owners, and to pay him therefor an agreed rate for loading and an
agreed rate for unloading. Held, That this agreement applied to all
live stock shipped in the ordinary course of the company's business
over its road, the direction of which is not otherwise specially ordered
by shippers, and which it was possible for the company to have loaded
at the stock-yard of S.; and, that on a breach on the part of the com-
pany being proved, without fault on the part of S., he could recover
from the company damages in consequence of stock being sent by the
company to another stock-yard at that terminus. Terre Haute & Indiana
Railway Company v. Struble, 381.

7. When a contract with the United States for building a wall provides
that payment for the work contracted for shall not be made until an
agent, to be designated by the United States, certifies that it is in all
respects as contracted for, and after completion of work, the desig-
nated agent refuses to give the certificate, and there is no fraud, nor
such gross mistake as would necessarily imply bad faith, nor failure
to execute honest judgment on the part of the agent, the engineer's
certificate is a condition precedent to payment. Sweeney v. United States.
618.

8. The ruling in Kihlberg v. United States, 97 U. S. 398, adhered to, and
applied to this case. Id.

9. For the purpose of settling a debt, the debtor gave to the creditor
orders for 25 wagons, and the creditor gave to the debtor a written
receipt, which he accepted, stating that the wagons were to be received
in payment of the claim, provided they were delivered to the creditor
in good condition and merchantable order, and that it was understood
and agreed that if the wagons were so delivered in good condition
they were to be sold for the highest prices that could be obtained for
them, and the surplus, after paying the debt and cost of selling, should
be refunded to the debtor; 21 of the wagons were delivered, but none
of them were in good condition and merchantable order; the creditor
sold 19 of them and made ineffectual efforts to sell the other 2, and,
after crediting the net proceeds of sale, sued the debtor to recover the
balance of the debt. Held, That the receiving the 21 wagons and pro-
ceeding to sell them was an acceptance of them pro tanto in payment
of the claim; that the contract for the payment in wagons was un-
fulfilled as to the 4 wagons not delivered; and that the price for which
the 19 wagons were sold, and the selling value of the 2 not sold, had
no bearing on the case, unless there was a surplus of the proceeds of
sale to be refunded to the debtor under the contract.
Partridge Manufacturing Company v. Funge, 651.

See CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, 9, 10, 11, 17, 18, 19, 20;
CORPORATION, 1, 2, 3, 4;

DOMINION OF CANADA;
FRAUD ;

INSURANCE, 2, 3;

LIMITATIONS;

Winchester &

PRINCIPAL AND AGENT, 1, 2.

CORPORATION.

1. The liability created by a provision in a general act of the State of New
York for the formation of corporations, that all the stockholders of
every company incorporated under it shall be severally individually
liable to creditors of the company until the whole amount of the capi-
tal stock shall be paid in and certified, is in contract, and not a pen-
alty; and can be enforced by an action in contractu against a stock-
holder found in another State. Flash v. Conn, 371.

2. The courts of New York having held that a liability of a stockholder
to creditors arising under one of its general statutes for forming cor-
porations was in contract, when the attempt was made to enforce it
in New York, this court follows that interpretation in a suit to enforce
such a liability in another State. Id.

3. The liability of a stockholder to a creditor under the 10th section of
the general act of the State of New York for forming corporations
for manufacturing purposes is a liability in contract, which may be
enforced by an action at law. It is not necessary to resort to equity.
Id.

4. When a corporation, being embarrassed, and owing money to its mort-
gage bondholders and to others, was authorized by the legislature
from which it obtained its franchises to make settlement with its
creditors on a plan which provided that all holders of its mortgage
bonds who did not, within a fixed period, dissent in writing from the
proposed settlement, should be deemed to have assented; and when
a large majority of such bondholders assented to such plan, and some
dissented, and the plan went into operation: Held, That a holder of
such bonds who had due notice, and opportunity to act, and who
neither assented to nor dissented from the plan within the time, was
bound by its terms as fully as if he had expressly assented to it. Gil-
fillan v. Union Canal Co., 401.

5. A corporation dwells in the place of its creation, but may do business
wherever its charter allows and local laws do not forbid. A corpora-
tion of one country, doing business in another country, is subject to
such control, in respect to its powers and obligations, as the govern-
ment which created it may properly exercise. Every person who
deals with it anywhere impliedly subjects himself to such law3
of its own country affecting its power and obligations, as the
known and established policy of that government authorizes. Any-
thing done in that country under the authority of such law, which
discharges it from liability there, discharges it everywhere.
Southern Railway v. Gebhard, 527.

