from the thief, took them to the pawn office, and brought back the money to the thief. This, in our opinion, was virtually as much a receiving of stolen goods as if her own hand, and not that of her servant, had received them. No question can be raised in this case involving the necessity of those subtle distinctions taken on former occasions, with respect to the continuance of the possession of the goods in the thief, for the goods here were clearly transferred to hands which were virtually those of Mary Miller herself. No question has been reserved relative to the sufficiency of the evidence of guilty knowledge. Affirmed. R. v. Miller, 6 Cox C. C. 353, B. 759.

(Eng. C. C. R., 1855.) By One Under Control of Accused. Smith was convicted of receiving a watch knowing it to have been stolen. The evidence was that prosecutor and a woman went to a public drinking house where Smith and five or six others were; that prosecutor heard the ring of his watch click, immediately missed the watch, and accused Smith of taking it; that a policeman was called, and partial search made without success; that an hour later Smith came to the room where prosecutor and the woman were, and asked how much he would give for return of the watch, was told £1, and took the woman with him to his room to get it; where she found H., who was at the drinking house, shortly saw the watch on the table, thought it must have been put there by II., and that it was not there when she entered. It was contended that there was no proof of possession by Smith. The recorder told the jury that if Smith knew the watch was stolen, that H. had it, that Smith could make him deliver it, and had absolute control over him, they would be justified in finding him guilty. LORD CAMPBELL, C. J. I think that conviction was right. In the first place the direction of the learned recorder was unexceptionable. According to the decided cases as well as to the dieta of learned judges, manual possession is unnecessary. If we were to hold a contrary doctrine, many receivers must escape with impunity. Then it has been held in decided cases, including R. v. Wiley, 2 Den. Cr. Ca. 37 [above], that there may be a joint possession in the receiver and the thief; that is the ratio decidendi on which the judgment in that case proceeds. Then, was not there ample evidence to justify the jury in coming to the conclusion at which they arrived? I think there was.

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[Alderson, B., Crowder, J., Erle, J., and Platt, B., expressed similar opinions.] Conviction affirmed. R. v. Smith, Dears. 494, 6 Cox C. C. 554, 24 L. J. m. c. 135, 1 Jur. n. s. 575, 3 W. R. 484, 33 Eng. L. & Eq. 531, B. 760, 1 B. & H. 576, C. 442.

(Eng. C. C. R., 1862.) Ratification of wife's Act. Conviction of receiving stolen goods on proof that the wife paid the thief 6d. on receipt of the goods in absence of the husband, who afterwards met the thief and agreed on and paid the balance. BLACKBURN, J.

The principal felon left the stolen property with the wife as the husband's servant, but the court below, as I understand the case, doubted whether the husband could be found guilty of feloniously receiving, as he was absent at the time when the goods were delivered to the wife, and could not then know that they were stolen. It is found that, as soon as the husband heard of it, he adopted and ratified what had been done, and that as soon as he adopted it he had a guilty knowledge; he therefore at that time received the goods knowing them to have been stolen. KEATING, J. I am of the same opinion. The case finds that the agreement as to the price was not complete till the thief and the husband agreed. I think therefore that the receipt was not complete till then, and that the conviction was right. If we were to hold that the conviction was not right, the consequences would be very serious. WILDE, B. I read the case as showing that the wife received the goods on the part of the prisoner, her husband, and that act of hers was capable of being ratified on the part of the prisoner. If so, that makes the first act of receiving by the wife his act. [Mellor, J., concurred, and Erle, C. J., gave a concurring opinion.] Conviction affirmed. R. v. Woodward, 9 Cox C. C. 95. L. & C. 122, 31 L. J. m c. 91, 8 Jur. n. s. 104, 5 L. T. 686, 10 W. R. 298, B. 763, C. 457, Ke. 364, Mi. 898.

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That the intent must exist at the time of the act to make it criminal, §§ 141-2 (as to larceny), 36.

