and the fcripture, of theological truth. When we say that nature is the ftandard of T'afte, we lay down a principle very true and juft, as far as it can be applied. There is no doubt, that in all cafes where an imitation is intended of fome object that exifts in nature, as in reprefenting human characters or actions, conformity to nature affords a full and diftinct criterion of what is truly beautiful, Reafon hath in fuch cafes full fcope for exerting its authority; for approving or condemning; by comparing the copy with the original. But there are innumerable cafes in which this rule cannot be at all applied; and conformity to nature, is an expreffion frequently ufed, without any distinct or determinate meaning. We must therefore fearch for fomewhat that can be rendered more clear and precife, to be the standard of Tatte. Tafte, as I before explained it, is ultimately founded on an internal fenfe of beauty, which is natural to men, and which, in its application to particular objects, is capable of being guided and enlightened by reafon. Now, were there any one perfon who poffeffed in full perfection all the powers of human nature, whofe internal fenfes were in every intance exquifite and juft, and whofe reafon was unerring and fure, the determinations of fuch a perfon concerning beauty,would, beyond doubt, be a perfect ftandard for the Tafte of all others. Wherever their Tafte differed from his, it could be imputed only to fome imperfection in their natural powers. But as there is no fuch living standard, no one perfon to whom all mankind will allow fuch fubmiffion to be due, what is there of fufficient authority to be the standard of the various and oppofite Taftes of men? Moft certainly there is nothing but the Tafte, as far as it can be gathered, of human nature. That which men concur the most in admiring, must be held to be beautiful. His Tafte must be efteemed just and true, which coincides with the general fentiments of men. In this ftandard we muft reft. To the fenfe of mankind the ultimate appeal must ever lie, in all works of Tafte. If any one fhould maintain that fugar was bitter and tobacco was fweet, no reafonings could avail to prove it. The Tafte of fuch a perfon would infallibly be held to be diseased, merely because it differed fo wide. ly from the Taste of the species to which he belongs. In like manner, with regard to the objects of fentiment or internal Tafe, the common feelings of men carry the fame authority, and have à title to regulate the Tafte of every individual. But have we then, it will be faid, no other criterion of what is beautiful, than the approbation of the majority? Muft we collect the voices of others, before we form any judgment for ourselves, of what deferves applause in elo. quence or poetry? By no means there are principles of reafon and found judgment which can be lied to matters of Tafte, as well as to the fubjects of fcience and philofophy. He who admires or cenfures any work of genius, is always ready, if his Tate be in any degree improved, to affign fome fome reasons of his decifion. He appeals to principles, and points out the grounds on which he proceeds. Tafte is a fort of compound power, in which the light of the understanding always mingles, more or lefs, with the feelings of fentiment. But, though reafon can carry us a certain length in judging concerning works of Tafte, it is not to be forgotten that the ultimate conclufions to which our reasonings lead, refer at last to fenfe and perception. We may fpeculate and argue concerning propriety of conduct in a tragedy, or an epic poem. Juft reafonings on the fubject will correct the caprice of unenlightened Tafte, and eftablish principles for judging of what deferves praife. But, at the fame time, these reasonings appeal always, in the last refort, to feeling. The foundation upon which they reft, is what has been found from experience to please mankind most univerfally. Upon this ground we prefer a fimple and natural, to an artificial and affected ftyle; a regular and wellconnected story, to loose and fcattered narratives; a catastrophe' which is tender and pathetic, to' one which leaves us unmoved. It is from confulting our own imagination and heart, and from attending to the feelings of others, that any principles are formed which acquire authority in matters of Tafte*. When we refer to the concurring fentiments of men as the ultimate teft of what is to be ac-` counted beautiful in the arts, this is to be always understood of men placed in fuch fituations as are favourable to the proper exertions of Tafte. Every one muft perceive, that among rude and uncivilized nations, and during the ages of ignorance and darkness, any loofe notions that are entertained concerning fuch fubjects carry no authority. In thofe ftates of fociety, Tafte has no materials on which to operate. It is either totally fuppreffed, or appears in The difference between the authors who found the standard of Taste upon the common feelings of humau nature afcertained by general approbation, and those who