defendant was at sea, and it had been impossible for him to learn that there was such a law. But the judges were of opinion that it would be proper to apply for a pardon. R. v. Bailey, Russell & R. 1, B. 280.

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(U. S. C. C., 1873.) Woman Voting, to Test Right. Indictment against Susan B. Anthony for a violation of the act of congress of May 31, 1870 (16 Stat. 144), which provides "that if, at any election for representative in the congress of the United States, any person shall knowingly vote without having a lawful right to vote, every such person shall be deemed guilty of a crime," etc. HUNT, J. The fourteenth amendment gives no right to a woman to vote, and the voting by Miss Anthony was in violation of law. If she believed she had a right to vote, and voted in reliance upon that belief, does that relieve her from the penalty? It is argued that the knowledge referred to in the act relates to her knowledge of the illegality of the act, and not to the act of voting; for, it is said, that she must know that she voted. Two principles apply here: First, ignorance of the law excuses no one; second, every person is presumed to understand and to intend the necessary effects of his own acts. Miss Anthony knew that she was a woman, and that the constitution of this state prohibits her from voting. She intended to violate that provision-intended to test it, perhaps, but certainly intended to violate it. The necessary effect of her act was to violate it, and this she is presumed to have intended. There was no ignorance of any fact, but, all the facts being known, she undertook to settle a principle in her own person. She takes the risk, and she cannot escape the consequences. To constitute a crime, it is true there must be a criminal intent, but it is equally true that knowledge of the facts of the case is always held to supply this intent. An intentional killing bears with it evidence of malice in law. Whoever without justifiable cause, intentionally kills his neighbor, is guilty of a crime. The principle is the same in the case before us, and in all criminal cases. The precise question now before me has been several times decided, viz., that one illegally voting was bound and was assumed to know the law, and that a belief that he had a right to vote gave no defense, if there was no mistake of fact. Hamilton v. P., 57 Barb. 625; S. v. Boyett, 10 Ired. 336; S. v. Hart, 6 Jones (N. C.) 389; McGuire v. S., 7 Humph. (Tenn.) 54; S. v. Sheeley, 15 Iowa 404. No system of criminal jurisprudence can be sustained upon any other principle. U. S. v. Anthony, 11 Blatchf. 200, Fed. Cas. No. 14, 459, F. 104, 2 Green 208, Kn. 54.

(Me. Sup. Judicial Ct., 1876.) Supposed Marriage Avoided. PETERS, J. The respondents are jointly indicted for adultery, they having cohabited as husband and wife while the female respondent was lawfully married to another man who is still alive. The only

question found in the exceptions is, whether the evidence offered and rejected should have been received. This was, that the lawful husband had married again, and that the justice of the peace who united the respondents in matrimony advised them that, on that account, they had the right to intermarry, and that they believed the statement to be true, and acted upon it in good faith. It is urged for the respondents that those facts would show that they acted without any guilty intent. It is undoubtedly true that the crime of adultery cannot be committed without a criminal intent. But the intent may be inferred from the criminality of the act itself. Lord Mansfield states the rule thus: "Where an act, in itself indifferent, becomes criminal if done with a particular intent, there the intent must be proved and found; but where the act is in itself unlawful, the proof of justification or excuse lies on the defendant; and in failure thereof, the law implies a criminal intent." Here the accused have intentionally committed an act which is in itself unlawful. In excuse for it, they plead their ignorance of the law. This cannot excuse them. Ignorance of the law excuses no one. Be sure, this maxim, like all others, has its exceptions. None of the exceptions, however, can apply here. Exceptions overruled. S. v. Goodenow, 65 Me. 30, B. 309.

