THE LAWS OF A PUBLIC NATURE; WITH A COPIOUS INDEX. FIFTEENTH CONGRESS-FIRST SESSION: 1818, MARCH, 1818. Internal Improvements. H. OF R. quiry. The powers delegated by it are restricted A constitution of government-the offspring of to the collection and application of the public mutual concession among a people jealous of their revenue. Many, indeed the far greater part of freedom, and divided into many distinct sover. the powers subsequently enumerated, require for eignties, alike jealous of their authority-ought their exercise no appropriation of money what- not to be construed as a treatise of political phiever. The very few which do require such aux-losophy-the production of one scientific mind. iliary aid, are the most important of them all, as We cannot be surprised at finding its language "to raise and support armies,"" to provide and redundant in the delegation as well as the limita maintain a navy," and they involve the neces- tion of power. Of this, the particular section sary exercise of many powers, which the mere on which I have just commented affords severa authority to appropriate the public money does examples. The powers to provide and maintai not comprehend. The latter furnishes but one fleets and armies are embraced in the more com means of attaining the common end of all the prehensive authority to declare war, the powe powers of Congress, the general welfare. It to borrow money, and in that of paying the debt may be employed for this purpose either singly, of the nation. Yet, all these powers are sepa or in conjunction with other powers, alike ne- rately and expressly delegated. cessary to this primary and ultimate end of all Government. The defect of the argument which I have sought to answer arises from a supposition that any construction of the clause in question, which extends its import beyond the power of levying taxes, asserts a title to every power whatever, tending in any degree to provide for the common defence and general welfare of the United States. For myself, sir, I totally disavow any such struction. I ask for Congress but the authority, expressly delegated by this clause, to lay and collect taxes, and, when thus collected, so to apply them as to provide for the safety and welfare of the Union. I claim no more, Mr. Chairman, in support o that for which I now contend, than that a powe as expressly delegated as any of those which have enumerated, shall not be subverted by any rule of construction whatever. This power has been exercised from the very foundation of the Federal Government, not merely in the purchase of lands for a variety of purposes, more or less intimately connected with the con convenience of the Government, or with the military defence and commercial prosperity of the United States. It has been substantially applied (as has been already remarked) to the encour agement of domestic manufactures, and (in a form less disguised) to the promotion of foreign em igration; the advancement of agriculture; the cultivation of science, literature, and taste; the diffusion of sentiments of patriotism, benevolence, and piety. Far from being the unbounded authority at which so much alarm has been expressed, it carries along with it several obvious limitations. The end to be obtained by it must be one of common defence, or of general welfare; it must also be one which requires the appropriation of money; and Congress can then no further participate in its attainment, in virtue of this power, than by contributing towards it the public money. The ingenuity of our opponents has not condescended-and surely will not-to distinguish between the release of a debt due to the Treasury, and the appropriation of a sum already collected, in favor of an object of general welfare. One of my colleagues (Mr. SMYTH) has consistently pushed his doctrine of construction to its proper extent. He has denied the constitutionality of the appropriations hitherto made to the Cumberland road, as well as that to the relief of the unfortunate sufferers of Venezuela. The same candor will extend this sentence of condemnation to all the pensions which have been granted, and to all the rewards of valor which have been bestowed by the Federal Government; not only to the whole tariff, but to the institutions in general, to the genius and character of the nation. It cannot be contended that this power is rendered unnecessary by that contained in the last clause of this section-" to make all laws which are necessary and proper for carrying into" effect the powers expressly delegated to Congress. The former is a primary and independent power; the latter but secondary, or auxiliary. Had the latter not been expressed, there can be no doubt (to use the language of Publius) "that it would have resulted to the Government by an unavoidable implication," as it did under the Articles of Confederation. It was inserted in the Federal Constitution to obviate, not to create, doubts. But, There remains, Mr. Chairman, one other clause if deemed essential, this authority extends beyond of the Constitution, hitherto unnoticed in this that in question, and comprehends the power to debate, to which I beg leave to call the attention pass other laws, as well as acts of appropriation. of the Committee, in support of the ConstituIt suffices for my present purpose, while it also tional authority for which I have last contended. obviates an objection of one of my colleagues, The second clause of the third section of the sixth (Mr. SMYTH,) that among those acts it expressly article confers on Congress a power not enumerauthorizes all such as are required for the exer- ated in the section over which we have just cise of the power contained in the clause which passed. It is, "to dispose of and make all needI have endeavored to expound. Both clauses iful rules and regulations respecting the territory resemble each other in one quality, which our ad- and other property belonging to the United versaries seem to disregard they were designed States. The first branch of this authority was to enlarge, rather than to abridge (as is contend-designed, as will appear from the context of the ed) the Constitutional powers of Congress. whole section, to enable the Federal Government 15th CoN, 1st SESS.-42 |