hopes of irregular power, and party revenge, and certain encouraging calculations of private gain; nor upon the strong contagion of the angry passions, the efficacy of mutual reproach and exhortation, the overpowering ascendancy of a few adventurous leaders, over many weak and irresolute minds, among a body of men, confined to one spot, and communing only with themselves.

To explain further the mistake, into which we had fallen. How is it possible we could have foreseen, that the senate, the constitutional frank-pledge of the nation, the ballast, if we may be allowed the figure, of the vessel of state, an assembly capable of weighing deliberately, and discerning accurately their own and the public interests, would have followed in the wild career, and gone all the desperate lengths, of the lower house? The event was the more strange to us, in consequence of the opinions gravely proclaimed not long before, by several senators forming a part of the usual majority of their body, with respect to our foreign relations, and our domestic condition. Inconsistency in statesmen is too common to excite surprise; but in the instance particularly, of two of the individuals to whom we allude, the apostacy, if we may so term it, from the maxims of conduct springing immediately out of their general and acknowledged views of things, was too gross and shameless, to be the ground even of a conjecture. Could we have expected from one of these persons that after having, in his place, denounced the administration, as imbecile, pusillanimous and incapable, after having traced to their weakness, all our "present sufferings and degradations," he would have voted for war in any shape, to be waged by them? Or that the other would have voted for war with England alone, after having in the month of May last, declared, also in his place, that the national honour then imperiously called upon us, to place both France and England precisely in the same situation, in which they were, when the president's proclamation of November 1810 was issued; adding, that men of nice notions of honour, would believe, that we could not honourably pursue the war with Great Britain, until we had freed ourselves from the deception practised upon us by France?

But it is time for us to speak particularly, of the Address of the federal representatives. As the same topics are treated in less detail, although with much ability, in that of the Massachusetts' legislature, we shall content ourselves with earnestly recommending it to the attention of the public. In the

course of the quotations we propose to make from the former, and the observations we shall annex to them, we expect to convince our readers, that this war well deserves the epithets which these addresses apply to it, and that, even admitting it to be just in the principle, our present rulers are utterly unfit to conduct it to a prosperous issue, and, in all respects, unworthy of the confidence of the nation.

Whoever has read with attention the appeal of the thirtyfour members of congress, will acknowledge with us, that every kind of praise is due to its excellence as a composition. The whole question of war is,-within a comparatively small compass, fully stated and argued, with equal perspicuity of style, and force of reasoning. The soundest and most luminous maxims of state-policy, are scattered throughout, and brought completely to bear, on all the seeming difficulties of our situation. It is impossible, in perusing this address, and what is called the manifesto of the committee of foreign relations, not to institute a comparison between the temperance, candour and radiant truth of the one, and the falsehood of the colours daubed over the other, the undignified acrimony of its language, and the glaring partiality of its statements.

In the first paragraphs of this peace-address, the authors judiciously assign their reasons, for appearing in this anomalous way, before the public. These are of a nature to kindle the most lively interest, and, we think, very strong alarms, in the breast of every sincere friend of our constitution. The war itself endangers that constitution but consequentially; the practices which have thus driven the minority of the house of representatives, from their proper theatre of duty, affect it directly and fundamentally; suspend some of its most important benefits and privileges,-and, if persevered in, must accomplish its total destruction.

We have always looked with an eye of jealousy and distrust, upon the secret sessions, in which the majority in congress, have so frequently indulged, for the few years past. There is nothing more obviously, and imperiously required, by the genius of our system of government, than that the discussions of our deliberative assemblies, should be public, in all cases, where the object of them, the legitimate, fair object,— is not liable to be certainly frustrated, by that course. It is not enough that the constituent, should know in what sense, his representative has voted, on a question of general concern. He should, in order to acquire a thorough acquaintance with

the character of the latter, and to exert over him the control, which the constitution intends, be enabled to follow him in every step of his conduct, and take cognizance of every sentiment he utters.

The closing of the doors on a debate, in either house of congress, is never justifiable, but when the execution of the measure in view, cannot be otherwise successfully compassed, or the public preserved from serious detriment. It must be a matter of indispensable necessity. The pernicious abuses to which, a free departure from this rule might lead, are sufficiently obvious. A majority need but muffle itself up in the cloak of secrecy, to prosecute with impunity plans hostile to the honour, the prosperity, or the liberties of the nation; to screen itself effectually, from the supervision of the people, on occasions when it is most important that such supervision should be exercised; to bereave them of the information and lights, which the minority might be able to communicate, and indeed paralize all opposition on the part of the latter, even to the most ruinous measures.

