ble, to the United States. Mr. Monroe tells us, in his instructions to Mr. Barlow, that the "restraints," just mentioned, "cannot be reconciled, to the respect due to this government; that when the president expected that the trade of the United States would be placed, immediately after the revocation of the decrees, upon such a footing, in the ports of France, as to afford it a fair market, the very reverse happened; all the ordi. nary usages of commerce, between friendly nations, were abandoned." Nay more:-that "a system of licenses was introduced, tending to sacrifice one part of our community to the other, and to give a corrupt influence to the agents of a foreign power, in our towns, which is, in every view, incompatible with the principles of our government."

Let the reader now remark, that the system thus described, and the restraints spoken of, have continued, without other change, or modification, than that of being rendered more vexatious, and disgraceful, ever since the mock repeal of the decrees; that our act of May 1810, according to the express admission of the Executive, had in view, such a revocation only, as would lead to substantial benefit, "commercial advantages;" that the French repeal neither expressed, nor implied, the recognition of any right claimed by us, or the retraction of any principle asserted by France,-being grounded solely on the basis of the quid pro quo.-Let him, then, call to mind, that, under such circumstances,-although nothing was, or has been gained, on any score, by this repeal, but a mere set of phrases from the duke of Cadore, not only did Congress revive the non-intercourse, against England, on this ground, under the act of May, but our Executive, has, without intermission, peremptorily demanded of her on the same ground, the abrogation of her orders, and now, alleges as a principal cause of war, her having persisted in refusing to follow such an example.

Mr. Madison, and the committee of foreign relations, intimate in their manifestos, that, we owe our commercial distresses, chiefly to the operation of the British orders in council; that, were it not for them, we might enjoy a lucrative trade with the Continent. The following passage of the Address, in relation to the extent of those orders, will show the fallacy of such an idea. "The effect of the British orders of blockade,. now in force, is, to deprive us of the commerce of France, Holland, and a part of Italy. They leave to us the commerce of all the rest of the world. What that is, some estimate may be formed, by a recurrence to the table, which exhibits the state

of our commerce during 1806, and 1807, the two last years antecedent to the operation of the restrictive system. By that table, it appears, that the value of the exports of our domestic products to France, Holland, and Italy, was, during those two years, at an average only of about six and a half million of dollars. Whereas the average of our domestic exports to all other parts of the world, and which are now left free to us, notwithstanding the effect of the British orders in council, exceed thirty eight millions. So extensive a commerce, it is proposed to surrender, for the restricted trade the emperor will allow."

We thus see, that the amount of our trade, with the countries blockaded by the orders in council, was comparatively insignificant, even before the existence of these orders. If the same trade is now reduced from six and a half million, to little more than one million, the difference is owing, not so much to them, as to the French, and our own restrictive systems. The language held by Mr. Monroe, in his instructions to Mr. Barlow, will show, how small, even in the estimation of the Executive, is the practical injury we sustain from the orders.— If," says the secretary," the ports of France and her allies, are not opened to the commerce of the United States, on a liberal scale, and on fair conditions, of what avail to them, it may be asked, will be the revocation of the British orders in council? In contending for the revocation of those orders, so far as it was an object of interest, the United States had in view, a trade to the continent. It was a fair legitimate object, and worth contending for, while France encouraged it. But if she shuts her ports on our commerce, or burdens it with heavy duties, that motive is at an end.”

We have, then, in these admissions, and in the preceding statements, full proof, that this war has been undertaken, so far as the orders in council are the cause, and they are declared to be the principal cause,-merely to extort froin the British, the retraction of a speculative principle. The same thing may be said in relation to the question of impressment, of which the practical injury is, in fact, but small, and to be easily removed by fair negotiation, while the matter of right must, to say the least of it, be viewed as extremely doubtful. As for the Henry plot, upon which the committee of foreign relations have commented, with an extravagance of hyperbole, that entirely counteracts its own purpose;*-the Indian hostilities, most in

* "The attempt to dismember our union, and overthrow our excellent constitution, by a secret mission, as lately disclosed by the agent employed in it, affords full proof that there is no bound to the hostility of the British

decently ascribed to the British, upon no other foundation than the idlest tales, and the wildest conjecture; the hovering of British vessels on our coasts, a practice vexatious, indeed, but to a certain extent, authorized by the law of nations:*-we consider these topics of accusation against England, as intended by Mr. Madison and the committee of foreign relations, merely to heighten the tragical effect of the piteous, woful picture of our wrongs. They are but a sort of light drapery;-mere accessories, to finish the piece. The people of this country, would not have borne, for a moment, that they should have been taken as, in themselves, sufficient cause of war.

What now, is the clear result of the arguments and remarks thrown together, in the foregoing pages? We have, in part, the following important propositions; that the United States are at war with England, for no real motive of interest, in a national point of view, worth mentioning,-but on account of an abstract, speculative violation of their rights; without having obtained, or having the most distant hope of obtaining, from France, any the smallest commercial, or pecuniary advantage; much less an equivalent for the benefits of the same kind which they surrender by the war: That France has not revoked those particular decrees, which assert, precisely the same obnoxious principle as the British orders; and, admitting them to be revoked, that she has other decrees yet in force, or which she has never formally annulled, founded upon pretensions no less destructive of their rights, and incompatible with the prosperity of their commerce:-That the general tenor of her conduct, togovernment towards the United States; no act, however unjustifiable, which it would not commit to accomplish their ruin!!!" Report of committee.