found it upon established principles which can be ascertained by reafon, is more an apparent than a real difference. Like many other literary controverfies, it turns chiefly on modes of expreffion. For they who lay the greatest ftrefs on fentiment and feeling, make no fcruple of applying argument and reafon to matters of Tafte. They appeal, like other writers, to established principles, in judging of the excellencies of Eloquence or Poetry; and plainly fhew, that the general approbation to which they ultimately recur, is an approbation resulting from difcuffion as well as from fentiment. They, on the other hand, who, in order to vindicate Tafte from any fufpicion of being arbitrary, maintain that it is afcertainable by the ftandard of reafon, admit nevertheless, that what pleafes univerfally, muft on that account be held to be truly beautiful; and that no rules or conclufions concerning objects of Taste, can have any juft authority, if they be found to contradict the general fentiments of men. These two fyf tems, therefore, differ in reality very little from one another. Sentiment and Reafon enter into both; and by allowing to each of thefe powers its due place, both fyftems may be rendered confiftent. Accordingly, it is in this light that I have endeavoured to place the fubject. I its its lowest and most imperfect form. We refer to the fentiments of mankind in polished and flourishing nations; when arts are cultivated and manners refined; when works of genius are fubjected to free difcuffion, and Tafte is improved by fcience and philofophy. Even among nations, at fuch a period of fociety, I admit, that accidental caufes may occafionally warp the proper operations of Tafte; fometimes the ftate of religion, fometimes the form of government, may for a while pervert it; a licentious court may introduce a taste for falfe ornaments, and diffolute writings. The ufage of one admired genius may procure approbation for his faults, and even render them fashionable. Sometimes envy may have power to bear down, for a little, productions of great merit; while popular humour, or party fpirit, may, at other times, exalt to a high, though fhortlived, reputation, what little deferved it. But though fuch cafual circumftances give the appearance of caprice to the judgments of Tafte, that appearance is eafily corrected. In the courfe of time, the genuine tafte of human nature never fails to difclofe itfelf, and to gain the afcendant over any fantastic and corrupted modes of Taste which may chance to have been introduced. These may have currency for a while, and mislead fuperficial judges; but being fubjected to examina. tion, by degrees they pafs away; while that alone remains which is founded on found reafon, and the native feelings of men. I by no means pretend, that there is any ftandard of Tafte, to which, in every particular inftance, we can refort for clear and immediate determination. Where, indeed, is such a standard to be found for deciding any of those great controverfies in reafon and philofophy, which perpetually dis vide mankind? In the prefent cafe, there was plainly no occafion for any such strict and abfolute provifion to be made. In or= der to judge of what is morally good or evil, of what man ought, or ought not in duty to do, it was fit that the means of clear and precife determination fhould be afforded us. But to afcertain in every cafe with the utmost exactnefs what is beautiful or elegant, was not at all neceffary to the happinefs of man. And therefore fome diversity in feeling was here allowed to take place; and room was left for difcuffion and debate, concerning the degree of approbation to which any work of genius is entitled. The conclufion, which it is fufficient for us to rest upon, is, that Tafte is far from being an arbitrary principle, which is fubject to the fancy of every individual, and which admits of no criterion for determining whether it be falfe or true. Its foundation is the fame in all human minds. It is built upon fentiments and perceptions which belong to our nature; and which, in general, operate with the fame uniformity as our other intellectual principles. When these fentiments are per verted by ignorance and preju dice, they are capable of being rectified by reafon. Their found and and natural flate is ultimately determined, by comparing them with the general Tafte of mankind. Let men declaim as much as they please, concerning the caprice and the uncertainty of Tafte, it is found, by experience, that there are beauties, which, if they be difplayed in a proper light, have power to command lafting and general admiration. In every compofition, what interefts the imagination, and touches the heart, pleases all ages and all nations. There is a certain ftring, which, being properly ftruck, the human heart is fo made as to anfwer to it. Hence the univerfal teftimony which the most improved nations of the earth have confpired, throughout a long tract of ages, to give to fome few works of genius; fuch as the Iliad of Homer, and the Eneid of Virgil. Hence