God governs the earth, governs it, too, in both cases, not by secondary causes or vicarious means, but by the direct and constant exertion of his own wisdom and power. The belief of the pious heart is also the conclusion of the enlightened understanding, that the will of the Almighty determines all events, and disposes them for good. Science adopts and sanctions the theory of religion in regard to an overruling Providence ;- the theory which discerns a moral purpose in all things, maintaining that they were specially designed to produce a certain effect on the character and the conduct; which subordinates the physical to the moral, considering the former as means and the latter as an end; which regards life as a gift and a trust, to be exercised for certain purposes, and death as a warning and a token that, in a particular case, these purposes have been accomplished.

LECTURE VII.

THE GOODNESS OF GOD.

THE brief examination, in the last Lecture, of the contents of the law imprinted upon the conscience, of the nature of the precepts which it issues for our observance, was intended to prove, that these injunctions reveal to us the character and attributes, as well as the purposes, of the Almighty. They do so, because they answer no lower purpose; they are not subservient as means to any end but this. They were not required to stimulate the body or mind to exertion, or to direct that exertion, or to preserve and uphold the arrangements and the workings of the material universe. They are of absolute obligation, so that the advantages which the observance of them actually procures are to be considered as their guards and enforcers, not as their object or final cause. Consequently, they are, to the human mind which receives them, a revelation of pure will, or a manifestation of the Divine nature and glory irrespective of any purposes which may be answered by the display. Requiring perfection, or unlimited obedience, they show the perfections of their Author.

The scheme of Divine government, I attempted to show, includes a system of rewards and punishments which follow immediately upon the observance or transgression of the law. Human life presents so many instances of these as to make the conclusion irresistible, that the current of this world's affairs, the natural course of events, is superintended and directed with a

view to moral retribution. The object of the pains and pleasures which we experience, whether they grow out of our connection with the body, appearing as health or disease; or out of the relations which bind men together in society, then taking the form of success or failure in life, and of the honors and penalties which society has to bestow; or out of the constitution of the mind itself, in the various forms and degrees of remorse or inward gratification and the consciousness of merit ; — the object, I say, in all these cases, is to uphold and enforce the law of right. That the incidents of life are distributed with a view to this end is the general rule; the apparent instances of an unequal or fortuitous distribution of them are only apparent, and they are the exceptions. There are a few seeming anomalies, which are most apt to present themselves in the consideration of those cases of which we know the least,—for instance, of historical personages and events, while they very seldom trouble one's retrospect of his own experience; here, knowing all, he knows that the law is carried out completely. And the proper conclusion, from the presence of such anomalies as we cannot explain, is, not that the doctrine of a superintending Providence must be given up altogether, that doctrine being supported by the vast majority of cases, but that we do not always know how such a Providence acts. It is certain that we are under a scheme of government; but we are not able to follow all the workings of that scheme, or to assure ourselves, from direct observation, that it is perfect. The belief of the pious mind is hereby amply confirmed, that all events which affect our personal welfare are dispensations of almighty wisdom and justice.

It has not been without design, that I have placed the argument for the moral government of God by a system of rewards and punishments before the consideration of the evidences of the Divine benevolence, though this is reversing the order usually adopted by writers upon the subject. But it is certain that the claims of justice are superior to those of mere benevolence. We are required to do good to our fellow-beings so far as we

can without violating other and higher obligations; we ought not to deprive another of that which is rightfully his own, or to utter an untruth, or to break our pledged faith, even for the sake of benefiting millions, while the wrong would be felt only by an individual. Nay, as the appointed ministers of justice, it may often be our duty to inflict suffering, and to stifle the emotions of sympathy and compassion which prompt us only to increase his happiness. What is done from such motives is no imputation upon the benevolence of the individual; his heart may be overflowing with love to his neighbour at the very moment when he is doing him harm, or is the minister of the law to him for a righteous retribution. And generally we may say, that the measure of immediate happiness or pain which is dispensed by any being is a very imperfect criterion of the real goodness of his disposition. The surgeon, for instance, is not necessarily a hard-hearted man, though he passes his life in causing pain to others; he intends, indeed, to benefit them ultimately, but the benefit is remote and contingent, while the suffering caused by the operation is immediate and certain. In like manner, it may be better for the criminal himself, it may be more for his highest and most permanent interest, that he should be punished for his present offence, than that he should be permitted to sin with impunity. Yet men have argued as if the presence of any pain, the existence of any suffering, in the moral universe, was a fact irreconcilable with the infinite benevolence of the Creator.

I do not dwell upon this consideration now, as a better occasion will arise for developing it afterwards. I have alluded to it here only to remind you, that, as the obligation to promote the happiness of others is always secondary to the demands of justice, we may at once, in estimating the proofs of the benevolence of the Deity, leave out of the account entirely all the pain which is evidently produced for the punishment and repression of sin. And how great is the deduction that will thus be made from the amount of suffering in the world! How large a portion of the evils borne both by individuals and communities are attributable directly to their own misconduct, to their wilful disregard of the

monitions of conscience! The bodily frame, which is now languid from inaction or enfeebled by disease, might have been active and vigorous, prompt to second every wish of its owner, and ministering to his enjoyment through every sense, joint, and limb. The community which is now torn with civil dissensions, or prostrated in an unequal strife with its rivals, might have been peaceful, affluent, and flourishing, if its rulers and their subjects. had heeded the stern calls of duty instead of blindly following their own tumultuous passions. Once admit the great truth, that virtue, not happiness, is man's highest interest, and most of the pains of this life indicate the goodness of God quite as clearly as its pleasures. Consider, further, that virtue must be spontaneous or self-cultivated, since what is compulsory or mechanical can afford no ground either for praise or blame, and most of the problems which would otherwise perplex us in a view of this world's affairs admit of an easy solution.

But our present object is to inquire whether there be not, on the whole, a vast preponderance of enjoyment in the world, from which, without troubling ourselves yet about the presence of evil in a few cases, we may directly infer the kindness and benignity of the Supreme Being. It is hardly possible to add any thing to Paley's admirable summary of the argument upon this point, nor can the heads of it be more forcibly and succinctly stated. than in his language. The first proposition is, "That in a vast plurality of instances in which contrivance is perceived, the design of the contrivance is beneficial"; the second, "That the Deity has superadded pleasure to animal sensations beyond what was necessary to any other purpose, or when the purpose, so far as it was necessary, might have been effected by the operation of pain."

His assertion, however, that evil is never the object of contrivance, needs to be explained and limited, before we can admit it. Evil here does not mean mere pain, for this, I believe, is often intended and provided for, both to punish wrong, and to warn us against danger. But the distribution of this pain indicates pure benevolence united with perfect justice. It is never