legislation authorized to be adopted by Congress for enforcing it is
not direct legislation on the matters respecting which the States
are prohibited from making or enforcing certain laws, or doing
certain acts, but is corrective legislation, such as may be necessary or
proper for counteracting and redressing the effect of such laws or
acts. Id.

3. The XIIIth Amendment relates only to slavery and involuntary servi-
tude (which it abolishes); and although, by its reflex action, it estab-
lishes universal freedom in the United States, and Congress may prob-
ably pass laws directly enforcing its provisions; yet such legislative
power extends only to the subject of slavery and its incidents; and
the denial of equal accommodations in inns, public conveyances and
places of public amusement (which is forbidden by the sections in
question) imposes no badge of slavery or involuntary servitude upon
the party, but, at most, infringes rights which are protected from
State aggression by the XIVth Amendment. Id.

4. Whether the accommodations and privileges sought to be protected by
the 1st and 2d sections of the Civil Rights Act, are, or are not, rights
constitutionally demandable; and if they are, in what form they are
to be protected, is not now decided. Id.

5. Nor is it decided whether the law as it stands is operative in the
Territories and District of Columbia; the decision only relating to
its validity as applied to the States. Id.

6. Nor is it decided whether Congress, under the commercial power, may
or may not pass a law securing to all persons equal accommodations
on lines of public conveyance between two or more States. Id.

7. The court adheres to the rulings in Ex parte Siebold, 100 U. S. 371,
and Ex parte Clarke, 100 U. S. 399, that §§ 5512 and 5515 Rev. St.,
relating to violations of duty by officers of elections, are not repugnant
to the Constitution of the United States, and holds them to be valid.
United States v. Gale, 65.

8. In deciding the federal question whether a State court gave effect to a
State law which impairs the obligation of a contract, and in deter-
mining whether there was a contract, this court is not necessarily
governed by previous decisions of State courts, except where they
have been so firmly established as to constitute a rule of property.
Louisville & Nashville Railroad Co. v. Palmes, 244.

9. The fact that a statutory right to demand reimbursement from a munic-
ipal corporation for damages caused by a mob has been converte
into a judgment does not make of the obligation such a contract as .3
contemplated in the provision of Article I. Section 10 of the Consti-
tution, that no State shall pass any law impairing the obligation of
contracts. Louisiana v. New Orleans, 285.

10. The term "contract," as used in the Constitution, signifies the agree-
ment of two or more minds for considerations proceeding from one
to the other, to do or not to do certain acts. Id.

11. To deny to a municipal corporation the right to impose taxes to such
an extent as to make it impossible to pay a judgment recovered
against it for injuries done by a mob is not depriving the owner of
the judgment of property within the meaning of the Fourteenth
Amendment to the Constitution. Id.

12. The President has power to supersede or remove an officer of the
army by appointing another in his place, by and with the advice and
consent of the Senate; and such power was not withdrawn by the
provision in § 5 of the act of July 13th, 1866, c. 176 (14 Stat. 92),
now embodied in § 1229 of the Revised Statutes, that "no officer in
the military or naval service shall, in time of peace, be dismissed from
service, except upon and in pursuance of the sentence of a court-
martial to that effect, or in commutation thereof. Keyes v. United
States, 336.

13. A bridge erected over the East River, in the harbor of New York, in
accordance with authority derived from Congress and from the legis-
lature of New York, is a lawful structure which cannot be abated as
a public nuisance. So far as it obstructs navigation, it obstructs it
under an authority which is empowered to permit the obstruction.
Miller v. Mayor, &c., of New York, 385.

14. It is competent for Congress, having authorized the construction of a
bridge of a given height, over a navigable water, to empower the
secretary of war to determine whether the proposed structure will be
a serious obstruction to navigation, and to authorize changes in the
plan of the proposed structure.

Id.

15. The navigable waters of the United States include such as are navi-
gable in fact, and which by themselves or their connections, form a
continuous channel for commerce with foreign countries or among the
States: Over these Congress has control by virtue of the power vested
in it to regulate commerce with foreign nations and among the several
States. Id.

16. The former cases, in which the court has considered the power of
Congress to authorize the construction of bridges over navigable
streams, referred to and considered. Id.

17. The legislative grant of a privilege to erect, establish and construct
gas works, and make and vend gas in a municipality for a term of
years, does not exempt the grantees from the imposition of a license
tax for the use of the privilege conferred. Memphis Gas Light Co. v.
Taxing District of Shelby County, 398.

18. In order to establish a legislative contract to exempt from taxation,
the statute must be explicit and unmistakable, and without doubtful
words.

Id.

19. The Constitution of the United States does not profess in all cases to
protect against unjust or oppressive taxation. Id.

20. A provision in an act for the reorganization of an embarrassed cor-
poration, which provides that all holders of its mortgage bonds who

do not, within a given time named in the act, expressly dissent from the
plan of reorganization, shall be deemed to have assented to it, and
which provides for reasonable notice to all bondholders, does not im-
pair the obligation of a contract, and is valid. Gilfillan v. Union

Canal Co., 401.
21. The State of Georgia indorsed the bonds of a railroad company, taking
a lien upon the railroad as security. The company failing to pay in-
terest upon the indorsed bonds, the governor of the State took pos-
session of the road, and put it into the hands of a receiver, who made
sale of it to the State. The State then took possession of it, and took
up the indorsed bonds, substituting the bonds of the State in their
place. The holders of an issue of mortgage bonds issued by the rail-
road company subsequently to those indorsed by the State, but before
the default in payment of interest, filed a bill in equity to foreclose
their own mortgage and to set aside the said sale and to be let in as
prior in lien, and for other relief affecting the property, and set forth
the above facts, and made the governor and the treasurer of the State.
parties. Those officers demurred. Held, That the facts in the bill
show that the State is so interested in the property that final relief
cannot be granted without making it a party, and the court is with-
out jurisdiction. Cunningham v. Macon & Brunswick Railroad,

446.

