son in a quarrel, nor was the killing intentional. Hence, the latter clause of the definition of the crime is the one to which our investigation should be confined. The state was required to show that while the killing was unintentional, it was done by Johnson while he was in the commission of some unlawful act; and the question arises whether the negligent act or acts of the slayer, though no breach of any law, may be sufficient to constitute the unlawful act designated in the statute? Or, is the state required to show that he was in the commission of an act prohibited by law? At the time of this homicide there was even no ordinance of the village of Sciota regulating the speed or manner of riding bicycles upon its streets. In our judgment the unlawful act, the commission of which gives color and character to the unintentional killing, is an act prohibited by law, and that such is the natural meaning of the term or clause when used in the parlance of criminal jurisprudence. * If the contention of the state in this case is tenable, it is not difficult to see how the criminal dockets of our courts will soon be flooded. The gross negligence of one may cause the death of many. The position is untenable. Plaintiff in error is discharged. Johnson v. S., 66 Ohio St. 59, 63 N. E. 607, 90 Am. St. Rep. 564. Compare cases under §§ 11, 23, and 40. * ** * * * * § 13. Repeals and Amendments. * * * (Mass. Sup. Judicial Ct., 1831.) Amendment Between Act and Trial. Indictment for disinterring a dead body Feb. 20, 1831, contrary to the act of Mar. 2, 1815, repealed by act of Feb. 1831 (St. 1830, c. 57). Plea, nolo contendere. Motion in arrest of judgment. SHAW, C. J. It is clear, that there can be no legal conviction for an offense, unless the act be contrary to law at the time it is committed; nor can there be a judgment, unless the law is in force at the time of the indictment and judg ment. If the law ceases to operate by its own limitation or by a repeal, at any time before judgment, no judgment can be given. Hence, it is usual in every repealing law, to make it operate prospectively only, and to insert a saving clause, preventing the operation of the repeal, and continuing the repealed law in force, as to all pending prosecutions, and often as to all violations of the existing law already committed. These principles settle the present case. By the statute 1830, c. 57, § 6, that of 1814 was repealed without any saving clause. The act charged upon the defendants as an offense, was done, after the passing of the statute of 1814, and before that of 1830. The act cannot be punished as an offense at common law, for that was not in force during the existence of the statute; nor by the statute of 1814, because it has been repealed without any saving clause; nor by the statute of 1830, for the act was done before that statute was passed. No judgment therefore can be rendered against the defendants, on this indictment. Judgment arrested. C. v. Marshall, 11 Pick. 350, 22 Am. Dec. 377, B. 5, Kn. 24. Congress cannot make innocent acts criminal by virtue of subsequent acts of others. U. S. v. Fox, § 2. (Mass. Sup. Judicial Ct., 1840.) Repeal of Repealing Law. Indictment of five counts for selling different liquors without a license. Verdict, guilty. Defendant excepted that the statute under which he was convicted had been repealed, whereas the court instructed the jury that it was still in force. SHAW, C. J. * It is conceded to be a maxim of the common law, applicable to the construction of statutes, that the simple repeal of a repealing law, not substituting other provisions in place of those repealed, revives the pre-existing law. As a maxim of the common law, it was in force here when the constitution of the commonwealth was adopted. * Taking it, then, as well established that the rules and maxims of the common law referred to in the constitution were those which our ancestors brought with them, and which had been, to some extent, modified and adapted to our condition by the legislative jurisprudence of the colonial and provincial governments, it follows that these rules and principles were regarded as binding both upon legislators and judges in their respective departments. A part of this system are the well known rules of construction for the expounding of statutes, which are as much a part of every statute as its text. These are presumed to be known and kept in view by the legislature in framing the statute; and they must be alike regarded by judges in expounding it. It was further insisted in the argument that the legislature could not have intended, when they repealed one license law, in effect to re-establish another. But their intentions must be ascertained by their acts alone, and not by evidence aliunde. We cannot possibly know the intentions of members of the legislature. It