(Ark. Sup. Ct., 1894.) To Hold for Reward. Baker was convicted of receiving stolen goods and appealed. He contended that conviction of receiving stolen goods could not be sustained without proof, that he intended to deprive the owner of the specific stolen property received by him; and the fact that he sought to get money as a condition to the return of the property is not sufficient. But the court held that if the jury believed from the evidence, as they well might, that he concealed from the owner the fact that he had the property, intending to defraud him into paying a reward for it, the offense under the statute was made out, citing R. v. O'Donnell, 7 Cox 337, Mi. 815; C. v. Mason, 105 Mass. 163 [§ 143]; Berry v. S., 37 Ohio St. 227 [§ 143]. Affirmed. Baker v. S., 58 Ark. 513, 25 S.

W. 603.

Acc. P. v. Wiley, 3 Hill (N. Y.) 194, C. 438, Mi. 904.

§ 155. "That Shall Be Feloniously Taken or Stolen."

(Eng. C. C. R., 1855.) Owner Has Thief Sell. Rogers was indicted for stealing and Dolan for receiving a brass casting, the goods of Turner. Rogers pleaded guilty and Dolan was convicted. Turner found the goods in the pockets of Rogers, the thief; and when they were given up. the policeman and Turner thought they might catch the receiver of such goods by returning them to the thief to be sold, which was accordingly done. Rogers took them by Turner's direc

tion to Dolan's shop, and gave the money to Turner. On these facts it was contended by counsel for Dolan and held by the court, that the conviction of Dolan could not be sustained; because the goods ceased to be stolen goods within the meaning of the statute when the owner resumed possession, and because the thief acted as his agent in making the subsequent sale. Before Lord Campbell, C. J., Coleridge, Cresswell, and Williams, JJ., and Platt, B. Conviction quashed. R. v. Dolan, 6 Cox Cr. Cas. 449, Dears. 436, B. 765, F. 316, 5 L. 658.

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(U. S. D. C. for E. Dist. of Wis., 1875.) Ordered by Owner to Forward. The postoffice at Unionville, Mo., was broken into and stamps to amount of $150 taken and enclosed in parcel addressed to DeBare at Milwaukee, but the robber being detected and arrested at Quincy, Ill., gave an order to the postmaster there on the express office at Milwaukee, by which that postmaster obtained possession of the parcel; after which the U. S. authorities ordered him to enclose them in the same wrapper and send them forward as first directed. This was done, and the parcel was received by defendant. On these facts Crawford was convicted of receiving stolen goods. He moved for a new trial. DYER, J. The ownership of these stamps was in the United States. The Quincy postmaster was an agent of the owner. When Crawford surrendered them to this agent they were reclaimed property that had been stolen, but their character as stolen property ceased in the hands of the postmaster, so far as the subsequent receiver was concerned. The moral turpitude of a receiver under such circumstances may be as great as in case the property comes directly from the hands of the thief, because the criminal intent on his part exists equally in both cases. But to create the offense which the law punishes, the property when received must, in fact, and in a legal sense, be stolen property. If these stamps were received by the defendant, they did not, when received, upon the proof made, bear this character. They had been captured from the thief by the owner, and the act of forwarding them to the alleged receiver was the act of the owner. Motion for new trial granted. U. S. v. DeBare, 6 Biss. 358, Fed. Cas. No. 14, 935, C. 426, 5 L. 662.

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(Eng. C. C. R., 1866.) Same. Passengers left luggage at the Arundel station on the Brighton Ry., which was soon stolen; and the next day a parcel deposited at another station on the same line, for delivery to F. Schmidt, Brighton, was discovered to contain part of the goods stolen. The porter in charge of the Brighton station was ordered not to deliver it till further notice; and, knowing it was there, told one who called for it that it had not arrived. Next morning he took it to the place addressed, asked defendant if her name was Schmidt; and being told it was, left the parcel with her, in the absence of her husband. Then a policeman went to the house, found the bundle unopened, and arrested the prisoner. On con

