Jones, 42 N. H. 25; Graham v. Meyer, 4 Blatchf. 129. Hence, if a partner commits a tort, not as a partner but as an individual, in respect to a matter entirely foreign to the business of the partnership, the other partners are not answerable for his wrong: Schwabacker v. Riddle, 84 Ill. 517; Durant v. Rogers, 71 Ill. 121; Graham v. Meyer, 4 Blatchf. 129; Heirn v. McCaughan, 32 Miss. 17; 66 Am. Dec. 588; Rosenkrans v. Barker, 115 Ill. 331; 56 Am. Rep. 169; Kirk v. Garrett, 84 Md. 383; Marks v. Hastings, 101 Ala. 165, 175; Grund v. Van Vleck, 69 Ill. 478; Titcomb v. James, 57 Ill. App. 296; Van Voorhis v. Brown, 29 App. Div. (N. Y.) 119; Stokes v. Burney, 3 Tex. Civ. App. 219; Abraham v. Hall, 59 Ala. 386; Gwynn v. Duffield, 66 Iowa, 708; 55 Am. Rep. 286.

Thus, a partner is not answerable for the trespass of his copartner in wrongfully taking and carrying away the property of a third person, or other wrongful act, committed by the latter without the former's knowledge or assent, and without the scope of the partnership business, especially when there is no proof that he ratified the same by sharing in the fruits of the wrong: Durant v. Rogers, 71 Ill. 121; but if there is proof which shows, or even tends to show, that the property seized and carried away was appropriated to the benefit of the firm, this would fix the liability of such partner: Durant v. Rogers, 87 Ill. 508. If property is conveyed to a firm composed of two persons, to secure a usurious loan of money made by one of the partners, without the other's knowledge, and the loan is made in a state where such loan and conveyance are void by its laws, the transaction cannot be regarded as within the scope and business of the partnership so as to make the ignorant partner answerable, in tort, for the other's violation of law. To make him liable, it must appear that he authorized or ratified the transaction: Graham v. Meyer, 4 Blatchf. 129. If one partner maliciously prosecutes a person for stealing partnership property, the other members of the firm are not answerable unless they are, in fact, privy to the malicious prosecution: Titcomb v. James, 57 Ill. App. 296, 307, and authorities there cited. One partner is not liable to an action for a malicious prosecution for the arrest of a person by his copartner on a charge of larceny from the firm, unless he advised or participated in the arrest. A mere "knowledge and consent" on his part that the arrest should be made will not render him liable: Gilbert v. Emmons, 42 Ill. 143; 89 Am. Dec. 412. If one member of a firm orders the arrest and imprisonment of a person charged with larceny of the firm's property, another partoer who knew nothing about the matter beforehand, and who did not afterward ratify it, is not answerable in an action for false imprisonment: Kirk v. Garrett, 84 Md. 383. A prosecution for larceny for goods stolen from the firm is not within the scope of a mercantile partnership. Hence, one partner cannot be made answerable for the arrest or prosecution of a person by a copartner, on a charge of stealing partnership property, unless he advises, directs, or participates therein, and even then, it has been held, he is liable only in his individual capacity: Marks v. Hastings, 101 Ala. 165, 175. One partner cannot involve another in a trespass unless in the ordinary

course of their business, and in a case where the trespass is in the nature of a taking which is available to the partnership; and, in such a case, to render the partner liable, who did not join in the commission of the trespass, he must afterward, according to some authorities, have concurred and received the benefit of it. Furthermore, the subsequent approval of a trespass by a third person does not render him answerable unless the act was originally done in his name or for his use. From these principles, it follows that, if a member of a partnership, which firm acts as agents for the owner of demised property, commits a trespass in expelling the tenant and removing his goods from the premises, the other partner, who took no part in the act and knew nothing of it at the time, and neither advised nor directed it, is not answerable merely because he subsequently approved and sanctioned the act after its commission: Grund v. Van Vleck, 69 Ill. 478. If a partnership holds a chattel mortgage upon the goods of a person who is in default, the firm has a right to take possession of the mortgaged property, if It can be done peaceably, but one member of the firm is not liable for the tort or trespass of another in taking possession of the property, committed without his knowledge or consent: Titcomb v. James, 57 Ill. App. 296. Another well-settled general principle of the law of partnership is. that a note given by one partner in the firm name in payment of his individual debt cannot be enforced against the firm by one taking the note with full knowledge of the facts. Hence, if a partner, who is a postmaster, gives a note in the name of his firm to secure a loan made to him by the payee, to enable such partner to replace government money which he has wrongfully and criminally appropriated to the payment of a partnership debt without the knowledge of his copartners, the payee cannot enforce the note against the maker's copartners, for the transaction is not within the scope of the partnership business, but is entirely distinct therefrom, though the firm may, in a certain sense, profit thereby. However this may be, the fact remains that the obligation to restore the money thus appropriated by the partner is purely a personal one: Van Voorhis v. Brown, 29 N. Y. App. Div. 119, 121. If one member of a firm purchases cotton, which is liable for rent, and such purchase is not made for the firm, but for himself alone, and the cotton is converted to his own use, the other partner is not answerable where he had nothing to do with its conversion and received none of its proceeds: Stokes v. Burney, 3 Tex. Civ. App. 219.

