III. INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

CHARLES EDWARD ASNIS

INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES

MEXICO

The Crisis and Mediation.-A narrative of the events which brought the United States to the verge of war with Mexico is given in another department (see I, American History). Every indication pointed to an armed conflict. Vera Cruz had been occupied, a military expedition was at sea bound for Mexican shores, and Congress had recorded its authorization of the President

in the employment of the armed forces of the United States to enforce the demand for unequivocal amends for affronts and indignities committed against the United States.

The crisis was relieved by the offer of mediation made by the Governments of Argentina, Brazil, and Chile. The situation was thus entirely changed before the American military expedition reached Mexican territory. On April 25 the Ambassador of Brazil, Dr. Domicio da Gama, the Minister of Argentina, Dr. Romulo S. Naon, and the Minister of Chile, Sr. Eduardo Suarez, made the following tender of good offices to the Government of the United States:

With the purpose of subserving the interests of peace and civilization in our

Secretary Bryan at once accepted on behalf of the United States in the following terms:

Conscious of the purpose with which the proffer is made. this Government does not feel at liberty to decline it. Its America, the cordial intercourse of her own chief interest is in the peace of

republics and their people, and the happiness and prosperity which can spring only out of frank, mutual understandings and the friendship which is created by common purpose.

The generous offer of your Governments is therefore accepted. This Government hopes most earnestly you may find those who speak for the several elements of the Mexican people willing and ready to discuss terms of satisfactory, and therefore permanent, settlement. If you should find them willing, this Government will be glad to take up with you for discussion in the frankest and most conciliatory spirit any proposals and will hope that they may prove feathat may be authoritatively formulated, sible and prophetic of a new day of mutual cooperation and confidence in America.

It will be seen that the scope of the offer was considerably extended by the acceptance. The acceptance was so worded as to include not only the "conflict between the United States and Mexico" but the whole Mexican continent and with the earnest desire to situation, and the bearing of the prevent any further bloodshed, to the "several elements of the Mexican peoprejudice of the cordiality and union ple" in order that a "permanent" setwhich have always surrounded the re-tlement might be had. The intent was lations of the Governments and peoples of America, we, the plenipotentiaries of Brazil, Argentine, and Chile, duly authorized thereto, have the honor to ten

der to your Excellency's Government our good offices for the peaceful and friendly settlement of the conflict between the United States and Mexico.

plain. The Administration indicated that the participation of the Constitutionalists was not only desirable but necessary; that the inquiry into the international situation, namely, that between the United States and the Government of General Huerta, was

of the mediation as accepted by the United States. Moreover, the conclusions of the conference without representation therein by Carranza would be rendered nugatory by reason of his manifest domination of the situation in Mexico and of his impending triumphant march to Mexico City. It was precisely this extension of the scope of mediation to all Mexican troubles insisted upon by the United States, that rendered Carranza's participation in the proposed conference remote.

