Servia from those in Montenegro, pre- |garian Government was soon confrontventing concerted action of these kin-ed with growing unrest and disaffecdred peoples and stunting their na- tion in its southern Slavic provinces, tional growth. The Sanjak was, due in great measure to its own therefore, Austria-Hungary's gateway harsh treatment of the peoples who to the East. The effect of its occupa- dwelt there, but, in Vienna, attributed tion by Servians and Montenegrins to the racial and religious propaganwas not only to unite these Slavic peoples, but to slam the gate directly in the face of the Dual Monarchy. After the Balkan wars, AustriaHungary was conscious of a growing Servia on its flank, which, it appeared, had almost doubled in territory and population and made bold to encroach on Austro-Hungarian integrity by reclaiming under Servian administration the thousands upon thousands of Slavs that dwelt across its border in the Austro-Hungarian provinces of Bosnia and Herzegovina. In the light of these circumstances, it will be seen that the Treaty of Bucharest (4. Y. B., 1913, p. 101), concluded at the close of the second Balkan War, was far from being an effective peace, and was in fact an armed truce. da for a Greater Servia. Relations between Austria-Hungary and Servia were further aggravated by Servia's landlocked position, to which Austria had relegated Servia by her refusal to allow Servia to annex an Albanian seaport, captured by the Servian army in the first Balkan War. The situation was rendered acute by the consciousness in Vienna that essentially Servia was a Russian outpost athwart Austro-Hungarian progress to the Egean, and that in the supreme crisis, Servia would be a Russian base for operations against Austria-Hungary. Austro-Servian relations, therefore, soon became strained to the breaking point because of the realization in Austria-Hungary that Servia was not acting for herself but for Russia, in whose orbit she moved; and that Servian propaganda was a part of Russian foreign policy. Vienna was convinced that eventually Servia would play the rôle of agent provocateur. The Assassination of the Archduke Franz Ferdinand. The inevitable crisis came. The occasion was the assassination of Archduke Franz Ferdinand, the heir-apparent to the AustroHungarian throne, and of his consort, the Duchess of Hohenberg, in Sarajevo, the capital of Bosnia, on June 28 (see IV, Foreign Affairs). crime was committed by a youth of eighteen years, a Serb by race, but a native of Herzegovina, who had lately removed from Belgrade imbued with The The Position of Servia.-It became evident that Servia was the next point of contact between Russia and Austria-Hungary, and as events subsequently proved, the very theater of their direct clash. Always in a position to bring about a crisis in AustroHungarian domestic affairs, Servia, by reason of its growth and prestige as a result of the second Balkan War, became an immediate source of danger. In Vienna, it was felt that the danger did not end there. The growth of the irredentist movement in Servia looking to the reclamation of the Serbs in the provinces of Bosnia and Herzegovina, was fraught with grave peril to Austria-Hungary. Itself a monarchy composed of diverse peoples and races, it was peculiarly suscepti-racial fanaticism. In Vienna it was ble to appeals to race consciousness and religious differences, in that they would liberate the centrifugal forces which ultimately would loosen the bonds of the Monarchy. Pan-Servian propaganda at Belgrade was, therefore, most dangerous to Austro-Hungarian integrity, and in fact brought about an acute crisis in the provinces of Bosnia and Herzegovina, where more than a million Slavs were separated by a geographical line from "mother Servia." The Austro-Hun- said: charged that the crime was the culmi- it with Servia. The situation was aggravated by the bitter campaign waged in the AustroHungarian press for punitive action against Servia. The Fremdenblatt Conditions that we cannot allow to continue have made themselves apparent on the threshold of our house as a result of the encroachment of the Pan Servian idea. Servia has covered her self with a network of societies which, with the pretext of fostering culture, preached the doctrine of hatred of us throughout the country. The campaign in the press was not confined to the Austro-Hungarian papers. The Belgrade press was equally provocative and indiscreet. The Pravala, speaking of the mourning in Austria-Hungary, said: The only genuine tears shed for the heir-apparent were those of his children. All others were crocodile tears. and indicate its willingness to comply with the demands. The note recited the Servian declaration of March 31, 1909, after the annexation by AustriaHungary of Bosnia and Herzegovina, wherein Servia undertook "to live in the future on good and neighborly terms" with Austria-Hungary. Then followed the charge that the Servian Government has permitted the criminal machinations of various societies and associations ditolerated