# * # aries of the state of North Carolina. The prisoners have been convicted of murder, and the question presented is whether they committed that offense within the jurisdiction of this state. It is a general principle of universal acceptation that one state or sovereignty cannot enforce the penal or criminal laws of another, or punish crimes or offenses committed in and against another state or sovereignty. * It cannot be doubted that the place of the assault or stroke in the present case was in Tennessee, and it is also clear that the offense of murder at common law was committed within the jurisdiction of that state. If this be so it must follow that unless we have some statute expressly conferring jurisdiction upon the courts of this state, or making the act of shooting under the circumstances a substantive murder, the offense with which the prisoners are charged can only be tried by the tribunals of Tennessee. There being, then, no concurrent jurisdiction at common law, we will now consider whether it has been conferred by statute; for it is well settled that "whenever a homicide is committed partly in and partly out of the jurisdiction where the charge is made, the power to punish it depends upon the question whether so much of the act as operates in the county or state in which the offender is indicted and tried has been declared to be punishable by the law of that jurisdiction." Kerr on Homicide, 226; C. v. Macloon [supra], Our statute* * * provides: "In all cases of felonious homicide, when the assault shall have been made within this state and the person assaulted shall die without the limits thereof, the offender shall be indicted and punished for the crime in the county where the assault was made, in the same manner, to all intents and purposes as if the person assaulted had died within the limits of this state." This statute has received a judicial construction by this court in S. v. Dunkley, 3 Ired. 116, and it was held that it did not create any new offense, but merely removed a difficulty which existed as to the place of the trial. In view of the authorities cited it can hardly be contended that the assault in the present case was committed in this state, and especially is this so when the assault mentioned in the statute evidently means not a mere attempt, but such an injury inflicted in this state, which results in death in another state. This would seem manifest from the history of the legislation as well as the language of the act, which plainly contemplates that every part of the offense, except the death, must have occurred in this state. It was a subject of doubt, as we have seen, whether the accused could be tried in the place of the stroke, the death having occurred without the jurisdiction, and it was to remove this doubt alone that this and similar legislation was resorted to. It was, of course, never questioned that the place where both the stroke and the death occurred was the place where the crime was committed. The fact that the prisoners and the deceased were citizens of the state of North Carolina cannot affect the conclusion we have reached. If, as we * have seen, the offense was committed in Tennessee, the personal jurisdiction generally claimed by nations over their subjects who have committed offenses abroad or on the high seas cannot be asserted by this state. Such jurisdiction does not exist as between the states of the union under their peculiar relation to each other (Rorer's Interstate Law, 308), and even if it could be rightfully claimed it could not in a case like the present be enforced in the absence of a statute providing that the offense should be tried in North Carolina. Even in England, where it seems the broadest claim to such jurisdiction is asserted, a statute (33 Hen. VIII.) appears to have been necessary in order that the courts of that country could try a murder committed in Lisbon by one British subject upon another. R. v. Sawyer, Russell & Ryan Cr. Cases 294. We are of the opinion that it is competent for the legislature to determine what acts within the limits of the state shall be deemed criminal, and to provide for their punishment. Certainly, there could be no complaint where all the parties concerned in the homicide are citizens of North Carolina. New trial granted. S. v. Hall, 114 N. Car. 909, 19 S. E. 602, 41 Am. St. Rep. 822, 28 L. R. A. 59, Kn. 377. * * § 88. "If Goods Stolen in One Place are Taken to Another." (Eng. King's Bench, 1406.) Goods Carried to Another County. A man was appealed of larceny in Middlesex, while the felony was done in London; and the court was informed that the appellee, after the felony done, took the goods into Middlesex county. The court said the appeal was well taken; for when a man robs another of his goods and carries them into other counties, he commits the crime in each county, and the appeal may be brought in whichever county the plaintiff wishes. Anon., Y. B. 7 Hen. 4, 43 pl. 9, B. 595. * * (Eng. Exchequer Chamber, 