tack is a question receiving much at- | main armament will consist of eight tention abroad. The French have 15-in. (possibly 16-in.) guns. The made successful experiments with an vessels will be 629 ft. long, with air-cushion defense against submarine attack. 26,000 tons displacement. They are designed for a speed of 25 knots, using oil fuel exclusively. England has advanced from the 13.5-in. gun to the 15-in., which is claimed to reproduce the virtues of the 13.5-in. gun on a larger scale. The battleships of the 1912-13 programme will carry this 15in. weapon, and it is probable that the British Navy will have ten vessels so armed before any other country has two. The latest French battleship design provides for a main armament of 12 13.4-in. guns mounted in three quadruple turrets. In addition to these spacious quadruple turrets, a revolving turret forming the upper part of the conning tower affords complete protection for range-finders. Italy has drawn up a new design for a group of four battleships introducing motor propulsion. The battleships will be fitted with one center and two wing shafts, the wing shafts to be driven by ordinary steam turbines, while the center shaft will be operated by a 12,000-h.p. Diesel engine. The small area to gun attack. PERSONNEL OF THE PRINCIPAL NAVIES There is discussion abroad of the possibilities of a battleship designed to fire a broadside of 12 torpedoes and so constructed as to be for the most part submerged, thus presenting a Aircraft Strength. The present strength in air war craft of European countries is indicated in official estimates submitted by the Navy Department to the Naval Committee. These show that Austria-Hungary has 600 aeroplanes and eight dirigibles; Belgium 60 aeroplanes, no dirigibles; Great Britain 900 aeroplanes, 12 dirigibles; France 1,400 aeroplanes, 30 dirigibles: Germany 1,400 aeroplanes. 60 dirigibles; Italy 300 aeroplanes, 4 dirigibles: Japan 20 aeroplanes, 2 dirigibles; Russia 1,000 aeroplanes, 20 dirigibles. Lessons of the European War.From the American point of view the chief naval lessons of the first few months of the European War may be summarized briefly as follows: 1. The value of aircraft for scouting and raiding. 2. The value of submarines for harbor defense and for attack when operating within a comparatively short radius (approximately 400 or 500 miles) from a naval base. 3. The value of fast cruisers to protect commerce by running down the enemy's commerce destroyers and to throttle the enemy's resources by cutting off her oversea trade. 4. The power of the battleship fleet to control the seas and protect the coasts in a war between belligerents separated by great distances of water. 5. The inadequacy of international agreements and treaties unless backed by adequate fighting power. 6. The value of naval preparedness. In a military sense the United States is virtually an island republic. In applying the lessons of the present war to home strategy, it is, therefore, par ticularly instructive to study the policy of Great Britain because of her geographical position, her national polices, and her commercial ambitions (see also III, International Relations; and IV, The European War). The following is quoted from Archibald Huru in the Fortnightly Review of October, 1914: The British peoples are incurably maritime, by geographical distribution, by instinct, and by political bias, because sea power has always suggested freedom. At the moment when war broke out our naval power stood high -we were nearly twice as strong as the next greatest sea power; at the moment our military power stood low in comparison with the enormous forcesa total of about 15,000,000 men-which were immediately mobilized in Europe. Consequently in the early stages at least of the present war the influence which we could exert most powerfully and most usefully to ourselves and those associated with us took a naval form. From the beginning our first line of defense became our first line of offense. The North Sea became a "closed lake." German trade was strangled, German shipping driven off the seas, and the German colonial empire divorced from the motherland and smothered in detail. If by pursuing an offensive-defensive policy on the sea we can continue to strangle the maritime activities of our of Europe are to be a great extent detwo great enemies-and all the nations pendent on oversea supplies-we shall gain a grip on the whole strategic situation, ashore as well as afloat, which military force as it should be used: It will enable us to use our increased is the projectile of the naval arm to be thrown into the balance at any moment and at any place, as may be decided by those whose business it is to direct it. Great Britain sending "so small a Without questioning the wisdom of the Continent" under the unusual cirmilitary force into the maelstrom on cumstances, Mr. Hurd comments upon the direct conflict with two historic principles: First, that an island power should secure command of the sea before it attempts to use the sea for military transport; secondly, that any power does well, on the highest strategic grounds, to use its strong arm first and hold in reserve its weaker arm, in the meantime devoting the best efforts to its strengthening. Mr. Hurd continues to point out that Germany was ready for war by land but unready by sea. He also makes the following statement: A strong and unconquered navy can render invaluable aid to armies in the field by supplying them with reinforcements, food and equipment, and by screening the preparation of further military power; but an army, however victorious, can give no aid to a navy. BIBLIOGRAPHY Annuario Navale. (Rome, 1913.) BAUDRY.-The Naval Battle. A Comprehensive Work on Naval Tactics. (London, 1914.) Naval Appropriation Laws from 1883 to 1913. (Washington, Government Printing Office, 1913.) Marine Almanach. (Vienna, 1914.) (Germany, 1914.) BURGOYNE, A. H.