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viction, the question was reserved as to whether the goods received by her had lost their stolen character. MELLOR, J. I agree entirely with my brother, Erle, C. J., and think the conviction was right. The indictment rightly alleges the property to have been in the railway company at the time it was stolen; they had the bailment of it from the true owner. Then it is stolen while in their custody, and the next step is, the thieves afterwards send a portion of it by the same railway company to be forwarded to the receiver at Brighton; so that the railway company get possession of this part from the thieves under a new bailment. Then the policeman examines the property and directs it not to be forwarded until further orders; but this was not done with the view of taking possession of it or altering its transit, but merely to see whether it was the stolen property. I agree with Dolan's case [above], but in the present case I think the stolen property had not got back to the true owner. KEATING, J. It seems conceded, on the authority of Dolan's case, that if the property had got back again for any time into the hands of the true owner, the conviction would be wrong. It is said that, in this case, the owners mentioned in the indictment, the railway company, were not the real owners, whereas in Dolan's case [above] the real owner intervened. But I think there is no distinction in principle between this case and that. The railway company are alleged in the indictment to be the owners of the property, and we sitting here can recognize no other. LUSH, J. I agree with my brothers, Martin, B., and Keating, J., and think that the conviction was wrong. I think that the goods had got back to the owner from whom they had been stolen. Had the railway company innocently carried the goods to their destination and delivered them to the prisoner, the felonious receipt would have been complete; but while the goods are in their possession, having been previously stolen from them, the goods are inspected, and as soon as it was discovered that they were the goods that had been stolen, the railway company did not intend to carry them on as the agents of the bailor; the forwarding them was a mere pretense for the purpose of finding out who the receiver was. It was not competent to the railway company to say, as between them and the original bailor, that they had not got back the goods. They were bound to hold them for him. In afterwards forwarding the goods to the prisoner, the company was using the transit merely as the means of detecting the receiver. [The similar opinions of Erle, C. J., and Martin, B., are omitted.] Conviction quashed. R. v. Schmidt, 10 Cox C. C. 172, L. R. 1 C. C. R. 15, 35 L. J. m. c. 94, 12 Jur. n. s. 149, 13 L. T. 679, 14 W. R. 286, B. 769, C. 421, 5 L. 653, Mi. 885.

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§ 156. "Knowing the Same to be Stolen."

(Eng. Assize, 1859.) What Knowledge. Indictment for receiving the queen's lead, knowing it to be stolen. BRAMWELL, B. (to the jury). The knowledge charged in this indictment need not be such knowledge as would be acquired if the prisoner had actually seen the lead stolen; it is sufficient if you think the circumstances were such, accompanying the transaction, as to make the prisoner believe that it had been stolen. Guilty. R. v. White, 1 F. & F. 665, B. 778, C. 469.

(Mass. Sup. Judicial Ct., 1886.) Same-Embezzled or Stolen. Defendant was convicted of receiving old iron, knowing it to have been stolen from the Boston & L. Ry. Co.; and excepted. FIELD, J. * * The offense of receiving stolen property, knowing it to have been stolen, must be considered as distinct from the offense of receiving embezzled property knowing it to have been embezzled, Pub. Sts. c. 203, §§ 48, 51, although embezzlement under our statutes has been held to be a species of larceny. C. v. Pratt, 132 Mass. 246. The punishments of the two offenses may be different, as the offense of receiving embezzled goods may be punished by a fine without imprisonment. If the property had actually been stolen, a belief on the part of the defendant that it had been stolen is tantamount to knowledge. If the defendant knew all the facts and the facts constituted larceny as distinguished from embezzlement, it would be no defense that the defendant thought that the facts constituted embezzlement. If the defendant did not know the facts, but believed from the circumstances that the property had been either embezzled or stolen, and it had been actually stolen, it was competent for the jury to find the defendant guilty of the offense charged. The second request for instructions was therefore rightly refused. * Exceptions sustained. C. v. Leonard, 140 Mass. 473, 4 N.

E. 96, 54 Am. Rep. 485, B. 778, C. 466.

(Ill. Sup. Ct., 1890.) Proof of Knowledge. Conviction of knowingly receiving a stolen ring was held supported and warranted by evidence that defendant knew the value of such property, purchased it for one-fourth of its value, from an ex-convict, denied having received it, lied as to how he had disposed of it when it was shown that he had had it, and finally offered to produce it for a reward and produced it when arrested. Judgment affirmed. Huggins v. S., 135 Ill. 243, 25 N. E. 1002, 25 Am. St. Rep. 357.

(Miss. Sup. Ct., 1889.) Same. A conviction for receiving car brasses, knowing them to be stolen, was upheld where it appeared that defendant, a junk dealer, after the theft, in an interview with some of the railroad company's employees and the chief of police. denied all knowledge of the brasses, which were marked with the