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pike; for there the tolls are paid for the benefit of the public, and not for the use of any individuals, and those tolls are not the subject of taxation within the 48 Eliz. ; there also the money is paid for the privilege of passing through the gate, and the party, having once paid it, cannot, under any circumstances, recover it back again. It seems to me, therefore, that this question was very rightly settled in Rex, v.
Page, which case cannot fairly be distin
guished from the present. Le Blanc, Justice. “This is a rate on tolls, and not on land. It is admitted that tolls, as such, are rateable property, and that such property is rateable in the parish where it arises; now it was decided in Rex v. Cardington, and other cases, that by this expression, “where it arises,’ we are not to understand the parish where the tolls are actually received, but the parish where they become due. The question then in this case is, Where do these tolls become due or payable? It has been said that the tolls are not paid to the company in respect of a contract for the carriage of goods, but for the privilege or liberty of carrying goods on the navigation : but in each instance, it is an entire contract to pay so much for the liberty of carrying goods for a certain space along the canal, and until the contract on the part of the company, giving the privilege of carrying the goods on their navigation, is performed, nothing becomes due to them. If the contract be for sending goods the whole length of the navigation, the contract is not performed on their part, and nothing becomes due to them for tolls until the goods are conveyed to Stourport; if the contract be for conveying goods an indeterminate voyage, to some place short of the whole distance, the tolls do not become due until such shorter voyage is performed. But this very question has been already determined in the case so frequently alluded to, Rex v. Page ; and unless the court felt that there were some strong objections to the mode of rating adopted in that case, that decision ought to govern the present case. Now, no mode of rating these tolls more consistent with justice or with policy than the rule there adopted has been pointed out. The counsel for this company have, indeed, contended that this case is distinguished from that in this respect—that there the toll was limited at a gross sum (4s. per ton) for the whole voyage, and so proportionably for a greater or less distance; whereas here the toll is 1}d. per ton per mile: but there is not in reason any distinction between the two cases on that account. In the one case, as well as in the other, the rate of tonnage is calculated at so much per mile. Not being able, therefore, to distinguish that case from the present, nor seeing any ground on which I can say that the decision is not consistent with the rules of law or public policy, I am of opinion that the order of sessions must be confirmed.” Notwithstanding these decisions in the King’s Bench, it is now customary, in some districts, to rate canals, passing through several townships, according to the net annual sum divided amongst the proprietors; and this sum is apportioned according to the length of canal contained in each township.
RAIL-RoADs are of modern invention, and were not known when the statute for the relief of the poor was framed, consequently their liability to the rate is not particularly noticed. They are, however, rateable, as so much land used for a valuable purpose, and the rate of the land must be increased to the annual value of the land and railroad united. There are two modes of estimating the annual value of rail-roads for the rate, each of which may be adopted, according to peculiar situations and circumstances. Public or private rail-roads, made by subscription, are rateable the same as canals, namely, by taking an average of the net annual amount of profit for the last two or three years for the rate; and if the rail-road passes through