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(Nev. Sup. Ct., 1896.) Bigamy-Separation Agreement. Appellant was convicted of bigamy on proof that he was married to S by written contract without the services of any person authorized by law to join persons in marriage, that two years later the appellant was married before a justice of the peace to L, while S was living. He assigns as error the rejection of his agreement in writing with S, executed before the second marriage, whereby they severed their marital relations. It is argued that the agreement was proper evidence to go to the jury, as tending to show that there was no criminal intent on the part of the defendant in entering into the second marriage, he believing that the agreement had annulled the first marriage. BONNIFIELD, J. # The rule adopted by the majority of the court in the said Gardner case (5 Nev. 377), to the effect that where a statute forbids the doing of a certain thing, and is silent concerning the intent with which it is done, a person commits no offense in law, though he does the forbidden thing, within all the words of the statute, if he had no evil or wrongful intent beyond that which is involved in the doing of the prohibited act, is disapproved, and the decision to that effect is hereby overruled. We recognize the well settled rule that where a specific intent is required by statute to constitute a crime, such specific intent enters into the nature of the act itself, and must be alleged and proved beyond a reasonable doubt. There is no intent involved in this case, except the doing of the thing forbidden to be done by the statute. We there

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fore hold that the court did not err in excluding said agreement.

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Affirmed. S. v. Zichfeld, 23 Nev. 304, 46 Pac. 802, 62 Am. St. Rep. 800, 34 L. R. A. 784.

(N. Ham. Sup. Ct., 1897.) Intent to Violate the Law. Indictment for compounding a violation of the liquor law. Defendant convicted, and excepts. BLODGETT, J. ** * # The ruling that "if the defendant knew what he was doing and did what he intended to do, it was immaterial what his opinion was as to the legal effect of what he was doing, and it would be no defense that he did not know he was violating the law," was manifestly correct. "A man's moral perceptions may be so perverted as to imagine an act to be right and legal which the law justly pronounces fraudulent and corrupt; but he is not therefore to escape from the consequences of it." Bump Fr. Conv. (3d ed.) 25. "Ignorance of a fact may sometimes be taken as evidence of a want of criminal intent, but not ignorance of the law" (Reynolds v. U. S., 98 U. S. 145); and "in no case can one enter a court of justice to which he has been summoned in either a civil or criminal proceeding, with the sole and naked defense that when he did the act complained of, he did not know of the existence of the law which he violated." 1 Bish. Cr. L. (7th ed.), § 294. It is elementary, as well as indispensable to the orderly administration of justice, that every man is presumed to know the laws of the country in which he dwells, and also to intend the necessary and legitimate consequences of what he knowingly does. * Affirmed. S. v. Carver, 69 N. H. 216,

39 Atl. 973, Kn. 308.

(Eng. Assize, 1828.) On Indictment for Robbing a Gamekeeper of a pheasant the gamekeeper had taken from wires wrongfully set by defendant, the court charged the jury to acquit if defendant acted under the impression that the pheasant was his property; because in that case there would be no animus furandi. R. v. Hall, 3 C. & P. 409, B. 281, C. 85, 3 L. 580.

(Mass. Sup. Judicial Ct., 1857.) Getting Pay. Defendant was indicted for larceny, and on the trial it appeared that she had loaned $200 to M. Dorsey, taking his note therefor, in the presence of prosecutor Patrick, his son; that the money was invested in a shop by Patrick; that his father soon died, leaving no will; that no administration was had, but Patrick took all the property, and went to Connecticut to live; that about four years after the loan was made, Patrick passed the night at a house where defendant then was; that, before going to bed, he counted out his money on a table near his bed; and that defendant, then being present, immediately took up the money, saying she had a right to it, that she had been looking for it a long time, now she had it, and she proposed to keep it. The court instructed the jury that if defendant took the money under an honest belief that she had a right to

take that specific money in the way and under the circumstances she did, she would not be guilty of larceny, although in fact she may have had no such legal right. On exception by the state, the instruction was held to be correct. C. v. Stebbins, 8 Gray 492, C. 83.

(Eng. Assize, 1879.) Setting Fire to Furze growing on the common was held by LOPES, J., not to be within 24 & 25 Vict. c. 97, § 16, "wilfully and maliciously" if defendant thought she had a right to do it. R. v. Twose, 14 Cox C. C. 327, B. 283, C. 84, 3 L. 581.

§ 55. "That the Defendant was an Infant."

