include counts for false pretenses, embezzlement, and receiving or concealing stolen property, and allowing the jury to convict of either. How. St. § 9546. While this will not allow a conviction except for an offense charged, it nevertheless recognizes the kindred nature of these offenses, and indicates a purpose to facilitate dealing with such offenders. Affirmed. P. v. Shaw, 57 Mich.

403, 24 N. W. 121, 58 Am. Rep. 372.

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(Pa. Sup. Ct., 1888.) Renewing $1600 Note with $16 Note. PAXSON, J. * Defendant was indicted, under § 104 of the crimes act of 31st March, 1860, for the larceny of a promissory note of the value of $1600, the property of the Coopersburg Savings Bank, and the jury have found that it was obtained animo furandi. The bank parted with the possession. If it also intended to part with its property represented by the note, we have no hesitation in saying the offense of the defendant was not larceny, whatever else it may have been. In considering this question regard must be had to the nature of the property alleged to have been stolen. It was a promissory note, as before stated, of the value of $1600. What gave it that value? Certainly not the paper upon which it was written, for that was of so inconsiderable value as not to be the subject of larceny. It is clear that it was valuable only in so far as it was a representative of money; as the evidence of a debt which the bank held against the defendant. The bank did not intend to part with its property in this note considered as an evidence of debt. The note was not the debt; it was the mere evidence of it. That it did not intend to part with any right of property is manifest from the fact that the cashier thought he was receiving in exchange for the note parted with a similar evidence of such debt, of equal amount and of equal value. It would be the baldest technicality, a mere sticking in the bark, to hold that the bank intended to part with any right of property by a mere delivery to the defendant of a piece of paper which qua paper, was of no value. It did not intend to deliver the evidence of its debt to the defendant, because it supposed it was getting another of equal value, and would have received it but for the trick and fraud of the defendant. In the absence of any decision of this court fully covering the facts of the case, it was natural and proper for the learned judge below to give the defendant the benefit of the doubt which he evidently entertained. Were we in doubt, we would do likewise; but we are all of opinion that upon the facts found by the jury the offense is larceny. Proceed to sentence the defendant according to law. C. v. Eichelberger, 119 Pa. St. 254, 13 Atl. 422, 4 Am. St. Rep. 642.

(Eng. C. C. R., 1887.) Bet on Race. Indictment for larceny. Defendant had a stand at the Ascot races taking bets, and took money of prosecutor on a bet by prosecutor 7 to 1 that "Bird of Freedom"

would win. That horse won, and prosecutor went for his money; but defendant and stand were gone. When found defendant denied all knowledge of the matter; but later confessed. For the prisoner it was submitted that there was no evidence of taking by trick or false pretense, and prosecutor had testified that he would have been satisfied had he not got back the same coins. The case was left to the jury. Verdict, guilty. SMITH, J. I think that it is clear the prosecutor never intended to part with the property in the 5s. except on condition that a bona fide bet was made. I think also that there is evidence that at the time the prosecutor handed the 5s. to the prisoner, the prisoner intended to keep possession of the money, whether Bird of Freedom lost or won. He therefore obtained the possession of the prosecutor's money by means of a preconcerted and premeditated fraud; in other words, by a trick. There was, therefore, abundant evidence of larceny, and in my opinion the conviction should be affirmed. [Lord Coleridge, C. J., Pollock, B., Manisty, J., and Hawkins, J., gave similar opinions.] R. v. Buckmaster, 16 Cox C. C. 339, 57 L. J. m. c. 25, 20 Q. B. D. 182, 57 L. T. 720, 36 W. R. 701, 52 J. P. 358, B. 663, C. 316.