unrestrained language on the rected against the Monarchy, and has part of the press, the glorification of the perpetrators of outrages, and the participation of officers and functionaries in subversive agitation. The further charge was made that An investigation of the crime at Sarajevo satisfied the Austro-Hungari- the Sarajevo assassinations were planned an Government that the plot to assas- in Belgrade, that the arms and explosinate the Archduke was planned and sives with which the murderers were promoted in Belgrade with the coöp- provided had been given to them by eration of official Servian individuals Servian officers and functionaries beand was carried out with weapons finally, that the passage into Bosnia of longing to the Narodna Odbrana, and furnished by the Servian Government. the criminals and their arms was organConvinced that the further propagan-ized and effected by the chiefs of the da would threaten the integrity of the Servian frontier service. Empire and that the situation warranted drastic measures, the Austro- The note demanded that the Servian Hungarian Government deliberated on Government should publish on the the matter for weeks before disclosing front page of its Official Journal of its programme. None knew better than July 26, a verbatim statement, carethe Austro-Hungarian statesmen that fully prepared in Vienna, to the efthe situation in the southern Slavic fect that the Servian Government provinces was not unlike that which “condemns the propaganda directed confronted their country in 1859 in against Austria-Hungary, i. e., the the Italian provinces and in Pied- general tendency of which the final aim mont. The present situation was ren- is to detach from the Austro-Hungadered more dangerous by reason of rian Monarchy territories belonging the feeling in Austria-Hungary that to it"; and "repudiates all idea of inRussia stood behind Servia, lending terfering or attempting to interfere no little aid and comfort to the Ser- with the destinies of the inhabitants vian Government in the crisis. The of any part whatsoever of AustriaSlav peril in the minds of the Austro-Hungary;" and further that a declaHungarian diplomats had reached its ration to this effect should be commost dangerous form, and it decided municated to the Servian Army as an upon a démarche which would not order of the day, and published in the only end the Pan-Servian propaganda Official Bulletin of the Army. The for all time, but would serve as a Servian Government was also rechallenge to Russia as well. It was quired to dissolve the society styled also felt in Vienna that in view of the the Narodna Odbrana (National Dedomestic troubles in the countries of fense) and all other societies which the Triple Entente, the impending engage in propaganda against the Ausconflict with Servia could be isolated. tro-Hungarian Monarchy; to remove The Ultimatum.-The decisive step from the military service and from was taken on July 23. An ultimatum the administration in general "all ofwas sent to the Servian Government, ficers and functionaries guilty of propgiving it 48 hours in which to replyaganda against the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy," whose names and deeds were to be communicated by AustriaHungary; to accept the collaboration in Servia of representatives of the Austro-Hungarian Government in the suppression of the "subversive movement directed against the territorial integrity of the Monarchy." The demand which was particularly offensive to the Servian Government and made the ultimatum unacceptable in this respect was as follows: To take judicial proceedings against accessories to the plot of the twentyeighth of June who are on Servian territory. Delegates of the Austro-Hungarian Government will take part in the investigation relating thereto. The arrest of certain individuals was further demanded. An annex was attached to this note giving the results of the investigation in Austria-Hungary. A circular note accompanying this ultimatum was sent to the vari ous capitals of Europe, reciting in detail the Servian propaganda and justifying the drastic step taken by the Austro-Hungarian Government. M. Sazonof, the Russian Foreign Minister, was reported to have stated Russia's interest as follows: It was clear that Austrian domina tion of Servia was as intolerable for Russia as the dependence of the Neth- The humiliation of Servia, therefore, statement: а Ministers are unanimously agreed that challenge to Russia and that, in M. SazAustria-Hungary has thrown down onof's words, there can be only one answer. (London Times, July 25.) At the close of the Grand Council convoked to consider the crisis, the Czar is quoted as having said: We have stood this sort of thing for seven and a half years. This is enough. (Ibid.) His Excellency (M. Sazonof) replied Russia's Interest in Servia.