person who received the wounds shall not excuse the person who gave them. R. v. Rew, Kelyng 26, B. 163, Mi. 559. See other cases to same effect. Ante § 15. (Eng. Assize at Liverpool, 1841.) Refusing Amputation. Deceased had been severely cut with an iron instrument across one of his fingers, and had refused to have it amputated. At the end of two weeks lock-jaw came on and the finger was then amputated, but too late; and the lock-jaw ultimately caused death. The surgeon expressed the opinion that early amputation would probably have saved his life. MAULE, J., held that a party inflicting a wound which ultimately became the cause of death is guilty of murder, though life might have been saved if the deceased had not refused to submit to a surgical operation. R. v. Holland, 2 Mood. & Rob. 351, B. 164, Ke. 93. * * (Eng. Assize, 1846.) Same. Manslaughter. Defendants, inciting each other while somewhat intoxicated, and one following the other closely, drove their horses and carts of pottery at a furious rate along a public road, and one or both ran over an old man, thus killing him. POLLOCK, C. B. (to the jury): The prisoners are charged with contributing to the death of the deceased, by their negligence and improper conduct, and if they did so, it matters not whether he was deaf, or drunk, or negligent, or in part contributed to his own death; for in this consists a great distinction between civil and criminal proceedings. If two coaches run against each other, and the drivers of both are to blame, neither of them has any remedy against the other for damages. Generally, it may be laid down, that, where one by his negligence has contributed to the death of another, he is responsible; therefore, you are to say, by your verdict, whether you are of opinion that the deceased came to his death in consequence of the negligence of one or both of the prisoners. Where two coaches, totally independent of each other, are proceeding in the ordinary way along a road, one after the other, and the driver of the first is guilty of negligence, the driver of the second, who had not the same means of pulling up, may not be responsible. But when two persons are driving together, encouraging each other to drive at a dangerous. pace, then whether the injury is done by the one driving the first or the second carriage, I am of opinion that in point of law the other shares the guilt. R. v. Swindall et al. 2 Car. & K. 230, 2 Cox C. C. 141, B. 167, F. 26, Ke. 74, Kn. 12. * * * Compare C. v. Adams, § 38, holding not liable though injury from riding faster than ordinance allowed; and Johnson v. S., § 12, as to fast bicycle riding. (Eng. Assize, 1849.) Deaf Man in Highway. Two indicted for manslaughter. The evidence proved that defendants, while partly intoxicated, drove in a gig, after dark, rapidly down a hill in a road thickly shaded by trees; and that three men shortly following * * found a man insensible and dying in the middle of the road, apparently having been just run over by a vehicle. Deceased had been deaf from childhood, but had a habit of walking at all hours in the middle of the road. At the close of the case for the prosecution, defendants asked to be acquitted because of the contributory negligence of deceased. "I do not at all recognize the analogy which has been put with regard to an action under Lord Campbell's act, and a charge of felony. There is no balance of blame in charges of felony, but, wherever it appears that death has been occasioned by the illegal act of another, that other is guilty of manslaughter in point of law, though it may be that he ought not to be severely punished. If the jury should be of opinion that the prisoners were driving along the road at too rapid a pace, considering the time and place, and were conducting themselves in a careless and negligent way, in the management of the horse intrusted to their care, I am of opinion that such conduct amounts to illegality, and that the prisoners must be found guilty on this indictment, whatever may have been the negligence of the deceased himself." Per ROLFE, B. Regina v. Longbottom, 3 Cox Cr. Cas. 439, 1 B. & H. 54-n, F. 25, Mi. 94. Acc. R. v. Dalloway (Assize, 1847), 2 Cox C. C. 273, B. 165; R. v. Kew (Assize, 1872), 12 Cox C. C. 355, B. 165, C. 150. § 24. "Was Equally Guilty." (Eng. Central Crim. Ct., 1845.) Counterfeit for Intercourse. The defendant was indicted for uttering counterfeit coin. Evidence was adduced to show that he had given a counterfeit sovereign to a girl with whom he had had intercourse. DENMAN, C. J. (in summing up): As to the law of this case, my learned brother (Coltman, J.) and myself are clearly of opinion that if the defendant gave the coin to the woman under the circumstances stated, knowing it to be counterfeit, he is guilty of the offense charged. R. v. 1 Cox Cr. Cas. 250, B. 158, C. 