(Eng. C. C. R., 1890.) Selling Purse and 3s. for 1s. On indictment for larceny, the substance of the prosecutor's testimony was: I was watching a man sell purses on the street when the prisoner came up and said he would show the trick, opened a purse he had in his hand, put 3s. in his other hand, appeared to drop them into the purse, asked me if I would give him 1s. for the purse and 3s., and I hesitated, but gave him 1s. for it; he then pulled out another purse, showed 2 half-crowns in his hand, seemed to drop them in, and offered me them and the purse for half-a-crown; as I walked away, I found one purse had only three half-pence in it, and the other two pennies in it. I did not buy on speculation; he offered me 3s. for 1s.; and I was willing to take it if he was to give it. The jury found the money was obtained by a trick, and the prisoner was convicted. For him it was argued that there was no larceny by trick here, as prosecutor willingly parted with both title and possession. HAWKINS, J. I cannot myself imagine a clearer illustration of the difference between the offense of false pretenses and that of larceny than is afforded by this case. It is perfectly clear that the prosecutor intended to part with the property in the coins, and that being so, the case is clearly not that of larceny. The conviction must therefore be quashed. [Coleridge, C. J., Mathew, J., Day, J., and Grantham, J., gave concurring opinions.] Conviction quashed. R. v. Solomons, 17 Cox C. C. 93, 62 L. T. 672, B. 668.

(Eng. C. C. R., 1892.) Taking Price and Running Off with Horse Sold. Defendant was convicted of larceny of £8 of B, on proof that he sold a horse at a fair to B for £23, received £8 on the price, and agreed to wait while B could find a friend about the place to borrow

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the other £15 of the price, but instead of doing so left with the horse and £8. For the prisoner it was contended that B intended to part with title to the money when he handed it over, and he had testified that he did not expect to get the money back, but to get the horse; wherefore there was no larceny. HAWKINS, J. In my judgment the money was merely handed to the prisoner by way of deposit, to remain in his hands until completion of the transaction by delivery of the horse. He never intended, or could have intended, that the prisoner should take the money and hold it, whether he delivered the horse or not. The idea is absurd; his intention was that it should be held temporarily by the prisoner until the contract was completed, while the prisoner knew well that the contract never would be completed, by delivery; the latter therefore intended to keep and steal the money. Altogether, apart from the cases and from the principle which has been so frequently enunciated. I should not have a shadow of doubt that the conviction was right. [Lord Coleridge, C. J., Pollock, B., A. L. Smith, J., and Wills, J., gave similar opinions. Affirmed.] R. v. Russett [1892], 2 Q. B. 312, 67 L. T. 124, 40 W. R. 592, 17 Cox C. C. 534, 56 J. P. 743, B. 671, Ke. 349.

(Ill. Sup. Ct., 1895.) Betting on Foot-Race. Doss was convicted of larceny of $530 from Divine. Doss obtained the money of Divine, who went with him, to bet on one Langdon as winner in a proposed foot-race, Doss assuring Divine that Langdon was a very swift runner and sure to win. At the race they met Kiplinger, who acted as stakeholder, the runners (Langdon and Simpson), and another. All proceeded together to the race track, some envelopes were placed in Kiplinger's hands, which he said he did not open, but the evidence does not show that any money was put up against Divine's, and Doss put only $20 in the hands of the stakeholder. The race came off, Simpson won; Kiplinger gave him the envelopes, Doss seemed very angry at Langdon for failing, the parties separated, the whole affair was a fraud, the conspirators met near town to divide, and they then ran away. CARTER, J. The jury were war

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ranted in finding that possession of the money was fraudulently obtained by plaintiff in error, with the felonious intent on his part, when he received it, to convert it to his own use, and that Divine, when he gave him the money, intended to part with his possession merely, and not with his title, relying on plaintiff in error to dispose of it as agreed upon for his (Divine's) benefit. It is the settled law of this state that this offense is larceny. Murphy v. P., 104 Ill. 528. * Affirmed. Doss v. P., 158 Ill. 660, 41 N. E. 1093, 49 Am. St.

Rep. 180.

Acc. R. v. Robson, Russ. & R. 413, Mi. 783.

(Ind. Sup. Ct., 1897.) Green Goods. One of defendants was a bank president, the other an insurance agent, and they represented to prosecutor, a credulous farmer, that they could get any quantity

