European nations to refinements and advantages, with which they were before unacquainted. For two centuries, during which the phrenzy lasted, they traversed from time to time, in going and returning, each other's territories, and in the East, found themselves associated pêle-mêle, with the same object in view.-Kings, nobles, and commons, who might never have had occasion to see each other in Europe, appeared, in Palestine, fighting under the same banners. The enlargement of their mutual relations, and their ideas, was the consequence. They acquired there in cominon, a taste for the fine arts, and for luxury; some among them, a relish for industry and commerce. The spirit of adventure and travel became general among the inhabitants of Europe, and it was, at this epoch, that their progress in letters, and in the sciences and arts, acquired that accelerated motion, with which they have continued to advance, down to the present time.

No social arrangement is so favourable to civilization, and the improvement of the human mind, as that, where a number of independent countries with the frequent opportunities, at the same time, of mixing together,--are made to form one family of states, a nation of nations, by means of a community of language, of religion, and of social institutions. The attainments of one readily become common to all; emulation springs up; one projects what, oftentimes, the other executes; their improvements form a joint stock; and a rivalship is excited, which allows them not even a relaxation of effort. Such was the condition of Greece. There, an identity of language, and moral habits, together with kindred social principles, amalgamated a number of states, feebly, indeed, linked by their Amphyctionic diet, but often blended together at their Nemean and Olympic games, and in their common pilgrimages either to Delos, or some celebrated oracle,-amalgamated them, I say, into one family, the members of which excited, and encouraged each other, in the career of glory.

To the same cause, were the Arabians indebted, for the great advances which they made in civilization, and learning, notwithstanding their original barbarism, and the fanatic, mar. tial character of their religion. The same language, and the same moral ideas, connected an hundred states from the Pye renees to Hindostan; the pilgrimages to Mecca and the great mosques, brought the more affluent portion of their inhabi. tants, frequently together. Modern Europe has also been blessed with a similar order of things. It is incalculable of what benefit, even in the dark ages, were the identity of religion, the universal prevalence of the Latin language, the pil

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grimages, and crusades of which we have been speakingto the progression of the human mind in Europe.--It is from a like concurrence of circumstances, that North America has much to hope, when, in a few generations more, she shall have reached her maturity.

Notwithstanding the close affinities, which thus united the nations of Europe, and made of them, as it were, but one family, they were, nevertheless, almost always in a state of war. Mutual attack and defence formed their chief concern, and their regular occupation. The case was the same with the Greeks and the Arabians, who, as we have observed above, were also commonwealths of nations. One might be led to suppose from the history of all ages, that war is, in truth, the natural state of man. Causes for it multiply without end, while peace is rarely sought from a spirit of wisdom, but mostly from lassitude and weakness.

With regard to this point, Europe had, in latter times, a system unknown to the Greeks and Arabs. I mean the celebrated balance of power. She owed this advantage,- for such it doubtless was, -principally to her physical conformation, which affords to many of her states, great facilities for distant military operations, and enables them, consequently, to aid, attack, or counteract each other with comparative ease. This would have been extremely difficult, or even impossible, had Europe been a more massive continent. In all


and all quarters of the world, the weak have, when it was possible for them confederated to resist the aggressions of the strong, or have been obliged to enlist as allies, under the banners of two great powers, contending for empire, or supremacy. But this species of equilibrium, if it can be so called, is temporary in its nature. Its duration is limited by that of the fear, or the dependence, which produces it.

In Europe, after the crusades, in proportion as the resources and relations of each of her states, became known to the rest, there grew up a system of natural alliances resting on identity of interests, which was calculated to maintain the importance, and double the strength of each state.

-In Spain, for example, Portugal and Arragon had reason to fear Castille; Arragon dreaded France, her restless and powerful neighbour; the interests of Castille connected her with France, whose enemy England was: it thence resulted, that the latter, with Portugal and Arragon, formed a counterpoise to the power of France and Castille. In Italy, the popes, and the Guelf party were when their independence was not likely to be endangered by it, the natural allies of France,

whose interests were opposed to those of the Germanic em. pire, and the Gibelins. This system of equilibrium was thus formed by degrees, until the sixteenth century, in which it was matured, when the ambition of Charles V, and the inordinate aggrandizement of the House of Austria, roused Europe against her, and compelled Paris, Stockholm, and Constantinople to league together, for the purpose of raising a bar. rier to her encroachments. The necessity of a balance was sufficiently evident, towards the end of the reign of Louis XIV. William of Orange availed himself most judiciously of it, to arrest the too ambitious career of the French sovereign. This useful idea thus became, at length, a fundamental principle with the European commonwealth, and a species of tacit compact, between all its members, never to consent, that one of them should aggrandize herself, at the expense of another, or of the rest. The conventional balance did not prevent wars; it was the cause of many:--but it prevented general convulsions or revolutions.