-The interest of Russia in Servia is at once religious and political. The entry of Russia in Servian affairs was through the medium of religion. Russian rubles constructed most of the SerbOrthodox churches in Old Servia, Bosnia and Herzegovina. By patient ap-On July 25, the day of the expiration plication Russian diplomacy gradual- of the ultimatum, the Russian Govly aroused in Servia a consciousness ernment appeared to have come to its of kind in affairs religious. Politdecision, for Sir G. Buchanan, the ically, also, Servia was of utmost British Ambassador at St. Petersburg, importance to Russia's policy in the reported to Sir E. Grey: Balkans. A strong and growing Servia would be the most effective check to Austria-Hungary's aspirations in that Russia could not allow Austria to the Balkans. It would be more, it nant Power in the Balkans, and, if she crush Servia and become the predomiwould serve as the disintegrating feels secure of the support of France, force which Russia hoped would she will face all the risks of war. (Britloosen the bonds of that conglomera-ish Blue Book No. 17.) tion of races and peoples known as Austria-Hungary. In the nature of The reply of Servia accordingly was things, Servia was the immediate foreshadowed in St. Petersburg, where point of contact between the great it was undoubtedly inspired. On rivals; and both were committed to July 24, the day of the arrival of the definite policies with reference to this text of the Austrian ultimatum, the intervening state, the one, toward Russian Foreign Minister informed strengthening its Government and en- Sir G. Buchanan that "some of her couraging its national aspirations, (Austria-Hungary's) demands the other, toward weakening its con- quite impossible of acceptance" (Britdition and reducing it to vassalage. ish Blue Book, No. 6). As to how were far Servia would go toward meeting | Servian reply, paragraph by parathe Austrian demands, the Russian Foreign Minister replied that he "must first consult colleagues on this point, but that doubtless some of the Austrian demands could be accepted by Servia" (ibid.). The reliance of Servia on Russia in her crisis was complete. St. Petersburg determined whether or not Servia should accept, and the extent of the acceptance. graph, together with the comments of the Austro-Hungarian Government, in which the reply is characterized as "insincere," "evasive," and "unsatisfactory" (German White Paper). The semi-official Fremdenblatt of July 26 said: "There can be neither mediation nor arbitration." In Vienna, in a semi-official communiqué on July 27, it was said that the Servian note was Servia's Reply.-Aside from Rus- "insignificant" and filled with the sian considerations, it was felt in Bel- "spirit of dishonesty" and that the grade that full compliance with the Servian Government was not "seriousAustro-Hungarian demands was out ly determined to put an end to the of the question. Some of them, it was culpable tolerance it has hitherto exstated, impaired the rights of Servian tended to the threats against the sovereignty, particularly those which Monarchy." On July 28 war was derequired Austro-Hungarian participa-clared. tion in judicial proceedings on Servian The Triple Alliance and the Triple soil. Moreover, no dynasty would sur- Entente.-The situation in Europe vive the national humiliation in yield- was such that by reason of treaty obing completely to Austria-Hungary. ligations and of community of interOn July 25 the Servian reply was de- ests, no two powers could wage a war livered to the Austro-Hungarian Min- without involving the other Great ister at Belgrade; in it Servia agreed Powers. The state of affairs was subto most of the demands, but declined stantially that there would be either to allow the coöperation of Austro- a general peace or a general war; no Hungarian officials on Servian territory. The reply concluded: In case the Austro-Hungarian Govern-diplomacy in dividing Europe into two ment should not consider itself satisfied with this answer, it is ready as always to accept a peaceful solution, either by referring the decision of this question to the international tribunal at The Hague or by leaving it to great powers who cooperated in the preparation of the explanation given by the Servian Govern alternative appeared possible. The situation was the fruit of European armed camps, the culmination of the policy of armaments to which the Great Powers were committed. Europe was under the “dead hand” of intrigue, mistrust, military "programmes," and racial and religious propaganda, which grouped the Powers into two hostile triplices. It was this division ment on the 18-31 March, 1909. into two armed groups so often reShortly after the delivery of the Ser-ferred to by European diplomacy as vian note, the Austro-Hungarian minister informed the Servian Government of its insufficiency and departed with his staff from Belgrade. Austria-Hungary Decides upon War. It may be seriously doubted whether the Austro-Hungarian Government expected full compliance as demanded, or was disappointed because Servia did not make complete surrender. It was particularly bitter against Servia, because the latter, as was charged, instituted no inquiry on its own accord nor in