1790 declares that any person who shall commit the crime of robbery or murder on the high seas shall be deemed a pirate, the crime is not less clearly ascertained than it would be by using the definitions of these terms as they are found in our treatises of the common law. In fact, by such a reference, the definitions are necessarily included, as much as if they stood in the text of the act. In respect to murder, where "malice aforethought" is of the essence of the offense, even if the common-law definition were quoted in express terms, we should still be driven to deny that the definition was perfect, since the meaning of "malice aforethought" would remain to be gathered from the common law. There would then be no end to our difficulties or our definitions, for each would involve some terms which might still require some new explanation. Such a construction of the constitution is therefore wholly inadmissible. To define piracies, in the sense of the constitution, is merely to enumerate the crimes which shall constitute piracy; and this may be done either by a reference to crimes having a technical name and determinate extent, or by enumerating the acts in detail upon which the punishment is inflicted. It is next to be considered whether the crime of piracy is defined by the law of nations with reasonable certainty. What the law of nations on this subject is, may be ascertained by consulting the works of jurists, writing professedly on public law; or by the general usage and practice of nations; or by judicial decisions recognizing and enforcing that law. There is scarcely a writer on the law of nations who does not allude to piracy as a crime of a settled and determinate nature. So that, whether we advert to writers on the common law, or the maritime law, or the law of nations, we shall find that they universally treat of piracy as an offense against the law of nations, and that its true definition by that law is robbery upon the sea. And the general practice of all nations in punishing all persons, whether natives or foreigners, who have committed this offense against any persons whatsoever, with whom they are in amity, is a conclusive proof that the offense is supposed to depend not upon the particular provisions of any municipal code, but upon the law of nations, both for its definition and punishment. We have therefore no hesitation in declaring that piracy, by the law of nations, is robbery upon the sea, and that it is sufficiently and constitutionally defined by the 5th section of the act of 1819. Another point has been made in this case, which is that the special verdict does not contain sufficient facts upon which the court can pronounce that the prisoner is guilty of piracy. We are of a different opinion. The special verdict finds that the prisoner is guilty of the plunder and robbery charged in the indictment; and finds certair additional facts from which it is most manifest that he and his associates were, at the time of committing the offense, freebooters upon the sea, not under the acknowledged authority or deriving protection from the flag or commission of any government. If under such

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circumstances the offense be not piracy, it is difficult to conceive any which would more completely fit the definition. It is to be certified to the circuit court that upon the facts stated the case is piracy, as defined by the law of nations, so as to be punishable under the act of congress of the 3d of March, 1819. Livingston, J., delivered a dissenting opinion. U. S. v. Smith, 5 Wheaton (18 U. S.) 153, C. 28.

Technical terms in statutes, how construed. Pitcher v. P., § 7.

(U. S. Sup. Ct., 1869.) Matter of Local Police. Indictment for selling and keeping for sale illuminating oils mixed with naphtha contrary to act of congress March 2, 1867, § 29. Defendant demurred, and the circuit court being divided in opinion as to whether an offense against the United States under any constitutional statute was charged, certified the case for the opinion of this court. CHASE, C. J. The questions certified resolve themselves into this: Has congress power under the constitution to prohibit trade within the limits of a state? That congress has power to regulate commerce with foreign nations and among the several states and with the Indian tribes, the constitution expressly declares. But this express grant of power to regulate commerce among the states has always been understood as limited by its terms, and as a virtual denial of any power to interfere with the internal trade and business of the separate states, except, indeed, as a necessary and proper means for carrying into execution some other power expressly granted or vested. It has been urged in argument that the provision under which this indictment was framed is within this exception; that the prohibition of the sale of the illuminating oil described in the indictment was in aid and support of the internal revenue tax imposed on other illuminating oils. * * ** This consequence is too remote and too uncertain to warrant us in saying that the prohibition is an appropriate and plainly adapted means for carrying into execution the power of laying and collecting taxes. There is, indeed, no reason for saving that it was regarded by congress as such a means, except that it is found in an act imposing internal duties. Standing by itself it is plainly a regulation of police. As a police regulation relating exclusively to the internal trade of the states, it can only have effect where the legislative authority of congress excludes territorially all state legislation, as for example, in the District of Columbia. Within state limits it can have no constitutional operation. This has been so frequently declared by this court, results so obviously from the terms of the constitution, and has been so fully explained and supported on former occasions, that we think it unnecessary to enter again upon the discussion. U. S. v. DeWitt, 9 Wall. (76 U. S.) 41, C. 60.