is the will of the aggregate body as expressed in the statutes which they pass, which can be regarded as having the force of law; any different construction would lead to the greatest confusion and uncertainty. The legislature are presumed to understand and intend all consequences of their own measures; and the only safe course is for courts of justice to expound the intentions of the legislature by their acts, and those acts construed by known and established rules of construction. On the whole, the court are of opinion that the simple repeal of St. 1838, c. 157, by that of 1840, c. 1, did revive the second and third sections of the R. S. c. 47, and that the provisions of those sections were in force at the time of the offenses charged in the indictment, and that the conviction was right. Exceptions overruled. C. v. Churchill, 2 Met. 118, B. 6, C. 3. (Miss. Sup. Ct., 1887.) Local Option Election Before Trial. ARNOLD, J. The sale of liquors in Copiah county was regulated by a local act passed in 1884, and appellant was indicted and convicted of a violation of this statute. After the indictment was found, but before appellant was tried, an election was held in Copiah county under the local-option act of 1886, which resulted against a sale of liquors in the county. The scheme proposed by the local-option act is that, the local-option act * * * shall supersede all other laws on the subject in the county. The proposition is too plain to admit of discussion, that, after the repeal of a law, no penalty can be enforced or punishment inflicted for a violation of its provisions, committed while it was in operation, unless provision be made for that purpose. Teague v. S., 39 Miss. 516; Cooley Const. Lim. 471, note; Bishop St. Cr. § 177. Prisoner discharged. Wheeler v. S., 64 Miss. 62, 1 So. 632. Acc. S. v. Mansel, 52 S. Car. 458, 30 S E. 481. (N. Car. Sup. Ct., 1887.) Repeal After Sentence. Defendant was convicted and fined $5, at the fall term, 1886, for selling liquor within five miles of Bethel church, contrary to acts of 1881, c. 234, § 5, repealed by act of March 7, 1887; by which the like selling within two miles was made indictable. He appeals. "The act punished must be criminal when judgment is demanded, and authority to render it must still reside in the court. The recent statute has no saving clause continuing it in force until pending prosecutions are ended; and, in withdrawing the power, the act arrests all further action in the matter." Per SMITH, C. J. Prior decisions reviewed. Judgment arrested. S. v. Williams, 97 N. Car. 455, 2 S. E. 55, F. 34. § 14. "Causing Injury.” (Eng. Assize, 1826.) Debilitated by Drink. The deceased died from a blow received in a fight with the prisoner; a surgeon expressed an opinion that "a blow on the stomach [in the state in which the deceased was] arising from passion and intoxication, was calculated to occasion death, but not so if the party had been sober." HALLOCK, B., directed an acquittal, observing "that where the death was occasioned partly by a blow and partly by a predisposing circumstance, it was impossible so to apportion the operations of the several causes as to be able to say with certainty that the death was immediately occasioned by any one of them in particular." R. v. Johnson, 1 Lewin C. C. 164. Of this case Roscoe remarks that it may be doubted how far this ruling of the learned judge was correct. Roscoe's Crim. Ev., 7th ed, 718 (Eng. C. C. R., 1858.) Negligence of Servants and Illegal Act of Accused. Bennett was convicted of manslaughter caused by the explosion of material collected at his place to manufacture fireworks, contrary to 9 and 10 W. 3, c. 7. COCKBURN, C. J. The keeping of the fireworks in the house by the defendant caused the death only by the superaddition of the negligence of some one else. By the negligence of the defendant's servants the fireworks ignited, and the house in which the deceased was was set on fire and death ensued. The keeping of the fireworks may be a nuisance, and if, from the unlawful act of the defendant, death had ensued as a necessary and immediate consequence, the conviction might be upheld. The keeping of the fireworks, however, did not alone cause the death; plus that act of the defendant, there was the negligence of the defendant's servants. [Wightman, Williams, Willes, JJ., and Channell, B., expressed similar views.] Conviction quashed. R. v. Bennett, Bell 1, 8 Cox C. C. 74, 28 L. J. m. c. 27, 4 Jur. n. s. 1088, 7 W. R. 40, Ke. 98, Mi. 567. (Eng. C. C. R., 1882.) Proof Required Medical Aid. Conviction of manslaughter under 31 & 32 Vic. c. 122, § 37, requiring parents to supply skilled medical attendance for their children when in need of it, was held erroneous on proof that the deceased child died of smallpox, was furnished no medical attendance (his father, the