349, 356, 31 L. ed. 175, 178, 8 Sup. Ct. Rep. 159; The Albert Dumois, 177 U. S. 240, 255, 44 L. ed. 751, 760, 20 Sup. Ct. Rep. 595; Eastern S. S. Corp. v. Great Lakes Dredge & Dock Co. 168 C. C. A. 3, 256 Fed. 497, 505; Tillson v. United States, 100 U. S. 43, 46, 25 L. ed. 543, 544; United States v. Omaha Tribe of Indians, 253 U. S. 275, 283, 64 L. ed. 901, 906, 40 Sup. Ct. Rep. 522; 7 Ops. Atty. Gen. 523-526; United States v. Sherman, 98 U. S. 565, 567, 25 L. ed. 235, 236; New York & C. M. S. S. Co. v. United States (D. C.) 300 Fed. 827; Texas Co. v. United States (D. C.) 11 F. (2d) 981. Mr. Justice Holmes delivered the opinion of the court: similar language in a special act (New York & C. Mail S. S. Co. v. United States (C. C. A. 2d) 16 F. (2d) 945), a writ of certiorari was allowed by this court, 275 U. S. 519, 72 L. ed. 403, 48 Sup. Ct. Rep. 121. The material words of the act are that the district court "shall have jurisdiction to hear and determine the whole controversy and to enter a judgment or decree for the amount of the legal damages sustained by reason of said collision, if any shall be found to be due either for or against the United States, upon the same principle and measure of liability with costs as in like cases in admiralty between private parties with the same rights of appeal." On a hasty reading one might be led to believe that Congress [47] had put the United States on the footing of a private person in all respects. Headnote 1 But we are of opinion that a scrutiny leads to a different result. It is at least possible that the words fixing the extent of the government's liability were carefully chosen, and we are of opinion that they were. We start with the rule that the United States is not liable to interest except where it assumes the liability by contract or by the express words of a statute, or must pay it as part of the just compensation required by the Constitution. Seaboard Air Line R. Co. v. United States, 261 U. S. 299, 304, 306, 67 L. ed. 664, 669, 670, 43 Sup. Ct. Rep. 354. Next we notice that when this special act was passed there was a recent general statute on the books, the Act of March 9, 1920, chap. 95, § 3, 41 Stat. at L. 525, 526, U. S. C. title 46, § 743, allowing This is a libel in admiralty brought by suits in admiralty to be brought in perthe petitioner to recover for damages sonam against the United States, in done to its steam lighter Cornelia by a which it was set forth specifically that collision with the United States de- interest was to be allowed upon money stroyer Bell. It is brought against the judgments and the rate was four per United States by authority of a special centum not the six per centum that the Act of May 15, 1922, chap. 192, 42 Stat. petitioner expects to get. The later genat L. 1590. There has been a trial in eral statute passed as a substitute for which both vessels ultimately were found special bills like the one before us, allows to have been in fault and it was ordered suits in admiralty for damages done by that the damages should be divided. 7 public vessels but excludes interest in F. (2d) 278. Thereafter the damages terms. Act of March 3, 1925, chap. 428, were ascertained and the petitioner § 2, 43 Stat. at L. 1112, U. S. C. title 46, sought to be allowed interest upon its share. (There was no cross libel.) The circuit court of appeals, going on the words of the statute, parallel legislation, and the general understanding with regard to the United States, held that no interest could be allowed. 19 F. (2d) 744. As there was a conflict of opinion with the second circuit dealing with § 782. Headnote 2 We are satisfied by the argument for the government that the policy thus expressed in the Act of 1925 had been the policy of the United States for years before 1922 and that the many private acts like the present generally have been un'derstood, before and since the act now in |