Age of Presumed Discretion. "It is clear that an infant above 14 and under 21 is equally subject to capital punishments, as well as others of full age; for it is presumptio juris, that after 14 years they are doli capaces, and can discern between good and evil; and if the law should not animadvert upon such offenders by reason of their nonage, the kingdom would come to confusion." 1 Hale P. C. 25.

(Eng. Assize, 1338.) Evidence of Discretion-Effect. A girl of 13 years of age was burnt because while she was servant to a woman she killed her mistress: and it was found to be so and adjudged treason. And it was said that by the old law no one under age was hung, or suffered judgment of life or limb. But SPIGURNEL found that an infant of 10 years of age killed his companion and concealed him; and he caused him to be hung, because by the concealment he showed that he knew how to distinguish between evil and good. And so malice makes up for age. Anon., Horwood's Year Book, 11 & 12 Edw. 3, p. 626, Mi. 252, Lib. Ass. Ann. 12, f. 37, pl. 30, Brooke Abr. Corone 74, Fitz. Abr. Corone 170, Ke. 41.

(Eng. C. C. R., 1486.) Same-Purpose of Punishment. An infant of the age of 9 years killed another of 9 years and confessed. And it was also found that when he had done it he hid himself and also excused the blood on his clothes by saying he had nose bleed. And they held that he should be hung. FAIRFAX, J., said that it was said by Sir John Fortesque that the reason of such hanging for murder was for an example to others that they should be treated the same. But if an infant or a man that had not discretion should kill a man they should not be hung; for no person of their discretion could set an example; and this note well. Anon. Y. B. 3 Hen. 7, 1 pl. 4, Brooke Abr. Corone 133, Fitz. Abr. Corone 57, 1 Hale P. C. 26.

(Eng. C. C. R., 1748.) Same-Concealment. A boy of 10 was convicted before WILLES, C. J., at Bury assize, of murder of a girl of 5 years; but out of regard for the prisoner's tender years, the chief justice respited execution to take the opinion of the judges. The boy and girl were parish children, left in care of a parishioner, who with his wife went to work early in the morning, leaving the children in bed together. When they returned the girl was missing; and the boy, on inquiry, said he had helped her on with her clothes but did not know where she had gone. On search, her body was found frightfully mangled and slightly buried in a dungheap near the house. At first the boy denied it; but being questioned, finally cried and said he did it and then washed the blood off his hands as well as he could, stating as his reason that she had fouled the bed (which proved false), and finally that the devil set him up to it. The judges having taken time to consider, agreed unanimously: 1, that the confessions of the boy repeated before the grand jury, before the magistrate after warning of the consequence, and again after being alone several hours, was competent to submit to the jury; and, 2, that supposing the boy to have been guilty of the fact, there were so many circumstances which are undoubtedly tokens of what Lord Hale called mischievous discretion, that he was a proper subject for capital punishment; for it would be very dangerous consequence to have it thought that children may commit such atrocious crimes with impunity. The boy was finally pardoned, on condition of immediately entering the sea service. R. v. York, Foster C. L. 70, 1 Hale P. C. (1 Am. ed.) 26, editor's note, 1 Russell on Crimes 4, 1 B. & II. 68-n.

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(Ill. Sup. Ct., 1880.) Burden of Proof of Discretion. Appellant and his father indicted for murder. The father was found not guilty, because insane, and appellant convicted. Motion for new trial was denied. WALKER, J. * The statute has provided (Crim. Code, § 282) that a person shall be considered of sound mind who is neither an idiot nor lunatic, nor affected with insanity, and who has arrived at the age of fourteen, or before that age if such person knows the distinction between good and evil. The 283d section provides that an infant under ten years of age shall not be found guilty of any crime or misdemeanor. * There is uncontradicted evidence in the record that plaintiff in error was little more than eleven years of age when the homicide was committed. This evidence was not contradicted, but was virtually conceded by the eighth instruction asked and given for the people. If this was true, and the evidence tended to prove it, the rule required evidence strong and clear beyond all doubt and contradiction, that he was capable of discerning between good and evil; and the legal presumption being that he was incapable of committing the crime, for want of such knowledge, it devolved on the people to make the strong and clear proof of capacity, before they could be entitled to a conviction.