locomotive engine, and shall be rung or sounded by the engineman
or fireman sixty rods from any highway crossing, and until the high-
way is reached, and that "the corporation owning the railroad shall be
liable to any person injured for all damages sustained" by reason of
neglect so to do, does not make the corporation liable for an injury
caused by negligence of the fireman in this respect, to a fellow ser-
vant. Id.

MICHIGAN.

See MORTGAGE, 4;
WRIT, 3.

MINERAL LANDS.

1. Section 2324 Rev. Stat. enacts that where certain mining claims re-
ferred to in the section are held in common, the expenditure upon
them required by the act may be made upon any one claim. Held,
That the act contemplates that this expenditure is to be made for the
common-benefit, and that one enjoying a mining right defined by
metes and bounds does not, by expending money upon a flume which
passes over adjoining land and deposits the waste from his mine on
that land without benefit to such adjoining land, and without other
evidence of a claim to it, thereby make an expenditure upon it within
the meaning of the Revised Statutes. Jackson v. Roby, 440.
2. In a suit under section 2326 of the Revised Statutes to determine ad-
verse claims to lands containing valuable mineral deposits, if neither
party shows a compliance with the requirements of law in regard to
work done upon the claim, the finding should be against both. Id.
3. In an action by the patentee of a placer claim to recover possession of a
vein or lode within its boundaries, an answer alleging that the vein or
lode was known to the patentee to exist at the time of applying for
the patent, and was not included in his application, well pleads the
fact which, under § 2333 of the Revised Statutes, precludes him from
having any right of possession of the vein or lode. Sullivan v. Iron
Silver Mining Co., 550.

MISTAKE.

1. After many conversations, and after a draft agreement had been made,
A, in 1870, in writing, granted to B a license to make, use, and sell,
and vend to others to sell, an invention. In 1873 B discovered that
the agreement gave him no exclusive rights in the invention, which it
was the purpose of both parties to have done. He notified A, and A
at once offered to grant such right for the original consideration. In
November, 1873, B refused to accept a new agreement, and took
steps to terminate the existing one. A thereupon sued B for royalties

claimed to be earned under it. B filed a bill in equity, claiming that
there was a mistake in the agreement, and praying to have it cancelled
and a restrained from prosecuting an action under it. Held, That
there was no mistake between the parties as to the agreement made;
that the minds of the parties met, and an agreement was made, al-
though the legal effect of it was different from what was intended;
that A was not in default; and there was no ground for the relief
prayed for. Lavar v. Dennett, 90.

2. If commissioners, authorized by statute to subscribe in the corporate
name of a town for stock in a railroad company, and upon obtaining
the consent of a certain majority of taxpayers, to issue bonds of the
town under the hands and seals of the commissioners, and to sell the
bonds and invest the proceeds of the sale in stock of the railroad
company, which shall be held by the town with all the rights of other
stockholders, issue, without obtaining the requisite consent of tax-
payers, to the railroad company, in exchange for stock, such bonds
signed by the commissioners, but on which the seals are omitted by
oversight and mistake; and the town sets up the want of seals in de-
fence of an action at law afterwards brought against it by one who
has purchased such bonds for value, in good faith, and without ob-
serving the omission, to recover interest on the bonds; a court of
equity, at his suit, will decree that the bonds be held as valid as if
actually sealed before being issued, and will restrain the setting up of
the want of seals in the action at law. Bernands Township v. Stelbins,
341.

MORTGAGE.

1. A mortgaged real estate to B, C, and D, including the south half of
a fractional section. Two years later B assigned his interest in the
mortgage to C and D, and took from A, who was embarrassed, a con-
veyance of all his property, including the other half of the fractional
section. This was done to aid A in disposing of his property, and
paying his debts. It was found in the decree below that it was for
the joint benefit of B and his co-mortgagees. The mortgaged prop-
erty was purchased by C at foreclosure sale. A brought suit against
B, C, D, and others in possession, to redeem all the estate conveyed
to B. An accounting showed a balance due A. Execution was
ordered directing the defendants to surrender the lands. B and C
appealed, giving security for a supersedeas. A applied for a writ of
assistance putting him in possession of the north half. The court
below granted the writ. On application to this court to stay the
writ of assistance: Held, That the writ of supersedeas should issue.
Hunt v. Oliver, 177.

2. A executed a promissory note to B, another to C, and two others to D,
and secured all by a mortgage of real estate in Louisiana. The notes

to D were paid at maturity. Default being made by the others, B
obtained a decree for foreclosure of the mortgage, and the property
was sold to E. E, being unable to pay the purchase money, agreed in
writing with the holders for time, and that the parties might enforce
their judgments in case of non-payment, and that the original mort-
gages should remain in full force and effect, and that they were rec-
ognized as operating on the property to secure the debts. This
agreement was recorded in the record of mortgages. E then conveyed
to F, who mortgaged to G. The debt to B not being paid on the ex-
piration of the extension, B instituted proceedings to foreclose, treat-
ing the agreement as a mortgage, and made G a party defendant.
Held, That the agreement was not a mortgage; that to constitute a
mortgage there must be a present purpose to pledge the estate, and
that there was no such purpose at the time of the agreement. New
Orleans National Banking Ass'n v. Adams, 211.