While, however, it was approaching gradually to a complete organization, and seemed to be acquiring thorough solidity, the canker-worm which was to destroy it, and thereby give rise to a new order of things, already lurked in the bosom of Europe, and gathered new vigour from year to year. For nearly ten centuries, after the fall of the Western Empire, the forces of the European monarchs were composed of their feudal vassals, whose services were recompensed by fiefs. The other expenses of warfare were defrayed, from the revenues of the private domains of the sovereign. Wars were then frequent, but short-lived. During the last half of the period just mentioned, when the monarchs, by the formation and growth of boroughs and cities, obtained another class of vassals, not noble indeed, but rich, they demanded subsidies of them, as they had before demanded them of the clergy. They were then able to wage more regular and expensive wars; but the troops which they raised, disappeared, and the subsidies granted, ceased, with the occasion that had called for one or the other. A permanent

army, no less than permanent taxes, was a thing unknown in Europe.

At the end of the long and severe war of the Plantagenets against France, Charles VIIth, who governed that country, and who found large domains appurtenant to his crowli, did not disband all his force, but retained a part of it, for service in time of peace. This innovation rendered him more absolute at home, and formidable abroad. The exam cple was soon followed by other sovereigns. With these sinal standing armies, they could more easily command subsidies, and by means of subsidies, they augmented the number of their troops. The most loyal of the nobility served in their armies, attached itself to the court, and monopolized the royal favour; the rest also, eagerly sought admission into the service, and soon viewed it as highly honourable: by degrees, the whole order became more obsequious, and entirely at the disposal of the monarch. In the sixteenth century, armies and wars were already more considerable, and better managed. In the fol, lowing one, the thirty years' war, and the reign of Louis XIVth, were memorable epocha, signalized by the progressive enlargement of standing armies, of the levy of taxes, and the organization of what was termed, the finances.

When one power increased its military force, the rest were constrained to do the same. To procure money in order to raise troops, to raise troops in order to procure money, had become, little by little, the most momentous concern of the European cabinets, and there seemed no end to this game which amused the monarchs, and enslaved their subjects. Prussia, at length, in the last century, set the example of an armed nation, by means of a conscription. This system was not dangerous to Europe, while it belonged only to a secondary power, such as Prussia. But adopted by France, in the deli. rium of anarchy, enlarged to its utmost hounds, and entrusted, at length, to hands that exert all its energy, it has become for Europe, what Vesuvius has been for the neighbouring cities. The understanding may surmise some distant effects, but it is not yet possible to foresee the precise extent of the eruption.

Thus have I passed in review, the former state of Europe, selecting such circumstances only, as I thought of a nature to shed light, on the principal subject of inquiry-her future situation, which now remains to be considered.


Letter on Domestic Manufactures.

We received, some months ago, an Essay, in the shape of a Letter to à

friend, under the signature of 'Stillingford.' Its general doctrines are such as we have, ourselves, always deemed both erroneous and hurtful, and such, of course, as we were unwilling to assist in disseminating. In consequence, however, of our wish to gratify the author, whose talents we greatly respect, and whom we would encourage to contribute liberally to our aid, on orthodox points-we resolved to publish his speculation, when there should occur what might appear to us, a suitable opportunity. The present number of our Journal, furnishes that opportu. nity, since it affords, in the extracts we have made from Ganilh's' “ In. quiry,” an infallible antidote, to the unwholesome contents, of the essay in question. Without further delay, therefore, we shall give place to Stil. lingford's" letter, rejecting, indeed, particular passages, too unsound, and mischievous, to be tolerated under any circumstances. Had this writer perused the work of Mr. Ganilh, or studied the science of political eco. nomy in all its parts, with the requisite assiduity, and vigour of thought, he never would, we are sure, have recommended “quadruple duties," with a view to the wide extension of domestic manufactures, in the present state of our country, nor have given the preference to the home, over foreign trade, as a source of national power and wealth.]

The Blue Ridge, 1st July, 1812. MY DEAR SIR, Your friendly letter has just reached me, and could you know the pleasure it has given, and the good it has done me, you would not long let me languish for another. You are well versed in the human heart, and can touch its springs of action with equal delicacy and effect. Your praise is so graceful that although I feel its flattery, I acknowledge its power, and while I blush at your commendations, I yield to the injunctions which are founded upon them. Yet warm under their influence, I seize my idle pen, and without books or documents for correcting or defending my opinions, I commit them unpolished as the scenes in which they are formed, to your partial indulgence.

You have, no doubt, several times, thought me enthusiastic in the accounts I have given you, of the country through which I have been wandering. I am indeed, singularly susceptible to the beauties of rural scenery. My heart expands as the fine landscape varies before me, and comparing this country with the other countries of the world, which bear any resemblance to it, I find it possessed of some advantage or other which gives it a superiority over them all. Here you have the moun.

ins and valleys of Switzerland, without its winter; the plains of Calabria without its Vesuvius; you have the richness of our

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