too narrow; and that the internal | hostilities. His participation was necproblems of Mexico were equally im- essary in order to come within scope portant for the conclusion of a permanent settlement of Mexican affairs. Complete relief from the crisis required the acceptance of mediation by General Huerta. He yielded to the pressure of the Governments of Great Britain, Germany and France, and on April 27 Señor Riano, the Spanish Ambassador at Washington, announced that Huerta had accepted mediation "in principle." On April 29 General Carranza, First Chief of the Constitutionalists, announced his "acceptance in principle," reserving, however, the right to inquire into details. Carranza's Attitude Toward MediDifficulties of the Mediators.-The ation.-Carranza was firm in his detask of the mediators required in- termination not to suspend hostilifinite tact and patience in compos- ties against Huerta, although he indiing the differences involved in the cated his willingness to send delegates tripartite situation. At the very out- to discuss the international situation. set the mediators were confronted by The correspondence between the methe determination of President Wilson diators and Carranza shows that the that a condition to American partici- difficulty lay in the extension of the pation in the conference should be the scope of mediation made after the inelimination of Huerta from authority vitation to Carranza. The first comin Mexico. It is said that the media- munication on April 29 invited him to tors appealed to the Governments of participate in a "friendly and peaceGreat Britain, Germany and France ful solution of the conflict between with reference to the President's the United States and Mexico." On stand and that these Governments de- the same day Carranza accepted. The clined to interfere. The first idea of mediators then asked him to suspend the mediators was to secure the sus-hostilities against Huerta. Therepension of hostilities in Mexico, particularly those between the Huertistas and the Constitutionalists; this accomplished, the plan called for the invitation to the Government of the United States, to the Government of General Huerta and to the Constitutionalists to send their delegates to a conference to be held at Niagara Falls, Canada. On April 30, Secretary Bryan announced that General Huerta had agreed to an armistice and that military operations between the United States and General Huerta were suspended. General Carranza remained ominously silent on the ques- The reply of the mediators indicattion of an armistice between himself ed the embarrassing position to which and General Huerta. Tampico was they had been reduced by the insistabout to fall to his army, and he was ence of the United States on extendplanning an attack on Saltillo. He ing the scope of mediation, so as to pressed his military advantage, know- include the whole troubled field of ing that Huerta was embarrassed by Mexican politics. They pleaded that the American occupation of Vera in inviting him originally they had Cruz. The task of the mediators was had the domestic situation "in mind": therefore rendered difficult in view of "We deem that this unexpected stateCarranza's disinclination to suspend 'ment is inconsistent with the view we

upon, May 3, Carranza reminded the mediators of their departure from the terms of their original offer, in the extension of mediation to the civil war which he was waging against Huerta, and he informed them "that the international conflict between the United States and Mexico is independent of our internal struggle for liberty and right." And he therefore deemed it "inconvenient for the Constitutionalist cause to suspend hostilities and military operations because such suspension would only accrue to the benefit of Huerta."

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had in mind when we offered our good | tion of a general amnesty; and prooffices." And if Carranza would still vision for a claims commission to deadhere to his decision not to suspend hostilities, "we find ourselves in the necessity of withdrawing as inopportune our invitation."

termine the matter of damages suffered by foreigners. This programme was in accord with the plan of permanent pacification urged by the President and comprised the matters on which he was firm-the elimination of Huerta, the inauguration of economic reforms, and the establishment of a constitutional régime in Mexico.

Nevertheless, Carranza insisted that there was discrepancy between the original offer of the mediators and their proposed subsequent programme; he refused to be drawn into a conference to discuss internal problems, The Question of the Provisional contending that they could be solved Government.-The Conference considonly by the Constitutionalist party, ered the plan of creating a Commisand that the conclusions of the pro- sion which should succeed General posed conference would not be bind- Huerta as a provisional government, ing on him or his party. He relied arrange for a general election, and considerably on the military situation, prepare the way for economic reform. hoping to confront the Mediation Con- The difficulty of this plan became apference with a fait accompli in the parent when it came to the naming of capture of Mexico City. In some the individuals who would compose the quarters, indeed, the United States Commission. The question whether the was charged with complacency in majority of the Commission should be viewing the attitude of Carranza; it Huertistas or Carranzistas became so was stated that the .occupation of troublesome and showed so little posVera Cruz had devitalized Huerta's resistance to the Constitutionalist

army.

sibility of agreement that the Conference took up the question of an individual with powers of a Provisional President. Here again the difficulty seemed insuperable. The Mexican delegates urged that a "neutral" be named; the American delegates insisted that only a Constitutionalist would be acceptable. On June 17, the Mexican delegates, departing from the procedure of the Conference, issued a statement to the press in which they urged their claims for a "neutral":

