commerce and resources. They hoped that by excluding the productions of British industry from their ports, and by prohibiting the use of British commodities throughout France and her dependencies, they might gradually undermine this overgrown power; while their depraved policy at the same time sought to inculcate a belief among their subjects, that such measures would promote the industry of France. Thus was a system established, (if indeed so rude and impolitic a thing deserve the name,) in direct opposition to all the views of modern science; a system, which was in truth but a barbarous extension of the old theories, that so many enlightened men had endeavored to banish for ever from the world.

CHAPTER III.

The Relation in which the affairs of America stood with those of France as regarded Great Britain-Great Britain fully succeeds in annihilating the Commerce &c of France merely by following the footsteps of that Government-Issuing of the "Berlin Decree"-That Decree executed with inexorable Force-Passing of the British" Orders in Council" in retaliation-The Orders in Council fully justified by the Law of NationsBlockade of the British Islands an open Violation of the Law of Nations—Rights of Neutral Nations the same in War as in Peace.

THE measures adopted by France, as set forth in the foregoing chapter,had a twofold connection with the affairs of America. In the first place, the American statesman entertained much the same feelings with respect to the commercial and naval greatness of England with their friends in France; their understandings were in general of the same character, and their tempers equally as violent. They, as well as the French politicians, wished to render their country great by commerce; and as the established ascendancy of Great Britain appeared to them to stand in their way, they scrupled not about the means which might be employed to remove it. Their minds were not susceptible of a generous emulation; envy was the only feeling which a near view of the naval and commercial greatness of England could excite in their bosoms. They had no dread of France, who had in the course of the war lost her commerce, her colonies and her ships; whose power never came into contact with their own; whose resources of all kinds were exclusively devoted in the prosecution of a war, in the result of which, they vainly thought that America had no interest. But they hated England, her commerce and her power, as cordially even as the members of the

French government did: and had America been as little dependent on commerce as France, had her citizens been as indifferent to its real interests, or had her rulers possessed the same despotic sway over their fortunes, which the French government had assumed over those of its own subjects, it is probable that Mr. Madison and his auxiliaries would at once have followed the example of Buonaparte, by prohibiting all commercial intercourse with the British empire. But the Americans had not yet been wholly overawed by their rulers; and it became necessary to pursue a more indirect and insidious course with them, than that which had been followed by Buonaparte in his dealings with a people whom he had entirely subdued.

The measures pursued by France in the execution of her anti-commercial system, suspended for a while the international law of Europe, and afforded to the rulers of America the pretext which they had so long desired, for gratifying their animosity against England. The commercial hostility of France during the peace, although never considered by Great Britain as a ground for war, was not however forgotten when hostilities were renewed: and the English ministers therefore determined to employ the naval power which was at their command, to the annihilation of the foreign commerce of their enemy. These measures were such as the interests of the British empire demanded, and which a state of hostility fully justified; and they completely suceeded in accomplishing the object which they had in view. The foreign commerce of France was annihilated; her industry checked; her resources wasted; and her ruler discovered, when it was too late, how gross were the errors which he had committed. It was however, impossible to retract; and he resolved to carry his commercial war to the utmost pitch of fury. In this temper did Buonaparte issue his famous Berlin Decree, which renewed all the old prohibitory regulations, and ludicrously declared the British Islands to be in a state of blockade, at the very

moment when the fleets of Great Britain actually blockaded all the ports of France and her dependencies. Neutral vessels bound to, or returning from a British port, were made liable to capture by this singular decree Matters remained for some time in this state, the French ruler being unable to execute his decree, and the British government being averse to advance further in so barbarous a warfare. But having again proved successful in his northern campaign. Buonaparte resumed with fresh vigor his prohibitory system; he confirmed all the provisions of the Berlin Decree; excluded the merchan dize of Great Britain and her dependencies, and accompanied these prohibitions with the severest penalties.

Every article of British produce was searched for, seized and committed to the flames; while the most cruel punishments were inflicted on the subjects of France, who dared to violate these arbitrary laws. This violent system had now reached its height, and it seemed to be the determination of the French ruler to have it executed with the utmost rigor; the British government, therefore, could no longer, either in prudence or honour, delay the retaliation which its power enabled it to inflict. The famous Orders in Council were therefore issued; all trade to France or her dependencies was strictly prohibited; all vessels, of whatever nation, which ventured to engage in this trade, were declared liable to seizure, and France and her dependencies were thus reduced to that state of blockade, with which she had vainly threatened the British Islands. The Orders in Council admitted but of one single exception to this general blockade of the French empire. The French decrees had declared all vessels liable to seizure which had touched at a British port, the Orders in Council, to counteract this provision, declared, on the other hand, that only such ships as were in that situation should be permitted to sail for France. Thus did the utter extinction of the foreign trade of France result as a natural

consequence of the very measures of her own government; measures, which no despotism, how ignorant soever, would have ventured to adopt, had it not trusted to a power which effectually silenced all popular opinion.

Two questions have been put on these Orders in Council, were they founded in justice, and were they supported by reasons of expediency? On the first point, with which alone foreign powers had any concern, the advocates of these measures had a very easy task to perform; for nothing surely can be more obvious to those who know any thing of the law of nations, than the right of Great Britain to retaliate on her enemies their own violence and injustice. What has been called the rule 1756, forms the first link in that chain of commercial restrictions, which in the sequel became so complicated; and the perfect equity of this rule has always appeared manifest to the most enlightened minds. France, like the other European powers who possessed distant colonies, endeavored to secure for herself the monopoly of their markets; and during peace strictly prohibited all strangers from carrying on trade with them. When she goes to war with England, however, the superiority of her enemy's naval power compels her to relax the rigour of her colonial policy; and she is willing that neutral vessels should bring home the produce of her American settlements. By the interference of these neutrals, however, the British are manifestly deprived of the advantages which their naval power would otherwise secure to them; of the chance of captures, and the certainty of reducing colonies without striking a blow.

But no neutral can, upon any pretext, claim greater advantages after, than she enjoyed before the war; she has a right to insist that her relative condition to the belligerents shall not be rendered worse by the hostilities in which they may engage, but she can have no right to demand that it should be improved. By admission,