Negligence. All the members of a partnership are answerable for an injury occasioned by the negligence of one of the firm while transacting its business: Linton v. Hurley, 14 Gray, 191. If physicians are in partnership, all are answerable in damages for the professonal negligence or malpractice of any one of them: Hyrne v. Erwin, 23 S. C. 226; 55 Am. Rep. 15; Whittaker v. Collins, 34 Minn. 299; 57 Am. Rep. 55; Hess v. Lowrey, 122 Ind. 225; 17 Am. St. Rep. 355. So, if a horse is borrowed by one member of a firm, to be used in and about the partnership business, and is lost by his negligence or other wrongful act, the firm is answerable to

the owner for the loss or conversion: Witcher v. Brewer, 49 Ala. 119. And if one member of a firm of butchers, in furtherance of the partnership business, and for its benefit, puts poisoned meat outside of a slaughterhouse, but negligently places it where dogs might be expected to get it, the partnership is answerable to the owner of a dog which dies from eating such meat: Dudley v. Love, 60 Mo. App. 420. But where one member of a firm of apothecaries negligently permitted a customer to help himself to a dose of medicine without paying for it, and by mistake he took poison instead of what he intended to take, it was held that giving away medicines was not a part of the firm's business, and that the innocent copartner was not, therefore, answerable for the result: Gwynn v. Duffield, 66 Iowa, 708; 55 Am. Rep. 286. If partners are jointly liable as wrongdoers, an action will lie against one of them, who may be made answerable for the negligent act of the firm's agent: Wood v. Luscomb, 23 Wis. 287; White v. Smith, 12 Rich. 595.

Conversion, Generally.-A firm may be held answerable in trover for a conversion by one partner. It is not necessary that there should be a joint conversion, in fact, in order to implicate all the partners, as such a conversion may arise by construction of law. A joint conversion may be implied, in law, by consent of a partner to the acts of his copartners. An assent by some of the partners to a conversion by the others will make them wrongdoers equally with the rest, if the conversion was for their use and benefit, and they were in a situation to have originally commanded the conversion; and one partner's conversion of property which has been delivered to him for purposes connected with the business of the firm, is deemed to be the act of the firm, unless repudiated by the other partners: Loomis v. Barker, 69 Ill. 360; Bane v. Detrick, 52 Ill. 19, 28; Nisbet v. Patton, 4 Rawle, 120; 26 Am. Dec. 122; Head v. Goodwin, 37 Me. 181; McCrillis v. Hawes, 38 Me. 566; Fletcher v. Ingram, 46 Wis. 191; Witcher v. Brewer, 49 Ala. 119; Hall v. Younts, 87 N. C. 285. Thus, trover will lie for property taken under a void attachment, not only against the constable who seized it, but against the members of a firm, who were creditors of the owner and sold the property under execution, where one of them ordered the property to be seized, but refused to give it up on demand of the owner, while the other declined to do anything about it, but referred the owner to his partner. The principle which controls in such a case is that whatever one partner does in the collection of a firm debt is presumptively done with the sanction of the other: Rolfe v. Dudley, 58 Mich. 208; Harvey v. McAdams, 32 Mich. 472. So if one partner places a claim in the hands of a constable for collection, and the property of a stranger is sold under attachment or execution, in his effort to collect the claim, both partners are answerable to the owner, in trover, for the conversion, where the other partner was present at the sale, bid on the property, and treated and spoke of it as having taken and sold on the process issued upon the claim due the firm, particularly where he received the proceeds of the sale as a payment on such claim: Loomis v. Barker, 69 Ill. 360. And two partners must be considered as

having acted as one for their joint benefit, and are jointly liable in trover, where one goes to a distant place, and, to secure a claim due the firm, takes possession of a man's store in his absence, and sells the goods therein, if the other partner remains at home, though he promised to go there, and credits the proceeds of the goods, on account of the firm, to the debtor, particularly where, upon the return of his partner, and upon being informed of what has taken place, he approves of his partner's conduct and in nowise dissents therefrom: Bane v. Detrick, 52 Ill. 19, 23. If property is wrongfully taken by partners and sold, a subsequent settlement with the owner for one-half by one, is no defense, in an action against the other for the remaining value: McCrillis v. Hawes, 38 Me. 566. If a commercial firm wrongfully converts the property of a decedent's estate, the members thereof are answerable in solido: Birdsall v. Bemiss, 2 La. Ann. 449. The refusal, by one partner, to deliver goods upon demand, which have been received by the firm as bailees is evidence of a conversion by all the partners: Holbrook v. Wight, 24 Wend. 169; 35 Am. Dec. 607; and if the members of a firm are sued as individuals for the conversion of plain. tiff's property, evidence of transactions with the firm in respect to it, and of the membership thereof, is competent to affect them: Hall v. Younts, 87 N. C. 285.