* On this point of British vessels hovering on our coasts, the authority of Mr. Jefferson will probably be considered as of some weight. In his correspondence, when secretary of state, with the British minister plenipotentiary, Mr. Hammond, he holds the following language. " France, England, and all other nations, have a right to cruize on our coasts; a right, not derived from our permission, but from the law of nature." With respect to the extent of the lawful jurisdiction of a country, over the seas that wash its coast, Vattel expresses himself thus: "In general, the dominion of the state over the neighbouring sea, extends as far as is necessary for its safety, and it can render it respected: Since, on the one hand, it can only appropriate to itself a thing, that is as common as the sea, so far as it has need of it for some lawful end; and on the other, it would be a vain and ridiculous pretension, to claim a right, that it was no ways able to cause to be respected.”

For the practice of the British, in hovering on our coasts, the federal minority suggest the true remedy,-the creation of a navy, which would enable us to cause our right of jurisdiction to be respected. The enforcing of it thus, would not necessarily lead to war; and if it did, the war on our part, would be one of defence.

wards the United States, for several years past, has been, at least as insulting to their dignity, and destructively predatory on their trade, as that of Great Britain; and, that she neither has, nor will, make reparation, either for the insults or the robberies, of which they have been the unoffending victims.

The motives then, under such circumstances, to justify the selection of Great Britain as our enemy?-Has France been more conciliatory or respectful in her language, towards the United States? Does any thing, in the current of our own experience, or in the world of reason, render it evident, that her dispositions are, in general, more amicable? Is the spirit of her government more congenial with that of our own institutions? Does she manifest more moderation in her desires; a less ardent thirst of domination; a stricter regard for the principles of equity or good faith? Is her cause more just, or her triumph destined to be less injurious to the human race? Is it quite as probable, that, in issuing her Berlin and Milan and other atrocious edicts, she could have been actuated by a mistaken notion of right, as it is that England was so, in enacting her orders in council? Will her conduct, in this regard, admit of the same extenuation, derived from the peculiar circumstances of her condition? Did she, or could she conceive, her very existence to be seriously endangered by the British blockades, so as to call, imperiously, for a system of retaliation? Is she capable of doing us more harm by her hostilities?

There cannot be devised a motive for this preference, bearing even the semblance of wisdom or justice. No man can be the dupe of the plea, that there were yet "unclosed discussions" with France, for the result of which, it was proper to wait, before any decisive measures were taken, with repect to her. If there were yet, "unclosed discussions," it is because it was the will of the executive, that such should be the state of things, long after the most complete certainty existed, that nothing was to be obtained by them. Had he but so pleased, the case might have been the same as to England; for she had not refused to listen at least, to remonstrance, and always manifested a readiness, to give even something more than an "oral answer," a favour which, it appears,-slender as it is, was denied to the supplications of Mr. Barlow. The honesty of this suggestion of "unclosed discussions," may be tested, by the sincerity of the intentions professed to be entertained, of pursuing, finally, (that is, when "discussions" could no longer, with any colour of decency, be kept open) with respect to France,

* Mr. Madison's manifesto.

"the course due to the rights, the interests, and the honour of our country." The history of the past, will determine this point.

دو

It is true, that until of late, administration have been very cautious of giving any definite pledge,-even in words, of real opposition, to the will, or retaliation against the outrages of France, in any instance. The only penalty, with which they have presumed, to threaten her directly, for the heaviest of her oppressions, the most atrocious of her robberies, has been "the high dissatisfaction of the government and people of these states.' When at length, some faith has been plighted to vigour, on this side, how has it been kept? Look to what has passed since the arrival of the Hornet, and compare it with the following statement, made by Mr. Randolph, on the floor of the house of Representatives. "What has been the language, held on this floor, and by ministers of state in official communications to committees of congress-that the return of the Hornet, should be conclusive, as to our relations with France: that if Mr. Barlow should not succeed in attaining the most complete redress for the past, and assurances for the future, we should take the same stand, as against Great Britain; that any uncertainty as to his success, would be equivalent to certainty of his failure.— Such was the language held, until the fact occurred, that no satisfaction had been, or was likely to be obtained.”*—

The United States have never, in truth, opposed one act of real resistance, to the invasions of France, on their rights and property. By our commercial restrictions, as has been already said, so far from thwarting, we efficaciously promoted her views, and of this consequence, government was always fully aware. By what right, then, is the plea of honour alleged, to justify the war against England? "It is true," says general Armstrong, in the most spirited of his replies, to the duke of Cadore," that, were the people of the United States destitute

* The conduct of administration, with regard to French licenses, is another striking exemplification of the respect, which they pay, to their own most solemn declarations, where France is concerned. No measures, as is well known, have been adopted to discourage or repress these licenses, and yet mark the language, which Mr. Monroe holds concerning them, in his instructions, dated one year ago, to Mr. Barlow.

"It is indispensable, that the system of carrying on trade by licenses granted by French agents, be immediately annulled. You must make it distinctly understood, that the United States cannot submit to that system. The president has long since expressed his strongest disapprobation of it.

"The trade by licenses must be abrogated. It will certainly be prohibited, by law, under severe penalties, in compliance with the recommendation of the president, if your despatches by the Constitution, do not prove that our demand on this subject, has been duly attended to."