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partments in 1810. It appears, however, that the public treasury had not furnished, or was not to furnish towards it, more than 391,292,455 francs. Thus, if the expenditure amounted, as in 1809, to 640 millions-which is probable if we consider the turn of affairs in Spain and Portugal-the deficit, or the sum to be provided by foreign contributions, must have been 249 millions.

Calculating from these data, the foreign contributions, either in specie, or in kind, of which the French troops have availed themselves, must have amounted

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Total in 5 years and 3 months 1131 millions of francs.* Enormous as this sum appears-209,430,000 dollars,-it comprises only that portion of the foreign receipts, which is levied under the title of requisitions. It is indeed, the greater portion, but it does not include the tribute, which Napoleon wrests from the sovereigns of the continent, by open, or secret treaties, for which he is not accountable, and which go into the chest of his extraordinary domains. We only know of these extortions, that

Austria, in 1806, paid 100 millions,
Prussia, in 1808, in 3

annual instalments, 120

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Total 361 millions fr. 65,780,000 dollars. If, to this, we add the subsidies paid in specie by Spain, previous to the invasion of her territory;-by Portugal, previous to her deliverance;-by Holland, and the Hanseatic towns, previous to their incorporation-the aggregate amount, levied from 1806, to 1810, inclusive, may be valued at from 4 to 500 millions. This is to be understood of sums, brought to the Thuilleries by mail, in bills of exchange, and in diamonds; or, with a military escort, in specie and ingots.

*Of the amount of the foreign contributions, preceding the year 1806, a statement is given in the work, on the foreign receipts, published in 1805, in which our author proves it to be equal to 1500 millions-277,500,000 dollars

So much, however, of these 400 or 500 millions, as has been taken from the emperor's private chest, to supply deficiencies in 1809, and 1810, is to be deducted, because it enters into the estimate of the amount of the requisitions. On the other hand, the seizures of American property, under the Rambouillet decree, equal at the lowest valuation, 100 millions;-we must count also 150 millions disbursed by Italy, thirty of which form a regular item in the annual budgets, since 1806; and 100 millions, furnished by the same country, for the endowment of the dutchies of the great fief, and for military pensions-all of which makes a grand total, of from 16 to 1700 millions of francs,-296 to 315 millions of dollars,-levied abroad, in requisitions, goods, or money, in the short space of five years and three months.

Will Mr. de Hauterive still say, that war has for his master, no attractions of profit?-On the contrary, the tranquillity of the world, depends on the circumstance, when war will cease to be more profitable to him than peace. He is unable to support his present military establishment without war.

In 1800, Prussia might have forced him to reduce that establishment. All his revenue, then amounted, to scarcely more than 400 millions, and it is avowed by his ministers, that he was obliged to discount the promissory notes, of the receivers of his revenue, at five per cent. per month, in order to raise, from 40 to 50 millions, to enable him to march to Marengo. As he has succeeded, in augmenting his internal revenue, to nearly 900 millions, (166 millions of dollars,) it cannot be denied, that his means of prolonging the contest, are now much greater. If, however, he persist in the warfare against Spain and Portugal, he will be compelled to seek in the north of Europe, those foreign receipts, of which he has been, for two years past, disappointed in the south. And why disappointed? Because he has at last met with a commander, who wages against him, a war of desolation; of exhaustion.

If, at Berlin, at Petersburgh, at Vienna, there be still statesmen, blind to the future, "let me ask them," says our author, "whom they will believe?-the French emperor, who assures us, that his annual revenue alone, would be sufficient to meet the expenses, necessary for resistance, to a hostile coalition of all Europe, or his minister of finance, who answers,-Sire, a great increase of burthens, would have borne down your majesty's subjects, had not victory invariably procured the needful supplies." Such an increase of burthens, our author thinks he has shown to be impossible.

"But," continues sir Francis, in his fifth chapter, "Mr. Pitt and myself have not been the only ones who saw the perpetuity of war, in the exhausted state of the regular, internal resources of France. Mr. Coulteux, while Bonaparte was in Egypt, pro

nounced in the Council of ancients, these remarkable words. "Let us acknowledge, citizens representatives, that, if we are not much on our guard, the existence, and the life of France, will become an existence, and a life, altogether dependent on war. Consider our vast military and naval expenditure;-consider the enormous sums which the war swallows up;-consider the mass of projects, and adventures, generated by an uninterrupted chain of military posts, stretching from Amsterdam to Naples, and you will with me, agree that the French people, propelled by the irresistible impulse, will soon have no other habits, no other industry, no other employment, no other morals, than those of war. For in war alone they will find MEANS OF EXISTENCE, AND RESOURCES. HOW CAN WE MAKE PEACE? How recal so large a portion of our population, from the mode of life to which they have been accustomed?-Citizens representatives, if we earnestly desire peace, we must make preparations for it, and of all preparations I have constantly regarded as the most indispensable, that of creating for the government a regular revenue, independent of casual receipts, confiscations and war contributions;-a revenue proceeding from the labour, the soil, the industry of the nation; from her commercial intercourse with friends and allies, not from conquests, armies, and adventures.-An amount of revenue, deemed adequate, and really so, to the wants of the state, can alone stop the effusion of human blood, and dry up the tears of the people."

