appeal to all young Frenchmen, to join him at Dijon, and to accompany him to Marengo.

"All arts, no doubt," said the Reporter, Carrion Nixas, "have their excellence, and their beauty, but the arts of honour, and victory, are the true arts of the French people. Nature, and Providence, will it so. History proves it. Such is the character of the French people, they must be the last, or the first of nations. For them there is no middle course. They have not the virtues of mediocrity. The new order of things, is principally founded on a change in the mode of existence, of almost every Frenchman.-The object now is, to convert a new position, the result of circumstances, and momentary in its nature, into a permanent, fixed, and durable attitude. A few more, such admirable, such energetic institutions as this, (the establishment of the legion of honour, which preceded the new code of conscription by two months only,) and we are sure, to delegate to our children, a republic eternal, and the supremacy of nations."

"I ask any man," says our author, "who will read the whole of this speech in the Moniteur of the 17th March, 1809, whether it was possible to tell the French people more plainly, that in future they ought to renounce the productive arts, and exclusively devote themselves to the arts of victory; that the foreign receipts would be in future, the source of all wealth; that the treaty of Amiens was but a truce!"

But Bonaparte is not satisfied, with emptying the universities of law and medicine, in order to recruit his armies. The elementary schools are now to furnish at once, and without delay, the forty thousand mariners, from 13 to 16 years of age, who are to subdue England, in a few campaigns, and avenge the liberties of the seas!

The senatorial decree on this subject, of December, 1810, nearly caused a revolution in France, particularly among the women; "This was worse," they said, "than Robespierre.. The real atrocity of the emperor's character had at last come to light," &c. &c.

The conscription of 1811, comprised 160 thousand individuals, including the maritime conscripts.

The preceding levies had been limited, by the senatorial decrees at 80,000, but Bonaparte had constantly exceeded the number authorized by law. The minister of war, Count d'Hunebourg, says, in his report to the senate of the 18th of September 1809," The growth of youth makes an annual accession, to the number of those subject to the conscription, of 360,000; of whom there have been embodied, to this day, 520,000,-viz. in 1806-102,500; in 1807--102,500; in 1808-102,500; in VOL. IV.

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1809-102,500, and in 1810, by anticipation 110,000. This, Senators, in truth, is the force of France arising from the conscription. I pledge myself for the correctness of the statement."

Instead of being struck dumb with astonishment, or breaking forth in reproaches, on account of such a transgression of the law, they saw no better remedy for preventing similar irregularities in future, than to authorize a levy of 160,000 men and children.

It may be difficult at first to conceive how so great an addition to the legal number is obtained, when every new conscription is accompanied with regular lists, specifying the number of conscripts, to be furnished by each district. It is thus explained by an eye-witness, who saw 207 from his district march, though the list mentioned only 99.-The recruiting officers, and other military agents, who superintend the drafting, secretly favour the desertion of the conscripts already drafted, because the law prescribes, that they are to be immediately replaced by others. When the complement is full, the deserters are sought for. Few escape. If any their families have to pay the penalty for refractory conscripts. In this manner his Imperial majesty procures men, or money, and often both.

The seventh chapter is devoted to some researches, concerning the numerical force of the French armies in January 1812, and the increased expenses of the military establishment.

Our author is of opinion, that in January, 1812, previously to the drafting of the new conscription, the French armies did not exceed 400,000 men, receiving pay.

He endeavours to support this opinion, by the statements, contained in a work entitled "Historical Accounts of the Revolutionary War, &c., preceded by an inquiry into the force of the French armies, from the time of Henry IV, to the end of 1806, accompanied by a Military Atlas," by certain statements of the minister of war; and by that part of the general financial accounts, which is headed, "Pay of active forces."

The work just mentioned was compiled by several officers, who had free access to the war office, and to all the memoirs and documents, there deposited, of which they stood in need; even to such as are called secret.

They declare that the calculations, which rated the first armies of the French republic, at one million of men, were exaggerated; that the object of such exaggerations must have been "to maintain confidence at home, and spread alarm "abroad." They contrast them with official documents, and show,

That in April and May 1794, there were actually under arms, no more than 690,132 men.

That in October and November 1795, there were no more than 448,071, present; and, it was said, 758,229 effective. But, this last number they believe incorrect. "The directory was anxious perhaps to give to France, and to Europe, an exalted idea of their power."

In February 1796-when Petiet was at the head of the war office, there were under arms 422,105; effective 692,528. In August and September-under arms no more than 396,016; effective 495,259.

Under the ministry of Scherer, the military force declined, from the impossibility of paying the troops regularly. The soldiers deserted for the interior, by whole battalions and brigades.

On the 2d of July, 1799-Bernadotte being then at the head of the department,-the whole army amounted to 449,844 men, inclusive of 41,019, not troops of the line; inclusive also of 32,375 in Egypt. Death, sickness, loss by prisoners, and other causes, reduced it to 298,463 disposeable. In this year, the military establishment was put on a better footing; the pay was fixed at 130,835,829 francs; the total of support at 206,807,354 francs.-If to this sum of 337,643,184 francs could be added, the cost of ammunitions of war, small arms, artillery, wagons, hospitals, transports, &c.-it would give an idea of the aggregate military expenditure. But their amount cannot be ascertained.