6. As individual holders of mortgage bonds issued by a railroad corpora-
tion, and secured by the same mortgage, have mutual contract inter-
ests and relations, there is nothing inequitable, when the power
exists, in subjecting a small minority to the will of a decided majority,

in reorganizing the mortgage indebtedness when the corporation is
embarrassed. Semble, That if this were done by virtue of a statute
of the United States, enacted under the provision of the Constitution
conferring power to establish uniform laws on the subject of bank-
ruptcy, it would not be regarded as impairing the obligation of a con-
tract. Id.

Where a court-martial has cognizance of the charges made, and has juris-
diction of the person of the accused, its sentence is valid, when ques-
tioned collaterally, although irregularities or errors are alleged to have
occurred in its proceedings, in that the prosecutor was a member of the
court and a witness on the trial. No opinion is expressed as to the
propriety of such proceedings. Keyes v. United States, 336,

COTTON.

On the question of the fact as to whether the proceeds of certain cotton
had been recovered and received from the United States as part of the
proceeds of cotton recovered for in the court of claims, this court re-
versed the decree of the circuit court. Lamar v. McCay, 235.
See CUSTOMS DUTIES, 1, 2.

CRIMES.

See JURISDICTION, B, 10, 11.

CRIMINAL LAW.

Where a defendant pleads not guilty to an indictment, and goes to

trial without making objection to the mode of selecting the grand

jury, the objection is waived; even though a law unconstitutional,
or assumed to be unconstitutional, may be followed in making the
panel. United States v. Gale, 65.

CUSTOM.

See INSURANCE, 3.

CUSTOMS DUTIES.

1. The rule that where words are used in an act imposing duties upon im-
ports, which have acquired, by commercial use, a meaning different
from their ordinary meaning, the latter may be controlled by the for-
mer, is not applicable when the language used in the statute is un-
equivocal. Newman v. Arthur, 132.

2. The fact that at the date of the passage of an act imposing duties,
goods of a certain kind had not been manufactured, does not with-
draw them from the class to which they belong, when the language of
the statute clearly and fairly includes them. Id.

3. The statute imposing duties divides foreign wool into three classes, and
enacts, among other things, that the duty on wool of the first class,
which shall be imported washed, shall be twice the amount of the
duty to which it would be subjected if imported unwashed; and fur-
ther, that wools of that class shall pay a specific duty per pound, and
an ad valorem duty in addition. Held, That the specific duty by
weight is to be calculated on the same number of pounds in each
case, and is to be twice the amount for washed wool that it is for un-
washed; and that the ad valorem duty on washed wool is to be twice
the ad valorem duty on the same number of pounds of unwashed
wool. Arthur v. Pastor, 139.

4. The common-law right of action against a collector to recover back
duties illegally collected is taken away by statute, and a remedy given
based on statutory liability which is exclusive. Arnson v. Murphy, 238.

DEFAULT.

See EQUITY, 2;
ERROR, 2.

DELAWARE.

See JURISDICTION, C, 1.

DEMURRER.

See PLEADING, 1, 2.

DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA.

1. A transcript of the record of a probate of a will in Virginia, sufficient
to pass real estate there, is not proof of the validity of the will in the
District of Columbia for the same purpose there. Robertson v. Pickrell,
608.

2. In order to pass real estate situated in the District of Columbia, a will
must be executed as provided by the laws in force there, and its valid-
ity must be established in the manner provided by those laws. Id.
3. Probate of a will in the District of Columbia is evidence of its validity
only so far as it affects personal property. As a will devising real es-
tate the instrument itself must be produced with the evidence of the
ubscribing witnesses, or if they be dead, or their evidence legally
unattainable, with proof of their handwriting. Id.

4. The treasurer of the United States cannot be compelled by writ of man-
damus to pay to an administrator appointed in the District of Colum-
bia, of an inhabitant of one of the States of the Union, the amount of
a draft payable to the intestate at the treasury out of an appropria-
tion made by Congress, and held by such administrator. Wyman v.
Halstead, 654.

See ADMINISTRATOR DE BONIS NON, 1, 2;

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, 5;

RECEIVER;
WASHINGTON CITY.

DIVISION OF OPINION.

This court cannot take cognizance of a division of opinion between the
judges of a circuit court on a motion to quash an indictment. United
States v. Rosenburg, 7 Wall. 580, approved and followed; United
States v. Hamilton, 63.

DOMINION OF CANADA.

1. The Parliament of Canada has authority to grant to an embarrassed rail-
way corporation within the Dominion power to make an arrangement
with its mortgage creditors for the substitution of a new security in