3. The maker of a promissory note executed, to one who for his accommo-
dation signed his name on the back of the note before its delivery to
the payee, a mortgage of real estate to indemnify him against all costs
and charges arising from his contract, with a power of sale in case of
the mortgagor's default in paying the note. The mortgagor failing
to pay the note at maturity, the mortgagee paid the amount thereof
to the payee, and entered it upon his books in general account against
the mortgagor, and the payee indorsed the amount as a full payment
on the note, and delivered up the note to the mortgagee. The mort-
gagee afterwards assigned to a third person the mortgage and the ob-
ligation therein mentioned. Held, That the assignee might maintain
a bill in equity against the mortgagor for foreclosure and sale of the
land under the mortgage, and for payment by the mortgagor personally
of so much of the amount of the note as the proceeds of the sale
under the foreclosure were insufficient to satisfy. Bendey v. Town-
send, 665.

4. A stipulation, in a mortgage of real estate, that in case of foreclosure
the mortgagor shall pay an attorney's or solicitor's fee of one hun-
dred dollars, is unlawful and void by the law of Michigan, as de-
clared by the supreme court of the State; and therefore cannot be
enforced in the circuit court of the United States upon a bill in
equity to foreclose a mortgage, made and payable in that State, of
land therein. Id.

See ACKNOWLEDGMENT;

ERROR, 1;

FORECLOSURE;

FRAUD ;
JUDGMENT, 2;
POWER, 1, 2.

MOTION TO ADVANCE..

A case will not be taken up out of its order simply because it is of great
public importance. Poindexter v. Greenhow, 63.

MOTION TO AFFIRM.

On motion to dismiss, with which is united, under Rule 6, a motion to
affirm, the motion to affirm will be granted when it appears that the
questions presented are frivolous, and that the case is brought here
for delay only. Evans v. Brown, 180.

MUNICIPAL BONDS.

1. A steam grist-mill is not a work of internal improvement within the mean-
ing of the statute of Nebraska, approved February 15th, 1869, author-
izing counties, cities, and precincts of organized counties to issue
bonds in aid of the construction of any railroad or other work of
internal improvement. Osborne v. Adams County, 106 U. S. 181, ap-
proved. Osborne v. Adams County, 1.

2. The court adheres to its former rulings in regard to the liability of
municipal corporations in Missouri to innocent holders of the bonds
of such corporations, issued in aid of railroads. Green County v.
Conness, 104.

3. The rights of such holders are to be determined by the law as it was
judicially construed to be when the bonds were put on the market as
commercial paper. Id.

4. Bonds of the kind involved in these suits are debts of the county.
Holders are entitled to payment out of the general funds of the
county raised by taxation for ordinary use, after exhausting the
special fund. The majority of the court adhere to the rulings in
United States v. Clark County, 96 U. S. 211; United States v. Macon
County, 99 U. S. 582, 589; and Macon County v. Huidekoper, 99 U. S.
592. Knox County Court v. United States, 229.

5. A bona fide holder for value before maturity of a bond issued by a
county is not bound to go behind the recitals in the bond to inquire
whether the amount of the indebtedness of the corporation exceeds
that authorized by law. Sherman County v. Simons, 735.

6. When a statute directs an officer to examine and determine the amount
of the indebtedness of a county, for the purpose of further deter-
mining the amount of bonds to be issued by the county for a given
purpose, and the officer performs the duty, the county cannot, in a
suit by a holder of a bond issued as a result of the exercise of the power
by the officer, set up that the finding was not true. Id.

NAVIGABLE WATERS.

See CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, 14, 15, 16.

NEBRASKA.

1. When the legislature of Nebraska authorized a county which was in-
debted to issue bonds for the amount of the indebtedness, that act
was no infringement of the provision in the State Constitution then
in force that, "the legislature shall pass no special act conferring cor-
porate powers." The case of Commissioners of Jefferson County v.
The People, 5 Neb. 127, followed. Sherman County v. Simons, 735.
2. The issuing of bonds under such authority was no violation of the
provision of the present Constitution of Nebraska, that the legislature
shall not pass any local or special laws "granting to any corporation,
association or individual any exclusive privileges, immunities, or
franchise whatever. In all other cases where a general law can be
made applicable, no special lav ̧ shall be enacted." A county is not a
corporation within the meaning of this clause. Woods v. Colfax
County, 10 Neb. 552, followed. Id.

See MUNICIPAL BONDS, 1.

NEW ORLEANS.

In the absence of fraud, a compromise made between the city authorities of
New Orleans and a railroad company, respecting a disputed grant of
a user of part of the city property, known as the Batture, for railroad
purposes, was sustained, as authorized by the laws of Louisiana.
Under the statutes of that State, the city authorities had the right to
make the compromise at the time it was made, and it remained valid,
notwithstanding the powers conferred upon the board of liquidation
of the city debt of New Orleans by the legislature. Board of Liqui-
dation, &c., v. Louisville & Nashville Railroad Co., 221.

NEW TRIAL.

1. The action of the court below in refusing a new trial is not subject to
review here. Terre Haute & Indiana Railway Co. v. Struble, 381.

NEW YORK.

See CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, 13;

CORPORATIONS, 1, 2, 3.

NUISANCE.

See CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, 13.