principle has always been recognized since the decision of the Six Carpenters' Case, 8 Coke 146. The prisoner, therefore, had a right to enter the inn, and the barroom; and the question arises, whether the larceny committed in the barroom can relate back, and give a character to the entry into the house, so as to make it criminal, and the prisoner punishable for it, upon reasoning similar to that which, in a civil action, would render him liable as a trespasser ab initio. Except the inference that may lawfully be made from the act of larceny, there is no evidence that he entered with any illegal purpose, or a felonious intent. Where the law invests a person with authority to do an act, the consequences of an abuse of that authority by the party should be severe enough to deter all persons from such an abuse. But has this "policy of the law' ever been extended to criminal cases? We are not aware that it has. It is true that, in order to ascertain the intent of the accused, the law often regards the nature of the act committed. But this is generally such an act as could not have been committed with any other than a criminal purpose. Thus, the act of secretly taking the property of another, necessarily raises the presumption that the party intended to steal. But where one lawfully enters a house, it by no means follows that because he steals while there, he entered with that purpose. New trial granted. S. v.

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Moore, 12 N. H. 42, B. 224, F. 267, 4 L. 846, Mi. 918.

Intent must exist at the time of the act. U. S. v. Fox, § 2. See several cases of larceny turning on this point: §§ 125, 141.

§ 37. "Distinguished From the Motive."

(Eng. Cent. Crim. Ct., 1834.) Removing the Public Stamp from one piece of gold plate to another, contrary to statute, was held none the less criminal, though the smith had no fraudulent design, but in repairing a ring accidently obliterated the stamp, and to make good the injury cut one from another piece of plate and welded it in; but the jury recommended mercy, and the prisoner was pardoned. R. v. Ogden, 6 C. & P. 631, C. 93.

(Eng. C. C. R., 1857.) Digging up Mother's Corpse. Defendant was indicted and convicted of indecently and unlawfully digging up a corpse from a burying ground. The facts were not denied. Defendant obtained the keys to the yard on pretext that he desired to bury his father, but all the while intended to and afterwards did dig up the body of his mother and take it some miles to another burying place. He was actuated only by motives of religious duty and affection for his mother. He argued in person that the conviction was wrong, and that there was no indecorum or impropriety in his acts. No counsel appeared for the crown. EARL, J. We are of opinion that the conviction ought to be affirmed. The defend

ant was wrongfully in the burial ground, and wrongfully opened the grave, and took out several corpses and carried away one. We say he did this wrongfully, that is to say, by trespass; for the license which he obtained to enter and open from the person who had the care of the place was not given nor intended for the purpose to which he applied it, and was, as to that purpose, no license at all. The evidence for the prosecution proved the misdemeanor, unless there was a defense. We have considered the grounds relied on in that behalf, and although we all feel sensible of the estimable motives on which the defendant acted, namely, filial affection and religious duty, still, neither authority nor principle would justify the position that the wrongful removal of a corpse was no misdemeanor if the motive for the act deserved approbation. A purpose of anatomical science would fall within that category. We have been unwilling to affirm the conviction on account of our respect for the motives of the defendant; but we have felt it our duty to do so rather than lay down a rule which might lessen the only protection the law affords in respect of the burial of dissentConviction affirmed. R. v. Sharpe, 7 Cox C. C. 214, Dears. & B. 160, 26 L. J. m. c. 47, 3 Jur. n. s. 192, 5 W. R. 318, B. 175.

ers.

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(U. S. Sup. Ct., 1878.) Bigamy as a Religious Duty. Indictment for bigamy under U. S. R. S. (1871) § 5352, providing that: "Every person having a husband or wife living, who marries another, whether married or single, is guilty of bigamy," etc. In defense defendant proved that at the time of the marriage complained of he was a member of the Mormon church and believer in its doctrines; and that one of the doctrines of the church was that it was the duty of every male member of the church, circumstances permitting, to practice polygamy; that this duty was enjoined by the prophets of his church and by the Holy Bible; and that what he did was with permission of the church authorities. Upon this proof he asked the court to instruct the jury that if they found from the evidence that he "was married as charged, if he was married in pursuance of and in conformity with what he believed at the time to be a religious duty, the verdict must be 'not guilty. This request was refused, and the court did charge "that there must have been a criminal intent, but that if the defendant, under the influence of a religious belief that it was right, under an inspiration, if you please, that it was right, deliberately married a second time, having a first wife living, the want of consciousness of evil intent, the want of understanding on his part that he was committing a crime did not excuse him; but the law inexorably in such WAITE, C. J. case implies the criminal intent." Upon this charge and refusal to charge the question is raised whether religious belief can be accepted as a justification of an overt act made criminal by the law of the land. The inquiry is not as to the power of congress to prescribe criminal laws for the ter