-Navy League Annual. Marine Rundschau. XIII. ECONOMIC CONDITIONS AND THE CONDUCT OF BUSINESS S. S. HUEBNER BUSINESS CONDITIONS IN 1914 A Year of Severe Decline in Busi- | throughout the year. The first nine ness. During 1913, as explained in the 1913 issue of the YEAR BOOK (p. 325), "practically all the leading barometers of trade indicated a marked decline instead of the very noticeable improvement of 1912, and the general tone of the financial and trade journals was distinctly pessimistic in character." It was stated also that in that year the condition of the crops, the principal mainstay of the nation's business enterprises, was so poor as naturally to exert a retarding influence on business in general. In addition to this factor, it was explained that months' sales of shares during 1914 totaled less than three-fourths of the sales during the same period of 1913, although the latter year showed a decline of nearly 30 per cent. as compared with the first nine months of 1912. Bond sales likewise were small in volume and but slightly in excess of 1913, which year represented a decline of 30 per cent. in this respect as compared with 1912 and 60 per cent. as against 1911. The average price of representative stocks and bonds showed a material decline, even when compared with the very low figures of 1913, thus showing that the year was one of liquidation, not accumulation. was 1913 was also a year of doubt and un- General business conditions also certainty, occasioned largely by numerous Federal and state investigations and compared unfavorably with those of the uncertain results of the new tariff 1913, although the situation law and other legislation. The year somewhat better than that presented represented a selling movement in which in the security market. Bank clearinvestors and speculators liquidated ings show a decrease of nearly five heavily. During the entire year business men marked time while awaiting developments and showed a disinclination to take the initiative in making purchases for the future or otherwise extending their business operations. The year 1914, although favored with much better crops, was marked, nevertheless, by a continuation of the unfavorable tendencies of 1913, the declines in most instances reaching such an alarming stage as to place the year on a par with the severe depression of 1907-1908. The security market, even before the closing of the exchanges on July 30 to prevent the wholesale liquidation of foreign holdings of American securities, was characterized by unprecedented dullness per cent. as compared with the first nine months of 1913, while the September clearings were only threefourths as high as in September of 1913. In the iron and steel business the leading plants were reported at the beginning of November to be operating at only about 40 to 45 per cent. of their capacity, and the orders for unfilled tonnage of the United States Steel Corporation declined nearly 33 per cent. during the first nine months of the year as compared with the corresponding nine months of the preceding year, and for the month of September totaled less than half the unfilled tonnage of January, 1913. Iron production, together with the prices for iron and steel, show a very severe falling off. In further of activity during the year in the contrast to the situation in 1913, the security market and the condition of The tables following data will prove instructive. the investment demand. Building operations during Septem- relating to "Loans and Deposits of ber of 1914 were less than those of the New York Clearing House Banks" 1913 by over 26 per cent. Gross rail- and "Domestic and Foreign Money road earnings during the first nine Rates" furnish an idea of the condimonths of the year, despite the very tions surrounding the money market bad showing of 1913, show a further during 1914; while the tables on decline of over $79,000,000, and net "Bank Clearings," "Foreign Trade," earnings a most extraordinary decline "Crop Production," "Idle Cars," "Proof nearly $111,000,000, i. e. nearly duction of Iron and Copper," "Buildand "Business 11.5 per cent. Incorporations were ing Construction," less than in the preceding year by Failures" will serve to furnish a view more than 33 per cent., and business of the year's activity in mercantile failures, as regards number and vol- and manufacturing lines. For purume of indebtedness, exceeded those of poses of comparison, the figures are any previous similar period, including given by months for the years 1913 the panic year of 1893. and 1914, and to make possible a further comparison, the totals for the several items, wherever possible, are also given for 1912 and 1913.1 AGRICULTURE In the last issue of the YEAR BOOK it was stated that all the leading divisions of our business activities showed a marked decline in 1913 with the exception of our foreign trade and the copper industry, the first showing a tremendous increase and the Crop Production. The grain-crop last having just about held its 1912 statistics of the United States for position. In 1914, however, even these 1914, as indicated by the October retwo branches of American industry port of the Department of Agriculexhibited unfavorable tendencies. ture, present a more favorable showWhile the volume of the country's ing than that described in last year's foreign trade has remained about the same, imports have gained tremendously on exports. During the fiscal year ending June 30 the net balance of exports was only 470 millions, as against 653 millions in 1912-1913, while during April-August, inclusive, imports actually reached such volume as to exceed exports. In the copper trade production is now going on at only about half the rate prevailing at the beginning of the year 1913, while the American visible supply in October was about four and one-half times that of the same month in 1913, and the price of the metal has declined by over 30 per cent. Statistics. In the tables on the following pages is presented a summary of business conditions in 1914 in contrast with those of 1913, as shown by those indices which are generally accepted as the truest barometers of industry and trade. The tables relating to stock-market activity, including summaries of "Shares of Stocks and Bonds Sold," "Average Security Prices," and "New Securities Listed," indicate the activity or lack YEAR BOOK. In fact, the crop situation is the most satisfactory feature to be related in this year's description of economic conditions in the United States. Considering the five leading cereals, the estimated yield for 1914, as indicated by the accompanying table, shows a total of 4,945,000,000 bu., or an increase of 489,000,000 bu. over 1913, nearly 10 per cent. The year's wheat crop is the largest ever harvested, the yield amounting to 892,000,000 bu., as compared with 763,000,000 bu. in 1913, an increase of 17 per cent. As was the case in 1913, this splendid showing was occasioned by the record yield of winter wheat, this crop amounting to 675,000,000 bu., or 152,000,000 bu. in excess of 1913. Corn, the nation's 1 The author is indebted for many of the statistics presented in the following tables to the monthly compilations prepared from authentic sources by R. W. Babson, and issued periodically in "Babson's Desk Sheet of Tables on Barometric Figures for Business Conditions." |