22. Whenever it is clearly seen that a State is an indispensable party to
enable the court, according to the rules which govern its procedure,
to grant the relief sought, it will refuse to take jurisdiction. Id.
23. The cases at law and in equity in which the court has taken jurisdic-
tion, when the objection has been interposed that a State was a neces-
sary party to enable the court to grant relief, examined and classified.
Id.

24. The case of the United States v. Lee, 106 U. S. 196, examined, and the
limits of the decision defined. Id.

25. The case of Davis v. Gray, 16 Wall. 203, questioned. Id.
26. The legislation of the United States may be constitutionally extended
over Indian country by mere force of a treaty, without legislative
provisions. Ex parte Crow Dog, 556.

27. The declaration contained a count in trespass for entering the
plaintiff's premises and carrying away his goods. The plea set up
that the goods were lawfully taken by the defendant as collector, to
satisfy a tax due the State of Virginia; the replication averred
that the plaintiff before the levy, under authority of a law of that
State enacted in 1879, tendered the defendant in payment of the
taxes coupons cut from bonds of the State; the rejoinder set up a
subsequent law of the State forbidding him to receive in payment of
taxes anything but gold, silver, United States treasury notes, or na-
tional bank currency. Held, That this raised a federal question suffi-
cient to lay the foundation for removing the cause from a State court

to the Circuit Court of the United States. Smith v. Greenhow,

A, having acquired the right to occupy a tract of land in Salt Lake City,
took possession of it and erected a public house thereon, and lived in
it with his wife and B, his polygamous wife, carrying on a hotel
there. He ceased to maintain relations with B, as his polygamous
wife, but he being desirous to have the benefit of her services, both
concealed this fact. He made a secret agreement with her, that if she
would thus remain she should have one-half interest in the property.
He acquired title to the property from the mayor under the provisions
of the act of March 2d, 1867, 14 Stat. 541, without any disclosure of
the secret agreement. Subsequently A's interest therein passed into
the hands of innocent third parties for value, without notice of
the claim of B under the secret agreement. Held, 1. That B
had no rights in the premises as against innocent bona fide encum-
brancers and purchasers without notice of her claim. 2. That the
joint occupation of the premises by A and B, under the circumstances,
was no constructive notice of B's claim of right.
Townsend v. Little,
504.

CONTRACT.

1. The owners of three steam-tugs which had pumping machinery were
employed by the master and agent of a ship sunk at a wharf in New
Orleans, with a cargo on board, to pump out the ship for a compensa-
tion of $50 per hour for each boat, "to be continued until the boats

were discharged." When the boats were about to begin pumping,
the United States marshal seized the ship and cargo on a warrant on
a libel for salvage. After the seizure the marshal took possession of
the ship and displaced the authority of the master, but permitted the
tugs to pump out the ship. After they had pumped for about eighteen
hours, the ship was raised and placed in a position of safety. The
tugs remained by the ship, ready to assist her in case of need for
twelve days, but their attendance was unnecessary, and not required
by any peril of ship or cargo. In libels of intervention, in the suit for
salvage, the owners of the tugs claimed each $50 per hour for the
whole time, including the twelve days, as salvage. The claims were
resisted by insurers of the cargo, to whom it was abandoned. The
District Court allowed $500 to each tug, and $500 to the crew of each
tug. On appeal by the owners of the tugs, the Circuit Court decreed
to each of them $1,000. On further appeal by them, this court affirmed
that decree. The Tornado, 110.

2. Held, that to enforce the contract as one continuing during the time
claimed would be highly inequitable; and, as against the insurers of
the cargo, the right of the tugs to compensation must be regarded as
having terminated when the ship and cargo were raised, and the tugs
must be regarded as having been then discharged. Id.

3. Where the language of a contract is susceptible of two meanings, the
court will infer the intention of the parties and their relative rights
and obligations from the circumstances attending the transaction.
-United States v. Gibbons, 200.

4. The parties contracted for the rebuilding of a shop at the Norfolk Navy
Yard, which had been destroyed by fire. The specifications provided
that "the foundation and the brick walls now standing that were
uninjured by the fire will remain and will be carried up to the height
designated in the plan by new work." After taking down so much
of the old wall as was supposed to be injured, the government officers
directed parties to examine the then condition of the walls before
bidding on the specifications. Defendant in error did so, then bid,
and his bid was accepted. Held, That the United States through its
officers was bound to point out to bidders the parts of the walls which
were to enter into the new structure, and that this was done by the
act of dismantling a portion and leaving the rest of the wall to stand.
Id.

5. The right to demand reimbursement from a municipal corporation for
damages caused by a mob is not founded on contract. It is a statu-
tory right, and may be given or taken away at pleasure. Louisiana v.
New Orleans, 285.

6. A railway company, in consideration of the undertakings of S. in a
written agreement, agreed therein to send all live stock coming over
its road to East St. Louis, to the stock-yard of S. at that place,
except such as should be specially ordered otherwise by shippers or
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