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ritories, but as to the guilt of one who knowingly violates a law which has been properly enacted, if he entertains a religious belief that the law is wrong. Congress cannot pass a law for the government of the territories which shall prohibit the free exercise of religion. The first amendment to the constitution expressly forbids such legislation. Religious freedom is guaranteed everywhere throughout the United States, so far as congressional interference is concerned. The question to be determined is, whether the law now under consideration comes within this prohibition. * At the first session of the first congress the amendment now under consideration was proposed with others by Mr. Madison. It met the views of the advocates of religious freedom and was adopted. Mr. Jefferson afterwards, in reply to an address to him by a committee of the Danbury Baptist Association (8 id. 113), took occasion to say: Believing with you that religion is a matter which lies solely between man and his God; that he owes account to none other for his faith or his worship; that the legislative powers of the government reach actions only and not opinions,-I contemplate with sovereign reverence that act of the whole American people which declared that their legislature should make no law respecting an establishment of religion or prohibiting the free exercise thereof,' thus building a wall of separation between church and state. Adhering to this expression of the supreme will of the nation in behalf of the rights of conscience, I shall see with sincere satisfaction the progress of those sentiments which tend to restore man to all his natural rights, convinced he has no natural right in opposition to his social duties." Coming as this does from an acknowledged leader of the advocates of the measure, it may be accepted almost as an authoritative declaration of the scope and effect of the amendment thus secured. Congress was deprived of all legislative power over mere opinion, but was left free to reach actions which were in violation of social duties or subversive of good order. In our opinion, the statute immediately under consideration is within the legislative power of congress. It is constitutional and valid as prescribing a rule of action for all those residing in the territories, and in places over which the United States have exclusive control. This being so, the only question which remains is, whether those who make polygamy a part of their religion are excepted from the operation of the statute. If they are, then those who do not make polygamy a part of their religious belief may be found guilty and punished, while those who do, must be acquitted and go free. This would be introducing a new element into criminal law. Laws are made for the government of actions, and while they cannot interfere with mere religious belief and opinions, they may with practices. Suppose one believed that human sacrifices were a necessary part of religious worship, would it be seriously contended that the civil government under which he lived could not interfere to prevent a sacrifice?

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Or if a wife religiously believed it was her duty to burn herself upon the funeral pile of her dead husband, would it be beyond the power of the civil government to prevent her carrying her belief into practice? So here, as a law of the organization of society under the exclusive dominion of the United States, it is provided that plural marriages should not be allowed. Can a man excuse his practices to the contrary because of his religious belief? To permit this would be to make the professed doctrines of religious belief superior to the law of the land, and in effect to permit every citizen to become a law unto himself. Government could exist only in name under such circumstances. A criminal intent is generally an element of crime, but every man is presumed to intend the necessary and legitimate consequences of what he knowingly does. Here the accused knew he had been once married and that his first wife was living. He also knew that his second marriage was forbidden by law. When therefore he married the second time, he is presumed to have intended to break the law. And the breaking of the law is the crime. Every act necessary to constitute the crime was knowingly done, and the crime was therefore knowingly committed. Ignorance of a fact may sometimes be taken as evidence of a want of criminal intent, but not ignorance of the law. The only defense of the accused in this case is his belief that the law ought not to have been enacted. It matters not that his belief was a part of his professed religion; it was still belief, and belief only. Affirmed. Reynolds v. U. S., 98 U. S. 145, B. 179, C. 95,

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Ke. 31.

(U. S. D. C. for Kansas, 1891.) Obscene Matter Sent Through the Mails, in violation of U. S. R. S. (1871) § 3893, was charged in an indictment against defendant, who claimed his sole motive was to improve the sexual habits of the people. PHILLIPS, J. Reduced to its actual essence, the ultimate position of defendant is this: That although the language employed in the given article may be obscene, as heretofore defined, yet as it was a necessary vehicle to convey to the popular mind the aggravation of the abuses in sexual commerce inveighed against, and the object of the publisher being to correct the evil and thereby alleviate human condition, the author should be deemed a public benefactor, rather than a malefactor. In short, the proposition is that a man can do no public wrong who believes that what he does is for the ultimate public good. The underlying vice of all this character of argument is that it leaves out of view the existence of the social compact, and the idea of government by law. If the end sought justifies the means, and there were no arbiter but the individual conscience of the actor to determine the fact whether the means are justifiable, homicide, infanticide, pillage, and incontinence might run riot; and it is not extravagant to predict that the success of such philosophy would remit us to that barbaric condition where

"No common weal the human tribe allied,

Bound by no law, by no fixed morals tied,

Each snatched the booty which his fortune brought,
And wise in instinct each his welfare sought."

Guiteau stoutly maintained to the end his sanity, and that he felt he had a patriotic mission to fulfill in taking off President Garfield, to the salvation of a political party. The Hindu mother cast her babe to the devouring Ganges to appease the gods. But civilized society says both are murderers. The Mormon contends that his religion teaches polygamy; and there is a school of so-called "modern thinkers" who would abolish monogamy, and erect on the ruins the flagrant doctrine of promiscuity, under the disguise of the affinities. All these claim liberty of conscience and thought as the basis of their dogmas, and the pro bono publico as the strength of their claim to indulgence. The law against adultery itself would lie dormant if the libertine could get the courts to declare and the jury in obedience thereto to say that if he invaded the sanctuary of conjugal life under the belief that the improvement of the human race demanded it he was not amenable to the statute. Society is organized on the theory, born of the necessities of human well-being, that each member yields up something of his natural privileges, predilections, and indulgences for the good of the composite community; and he consents to all the motto implies, salus populi suprema est lex; and, as no government can exist without law, the lawmaking power, within the limits of constitutional authority, must be recognized as the body to prescribe what is right and prohibit what is wrong. It is the very incarnation of the spirit of anarchy for a citizen to proclaim that like the heathen he is a law unto himself. The responsibility for this statute rests upon congress. The duty of the courts is imperative to enforce it while it stands. U. S. v. Harmon, 45 Fed. 414, B. 180.

§ 38. "Intent to do Some Other Illegal Act."

(Eng. C. C. R., 1575.) Intent to Poison Another-AccessoryAccidental Result. On indictment of John Saunders and Alex. Archer for murder of Eleanor Saunders, it appeared that Saunders desired to kill his wife who was ill, that he might marry another, and to this end took counsel of Archer, who bought and gave him arsenic to give his wife; and Saunders put the arsenic in a baked apple and gave it to his wife; who ate a little of it and gave it to Saunder's daughter Eleanor; and he protested as much as he dared for fear of suspicion, that apples were not good for the child; but his wife was determined, and said it was better for the child than for her; and the child ate it and died.

"Whether or no this was Murder in John Saunders, the father,