1489.) Same. Same. One was arraigned upon an indictment, for stealing certain goods, in the county of Surrey. And the defendant said that he was indicted for taking the same goods on the same day in Middlesex, and thereof acquitted. And prayed judgment. FISHER. It is no plea, for it shall be taken most beneficially for the king, and they may have been taken twice. FROWİKE, to the contrary. For where goods are stolen in one county, and carried into another county, he may be indicted in each county, and shall have judgment of life; and, therefore, it is reason that if he should be acquitted in one county, he should be acquitted in the other county. And if one should be beaten in one county, and after die in another county, and indictment in both counties, it is reason that if he should be acquitted in one county that should help him in the other county, etc. HUSSEY [C. J.]. It seems no plea. And as I understand, trespass for battery done in one county cannot be found in another county on pain of attaint; and the same law of goods taken and carried out of the county where they were taken, it can be found only in the county where the taking occurred, and that on pain of attaint. But the law is otherwise in appeal; for there he may bring an appeal in each county where the goods are carried. And this has been a diversity, for the appeal is to recover his goods, and affirms property continually in the party, etc., but it is otherwise of trespass; for it is not to recover the goods, but damages for the goods, etc. And, sir, I take it, if one steals my goods, and another steals the goods from him, I shall have an appeal against the second felon, but it is otherwise of trespass. And notwithstanding the appeal lies in each county where the goods are carried, still he cannot be indicted except where the taking was made, for the indictment is not to have the goods, etc.; and that has been the diversity between indictment and appeal. And, so here, notwithstanding he submits that it is the same felony, that cannot be tried; for if it should be tried, it ought to be tried by both counties, and here neither of them can give evidence to the other, for the takings are so several that one cannot give evidence nor notice to the other; and therefore, notwithstanding mischief shall happen to the party, such mischief shall be borne; for in one county, etc., without cause; and yet he ought to answer. FAIRFAX, J., agreed to the diversity between appeal, indictment, and trespass, etc., and said that the allegation that it is the same felony could not be tried by both counties when he is acquitted in one county, and those of this county cannot give evidence of any felony in that county. And then Mordant pleaded the plea, and prayed allowance of it; and as to the felony, not guilty. And the chief justice said that he should have the plea, because it is matter in law, and the other matter in fact. And all the court was against him. And it was held by all the justices and barons that in a writ of trespass in Middlesex it is no plea to say he has recovered for a trespass committed in the county of Surrey, because it could not be intended as the same trespass; but some at the bar held that it is different in felony, for it is felony in every county where the goods are, or come, etc. Anon., Y. B. 4 Hen. 7, 5, pl. 1, B. 596. (Mass. Sup. Jud. Ct., 1806.) Receiving Goods Stolen in Another State. Goods having been stolen in New Hampshire and brought to and received by defendant at Boston, Mass., he was convicted. of receiving stolen goods in Boston; and the conviction was affirmed on exception to this court, on the ground that if the principal could be tried and convicted in that county, as had been decided in a previous case, the accessory could also be tried there. C. v. Andrews, 2 Mass. 14, 3 Am. Dec. 17-n, C. 436. (Eng. C. C. R., 1832.) Goods Brought into England. The prisoner was indicted for larceny in Dorset county and convicted on proof that he took the goods at St. Helier's in Jersey island, and was soon found with them in his possession in Weymouth, Dorset county. "A doubt occurred, whether the original taking was such whereof the common law could take cognizance; and, if not, whether the case fell within the statute 7 and 8 Geo. 4, c. 29, § 76; or in other words, whether the island of Jersey could be considered as part of the united kingdom. At a meeting of all the judges, (except Lyndhurst, C. B., and Taunton, J.) they held unanimously that the conviction was wrong, and that the case was not within the statute." R. v. Prowess, 1 Moody C. C. 349, B. 597, 2 B. & H. 224n, C. 379. ** * ** * (Vt. Sup. Ct., 1839.) Respondent Stole Oxen in Canada and brought them into this state, for which he was convicted of larceny here. He moved in arrest of judgment. The motion was overruled, and he excepted. REDFIELD, J. The only remaining ground urged by the respondent's counsel is that an indictment for larceny cannot be sustained here where the