Bonaparte, on his return from Europe, quickly silenced this orator, by conferring on him the senatorial dignity.

Mr. Le Coulteux spoke only of the connexion, between the war, and the deficit. Our author proceeds in the sixth chapter, to consider the connexion, not less intimate, between the deficit, and the conscription.

The conscription existed, previously to Bonaparte, as a law to be inforced in time of war. He made it a permanent law.

During the rejoicings on account of the treaty of Amiens, and only six weeks after it had been signed, he broached the philanthropic idea, of establishing in the conscription, a sort of palladium for the repose of Europe;-a supplement to St. Pierre's project of universal peace.

When the consular conscription was decreed in May 1802, "it might be asked," said the reporter of the decree, Mr. Daru-"why raise armies so formidable, after the conclusion of peace? The legislator aims at erecting the social edifice on a durable foundation. He feels anxious to ameliorate the condition of his copatriots,but it also does not escape him, that he

is responsible for the preservation of peace;-this law will restore your colonies, and be a pledge for the tranquillity of the world."

Thus the whole youth of France is distributed in regular crops, which Napoleon reaps, as he does his land tax, even by anticipations. The conscripts of 1810, were, in 1809, on the banks of the Tagus, after having served their apprenticeship on those of the Niemen.

In times of peril, when invasion threatens, let every able bodied man fly to arms, to defend his home, and his country. Nothing can be more just, more necessary to independence and liberty. But can any thing be more unjust or horrid than to seize indiscriminately on every young man, who has attained his twentieth year, to send him to serve, combat, and die in the sugar islands, in the burning sands of Egypt, amidst the marshes of Poland, or in the deserts between Portugal and Spain?-Yet such is the work of the man, who constantly exclaims, "good laws are the principal causes of the prosperity of nations. Our first solicitude is for our people. We are still more anxious for their happiness, than their glory? Nothing," remarks our author very justly, prejudicial to industry, more destructive of it, than the conviction, that, whatever education a young man may have received, whatever profession he may have chosen, he will be obliged to follow another; he will be sent, at the age of twenty, and even before this period, to distant regions, on an errand of conquest and rapine.

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Daru and Sahuc, when they refer in their reports, to antiquity, forget that Rome had her slaves; that the labours of agriculture, and the mechanical arts, continued their accustomed course at home, whilst war was advancing abroad. But, they well knew, though they chose not to mention, that modern Rome, in indiscriminately recruiting her legions from the plough, from the work-shops, the counting-houses, the colleges, and even from the secondary schools,-levels the tree of reproduction, at the moment of its budding.

In the present French armies, thousands of soldiers, are superior in education, to the officers who command them.-On the field of battle, every conscript slain, counts but for one; but, all the labour, that had been bestowed on his education, all the fruits, that his acquirements would have yielded, are, with him, lost to the state.

Yet it is not so much by the number of those so lost, that we ought to calculate the bad consequences of the conscription, as by the number of those, whom it prevents from embracing any profession whatever.

Those, who survive, and return after years of service, have

lost the habit of peaceable pursuits, and are no longer fit for soldier's life.

any

but a

There can exist no motive, in such a state of things, for bestowing pains on the education of children; for forming carefully their habits, their taste; for training them to regular pursuits. Why teach them to explore the mines of agriculture, commerce, and the arts, when only destined to explore those of victory, and pillage?

At Berlin, in 1808, Tallyrand, in a report concerning a new conscription, said to the emperor," The former conscripts, aided in conquering kingdoms; those, who are going to follow them, will aid in conquering peace. You will accelerate for them, Sire, the period of devotion, and valour; they will for their country, accelerate that of gratitude and peace."

In Prussia-with whose military laws, Daru compares the conscription, no recruits were taken from the colleges, or the universities. In the cities, those belonging to incorporated trades and professions, were exempt.-The only sons of farmers were never enlisted. Besides, the enlistments were for life, whilst the object of the French conscription is, manifestly, to convert the whole nation into soldiers.

Obstacles are multiplied to prevent young men, necessary to their families, or devoted to the useful and liberal arts, from finding substitutes. The law, though it expressly allows of the latter, requires that they should be procured in the same district, where the drafting took place. The number, consequently, of those who seek substitutes, being very great, and of those, qualified and willing to serve as such, very small, the latter obtain a sort of monopoly, and demand exorbitant prices. Eight hundred Napoleon d'ors, have been paid in Paris, and Antwerp.

The trait of the conscription-law just mentioned, is characteristic. Had Bonaparte's object merely been to raise men, by admitting of reasonable excuses, on receiving an indemnity, and by fixing the minimum of these indemnities at twenty-five, the maximum at fifty Napoleon d'ors, the sums arising from them would have been sufficient, if government alone recruited, to obtain as many men, as might have been wanted. But Napoleon has neglected nothing, to make it extremely difficult, and, for all but a few, impossible, to produce substitutes, a conduct for which he could have no other motive, than to give. more brilliancy to the profession of arms, and to convert the whole French population into soldiers.

He has succeeded so well, that his new colleges of law were almost emptied in 1807. Just so the ancient schools of medicine were emptied at an early period, when he made a patriotic

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