the authority which fuch works have acquired, as standards in fome degree of poetical compofition; fince from them we are enabled to collect what the fenfe of mankind is, concerning thofe beauties which give them the highest pleasure, and which therefore poetry ought to exhibit. Authority or prejudice may, in one age or country, give a temporary reputation to an indifferent poet, or a bad artift; but when foreigners, or when pofterity examine his works, his faults are difcerned, and the genuine Taste of human nature appears. Opinionum commenta delet dies; naturæ judicia confirmat." Time overthrows the illufions of opinion, but establishes the decifions of nature." Comparative Strictures on Tillotson, IMPLICITY is the great Sbeauty of Archbishop Tillotfon's manner. Tillotfon has long been admired as an eloquent writer, and a model for preaching. But his eloquence, if we can call it fuch, has been often mifunderstood. For, if we include, in the idea of eloquence, vehemence and ftrength, picturefque defcription, glowing figures, or correct arrangement of fentences, in all thefe parts of oratory the archbishop is exceedingly deficient. His ftyle is always pure, indeed, and perfpicuous, but careless and remifs, too often feeble and languid; little beauty in the conftruction of his fentences, which are frequently fuffered to drag unharmonioufly; feldom any attempt towards ftrength or fublimity. But, notwithstanding these defects, fuch a conftant vein of good fense and piety runs through his works, fuch an earnest and ferious manner, and fo much ufeful instruction conveyed in a style so pure, natural, and unaffected, as will juftly recommend him to high regard, as long as the English language remains; not, indeed, as a model of the highest eloquence, but as a fimple and amiable writer, whofe manner is strongly expreffive of great goodnefs and worth. I obferved before, that fimplicity of manner may be confiftent with fome degree of neg ligence in ftyle; and it is only the the beauty of that fimplicity which makes the negligence of fuch writers feem graceful. But, as appears in the archbishop, negligence may fometimes be carried fo far as to impair the beauty of fimplicity, and make it border on a flat and languid manner. Sir William Temple is another remarkable writer in the ftyle of fimplicity. In point of ornament and correctness, he rifes a degree above Tillotson; though, for correctness, he is not in the higheft rank. All is eafy and flowing in him; he is exceedingly harmonious; smoothness, and what may be called amenity, are the diftinguishing characters of his manner; relaxing, fometimes, as fuch a manner will naturally do, into a prolix and remifs ftyle. No writer whatever has itamped upon his ftylé a more lively impreffion of his own character. In reading his works, we feem engaged in converfation with him; we become thoroughly acquainted with him, not merely as an author, but as a man; and contract a friendfhip for him. He may be claffed as ftanding in the middle, between a negligent fimplicity, and the highest degree of ornament, which this character of style admits. Of the latter of thefe, the highest, most correct, and ornamented degree of the fimple manner, Mr. Addifon, is, beyond doubt, in the English language, the most perfect example: and, therefore, though not without fome faults, he is, on the whole, the fafeft model for imitation, and the freeft from confiderable defects, which the language affords. Perfpicuous and pure he is in the highest degree; his precifion, in deed, not very great; yet nearly as great as the fubjects which he treats of require: the conftruction of his fentences eafy, agreeable, and commonly very mufical; carrying a character of fmoothness, more than of ftrength. In figurative language, he is rich; particularly, in fimilies and metaphors; which are fo employed, as to render his style fplendid without being gaudy. There is not the leaft affectation in his manner; we fee no marks of labour; nothing forced or constrained; but great elegance joined with great eafe and fimplicity. He is, in particular, diftinguished by a character of modefty, and of politenefs, which appears in all his writings. No author has a more popular and infinuating manner; and the great regard which he every where fhews for virtue and religion, recommends him highly. If he fails in any thing, it is in want of ftrength and precision, which renders his manner, though perfectly fuited to fuch effays as he writes in the Spectator, not altogether a proper model for any of the higher and more elaborate kinds of compofition. Though the public have ever done much juftice to his merit, yet the nature of his merit has not always been seen in its true light: for, though his poetry be elegant, he certainly bears a higher rank among the profe writers, than he is intitled to among the poets'; and, in profe, his humour is of a much higher, and more original ftrain, than his philofophy. The character of Sir Roger de Coverley difcovers more genius than the critique on Milton Such |