of "good money," "that would pass anywhere," five dollars for one, and would let him into the scheme. They induced him to give them $1,000 in money and his note for $4,000. Then the bank president started for New York to get the money ($50,000), sent a box by express to prosecutor, notifying him to keep it safe till the three could meet and divide. Prosecutor got the box, took it home, and hid it in the oat bin. A few days later defendants called, and asked if he had the box. He produced it, and the three went to the woods. to divide. While opening it, the bank president noticed that the nails on the box were not the same as he used, and suspected that it might have been tampered with. When opened it was found to contain brown paper only. Each defendant accused the other, the bank president said the others had robbed him, drew a revolver and pointed it at prosecutor, and the other defendant grabbed the revolver; then a great scuffle ensued between defendants, and prosecutor in great fright turned and fled. Later the insurance agent called to the farmer, and said come back, he had the gun, would investigate and they must keep the matter quiet or all would go to the penitentiary. After waiting some time without results, prosecutor made complaint, resulting in this proceeding. Both defendants were convicted on an indictment for larceny, and on error the conviction was affirmed. It was contended that the offense was obtaining money by false pretenses, if anything, and not larceny. But the court held that prosecutor parted with possession only, not with his title to the money; that it was to be returned to him, or five to one for it, in 30 days at most; that there was a taking by trick and deception with intention to appropriate at once to the taker's own use, which constitute plain larceny. Crum v. S., 148 Ind. 401, 47 N. E. 833.

§ 134. "Without Consent."

(Eng. Assize, 1841.) A Wife Having Agreed to Elope with the Prisoner, was desired by him to bring all the money she could; accordingly she packed money, etc., into boxes, had the prisoner call for them, and was about to depart with him when the husband awoke. On trial for larceny, COLERIDGE, J., instructed the jury that the unity between husband and wife prevented her being convicted of larceny from him, and a stranger receiving the husband's goods from her hands could not ordinarily be convicted; but if the person to whom she delivered the goods was an adulterer with her or they then intended adultery, he can be convicted though he received the goods from the wife. Verdict, guilty. R. v. Tollett, Car. & M. 112, B. 533.

Likewise, though the jewelry was community property. P. v. Swalm, 80 Cal. 46, 22 Pac. 67, 13 Am. St. Rep. 96.

(Ala. Sup. Ct., 1871.) Matches Set Out for Free Use. Defendant

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was convicted of larceny of a box of matches. It was proved that he took the matches put up in a store by the proprietor to accommodate customers in lighting their pipes and cigars. His counsel requested the court to charge the jury that if the matches were placed on the counter for the accommodation of the public, the owner consented that they should be taken, and so there was no larceny. SAFFOLD, J. Larceny may be committed of property under the circumstances attached to the box of matches. The owner had not abandoned his right to them. They could only be appropriated in a particular manner and in a very limited quantity with his consent. Taking them by the boxful without felonious intent would have been a trespass, and with it, a larceny. The ownership was sufficiently proved. Affirmed. Mitchum v. S., 45 Ala. 29, B. 616, Mi. 711.

(N. Car. Sup. Ct., 1892.) A Cotton Sampler was Permitted to Pull Cotton from the Bales, to test its quality, and he used this privilege to take more cotton than was necessary for the purpose, intending fraudulently to appropriate it. A conviction of larceny on an instruction that this was sufficient to convict, though the owner consented to the taking of the samples, was approved and affirmed. S. v. MacRae, 111 N. Car. 665, 16 S. E. 173.

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(Eng. C. C. R., 1873.) Overpayment by Mistake, Knowingly Taken. The prisoner was convicted of larceny on proof that he presented an order at a postoffice for 10s. on deposit to his credit, that the clerk in the office took the prisoner's book, by mistake read another letter of advice, charged him with £8 16s. 10d., and counted that sum out onto the counter; and that the prisoner took up the money and went away. BOVILL, C. J., read the judgment of Cockburn, C. J., Blackburn, Mellor, Lush, Grove, Denman, and Archibald, JJ. The finding of the jury, that the prisoner, at the moment of taking the money, had the animus furandi and was aware of the mistake, puts an end to all objection arising from the fact that the clerk meant to part with the possession of the money. On the second question, namely, whether, assuming that the clerk was to be considered as having all the authority of the owner, the intention of the clerk (such as it was) to part with the property prevents this from being larceny, there is more difficulty, and there is, in fact, a serious difference of opinion, though the majority, as already stated, think the conviction right. The reasons which lead us to this conclusion are as follows: At common law the property in personal goods passes by a bargain and sale for consideration, or a gift of them accompanied by delivery; and it is clear from the very nature of the thing that an intention to pass the property is essential both to a sale and to a gift. But it is not at all true that an intention to pass the property, even though accompanied by a delivery, is of itself equivalent to either a sale or a gift. The property