The Conference at Niagara Falls.On May 20 the first formal session of the Mediation Conference was held, under the auspices of the plenipotentiaries of Argentina, Brazil and Chile. The United States was represented by Joseph R. Lamar, Associate Justice of the Supreme Court of the United States, and Frederick W. Lehmann, formerly the Solicitor-General of the United States. General Huerta was A provisional government composed represented by Augustin Rodriguez, of revolutionaries and with revolutionEmilio Rabasa and Luis Elguero. The ists in authority throughout the counprogramme of the Mediation Confer- try would turn the elections as ence was as follows: the creation of a wished; the public vote would be falsified and the result would necessarily be provisional government to succeed the election of another revolutionary. General Huerta, who would retire; the discussion and determination of The American delegates replied the the nature of such provisional govern- next day. They emphasized the miliment, whether it should be an indi- tary strength of the Constitutionalvidual or a commission; the discus-ists and indicated that permanent sion and determination of the internal peace

it

just wishes of the Constitutionalists, who are not only in numerical majority, but are now the dominant force in the

country.

problem, which would include agra- can only be obtained by consulting the rian, electoral and other constitutional reforms; provision for a general election, wherein the people of Mexico would elect a President and a Congress under constitutional forms; the evacuation of Vera Cruz; the determination whether or not the United we would have secured no practical reStates was entitled to satisfaction for sults, but still be confronted with the the Tampico incident; the promulga-insurmountable fact, that the Constitu

If a neutral should be chosen as Provisional President,

tionalists, now almost completely trium- | General Carranza and thereby give phant, would reject the plan, repudiate the man and press forward with renewed zeal to Mexico City, with all the loss of blood and life that may involve. Moreover, it would be a difficult matter to find a neutral in Mexico:

The country might well question the patriotism of any Mexican who has been colorless in such a contest. The effort, therefore, should be not to find a neutral but one whose attitude on the controlling issues would make him acceptable to the Constitutionalists while his character, standing and conduct would make him acceptable to the other party.

the mediators the opportunity to withdraw from an inquiry under their auspices into Mexican domestic troubles. This programme was adopted and on June 24 the mediators invited the representatives of Huerta and of Carranza to meet and

to discuss and agree between themselves on a basis of an arrangement whereby the political pacification of the country could be consummated, with the termination of the Civil War and the organization of a provisional government to conduct the general elections for the establishment of the powers of a permanent government.

rived at a solution of the Mexican crisis both international and domestic. From the international standpoint the mediators' task was not difficult. The American delegates did not appear to press for international satisfaction "for affronts and indignities committed" against the United States, and the assurance appears to have been given that Vera Cruz would be evacuated. The military situation in Mexico appears also to have convinced the mediators that their task with reference to Mexican internal questions was at an end; for while Carranza's delegates were waiting for instructions his army was about to march into Mexico City. Huerta's downfall was a question of days, and with his elimination and Carranza's final triumph "the whole troubled field of Mexican politics" would no longer concern them.

After a period of pessimism, during This arrangement gave the mediators which the Conference was on the their opportunity to close the Conferbrink of failure, the mediators decid-ence with the semblance of having ared to pass this difficult question, and their efforts were directed to the drafting of a protocol so general in terms as to be acceptable to both sides. The mediators were also conscious of the fact that the leading political party in Mexico was unrepresented at their Conference; and their embarrassment was not relieved by the unexpected arrival at Niagara Falls of Señor Juan F. Urquidi with a note from General Carranza concerning his participation in the Conference. While the overtures seemed to come from Carranza voluntarily, the likelihood of a suspension of hostilities was as remote as ever because of his continued military successes. The mediators therefore maintained their previous attitude in refusing permission to Carranza to participate in the Conference unless military operations were suspended forthwith. On June 12, Carranza announced the names of his delegates but made no reference to an armistice and expressed no willingness to discuss internal questions.