Misapplication of Moneys or Property.-If one member of a firm appropriates or misapplies moneys or property in its custody, within the scope of its business, or in the custody of such partner as a representative of the firm, such act will make each partner answerable to the owner for such conversion: Jackson v. Todd, 56 Ind. 406; Pundmann v. Schoenich, 144 Mo. 149; Ex parte Biddulph, 3 De Gex & S. 587; and this rule applies to law partnerships: Harman v. Davey, 2 El. & B. 61; St. Aubyn v. Smart, L. R. 3 Ch. App. 646; Rhodes v. Moules [1895], 1 Ch. 236; Plummer v. Gregory, L. R. 18 Eq. 621; In re Ketchum, 1 Fed. Rep. 815; Cleather v. Twisden, L. R. 24 Ch. Div. 731; Eager v. Barnes, 31 Beav. 579; Willet v. Chambers, Cowp. 814; Fornes v. Wright, 91 Iowa, 392, 395; McGill v. McGill, 2 Met. (Ky.) 258. Hence, if the treasurer of a city deposits its funds in banks, in the name of a firm of which he is the manager, or commingles them with money in the firm's drawer, and they are paid out by checks drawn in the name of the firm, the result is a conversion by the firm of the city's money, particularly where the other members of the partnership have knowledge of the facts. Such funds are, therefore, trust funds in the hands of the firm, and all the property of the firm is chargeable with their amount: Pundmann v. Schoenich, 144 Mo. 149. So if the active member of a firm engaged in making sales to a railroad, for which it receives its pay from the state, defrauds the state out of a large sum by duplicate bills and bogus accounts, the innocent partner is answerable: Alexander v. State, 56 Ga. 478. So if one member of a firm of attorneys doing a collection business collects money from a client and absconds with it, his partner is answerable: Dwight v. Simon, 4 La. Ann. 490.

The mere collection of money, it is true, is not professional busi

ness, nor does its performance require the exercise of legal skill; but if attorneys at law, being members of a firm, undertake business of this kind, the undertaking involves the same liabilities that are incurred by ordinary partnerships, and each member of the firm continues bound for the performance of all the partnership undertakings begun but not completed prior to a dissolution of the firm; and if the dissolution results from the death of one of the partners, his estate still continues answerable for their performance, as where one of the partners of a firm of lawyers died before moneys collected for clients by the firm were paid over: McGill v. McGill, 2 Met. (Ky.) 258, 263, per Simpson, C. J. There are also many other things an attorney may do, and which the law does not enjoin upon him as a duty, yet they are within the scope of his business. Hence, while the furnishing of a surety on an attachment bond, and the receiving of money to indemnify such surety, is not a duty enjoined upon a firm of lawyers, and is not an absolute necessity to the carrying on of the partnership business, still such acts are proper to be done in furtherance of a client's interest, and, when so done, all of the members of the firm, whether cognizant of the facts or not, are bound by the individual act of a partner, done in the firm name, and in furtherance of its interests: Fornes v. Wright, 91 Iowa, 392, 395. An innocent partner's liability for the tort or wrong of a copartner in appropriating or misapplying moneys or property has sometimes been made to depend, apparently, upon his want of knowledge, at the time of the transaction: Bishop v. Countess of Jersey, 2 Drew. 143; but, where money or property in the custody of one member of a firm is appropriated or misapplied by him, it is immaterial whether the other partners knew anything about it or not: Cleather v. Twisden, L. R. 24 Ch. Div. 731; Dwight v. Simon, 4 La. Ann. 490; Alexander v. State, 56 Ga. 478; Brydges v. Branfill, 12 Sim. 369; Blair v. Bromley, 2 Phill. Ch. 354; for it has been justly observed that "one can hardly see what the knowledge or means of knowledge has to do with it, if covered by the scope of the business."

On the other hand, if money or property comes into the hands of a partner in the course of some transaction unconnected with the firm business, his appropriation or misapplication thereof will not affect his innocent copartners, where the firm does not receive the benefit of the wrong: Alexander v. State, 56 Ga. 478; Adams v. Sturges, 55 Ill. 468; Ex parte Eyre, 1 Phill. Ch. 227; Coomer v. Bromley, 5 De Gex & S. 532; Dounce v. Parsons, 45 N. Y. 180. Thus, if a promissory note is delivered to one member of a firm, as collecting agent, his refusal to redeliver the note does not make his copartners answerable for the amount thereof: Linn v. Ross, 16 N. J. L. 55.

Misuse of Trust Funds.-It has been held that, if one member of a firm uses trust moneys of a third person in the business of the partnership, and commingles them with those of the firm, a partnership liability is created, and the firm is answerable therefor, even where such trust moneys were so used without the knowledge of the other partners: Welker v. Wallace, 31 Ga. 362; Palmer v. Scott,