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* * **

(U. S. Sup. Ct., 1877.) Power of Congress on Crimes in General. Defendant was convicted under U. S. R. S. (1871) §5132, in the

U. S. C. C. for southern New York; and on motion in arrest of judgment, the circuit judges were opposed in opinion, and certified the case for the opinion of this court: "If a person shall engage in a transaction which, at the time of its occurrence, is not in violation of any law of the United States, to-wit, the obtaining of goods upon credit by false pretenses, and if, subsequently thereto, proceedings in bankruptcy shall be commenced respecting him, is it within the constitutional limits of congressional legislation to subject him to punishment for such transaction considered in connection with the proceedings in bankruptcy?" FIELD, J. The question presented by the certificate of division does not appear to us difficult of solution. Upon principle,

An Act which is not an Offense at the Time it is Committed cannot become such by any subsequent independent act of the party with which it has no connection. By the clause in question, the obtaining of goods on credit upon false pretenses is made an offense against the United States, upon the happening of a subsequent event, not perhaps in the contemplation of the party, and which may be brought about, against his will, by the agency of another. The Criminal Intent Essential to the Commission of a Public Offense must exist when the act complained of is done; it cannot be imputed to a party from a subsequent independent transaction. There are cases, it is true, where a series of acts are necessary to constitute an offense, one act being auxiliary to another in carrying out the criminal design. But the present is not a case of that kind. Here an act which may have no relation to proceedings in bankruptcy becomes criminal, according as such proceedings may or may not be subsequently taken, either by the party or by another. There is no doubt of

The Competency of Congress to Provide, by suitable penalties. for the enforcement of all legislation necessary or proper to the execution of powers with which it is intrusted. And as it is authorized "to establish uniform laws on the subject of bankruptcies throughout the United States," it may embrace within its legisla tion whatever may be deemed important to a complete and effective bankrupt system. The object of such a system is to secure a ratable distribution of the bankrupt's estate among his creditors when he is unable to discharge his obligations in full, and at the same time to relieve the honest debtor from legal proceedings for his debts. upon a surrender of his property. The distribution of the property is the principal object to be attained. The discharge of the debtor is merely incidental, and is granted only where his conduct has been free from fraud in the creation of his indebtedness or the disposition of his property. To legislate for the prevention of frauds in either of these particulars, when committed in contemplation of bankruptcy, would seem to be within the competency of congress. Any act committed with a view of evading the legislation of congress passed in the execution of any of its powers, or of fraudu

lently securing the benefit of such legislation, may properly be made an offense against the United States. But an act committed within a state, whether for a good or a bad purpose, or whether with an honest or a criminal intent, cannot be made an offense against the United States, unless it have some relation to the execution of a power of congress, or to some matter within the jurisdiction of the United States. An act not having any such relation is one in respect to which the state can alone legislate. The act described in the ninth subd. of § 5132, R. S., is one which concerns only the state in which it is committed; it does not concern the United States. It is quite possible that the framers of the statute intended it to apply only to acts committed in contemplation of bankruptcy; but it does not say so, and we cannot supply qualifications which the legislature has failed to express. Our answer to the question certified must be in the negative. U. S. v. Fox, 95 U. S. 670, B. 227, C. 58.

Intent must exist at the time of the act. § 36. Act must be criminal at the time. § 13.