145. * (Mass. Sup. Judicial Ct., 1851.) Trading "Gold" Watch. Defendants were convicted on an indictment charging them with cheating one Lynch of his goods by falsely pretending that a watch they offered to trade was gold, 18 carats fine, and worth $80. Lynch also overstated the value of his watches. The judge instructed the jury that if they supposed that each of the parties was endeavoring to defraud the other, and Lynch knew that his watches were of little value, the jury should not convict the defendants merely because they had the best of the bargain; but that if the defendants made the false representations charged in the indictment, with the intent to defraud, knowing them to be false, and they were such as would mislead and deceive a man of ordinary pru dence, and Lynch, by reason of the representations, and trusting in them, parted with his property and was defrauded, it was not necessary to show that he was defrauded to the extent charged in the indictment. Defendants excepted. DEWEY, J. The exceptions taken to the instructions of the presiding judge cannot be sustained. If it were true that the party from whom the defendants obtained goods by false pretenses also made false pretenses as to his goods which he exchanged with the defendants, that would be no justification for the defendants, when put on trial upon an indictment charging them with obtaining goods by false pretenses, knowingly and designedly in violation of a statute of this commonwealth. Whether the alleged misrepresentation of Lynch, being a mere representation as to the value or worth of a certain watch and an opinion rather than a statement of a fact, would be such false pretense as would render him amenable to punishment under this statute, might be questionable; but supposing that to be otherwise, and it should appear that Lynch had also violated the statute, that would not justify the defendants. If the other party has also subjected himself to a prosecution for a like offense, he also may be punished. This would be much better than that both should escape punishment because each deserved it equally. C. v. Morrill, 8 Cush. 571, B. 160, C. 146. ** (Eng. C. C. R., 1860.) Cheating a Cheat. Crown case reserved on conviction on indictment for conspiracy to cheat. The prosecutor and defendants were in a public house when defendant Dewhirst put a pen case on the table where they were and left to get some paper, whereupon defendant Hudson took a pen out of the case, put it under prosecutor's drinking glass, and with defendant Smith induced prosecutor to bet £2, 10s with Dewhirst on his return that there was no pen in the case. When the case was turned over another pen fell out, and the prisoners took the money. BLACKBURN, J. Here the prisoners cheated the prosecutor into the belief that he was going to cheat, when in fact he was to be cheated. POLLOCK, C. B. We are all of opinion that the conviction on the third count is good and ought to be supported. There is abundant evidence of a conspiracy by the prisoners to cheat the prosecutor, and though one of the ingredients in the case is that the prosecutor himself intended to cheat one of the prisoners, that does not prevent the prisoners from liability to be prosecuted upon this indictment. Conviction affirmed. R. v. Hudson, 8 Cox C. C. 305, Bell C. C. 263, 29 L. J. m. c. 145, 6 Jur. n. s. 566, 2 L. T. 263, 8 W. R. 421, B. 158, C. 142. * ** ** (New York Ct. of App., 1871.) Blackmail by Pretended Officer. Defendant was convicted of obtaining a gold watch and diamond ring of prosecutor by pretending to be an officer with a warrant to arrest him. Per CURIAM. If the prosecutor parted with his property upon the representations set forth in the indictment, it must have been for some unlawful purpose, a purpose not warranted by law. There was no legitimate purpose to be attained by delivering the goods to the accused upon the statements made and alleged as an inducement to the act. What action by the plaintiff in error was promised or expected in return for the property given is not disclosed. But whatever it was, it was necessarily inconsistent with his duties as an officer having a criminal warrant for the arrest of the prosecutor, which was the character he assumed. The false representation of the accused was that he was an officer and had a criminal warrant for the prosecutor. There was no pretense of any agency for or connection with any person or of any authority to do any act save such as his duty as such pretended officer demanded. The prosecutor parted with his property as an inducement to a supposed officer to violate the law and his duties; and if in attempting to do this he has been defrauded, the law will not punish his confederate, although such confederate may have been instrumental in inducing the commission of the offense. Neither the law or public policy