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shows it; the votes in congress on the war bill, show it. The division is precisely of that nature, from which, unless speedily healed, a dissolution of the Union must result. It is between the two great, dissimilar sections of the confederacy. It is on account of primary, fundamental interests. It is, on one side, exasperated to the utmost, by the blackest suspicions.* It is connected with, and violently inflames, passions and prejudices of a kind the most inveterate and dissociable, and which, if not allayed, nothing short of an open rupture can satisfy. The true, and only tenacious ties of the confederacy, are mutual confidence and interest; mutual esteem and regard; equal protection, and equal burdens. When these are broken, when the bond which originally induced, and can only preserve the unity of our empire, is cracked, the cohesion is at an end; and it is in vain to expect, that the disjointed parts of the great fabric, can be long kept together, by engagements on parchment, or metaphysical subtleties, or impotent menaces. Let the war but continue grinding down the Eastern states, while it presses, with comparative gentleness, upon the Southern, inflaming the maddening sense of domestic oppression and treachery, by which the former seem now to be animated, and it will be found,—(may God, in his beneficence, avert the catastrophe)it will be found, that no reasoning will be effectual, as there is no force sufficient, to retain them in their allegiance to the federal government. We have never thought the experiment of war, if made under ordinary circumstances, and with something of unanimity, likely to endanger or weaken the Union, On the contrary, we supposed it of a tendency to knit us more firmly together, as, on the other hand, the Union would give incalculably greater activity and effect to our belligerent efforts. But we do tremble for the constitution, under the trial of a war like the present. The danger is manifest; and so also is the necessity of pointing it out, in order that it may be removed without delay.
Never did a people appeal to arms with such inequality of strength; never did a people consent to make so great sacri. fices,
for such insignificant objects, and with so utter a hopelessness of attaining those objects, in the mode selected. It may well be said of us, what was said of our parent-country, when, in the delirium of her folly, and the hardness of her heart, she waged war upon us, as we now do upon her; “ that we have lost all measure between means and ends, and our headlong desires have become our politics and our morals."
* See the Address of the Legislature of Massachusetts. VOL. IV,
Is there any one so ignorant of the history and character of the British, as to suppose they will yield to our plan of coercion, without a severe, and obstinate struggle? Can any one be so blind to the insignificance of our military power, as to imagine that we can ever bring them to that kind of struggle?
Suppose we were able to support the contest at all.-What have we to gain by it?--We must first weaken the power of England materially, before we can reduce her to our terms; terms which, as we have shown, amount at last, to nothing more than the relinquishment of certain maritime pretensions, of little or no practical injury to our interests. But if we do weaken her, what may, and in all likelihood, must be, the consequence!--The triumph of France. And will our rights be then more respected, when the guarantee of them is trusted to the sympathy of Bonaparte? Will our independence be safer; our prosperity fixed on a more solid basis? To imagine this, is to be absurd, beyond the privilege allowed to folly. There seems indeed, to be no limit to the preposterousness and desperation of this business. If the British, as we are told, are jealous of our commercial prosperity, and aim at the destruction of our trade; if they seek to obtain a monopoly of commerce, could we have taken any course tending so immediately and certainly to the accomplishment of their wishes, as that of declaring war against them? We thus rid them of all competition; and give them a warrant, not only to appropriate to themselves the fruits of our past commercial industry, but to prevent its future activity.
The United States, must lose by this war, all their fair fame. The rest of the world and posterity will, whatever may be the professions of our government, ascribe its conduct to base motives. Such is the state of things, that, were the attitude we have taken against England, really the result of honest views of right and expediency, it would not, nevertheless, be so regarded by the nations of Europe;-posterity could not be persuaded of the fact. This consideration would have weighedl powerfully, with men jealous of the glory of their country. We shall be covered with a double load of opprobrium, as we are the only nation of the globe, that will have arranged itself on the side of France, without unavoidable necessity, or without having first undergone a struggle with that power. The security which circumstances had given us, from her desolating sword, will be the seal of our condemnation.
It will be our ignominious sentence, in the judgment of our contemporaries, and at the bar of history, that when, to our
eternal honour, we might at very little risk, have stood forth, after England, as the second and only bulwark of civilization and justice, we exchanged this illustrious character, for that of a subordinate, and the only voluntary confederate, in the monstrous scheme pursued by her enemy, to brutalize and enslave the human race. Should France ultimately fail in her projects, -should the nations shake off her iron yoke, shedding torrents of blood, and suffering incredible miseries, in the recovery of their independence, -in what light will America then stand towards them, after forming a league with their oppressor, and wagiag war upon the power, to whose mighty exertions, they will be principally indebted for their rescue? We must expect, that they will view us with abhorrence and unutterable scorn:we cannot be surprised, if we should be assailed by a general conspiracy of mankind, as deserving a share in the severe vengeance so richly earned by the despotism of France; as unworthy of maintaining a place among the great commonwealth of states, which had established and taken for its basis and bond, the admirable system of refined humanity, mutual improvement, and social order, that France so furiously laboured to destroy.
