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in the original direction the same energy of movement as if its first impulse had been undisturbed, and produces, by that energy, an exactly equivalent quantity of effect. This is true, even when the force leaves the body, as it found it, in a state of absolute rest; as when we attempt to raise a body of three tons' weight with a force equal to one ton. For if, while we are applying this force, the wind, or water, or any other agent, supplies an additional force just exceeding two tons, the body will be raised; thus proving that the force we applied exerted its full effect, by neutralizing an equivalent portion of the weight which it was insufficient altogether to overcome. And if, while we are exerting this force of one ton upon the object in a direction contrary to that of gravity, it be put into a scale and weighed, it will be found to have lost a ton of its weight, or, in other words, to press downwards with a force only equal to the difference of the two forces.

"These facts are correctly indicated by the expression tendency. All laws of causation, in consequence of their liability to be counteracted, require to be stated in words affirmative of tendencies only, and not of actual results. In those sciences of causation which have an accurate nomenclature, there are special words which signify a tendency to the particular effect with which the science is conversant; thus, pressure, in mechanics, is synonymous with tendency to motion, and forces are not reasoned upon as causing actual motion, but as exerting pressure." *

How language so precise as this is to be reconciled with the writer's denial of the fact, that we have even any idea of efficient cause, is a question for Mr. Mill to answer. I have no concern with it, except to remark, that the energy, or power exerted, which is not followed by any actual effect, but only tends to produce one, cannot with any propriety be considered as a mere antecedent event, for it has no consequent. It is no fact of observation, inasmuch as no result is perceived; and therefore it does not conflict with our doctrine, that we nowhere

* System of Logic, p. 258.

discern efficient causes in the material world. But tendency cannot even be conceived of, much less so clearly explained as it is by Mr. Mill, except as the effect of power in action, and therefore as implying a real cause.

However this may be, the illustration amply vindicates our knowledge of efficient causation in the phenomena of mind, against which no objection can be brought, except the alleged necessity of waiting till experience informs us whether the volition is effective or not, so that we cannot say a priori, as we should do of a true cause, that it will be, it must be, effective. We can say this beforehand of mental activity, or will; the volition Is always effective, if not to the full extent of actually producing the whole result in view, at least as tending to produce it, so that it is an efficient cause.

The difference between voluntary and involuntary states of mind, -between attention and sensation, for example, is soon recognized. We know that power is exerted in the former case, that every act is preceded by a volition, and that this volition is the sole and efficient cause of the act. Nay, within the proper domain of the will, it is even inconceivable to us that any event or change should take place without the agency of the will; and hence, as I am inclined to believe, by a natural association of ideas, we are led to the doctrine of universal causation, to the belief that no event whatever, whether in the mind or in the outer universe, can take place without an efficient cause. In most cases, we are ignorant what that cause is, for undoubtedly the majority even of our mental states is involuntary; we must believe and perceive, when evidence or objects are presented to These cases we are not completely acquainted with; strictly speaking, the efficient cause of them comes not within the range of our knowledge. But voluntary acts we do know thoroughly; the efficient cause of them—namely, our own will

us.

does lie entirely within the sphere of our consciousness, and is known to be in immediate contact, as it were, with the effect. Hence, association leads us to believe that every other event must have a cause, and that if we had the thorough knowledge of

it which we have of a voluntary act, it would be seen to proceed from a cause; and this cause is naturally sought for in the immediately antecedent event. Every action of our lives, every volition, appears in this character; so that it is by no narrow and insufficient induction, but by one that is coextensive with our whole conscious existence, the acts which form its basis recurring at every instant, that we are led to the general law, that no phenomenon occurs without a cause.

This doctrine derives confirmation from the fact, that all the phraseology employed in speaking of the successive generalizations of science is borrowed from the action of mind. The word action itself has no real significance except when applied to the doings of an intelligent agent; we cannot speak of the doings of matter, as we could if the word action were applicable to it in any other than a figurative sense. Let any one conceive, if he can, of any power, energy, or force inherent in a lump of matter, a stone, for instance,- except this merely negative one, that it always and necessarily remains in its present state, whether this be of rest or motion. Again, in speaking of the similarity of facts and the regularity of sequences, we refer them to a law of nature, just as if they were sentient beings acting under the will of a sovereign. Chemical affinities, also, are spoken of, as if material elements were united by family ties, and manifested choice, or affection and aversion. We attribute force, or power, to the particles of matter, and speak of their natural agencies. Just so, we talk of tone in coloring, and of a heavy or light sound; though, of course, in their proper significance, tone belongs only to sound, and heaviness to gravitating bodies. These modes of speech are proper enough, if their figurative character be kept in view; but we ought always to remember, that agency is the employment of one intelligent being to act for another; force and power are applicable only to will; they are characteristic of volition. Of course, it is a violent trope to apply either of them to senseless matter.

An obvious corollary from these remarks is, that all causation is an exertion of mind, and is applied only by metaphor to the

material universe. It necessarily implies power, will, and action. It is a universally admitted truth, that an efficient cause is nowhere discoverable in the world without us; we know what it is only from consciousness, and all our language respecting it is borrowed from mental phenomena. This doctrine places the material universe before us in a new light. The whole framework of what are called "secondary causes" falls to pieces. The laws of nature are only a figure of speech; the powers and active inherent properties of material atoms are mere fictions. Mind alone is active; matter is wholly passive and inert. Mind alone moves; matter is moved. There is no such thing as what we usually call the "course of nature "; it is nothing but the will of God producing certain effects in a constant and uniform manner; which mode of action, however, being arbitrary, or dependent upon will, is as easy to be altered as to be preserved. All events, all changes, in the external world, from the least even unto the greatest, are attributable directly to his will and power, which, being infinite, are always and necessarily adequate to the end proposed. The laws of motion, gravitation, affinity, and the like, are only expressions of the regularity and continuity of one infinite cause. The order of nature is the effect of Divine wisdom; its stability is the result of Divine beneficence.

12

LECTURE V.

FATALISM AND FREE-WILL.

THE question respecting the origin and validity of our idea of cause, which formed the topic of my last Lecture, has been greatly obscured and perplexed, because it involves several distinct inquiries, which are too frequently confounded with each other. I endeavoured to separate them, and to consider each one by itself in the natural order. First, the popular acceptation of the word cause was observed to be also its strict and metaphysical meaning; as efficiency is universally attributed to causation, and a necessary connection is believed to exist between cause and effect. But in opposition to the common belief, it was proved that we can nowhere detect such causes in the material universe; the observation of external nature never has led, and never can lead, to the discovery of any thing beyond the invariable succession of events, or the fixed relation of antecedence and consequence, a relation which differs as widely from that of cause and effect as any two distinct conceptions, which the mind is capable of forming, do from each other. But our inability to discover such causes in the world of matter is no proof that they are not to be found anywhere; for there is clear and indisputable evidence that they exist in the world of consciousness, every act, every volition, of a conscious agent being a true cause; this inability does not even prove that there are no such causes operating in external nature, as the limits of our faculty of investigation and discovery are not, surely, the limits of the possi

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