defendant being of the faith of "Peculiar People"), and on testimony of a physician, who did not see the child in life, that his life probably would have been prolonged by medical attendance, but who would not say that the death would probably have been averted by medical attendance. There was no satisfactory evidence to sustain the conviction. R. v. Morby, L. R. 8 Q. B. Div. 571, 51 L. J. m. c. 85, 46 L. T. 288, 30 W. R. 613, 15 Cox C. C. 35, 46 J. P. 422, 36 Moak 358, F. 63. Compare other cases on failure to furnish medical treatment. R. v. Wagstaffe, § 11; R. v. Lownes, § 11. (Mass. Sup. Judicial Ct., 1861.) Other Contributing CausesBad Treatment. Defendant was indicted for murder. The evidence tended to show that the wound given by the defendant became infected with gangrene by reason of maltreatment, on which death ensued. He was convicted of manslaughter, and excepted to the instruction given to the jury, in substance, that the burden of proof was upon the government to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the deceased died of the wounds inflicted by the defendant, but that this general rule required explanation in its application to certain aspects of the present case; that a person who has inflicted a dangerous wound with a deadly weapon upon the person of another cannot escape punishment by proving that the wound was aggravated by improper applications or unskilful treatment by surgeons; that if, in the present case, they were satisfied that the wounds inflicted by the defendant were improperly and unskilfully treated by the surgeons in attendance, and that such treatment hastened or contributed to the death of the deceased, the defendant was not for this reason entitled to an acquittal; and that if these wounds were unskilfully treated, so that gangrene and * * # fever ensued, and the deceased died from the wounds combined with the maltreatment, the defendant was guilty of murder or manslaughter, according as the evidence proved the one or the other. BIGELOW, C. J. We have looked with care into the authorities which bear on the correctness of the instructions given to the jury, relating to the unskilful or improper treatment of the wounds alleged to have been inflicted by the prisoner upon the body of the deceased. We find them to be clear and uniform, from the earliest to the latest decisions. The well established rule of the common law would seem to be, that if the wound was a dangerous wound, that is, calculated to endanger or destroy life, and death ensued therefrom, it is sufficient proof of the offense of murder or manslaughter; and that the person who inflicted it is responsible, though it may appear that the deceased might have recovered if he had taken proper care of himself, or submitted to a surgical operation, or that unskilful or improper treatment aggravated the wound and contributed to the death, or that death was immediately caused by a surgical operation rendered necessary by the condition of the wound. 1 Russ. Crimes (7th Am. Ed.) 505; Roscoe, Cr. Ev. (3d Ed.) 703, 706; 3 Greenl. Ev. § 139; C. v. Green, 1 Ashm. (Pa.) 289; R. v. Haines, 2 Car. &. K. 368 [§ 11]; S. v. Baker, 1 Jones (46 N. C.) 267; C. v. M'Pike, 3 Cush. 184. If a The Principle on Which This Rule is Founded is one of universal application, and lies at the foundation of all our criminal jurisprudence. It is, that every person is to be held to contemplate and to be responsible for the natural consequences of his own acts. person inflicts a wound with a deadly weapon in such manner as to put life in jeopardy, and death follows as a consequence of this felonious and wicked act, it does not alter its nature or diminish its criminality to prove that other causes co-operated in producing the fatal result. Indeed, it may be said that neglect of the wound or its unskilful and improper treatment, which were of themselves consequences of the criminal act, which might naturally follow in any case, must in law be deemed to have been among those which were in contemplation of the guilty party, and for which he is to be held responsible. But however this may be, it is certain that the rule of law, as stated in the authorities above cited, has its foundation in a wise and sound policy. A different doctrine would tend to give immunity to crime, and to take away from human life a salutary and essential safeguard. Amid the conflicting theories of medical men, and the uncertainties attendant on the treatment of bodily ailments and injuries, it would be easy in many cases of homicide to raise a doubt as to the immediate cause of death, and thereby to open a wide door by which persons guilty of the highest crime might escape conviction and punishment. Exceptions overruled. C. v. Hackett, 2 Allen 136, C. 168, F. 170. See also cases of unexpected consequences, §§ 38-40, 81. 82. |