of individuals, are parties to the Constitution of the United States,) how those individuals have disposed of the power of instruction, which, it is said, the nature of representative government requires that they should possess? Does it suffice to answer, “ that they give their general attributes of sovereignty to their state legislatures?” This surrender must have been made, at the time when the constitution of the state, the instrument of the grant, was notified by the people. But, at that time, the Constitution of the United States did not exist; and a power to control one of its legislative organs could not have been then conveyed, for this, if for no other reason. It is in vain, therefore, to search into the constitutions of the general and state governments, for


express grant. If claimed, by implication, in behalf of the legislature of the state, “because the power of legislation is a sovereign power?” the reply is obvious. All power, uncontrolled by a superior, is sovereign; that is, supreme. The power of interpreting or the power of executing the law is as much a sovereign power, as that of making the laws themselves. And the whole sovereign power of a nation, as has been shown, in a former part of this inquiry, embraces every possible subject of legislation, and can be restrained only by the law of nature, or of God. Of this sovereign power, the people of the United States have delegated to the general, or national government, one part; to the governments of the particular states, belong as much as the people, distributed into communities, or states, have respectively thought proper to give them; and the other part retained by the bills of rights of the different state constitutions, or reserved by the whole people, to those several communities, by the constitution of the United States, remains in the people themselves, where their sovereignty, in virtue of which, all those delegations of power have been made, for ever resides.

Of that portion of sovereign power delegated by the people of the several states, to the state governments, and secured to those governments, by the constitution of the United States, the. act of the whole people, the legislatures of the respective states, possess but a part. The state judiciaries, and the state executives have also, their portions of sovereign power, or of sovereignty, if those expressions are deemed synonimous. Each power, moving within the orbit prescribed to it by the people, is sovereign, that is, liable to no other control than that of the constitution, the act and law of the people themselves. The power of instructing the senators of the United States as it has been already remarked, has been expressly delegated, by the people, to none of those state authorities. If assumed by implication,

because any such authority possesses a sovereign or uncontrolled power, it must belong either to all of them, conjunctively, or to each of them, separately. Is it to be exercised by the joint act of all, or by each? It is not contended that a concurrence of all is necessary, to make instructions binding on a senator of the United States; still less is it admitted, by the advocates of the doctrine of instructions, that each has a right to instruct, which would, moreover, be absurd; because, as each instruction, it is said, would be binding, the senator might be subjected to three distinct and interfering rules of conduct.

The advocates for the right of instruction limit its exercise to the legislative branch of the state government, to the exclusion of the other two branches. Whereas, if analogy and implication were both to be respected, their theory would appear more consistent, if in relation to interpretations of the constitution and laws of the United States, the state judiciaries were allowed to be the popular organ of instruction; if in relation to the conduct of the executive, the state executives; for the Senate of the United States has executive as well as legislative power; and to the legislatures of the state, the power of instruction would be consistently confined to its operation on questions of expediency, occurring in the course of national legislation.

It is believed by this assembly, that every authority exercising, under a state government, a power unrestrained, except by the constitution of such state, has, what is commonly denominated, a sovereign power, and as the constitution of this state provides, that the legislative, executive, and judiciary departments shall be "separate and distinct," each department has the same "general attributes of sovereignty” which belong to either of the other two departments.

Having closed th vi of this interesting question, this assembly will resume the point, which it conceded, and regarding the people of the United States as the parties to their constitution of national government, it will briefly consider the other argument, 7? which," the right of the state legislatures, to instruct the senators of the United States,” has been grounded. Does the constitution of the United States, by requiring that the senators in congress shall be elected by the legislatures of the several states, give to those legislatures, the right to instruct the senators, who respectively represent those states? The people are as much the constituents of the senate of the United States as they are of the president. Are they not the constituents of the latter? Speaking of the possible corruption of a president of the United States, Publius closes a train of animated remark in these words, "he might make his own aggrandizement the price of his treachery to his constituents.Speaking of the utility of his qualified veto against the passage of an iniquitous law, "his fortitude would be stimulated, by the probability of the sanction of his constituents.What constituents? Unquestionably, the people of the United States; for the existence of the “colleges of presidential electors" ceases with the election of the officer, as has been justly remarked. In like manner, the senate of a neighbouring state is elected by the instrumentality of deputies chosen for that purpose. But it has never been even imagined, that the senators of that state were liable to be bound by the instructions of their immediate electors. Those senators are regarded as the representatives of the people, who have, by their constitution of government, provided that mode of electing them, either for convenience, or to render the two branches of their legislature, intended as mutual checks upon one another, less “ homogeneous."