On July 1, having decided upon adjournment, the mediators issued an identical note to the delegates of the United States and of Huerta, defining the status of their mediation and giv ing the reasons for recess:

The undersigned believe that what remains to be done in the discharge of the task which it was their good fortune to initiate two months ago, does not at the present time require their presence at this place, and that the work now a matter falling to the Mexican delegations may be resumed with

The Mediators and the Mexican Factions. The way out of the difficulty seemed to be (1) to restrict mediation for the time being to the settlement of the international question, namely, the "pending conflict between the United States and Mexico" (in the words of the original offer of the mediators), and (2) to hand over the out any inconvenience whatsoever whendiscussion and settlement of the in-ever the arrival of the representatives ternal conflict to a conference of the of the Constitutionalist party is delegates of General Huerta and of nounced.

an

The Protocol.-The mediators were now in a position to issue a protocol, couched in general terms, which would express the results of their labors. It was signed on June 24 by the mediators, by the American delegates and by the representatives of General Huerta. It read as follows:

ARTICLE II.-(a.) Upon the constitution of the provisional government in the City of Mexico, the Government of

the United States of America will recognize it immediately, and thereupon diplomatic relations between the two countries will be restored.

(b.) The Government of the United States also will not in any form whatsoever claim a war indemnity or other

troubled field of Mexican affairs was still untouched. But there were other considerations not quite so tangible but equally important. A war with Mexico was averted and mediation gave the opportunity for calm reflection and the cooling of national passion. Equally important was the effect of mediation on the relations of ARTICLE I. The provisional govern- the United States with the countries ment referred to in protocol No. 3 shall of Latin America. The offer of medibe constituted by agreement of the dele-ation came at a time when suspicion gates representing the parties between which the internal struggle in Mexico in Latin America of the designs of is taking place. the United States was deepest. The affair of Panama, the intervention in Cuba, the annexation of Porto Rico, and the attempted fiscal protectorates in Central America, produced a grow ing suspicion in the countries of Latin America that the United States was bent on territorial aggression at their expense. The seizure of a great Central American port, Vera Cruz, served to substantiate the suspicion. The readiness with which the United States accepted the tender of mediation by the South American republics did more to allay this suspicion than any number of Pan-American Conferences and tours of Secretaries of State. The Mediation Conference had some of the aspects of a Hague Tribunal; and in its broader phases, it was as beneficial. It may serve as the starting point for the general recognition that the Americas have interests peculiarly their own and that the New World has awakened to the consciousness that in some aspects it is a political unit. The statement may also be ventured that the "Concert of America" has been inaugurated, its first action serving to allay the growing feeling of danger of aggression from within the hemisphere itself.

international satisfaction.

(c.) The provisional government will proclaim an absolute amnesty to all foreigners for any and all political of fenses committed during the period of

Civil War in Mexico.

(d.) The provisional government will negotiate for the constitution of inter

national commissions for the settlement of the claims of foreigners on account of damages sustained during the period of Civil War as a consequence of military acts or the acts of the national authorities.

ARTICLE III.-The three mediating Governments agree on their part to recognize the provisional government organized as provided in section I of this protocol.

With the departure of the mediators on July 2 the formal sessions of the Mediation Conference were concluded. The protocol was of no practical effect and the plan was not made operative in any particular. Huerta, however, voluntarily resigned on July 15. The subsequent course of events in Mexico is described on another page (see IV, Latin America).

Results of the Mediation Conference. The results of the A. B. C. mediation must not be judged from the practical standpoint alone. It would appear that the immediate results were barren of accomplishment; that the United States emerged from the Conference without international satisfaction for the affronts and indignities suffered by it; and that the whole

COLOMBIA

The year 1914 marks the successful conclusion of a treaty with Colombia, after negotiations stretching over a period of ten years. Relations between the United States and Colombia became strained immediately after the secession of Panama, because of the feeling in Colombia that the Government of the United States was responsible. The negotiations of Mr. Du Bois (A. Y. B., 1913, p. 89) were doomed to failure as were previous