original caption was in the province of Canada. If this question were entirely new and to be now decided upon the weight of authority at common law, I confess I should incline to the view taken by the respondent's counsel. For it is expressly laid down by all the English law writers upon this subject, that "if the original taking be such whereof the common law cannot take cognizance, or if the goods be taken at sea, the thief cannot be indicted of the larceny in any county into which he shall carry them." 2 Russell on Crimes, 175. The case of the Pirates, 3 Inst. 113; 1 Hawk. P. C. c. 33, § 32. The same exceptions obtained in regard to goods taken in any other part of the united kingdom and brought into any county in England. R. v. Anderson, 2 East's P. C. c. 16, § 156, p. 772. These obstacles were removed by the statute of 45 & 54 Geo. III., and 7 & 8 Geo. IV. But in this state the rule has been too long settled, and recognized by too long and uniform a course of practice and decision, to be now changed, unless it be by act of the legislature. We think, too, that the reasons are quite sufficient why the law, upon principles of mere policy, should not be changed. Larceny consists in the felonious taking and carrying away of the goods of another. It implies a forcible violation of the right of the owner in regard to possession as well as property; and that this should be done secretly or feloniously. Now, precisely the same reason found in all the books, why the offender is guilty of larceny, in every county into which he conveys the goods; viz.-"that every moment's continuance of the trespass and felony amounts to a new caption and asportation, "-will apply to the present case with the same force of its original use. Hence it has been decided, that where goods are taken in one of the United States and brought into another, the offender may be indicted in the latter state, and there tried. S. v. Mockridge, decided by this court, some years since, in the county of Chittenden, and not reported. The same rule obtains in some of the other states. C. v. Cullins, 1 Mass. R. 116; C. v. Andrews, 2 Mass. 14 [above]; S. v. Ellis, 3 Conn. 185. New York and North Carolina have decided otherwise. It is believed no good reason can be urged why the rule should apply as between the American states and not extend to all countries. These states, so far as punishment for crime is concerned, are as foreign to each other as distinct nations. There could be no pretence, that in the case of Mockridge, the stealing of money, in the state of New York, was any more punishable here than if he had taken it in Canada, or even in a country where there is no law on the subject. It could only be upon the ground that the bringing the money into this state "amounted to a new caption and asportation," like the carrying of goods feloniously through more than one county, which is indictable in either county. Such has been the long established practice in this state. A case is mentioned by one of my brethren as having occurred while the late Judge Tichenor was chief justice of this court, where the original taking was in Canada, and the offender was convicted here. Other cases of a similar character are known to have occurred in the state at different periods. We are not disposed to relax the rule. The argument that it might operate severely upon offenders who took property in a remote section of the union and, after having carried it through many intervening states, should finally be arrested, having passed perhaps a jurisdiction where larceny was a capital offense, is one of those arguments ab inconvenienti which are always specious, but not always safe to be relied upon. It is sufficient to say that no country not absolutely barbarous would ever presume to punish any one a second time for the same offense. Again, it would never be in the power of a second jurisdiction to punish the same offense unless the first jurisdiction, after having inflicted the utmost punishment, should surrender the expiated offender to be still further punished, which is not a supposable case in any Christian country. Exceptions overruled. S. v. Bartlett, 11 Vt. 650, C. 376. Acc. S v. Underwood, 49 Me. 181, 77 Am. Dec. 254; Contra: Lee v. S, 64 Ga. 203, 37 Am. Rep. 67; C. v. Uprichard, 3 Gray (69 Mass.) 434, 63 Am. Dec. 762, 5 L. 501; Stanley v. S., 24 Ohio St. 166, 15 Am. Rep. 604, B. 605, 5 L. 508. (Mass. Sup. Jud. Ct., 1857.) Goods Stolen in R. I. Brought to Mass. Defendant broke and entered a shop in Smithfield, R. I., and stole goods and brought them into Massachusetts. He was convicted on indictment for stealing in Massachusetts on proof of these facts. He excepted. SHAW, C. J. A majority of the court are of the opinion that this case must be considered as settled by the case of C. v. Uprichard, 3 Gray, 434, and the principles stated and the precedents cited. Though to some extent these colonies before the Revolution were distinct governments and might have different |