designs the protection of rogues in their dealings with each other, or to insure fair dealing and truthfulness as between each other in their dishonest practices. The design of the law is to protect those who, for some honest purpose, are induced upon false and fraudulent representations to give credit or part with their property to another, and not to protect those who for unworthy or illegal purposes part with their goods. Judgment reversed. [Peckham, J., filed an exhaustive dissenting opinion.] McCord v. P., 46 N. Y. 470, B. 162, C. 148. Acc. State v. Crowley, 41 Wis. 271. * ** * (Mich. Sup. Ct., 1882.) Furnishing Money to be Used Illegally. MARSTON, J. The respondent was charged with obtaining the indorsement of Martin Kline to a promissory note by false pretenses, and upon trial had was convicted. The case comes here on exceptions before judgment. * * This objection, as we understand it, under the facts in this case, means that if the money to be obtained from a negotiation of the note after its indorsement, was to be used by the respondent for an unlawful or immoral purpose, and such fact was known to the person before endorsing, there could be no conviction. This position is based upon the theory that the statute upon which this prosecution was founded was in some way intended to protect the party deceived or defrauded but not to punish the party guilty thereof. When a crime has been committed the law seeks to punish the party guilty thereof. The injured individual has been wronged, and his object, motive, or complicity therein, may affect any remedy that he might have against the perpetrator thereof. In every crime there is in addition to this wrong done to the individual, also a public wrong. This the state punishes; and, except in certain trivial cases, the person injured has no control over, and cannot prevent or interfere with the public prosecution by the state authorities. The penalty attached to the commission of the offense charged in the information is imposed upon public grounds, and the fact that the party deceived or defrauded may have supposed or known the money obtained on his endorsement would be used for immoral or unlawful purposes, would not purge the guilt of the accused. Proceed to * judgment. P. v. Henssler, 48 Mich. 50, 11 N. W. 804. (Colo. Sup. Ct., 1891.) Public Land Fraud. Public Land Fraud. Petition for writ of habeas corpus. A justice of the peace committed petitioner to the county jail to await action by the grand jury on four charges of obtaining money by false pretenses. It appeared by the complaint as well as the testimony before the justice that in each instance the pretenses induced the prosecuting witnesses to pay the money in furtherance of an illegal purpose to obtain valuable coal lands of the United States by fraud. "The primary object of punishment is the suppression of crime; and, where both the prosecutor and the defendant have violated the law, it is better that both be punished than that the crime of one should be used to shield the other. When the plaintiff in a civil action is shown to have been guilty of a wrong in the particular matter about which he complains, he cannot ordinarily recover. But there is little chance to apply this rule to criminal prosecutions conducted by the state; the person defrauded being at most a prosecuting witness in the case, and not a party to the proceeding. The language of our statute is plain. The false pretenses charged in this case are embraced within its express terms, and we are not in favor of sanctioning a rule that will permit offenders to escape by showing that another should also be punished." Petition denied. In re Cummins, 16 Colo. 451, 27 Pac. 887, 25 Am. St. Rep. 291, 13 L. R. A. 752, F. 23, Kn. 15. Acc. Com. v. O'Brien, 172 Mass. 248, 52 N. E. 77; Com. v. Henry, 22 Pa St. 253. To adopt this position would give free license to villains and sharpers to prey upon those who have become credulous through the infirmities of age, or who are unwary from the inex perience of youth, as well as a large class who are weakminded by nature,-the very class of the community whom it is the policy of the law to protect." CHAMPLIN, J., in giving the opinion on P. v. Watson, 75 Mich. 582, 42 N. W. 1005. § 25. "Has Been Reimbursed." (Ark. Sup. Ct., 1893.) Reimbursement by Guaranty Co. Appeal to this court from denial of motions in arrest of judgment and for new trial, after conviction on indictment for embezzlement. "Defendant contends that having hired the guarantee company to make his bond for faithful performance of duty to the Pacific Express Company, and that company having paid the express company for all losses claimed by it to have been suffered by reason of defendant's alleged embezzlement, therefore, there was no crime committed; that the express company had no longer any interest at |