MR. CHIEF JUSTICE HUGHES delivered the opinion of the Court. The petitioners, 'citizens and voters' of the State, sought a writ of mandamus to compel the Secretary of State of New York, in issuing certificates for the election of representatives in Congress, to certify that they are to be elected in the congressional districts defined in the concurrent resolution of the Senate and Assembly of the State, adopted April 10, 1931. The Secretary of State, invoking the provisions of Article I, section 4, of the Constitution of the United States, and those of the Act of Congress of August 8, 1911, c. 5, 37 Stat. 13, and also the requirements of the constitution of the State in relation to the enactment of laws, alleged that the concurrent resolution in question was ineffective, as it had not been submitted to the Governor for approval and had not been approved by him. The Court of Appeals of the State, construing the Federal constitutional provision as contemplating the exercise of the lawmaking power, sustained the respondent's defense and affirmed the decision of the lower courts refusing the writ. 258 N. Y. 292; 179 N. E. 705. This Court granted a writ of certiorari. The State of New York, under the reapportionment pursuant to the Act of Congress of June 18, 1929, c. 28, 46 Stat. 21, 26, is entitled to forty-five representatives in Congress in place of forty-three, the number allotted under the previous apportionment. The Court of Appeals decided that, in the absence of a new districting statute dividing the State into forty-five congressional districts, forty-three representatives are to be elected in the existing districts as defined by the state law, and the two additional representatives by the State at large. For the reasons stated in the opinion in Smiley v. Holm, decided this day, ante, p. 355, the judgment is affirmed. Judgment affirmed. MR. JUSTICE CARDOZO took no part in the consideration or decision of this case. 285 U.S. Argument for Petitioner. CARROLL v. BECKER, SECRETARY OF STATE. CERTIORARI TO THE SUPREME COURT OF MISSOURI. No. 805. Argued March 24, 1932.-Decided April 11, 1932. Decided upon the authority of Smiley v. Holm, ante, p. 355. 328 Mo.; 45 S. W. (2d) 533, affirmed. CERTIORARI* to review a judgment quashing an alternative writ of mandamus. Messrs. Edward F. Colladay and Hyman G. Stein for petitioner. Whatever the term "legislature " meant to the framers of the Constitution when it was adopted it still means. 1 Cooley's Const. Lim., p. 123. When the Constitution was agreed upon, eleven of the original States had adopted constitutions in which the word "legislature" or its equivalent was defined, but not in any one of them was the Governor included as a part of the legislature. The framers must have intended to provide for the uniform operation of the instrument among all of the original States. The carrying out of such intention necessarily required that the word "legislature" should mean the same in each State, and this required the exclusion from that term of the Governor. As was pointed out in Hawke v. Smith, 253 U. S. 221, a "legislature" at the time the Constitution was framed was the representative body which made the laws of the people, and the term is often used in the Constitution with this evident meaning. If the word "legislature" as used in Art. V does not mean the law-making power, then we submit that it does * See table of cases reported in this volume. 380 Opinion of the Court. not mean the law-making power when it is used in Art I, § 4. The Act of August 8, 1911, 37 Stat. 13, has expired by its own limitations. The legislature, in re-districting the State, acted exclusively under Art. I, § 4, of the Constitution. The clause "by the method used in the last preceding apportionment," in the 1929 Act, related only to the arithmetical method of computation. The Act of 1911, has been repealed by the repealing clause (§ 21) of the Act of 1929. Mr. Ray Weightman, Assistant Attorney General of Missouri, with whom Messrs. Stratton Shartel, Attorney General, and L. Cunningham were on the brief, for respondent. MR. CHIEF JUSTICE HUGHES delivered the opinion of the Court. The State of Missouri, under the reapportionment of representatives in Congress (Act of June 18, 1929, c. 28, 46 Stat. 21, 26) is entitled to thirteen representatives in place of sixteen as theretofore. The petitioner brought this proceeding to obtain a writ of mandamus to compel the Secretary of State of Missouri to file a declaration. of the petitioner's candidacy for the office of representative in