(U. S. C. C. for Dist. of E. Mich., 1887.) Court Civil or Martial. BROWN, J. In view of the fact that this was a homicide committed by one soldier, in the performance of his alleged duty, upon another soldier, within a military reservation of the United States, I had at first some doubt whether a civil court could take cognizance of the case at all; but, as crimes of this nature have repeatedly been made the subject of inquiry by civil tribunals, I have come to the conclusion that I ought not to decline to hear this complaint. Indeed, it is difficult to see how I could refuse to do so without abdicating that supremacy of the civil power which is a fundamental principle of the Anglo-Saxon polity. While there is no statute expressly conferring such jurisdiction, there is a clear recognition of it in the fifty-ninth article of war, which provides that "when any officer or soldier is accused of a capital crime, or of any offense against the person or property of any citizen of any of the United States, which is punishable by the laws of the land, the commanding officer, and the officers of the regiment, troop, battery, company, or detachment to which the person so accused belongs, are required (except in time of war), upon application duly made by or in behalf of the party injured, to use their utmost endeavors to deliver him over to the civil magistrate, and to aid the officers of justice in apprehending him and securing him, in order to bring him to trial." This article makes no exception of crimes committed by one soldier upon another, nor of cases where there is concurrent jurisdiction in the military courts. Tytler, in his work upon Military Law, says: "The martial or military law, as contained in the mutiny act and articles of war, does in no respect supersede or interfere with the civil or municipal laws of the realm." * * U. S. v. Clark, 31 Fed.

710, B. 319.

More of this case in § 49.

SOURCES OF STATE CRIMINAL LAW.

§ 3. The criminal law of the states consists of so much of the common law of England and English statutes enacted before the settlement of the American colonies as is suitable and adapted to our condition and institutions, supplemented and amended by the common law and customs that have grown up in this country, and by the constitution and statutes of the state where the crime is committed, except as restrained by the United States constitution.

§ 4. "Common Law of England and English Statutes Enacted before the Settlement."

(Mass. Sup. Judicial Ct., 1809.) Getting Credit by Lies. Indictment against Warren for deceit, cheating, and fraud, in that he obtained fifty pairs of shoes on credit by falsely pretending that he had good credit, kept a grocery at Salem, and that his name was Waterman. Being convicted, defendant moved in arrest of judgment, on the ground that the indictment charged no offense. The motion was granted, because: 1, defendant being alone, no conspiracy was charged; 2, there is no pretense that false weights. or measures were used, which alone would make cheating at the common law; 3, no false token was used to obtain the credit, which is punishable by the statute of 33 Hen. 8, c. 1, which is a part of our common law, having been enacted before the settlement of this colony; and 4, the statute 30 Geo. 2, c. 24, which makes obtaining by false pretenses indictable, is not in force here. Defendant gave a note for the price at the time of obtaining the shoes, and signed it "William Waterman." C. v. Warren, 6 Mass. 72, C. 11, F. 3, Kn. 3. St. 33 H. 8, c. 1; and St. 30 G. 2, c. 24, will be found under "False Tokens and Pretenses" post. See these sections and § 16 for further discussion of false tokens and

pretenses.

(Mass. Sup. Judicial Ct., 1804.) Jurisdiction-Common Law Crime. Defendants were convicted, on a common law indictment, in the court of general sessions, of poisoning a cow, property of A. Bliss moved in arrest of judgment that justices of the peace had no jurisdiction to try this common law offense, having no such power given them by statute; citing Com. Dig. t. Justices of Peace, B. 1; 1 Salk. 406. SEDGWICK, J. Justices of the peace, whether acting individually or in sessions, are creatures of statute, and their powers are given them by the statutes. 2 Hawk. 61, 8. It appears to me, generally speaking, that the English statutes which were in force at the time of the emigration of our ancestors from that country are common law here. The statutes of Ed. 3 [1 Edw. 3, c. 16; 34 Edw. 3, c. 1] have been adopted and practiced upon here, and are therefore to be considered as part of our common law. This is decisive of the question before the court, as the offense charged in