But it does not appear, if the right of instruction be deemed coincident with the right of election, that the single college which elects the senators of Maryland, or the numerous colleges which elect the president and vice president, can be, consistently, denied the right of instructing the authorities, whom they must, in this sense, be deemed, respectively, to constitute. The exception which has been taken to this parallel, that no one electoral body appoints the president, does not apply to the election of the Senators of Maryland, who are all elected by one assembly of deputies; and it is not perceived, how the number of the electoral colleges, employed in the choice of a president of the United States, absolutely disqualifies them for giving him instructions. They all meet at the same period of time; and it would suffice, to settle any proposition among them, that it be, at that time, propounded to them ai » Vihere the two branches of a state legislature elect by concurrent vote, the senator is not elected by one body; and those who claim for each congressional district, consisting of many counties, the right of instructing its representative in congress, will not cop end, that the counties shall not instruct him, because no one county elects him, or because the sense of the people, on any such instruction, must be taken in the separate counties of the district. moreover, very obvious, that the act of electing a senator of the United States, performed by a state legislature, is as completely a final act of election, as that by which the whole senate of Maryland is elected by one college, or the president and vice president by many colleges of electors. And, although the electors, in the latter case, usually disperse after the election is over, yet the doctrine, for which the advocates of instructions

It is, contend, would warrant their longer continuance together. The duration of the sessions of a state legislature arises from its having other duties to perform, in relation to its own constituents. Will it be contended, that if any other duties had been required, by the constitution, of the colleges of presidential electors, which could have had the effect of protracting their sessions beyond the date of the election, such additional duties would have carried with them the right of instructing the president of the United States? It would, further, seem to be required, if this assembly undertakes to instruct the senators of Virginia, in congress, that it should be done by resolution adopted by joint ballot of the two houses; in pursuance of the mode of election, required by the state constitution; which has not yet been suggested.

Hence it appears, that, at the end of every inquiry, the doctrine recurs with additional force, that the people are the constituents of the legislative body, however they may vary the mode of election; to whatever voices, for the sake of utility or convenience, they may commit the exercise of the power of election; and, however elected, the senator is to be regarded as a representative of the whole people, of whose deliberative council he is a member. If this doctrine be deemed inconsistent with the policy and interest of the smaller states, who are entitled, by the constitution, to the benefit of equal representation in the senate with the larger-If it be urged, that this apportionment of representation is a benefit, of which, even by a change of the constitution, no state can be deprived without its consent, and, therefore, that a particular importance is to be attached to it, the answer is obvious. It is a most important provision to the smaller states. For, however free may be the deliberations of the senate, each senator will look to the state in which he resides, and where he beholds the organ of his appointment. It is unnecessary here to repeat all the considerations which the general theory of representative government suggests, to lead to the conviction, that the representative of a particular district, in which he is required to reside, elected by the people of that district, or by persons deputed by them to whom he is also responsible, through regular periodical elections, will be sufficiently devoted to their interests, to avail himself of every proper occasion to promote them. And that he will think much less of the interests of the residue of the community, in proportion as he thinks more of those of his immediate constituents. This, therefore, is a feature of the constitution, the result, unquestionably, of a compromise of interests, of which the large states have most reason to complain. But it does not prove, that any state

has a right, in consequence of it, to suspend or control the deliberations of the senate, by instructing its senators.

If the states, in their separate capacities, be again regarded as the parties to the constitution of the United States, they have all an equal interest in the character and rights of those who compose the senate of the United States. As a branch of the legislature, it cannot perform its constitutional functions, without deliberating, as well as deciding. There is no question, but the arrest of a senator by an armed force, and the confinement of his person, so as to prevent his attendance on his public duty, would be a gross invasion, not only of the rights of the injured senator, but of that branch of the national legislature, who would be thus suddenly deprived of his services; and although, where he is simply instructed, the character of the act, by which his faculties are chained, while his person is at liberty, may be less obnoxious to himself, it is not less detrimental to the assembly, of which he is a member.

If it be contended, that all the state legislatures possess this right, and are thus placed on the same footing of equality; it has been already denied, that any of them possess the right. But if they all did, it could not be equally enjoyed by all. An accidental coincidence of time between the sessions of a state legislature and of the senate, would afford one state an opportunity of instructing its senators by its legislature, which could not be exercised by another state differently circumstanced. Tothe disparity thus arising, from temporary or accidental causes, must be added the irremediable inequality growing out of the geographical position of the states around their common political centre. What would be the similitude, in this respect, between the advanta

of the state of Maryland, the seat of whose government is but a day's journey from the metropolis of the United States, and those of the states of New Hampshire and Georgia, on the Atlantic; of the trans-Allegany states of Kentucky, Tennessee, and Ohio; or those just rising into existence, at the mouth, or at the sources, of our western waters? If this right be exercised at all by the latter, it must often be after the occasion has passed, which alone could give it importance; and when the instruction, instead of furnishing, as required, a rule of conduct to the senator, will have no effect whatever. While it is not easy to conceive, how, among co-ordinate states, a right can belong to one, which all cannot exercise, it must, in this view, be greatly deplored, that the assumption of such a right by any, will very disproportionably increase the influence of the particular states in the vicinity of the seat of the national government; and, in so doing, excite, of necessity, the jealousies of those whose geo


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