There is but one mode of redeeming the honour, and preventing the ruin of these states. Let the people, at the approaching election, regenerate the public councils. The reme. dy for all their ills, is in their own hands. To induce them to apply it, is the main object of the excellent Address, we have had under consideration. It is our own object, in all that we have uttered. Neither we, nor the patriotic members of congress, side with the enemy. We side with our country, which, we believe, has been most wretchedly abused, and betrayed. We protest against a war, which is not that of the people, but of an unworthy administration, whose acts, and character, have put the United States in the wrong, in a cause, which, otherwise, they might have asserted, with equal justice, and success.—To proclaim the whole truth of the case, is not to favour the views, or to confirm the obstinacy of the enemy. It is but to awaken the American people, to a just sense of their own duty, and to pave the way for honourable reconciliation. Great Britain knows, that, as she has done us wrong, she is not, by the misconduct of our rulers, absolved from the obligation of rectifying it. She knows, “ that great and acknowledged force, is not impaired, either in effect, or in opinion, by an unwillingness to exert itself;--that the superior power may ofer peace with honour, and with safety.”
The nation is called upon, by every possible interest, exclu sive of other considerations, to change her public servants. The men who compose her councils, are notoriously incompetent to conduct the war, in a suitable manner, on the supposition that it may be necessary to proceed in so lamentable a career. Their whole system, is by its nature, one of mere inertness. Disaster and disgrace, must inevitably await all their enterprises. Narrowness of intellect, and poverty of spirit, are wretched springs for the operations of war. We can never be extricated, with any remnant of strength, from our difficulties, but by a vigourous Executive, and an administration which commands our confidence under all points of view. The failure of the loan proves, irrefragably, that the present have it not, even in that department, which is to furnish “the nerves of war.” The experience of the past, puts it beyond a doubt, that they are incapable of making the effort to collect resources, in any degree adequate for the contest. To wield the military strength of a nation; to guide the chariot of Mars—is, certainly, the least of the little talents of those, who fill the executive departments of the government.
Peace is acknowledged to be the object of all; a solid, permanent peace. But this can never be attained, by the men now at the head of our affairs. If their own prejudices, and passions, and silly pledges, did not render it impracticable, the character, which they have, undeniably, established, with the enemy, will be an insuperable obstacle. Great Britain certainly believes, whether erroneously or not, that they are irreconcilably hostile, to her; wedded, irreclaimably, to the interests and views of her foe. She cannot, therefore, feel confidence in treating with them; her pride must be always on the alert, to check her feelings of liberality, or justice. In their negotiations, there must be wanting every requisite to real or lasting pacification;—the spirit of mutual concession, mutual trust, and mutual good-will. To any other set of individuals, our enemy would yield more; to them, indeed, she will yield nothing, but upon the severest compulsion.
All these, however, are but secondary considerations, although full of importance.“ A speedy peace, and no French alliance,” are the invocation, with which our voters should proceed to the polls. As for ourselves, who are not marshalled under the standard of any party, we care not to whom they give their suffrages, provided they do but select those, who wifi snatch them from the grasp of Bonaparte.
Napoleon, Administrateur et Financier.—Par Sir Fran
cis d'Ivernois.—à Londres, Avril, 1812. Napoleon, Administrator and Financier.—By Sir Fran
cis d'Ivernois. —London, April, 1812. THE book before us is a new, and very interesting specimen, of that indefatigable industry, and those great powers of analysis, for which the author, Sir Francis d'Ivernois, is so justly distinguished. His unremitted endeavours to ascertain the real condition, of the internal affairs of France, deserve the highest approbation, and the best thanks, of every friend to the human race. Without a minute scrutiny, such as he has undertaken, of the official documents furnished from time to time, by the imperial government, and without contrasting, as he enables us to do, the results they exhibit, with the results obtained from similar documents of an earlier date, the world might never duly appreciate, the vain-glorious accounts of the wealth, and resources of the French empire, with which almost every French state-paper is filled,
Since the unparalleled military success of Bonaparte, rests, in some measure-although, as we think, not principally,-upon opinion; upon that dread of his superior means, which his triumphs and boasts have created, and which he seems so anxious to maintain, every well-grounded, judicious effort, tending to preserve or restore self-confidence in those, who have not yet submitted to his dominion, may be regarded as a service rendered to the cause of mankind.
The present publication is directly calculated to promote this end, and particularly important, from the circumstance of being brought forward, at the commencement of a new war in the North of Europe. We propose, therefore, to offer something like a summary of its contents to our readers, and expect to merit their thanks, by so doing. The documents and reasonings which it contains, constitute materials for hope, in reference to the affairs of Europe, more satisfactory than any we had supposed it possible to furnish, even with the aid of such opportunities and talents as those of Sir Francis d'Ivernois. He has displayed in this instance, a diligence, and accuracy of research, a force of argument, and distinguishing acuteness, not less remarkable, than what we find exhibited, in his former works, so replete with prophetic views and valuable informatior.