Congress in one of the congressional districts alleged to have been created by a bill passed by the House of Representatives and the Senate of Missouri in April 1931. An alternative writ was issued, and respondent, Secretary of State, alleged in his return that the bill in question had been vetoed by the Governor and hence had not become a valid law of the State. The Supreme Court of the State, in the view that Article I, section 4, of the Federal Constitution, provided for the enactment of laws, upheld the action of the Secretary of State and quashed the alternative writ. The court also decided that "since the number of representatives for Missouri has been reduced the former districts no longer exist and representatives must be elected at large." 45 S. W. (2d) 533. A writ of certiorari was granted by this Court. The questions are substantially the same as those which were presented in Smiley v. Holm, decided this day, ante, p. 355, and the judgment is affirmed. Judgment affirmed. MR. JUSTICE CARDOZO took no part in the consideration or decision of this case. CLAIBORNE-ANNAPOLIS FERRY CO. v. UNITED STATES ET AL. APPEAL FROM THE SUPREME COURT OF THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA. No. 454. Argued February 18, 1932.-Decided April 11, 1932. 1. Paragraphs 18, 19 and 20 of § 1 of the Interstate Commerce Act, respecting extension and new construction of railroads, are restricted to carriers engaged in transporting persons or property in interstate and foreign commerce and were intended to affect intrastate commerce only as that may be incidental to the effective regulation of interstate commerce. P. 390. 2. A company operating a ferry within a State under a state charter held capable, as a "party in interest," of instituting suit for the purpose of annulling an order and certificate of the Interstate Commerce Commission whereby permission was granted a railway company to extend its line by a ferry over the same waters, and for the purpose of enjoining the railway from constructing and operating such proposed ferry, it appearing from the. bill that such action might directly and adversely affect the welfare of the plaintiff by changing the transportation situation. Id. 3. A suit of this kind is to be tried by the specially constituted District Court, under the Urgent Deficiencies Act of October 22, 1913; 28 U. S. C., § 47. Id. 382 Argument for Appellant. 4. The statute (28 U. S. C., §§ 46, 47) provides that suits to set aside orders of the Interstate Commerce Commission shall be brought in the District Court against the United States, etc., and shall be heard before three judges, at least one of whom must be a circuit judge. Held, that for the District of Columbia, such suits are triable in the Supreme Court of the District before two judges. of that court and a judge of the Court of Appeals of the District. P. 390. 5. In such a suit an order of the Commission permitting extension of a railroad line by adding a ferry is not open to attack upon the ground that the railroad has not corporate power to operate a ferry. P. 391. 6. Where the right of a plaintiff to enjoin an interstate carrier from constructing and operating an extension of its line depends upon the provisions of the Interstate Commerce Act (§ 1, pars. 18-20,) forbidding such construction and operation unless a certificate of convenience and necessity for the extension was granted the defendant carrier by the Commission, the fact that the Commission granted such an order, in a case within its jurisdiction, and upon sufficient evidence, is a complete defense. Id. 7. Evidence before the Commission held enough to support its conclusion that extension of the railway company's line across Chesapeake Bay by means of a ferry would bring material advantages to the public in the way of additional facilities for interstate transportation. P. 392. 59 Wash. L. R. 410, affirmed. APPEAL from a decree of the Supreme Court of the District of Columbia, which dismissed a bill to set aside an order and a certificate of the Interstate Commerce Commission and for an injunction. 166 I. C. C. 293. Messrs. Philip B. Perlman and Jesse I. Miller, with whom Mr. George E. Edelin was on the brief, for appellant. The certificate could be lawfully issued only upon a showing that public convenience and necessity require the establishment and operation of the ferry as a railroad ferry or extension of the railway line, that is, a ferry to be "used by or operated in connection with " the rail line. Application of Utah Terminal Ry., 72 I. C. C. 89, |