This proves, remarks Sir Francis d'Ivernois, that even then before the pay of the soldiers had been enhanced three sols; before an immense, and expensive etat-major had been created; before the Berlin decree had raised the prices of all warlike stores-337 millions were already found insufficient for an army of 290 thousand disposeable men.-It ought to be kept in mind that in 1799, the pay of 449 thousand men was fixed at 130 million of francs, which is 290 francs per head, on an average.

From the 23d September, 1800, to the 22d September, 1801, during the ministry of Carnot and Berthier, France kept in activity 414,732 men.

In 1802, the army consisted of 327,151 infantry, and 72,564 horse;-in the whole 399,715, exclusive of 15 thousand veterans.

In 1802 and 1803, the army was reduced to 340,318 men, disposeable, and it was not greater on the 24th September, 1803, though war with England had recommenced on the 16th of May preceding. This is the period when the first consul tried to alarm lord Whitworth, by threatening England with an army " of 480,000 men, ready for the most desperate undertakings."

Towards the end of the year 1804, and in the beginning of 1805, the disposeable force consisted of 371,820 men.

In the first months of 1806, the disposeable force was about 378 thousand. The exact number of the troops at the recommencement of the war in Germany, cannot be given, but if it is supposed, say the authors of the military atlas, to have amounted to 477 thousand men, this will be near the truth.

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These statements, continues sir Francis d'Ivernois, bear the stamp of accuracy and impartiality. They are further corroborated by the register of the votes, which, in 1804, conferred," on Bonaparte the imperial dignity, wherein the unanimous suffrages of the army and navy are stated at 450,000.

Yet, in 1805, the imperial cabinet of Vienna suffered itself to be imposed upon, with a list of 651,904 men.

All these disclosures, indeed, prove the more forcibly, the superiority of Napoleon's talents. But, if he has succeeded by terrifying men's imaginations, it is the more important that the truth should be known.

In 1806 the Austrian army was numerically stronger than the French, though it conceived itself, by one third, inferior.

Since 1806 no similar statements have been published. The emperor has even tried to efface the recollection of the preceding, by again bringing forward exaggerated estimates in order to "maintain confidence at home, and spread alarm abroad."

"The heavy expense," says the duke de Gaëte, "of the military establishment to be provided for in 1809, ceases to be a matter of astonishment when it is considered, that your majesty has this year on foot, besides an immense etat-major, 900,000 infantry, 100,000 horse, and 50,000 artillery-an. amount of force, which your majesty had at no former period.

In 1809-more than one million of men under arms, when only 180,000 had been left in Spain, and when scarcely more than 130,000 were in Germany, and Italy!-What had become, asks Sir Francis, of the remaining 700,000?—This is indeed as Mr. Faber says, "falsehood organized into a system, made the basis of a government, and consecrated in public acts."

The minister of war, without imagining that his colleague would have, on paper, one million of men to be supported by his majesty, acknowledged to the senators, that the conscription, though pushed beyond the limits prescribed by law, had not, in the five last years, yielded more than 520,000 recruits.

But, if in the first months of 1806, the army amounted only to 390,994 men, and the conscription, during the five years succeeding, produced only 520,000 recruits, to pretend that in

January, 1810, the army numbered upwards of one million, would be pretending that neither the innumerable battles in Germany, Poland, Holland, Portugal, and Spain, nor sickness, nor desertion, nor the usual fatigues, privations, and casualties attending war, weakened it by a single man.

If this be improbable, his excellency the duke of Gaëte must have taken into his account, the ghosts of the slain.

Since this report of the minister of finance, we have learnt from the exposé of the minister of the interior, that on the 29th June 1811, France had still under arms, 800,000 men.

But, during the interval between the report, and the exposé, the conscription furnished 120,000 new soldiers, and a reinforcement of 40,000 men accrued from the incorporation of Holland and Illyria. Notwithstanding this the army is suddenly 200,000 men less than in 1809!

Impressed with the idea, that the downfall of Bonaparte's power will arise from financial embarrassments, whenever the fields of foreign contribution and tribute become barren, or victory begins to forsake him, our author, in the eighth and last chapter, of his valuable work, takes a conjectural survey of the nature and extent of the internal resources, by which, it may be conceived, that the deficiency of foreign receipts could be supplied.

Paper money cannot be thought of for this purpose.-The bank at Paris has branches at Lyons, Rouen, and Lisle.—The discounts of the mother bank in 1810, amounted to 747,809, 839 francs, (138,344,820 dollars). In 1811, only to 391,389, 483 francs, (72,407,054 dollars.)-The profits of the bank at Lyons in 1810 were 174,768 francs. In 1811 only 39,965 francs. The profits of the branch at Rouen have likewise declined. The branch at Lisle has yielded none. This decline does not arise from bad debts, but from the universal stagnation of business, and from the circumstance, that in the departments, the notes of the branch banks, are returned upon them as soon as issued. Even in Paris, agreeable to the last report of the bank, the notes of the mother bank in circulation amounted only to 130 millions of francs-about as many dollars, as the bank of England circulates pounds sterling. Yet the Paris notes are convertible into specie.

But trade is at a stand. The fate of the assignats is remembered. Still more immediately present to every mind, is the recent occurrence, when the emperor took the specie of the bank to march to Austerlitz; supplying it at the same time with a military guard, to prevent all improper intrusion of creditors. The event of the resumption of the payments of the bank, was necessarily dependent upon the success of the cam