This is what we see exemplified in the conduct of the present congress. "Secret sessions," to use the language of the address," have multiplied; and in proportion to the importance of the questions agitated, has been the studious concealment of debate." All difficulties for the majority, arising from the logic and patriotism of the minority, and the inquisitive, imposing gaze of the public, have vanished before this easy, but unhallowed expedient. It was to be expected, after certain previous sallies, that, however daring the irregularity, recourse would be had to it, on the question of war; of all others, that on which free and public discussion, was most to be dreaded by the authors. Accordingly, the rights of the minority and of the public, were trampled upon without hesitation. It was notorious, that the subject of secret debate eould not be concealed while in agitation, and even, if the object had not succeeded, that it must be immediately known, what that object was. Of course no advantages would have accrued to the enemy, from a public discussion; no one of our hostile plans could have been thwarted or impeded. In fact the case would not have been different, had it been possible to keep the public, in total ignorance of the main design. The closing of the doors, therefore, served but for the more speedy, and unembarrassed execution, of the will of the majority. In conclave, timid spirits could be rallied and fixed to the ob

ject; defiance might be securely bid to the voice of the minority, even had they been inspired.

But let us hear the language of the address on this point. "The momentous question of war," say the authors to their constituents" is decided. On this topic so vital to your interests, the right of public debate has been denied to your representatives. They have been called into secret session on this the most interesting of all your public relations, although the circumstances of the time and of the nation afforded no reason for secrecy, unless it be found in the apprehension of the effect of public debate, on public opinion, or of public opinion on the result of the vote. Except the message of the president of the United States, which is now before the public, nothing confidential was communicated. That message contained no fact not previously known. No one reason for war was intimated, but such as was of a nature public and notorious. The intention to wage war, and invade Canada had been long since openly avowed. The object of hostile menace had been ostentatiously announced. Yet the doors were shut upon the people. In a situation so extraordinary the undersigned have deemed it their duty by no act of theirs, to sanction a proceeding so novel and arbitrary. When this momentous subject was stated as for debate, they demanded that the doors should be opened. This being refused, they declined discussion, being perfectly convinced from indications too plain to be misunderstood, that in the house, all argument with closed doors, was hopeless, and that any act giving implied validity to so flagrant an abuse of power, would be little less than treachery to the essential rights of a people."

We beg our readers to pause, upon the solemn testimony here borne, by so large and respectable a portion of the house of representatives, to the fact of the utter hopelessness and futility of argument in that house, when in conclave, on a question, of all others the most important, for the public interest! Under such circumstances, what have we not to fear for our constitution, one of the primary ends of which, is, that reason should have full and fair play, and passion as little scope as possible, in the administration of our public concerns;-which depends, indeed, for its existence, upon the predominance of that end? The apprehensions awakened by the fact just mentioned, must be greatly increased, by other, and equally alarming statements, from the same high authority.

"The undersigned," says the address, "have witnessed a principle, adopted as the law of the house, by which under a

novel application of the previous question, a power is assumed by the majority to deny the privilege of speech, at any stage and under any circumstances of debate. And recently, by an unprecedented assumption, the right to give reasons for an original motion, has been made to depend upon the will of the majority."

Thus has a finishing blow been given to the freedom of speech, in the house of representatives. If the previous question is to prevail, whenever its intervention may suit the caprice or convenience of the majority,—if the doors are to be closed upon the same principle, in any other case than one of imperious necessity,if it be compulsory on a member to submit to the house an intended motion in writing, previous to any explanations or comments on his part,—and if it be then permitted to the house to refuse at once to consider it, and to arrest all further discussion on the subject,-is it not self evident, that the minority is entirely, as regards the freedom of speech, at the mercy of the majority?

And if this be the case, may it not be said that the nation itself, with respect to its highest interests, is also at the mercy of that majority, although, not exceeding the minority, perhaps, but by a few voices? What could prevent the majority in congress, particularly when backed by the favour of a misguided majority out of doors, from trampling with impunity upon their opponents both in the house and throughout the nation; from perpetuating among the people the most fatal delusions, and under shelter of those delusions, committing the wildest excesses and the most destructive follies? Of what avail but to the most pernicious purposes, can deliberative discussion be at all, if it may be restricted arbitrarily to one side of the question, or of the house, as it evidently may be, under the precedent set in the case of Mr. Randolph, to which the address alludes in the last phrase of the quotation just made.

Our own legislative history, and that of every free commonwealth shows, that a majority elected and supported by a party, will, in almost all instances, stretch their constitutional power, at least, to the utmost; leave no particle of it unexerted, in order to hamper and oppress their opponents, as well as to gratify the resentments, and prejudices, of their supporters out of doors. The framers of our constitution were well aware of this, and were, therefore, very far from intending to leave to the majority in congress, the constitutional power to silence the minority under any pretext, or by any devices. On the contrary, they looked to the enjoyment by the minority, of the VOL. IV. C