General Howe's army was badly supplied with munitions of war; which ultimately tended to the destruction of his plans. On the 25th of May, he crossed the Alatamaha river and encamped at Reid's bluff. The distressing effects, which must always arise from placing an army under more than one head, already began to appear. The governor of Georgia had taken the field at the head of her militia, and in opposition to the wishes of general Howe, had ordered the gallies to proceed up the river to Beard's bluff, fifty miles above the influence of the tide. The shallows in the river, and the force of the current, rendered obedience to this order impracticable. On this occasion Howe made some ill natured comments, reflecting on the governor's generalship, at which the latter took offence. To this misunderstanding and the want of munitions of war; was attrib. uted, the final failure of the expedition. Though governor Houstoun was a man of great political talents, his military skill had never been tested by experiment; and when the militia of his own state were called into service, the constitution gave him a right to the supreme command. General Howe was aware of this, and did not assume the power of hastening his movements, but in his private letters, complained that they were very tardy.

On the 5th of June, the continental troops, under the command of colonel Elbert, marched for Sattilla river, with orders to take possession of

the ferry, collect such boats as he could find, and throw up some works on each side to facilitate the advance, or cover the retreat of the army, as circumstances might require. Howe complained that the tardy movements of the militia under governor Houstoun and colonel Williamson, had given time to the enemy to put Florida in such a state of defence, as to counteract his plans. He had agreed to form a junction with commodore Bowen, at St. Mary's, on the 12th of June; therefore he was obliged to march from Reid's bluff before the militia arrived. He proceeded without interruption, except from small parties of the enemy, to St. Mary's river, where he found fort Tonyn had been evacuated and demolished. A detachment of the enemy had halted at Alligator creek, fourteen miles south of fort Tonyn, but prepared to retreat with security, should they be pressed by the Americans. Information was received, that twelve hundred men had marched from St. Augustine toward St. John's, and that two gallies, laden with twenty-four pounders and other heavy cannon, were sent round to the entrance of St. John's river, to dispute the passage of the Americans, or to aid in a general engagement, if prudence would justify the risk.

An intelligent deserter from the enemy, gave the following account of the British force in EastFlorida. Eight hundred regular troops, one hundred Florida rangers, one hundred and fifty provincial militia, three hundred and fifty loyalists,

from the Carolinas and Georgia, and two hundred Indians; making a total of fifteen hundred and fifty. In this stage of the campaign, a letter from general Howe, dated July 5th, at the ruins of fort Tonyn, will give the best impressions of his feelings.

"I have been waiting for the gallies first, and after their arrival, a tedious time for the militia of this state, and for the long expected coming of colonel Williamson and our countrymen with him. In short, if I am ever again to depend upon operations I have no right to guide, and men I have no right to command; I shall deem it then, as I now do, one of the most unfortunate incidents of my life. Had we been able to move at once, and those I expected would have been foremost, had only been as ready as we were, a blow might have been given to our enemies, which would have put it out of their power to have disturbed us, at least not hastily; and perhaps have been attended with consequences more important than the most sanguine could have expected; but delayed beyond all possible supposition, embarassed, disappointed, perplexed, and distressed beyond expression; the utmost we could now achieve, will be a poor compensation for the trouble and fatigue we have undergone, excepting we may be allowed to suppose (what I truly think has been effected) that the movements we have made, have drove back the enemy and prevented an impending invasion of the state of Georgia, which would

otherwise inevitably have overwhelmed it, and also a dangerous defection of both states. This good I am persuaded has resulted from it, and this is our consolation. The enemy were two or three days since at Alligator creek, fourteen miles from this place; their forces by all accounts, are at least equal to either the governor's troops or mine, and we are on contrary sides of the river, and not within eight miles of each other. Ask me not how this happened, but rest assured that it has not been my fault. I believe however, that the governor will encamp near me to-night, and if the enemy are still where they were, which I hope to know to-night or to-morrow morning, we shall probably beat up their quarters.

It is to be inferred from the foregoing letter, and other circumstances connected with the subject, that general Howe wished to draw the militia into Florida, where the constitutional powers of governor Houstoun, to command, would cease. Whether any other purpose could have been answered by it, except the personal gratification of general Howe, is doubted. His talents were not above mediocrity, and his generalship while he served in Georgia, was condemned by the officers who served under him, as well as by the people at large.

From fort Tonyn, he ordered three hundred Georgia militia to pursue the enemy, to Alligator creek, to reconnoitre their position, and to attack them if they were not re-inforced or strongly for

tified. An entrenchment had been opened round the camp, fronted by logs and brush, as a substitute for abbatis: at first view the camp was considered assailable, and a detachment of mounted militia, under the command of colonel Elijah Clarke, was ordered to penetrate the camp on the weakest flank, and if practicable to throw the enemy into confusion, of which the main body was to take advantage by advancing quickly on the front. Clarke's detachment acted with great spirit, but their utmost efforts to pass the works were vain and unsuccessful; the horses were entangled among the logs and brush, and with much difficulty got through: when they reached the ditch, it was found too wide to leap over. Here they were met by the fire and huzzas of the enemy, to which the horses had not been accustomed, and they could not be forced to meet it. Co. lonel Clarke was shot through the thigh, and with difficulty escaped falling into the hands of the enemy. A retreat was ordered, and the American loss was three killed and nine wounded. As the execution of this part of the plan of attack had failed, the main body did not attempt to perform that part of the operations, which had been assigned to it. Finding that nothing could be achieved, and that re-inforcements to the enemy were at hand, the Americans retreated and re-joined the

army.

At an early stage of the expedition, the warmth of the climate and change of water began to show