any way indicated a willingness to investigate to what extent Servian officials were responsible for the crime of Sarajevo. The Norddeutsche Allgemeine Zeitung of July 25 set forth an analysis of the necessary to preserve "the balance of power" that really proved the dread engine of war that set Europe in flames. Even before the outbreak of the war, the situation was in fact one of economic warfare, in which the two groups were fast approaching the alternative of economic ruin on the one hand or the hazard of a general war on the other. The conflict appeared inevitable. It required the conjunction of two factors: the recognition that the burdens of an armed peace were too great to carry and the realization that the passing of time was wreaking changes in the military situation of Europe in the favor of the respective opponents. In the year of grace 1914, these factors conjoined. ple to the Persian Gulf. The Bagdad Railway was Germany's great factor for further penetration in Asia Minor. With its terminus at the Persian Gulf, Germany had an unrivaled route to the East, superior in some respects to the Siberian Railway of Russia and to the Suez Canal route of Great Britain. The route from Constantinople to the Persian Gulf being successfully acquired, there remained but the connecting of the intervening link from Vienna to the Bosphorus. The pendulum of advantage had in | in the Marmora, in the Ægean and in recent times swung to the side of the the Euphrates Valley. German interTriple Entente. A Slavic barrier ests were supreme from Constantinoclosed the path of Teutonic progress to the Egean; Morocco became a French province and France launched forth as a great Mediterranean power; Turkey was eliminated from Europe, leaving the way open for Russian progress to the Dardanelles; Russia and Great Britain had partitioned Persia, which gave to Russia the opportunity for propaganda against Turkey in Asia, and to Great Britain the means to check the German Bagdad Railway at its terminus on the Persian Gulf; and most sig- The elimination of Turkey as a nificant of all, Italy was aloof and factor in Europe wrought a great apparently under obligations to Great change in the German-Austro-HungaBritain for isolating her Tripolitan rian plans. The bridge to Asia Minor war. Gradually, Germany and Aus- was now closed by the Slavic confedtria-Hungary were being hemmed in eration in the Balkans, and the integby their enemies, who seemed to be a rity of Austria-Hungary was threatunit against their expansion. Aus- ened by the growth of Pan-Servian tria-Hungary was in fear of disinte- propaganda. These considerations acgration and Germany faced the star- count for Germany's unflinching suptling possibility of complete isolation. port of Austria-Hungary in the latTheir fears were brought home to ter's controversy with Russia. The them by the Archducal assassination. danger to Germany was not in the In Berlin and in Vienna the crime southeast only; it also came from the was interpreted as a Servian torpedo northeast. Germany looked with aplaunched by the protégé of Russia prehensive eyes at the growth of Rusagainst the body politic of Austria-sia and the reorganization of the RusHungary and the solidarity of their sian army. Her military authorities Alliance. feared that within a few years the Russian military programme would become too formidable to meet with Germany's Position. As Russia had national interests in Servia, so Germany had vital interests in the in-counter precautions. tegrity of the Austro-Hungarian Empire. Austria-Hungary was at once a source of strength and of weakness to Germany; the weakness lay in the great diversity of races and peoples that dwelt in the Dual Monarchy, and particularly in the millions of Slavs who might be induced to grow restive under Teuton rule. Germany was, therefore, in great danger if PanSlavism made further inroads in Austria-Hungary. A well-organized PanSlavic propaganda would result in the gradual drifting away of AustriaHungary from Germany toward Russia. The alliance between Germany and Austria-Hungary was economic as well as political. Together they had developed plans for expansion in the Near East. Before the collapse of Turkey, they had so far succeeded that German interests were dominant sun." German statesmen were also confronted with the economic problem of the country. Its small coast line, its poor access to the sea, its growing population, its geographical situation in mid-Europe encircled by hostile neighbors, its realization that it was fast outgrowing its boundaries and that it was rapidly approaching the limit of its internal resources, its aspirations for colonial expansion and an opportunity to venture upon a career as a maritime nation, its impatience at being huddled up "like a petty tradesman in a narrow shop," and its realization that the economic stress would become unbearable if the race in armaments with France, Russia, and Great Britain were continued, all cried for relief and for an outlet towards a place somewhere "in the |