including the Pilgrim Fathers; the signers of the Declaration of Independence the presidents of the Republic, and their able cabinets-the thirty-one national congresses, embracing the able senators and representatives, who have, in rotation, governed the nation successfully for sixty-two years-together with the profound jurists, who have composed the Supreme Court of the nation from its organization to the present time-as well as scores of other eminent citizens, both living and dead, who have wielded a powerful influence in forming the character of the nation, and then show us their superiors in numbers, talents, wisdom, and moral excellence in Great Britain, or in any other nation on the globe, during the same period? But the same learned critic complains that the American debates are without interest! Perhaps the gentleman has not read all the eloquent volumes which contain them; or he may have overlooked the herculean debates of Webster and Hayne; or the powerful and eloquent speeches of both houses of Congress in 1849 and 1850!

A statesman is a man versed in the arts of government; usually one eminent in political abilities; one employed in public affairs. In order to determine the character and abilities of American statesmen, it is only necessary to study their history and works. But the subject of American democracy and American institutions, will be further examined in a subsequent chapter, in comparing America with Poland and Europe, where we intend to meet fully the aspersions of European critics, which they have so long and so lavishly heaped upon American demo

cracy.

Alison complains of the democracy of Greece, Rome, and Poland; and so he may, for they never had any. The very few and imperfect republican principles cherished in Greece and

Rome, never were sufficiently developed and matured to afford much stability to their governments, or give any permanent relief to the people. But when our author groups together in one sentence, the democracy of Greece, Rome, Poland, Russia, Germany, France, England, and America, and pronounces them all one and the same thing, he betrays a want of discrimination, of knowledge in the principles of the several governments and their institutions; and, consequently, confounds things no way similar or connected, and fails to do justice to the several countries, whose institutions he seems to misunderstand.

Whoever studies the history and science of law and government, including ancient as well as modern nations, will not fail to reach the conclusion, that, as a general rule, monarchs and aristocrats are the authors of all the political disasters which have injured and ruined nations, and not the people; and the only exceptions to the rule are those few and extreme cases where the masses have been led to revolts and revolutions by artful and designing princes, or have been excited to the work of ruin. by the tyranny of their rulers. In nine-tenths of the cases where nations have fallen, the people have not been responsible. Poland was never ruined by the democracy of the people, for they never had any. Poland did not fall by the hand of the masses, for they were not permitted to participate in the struggles of the nation.

It is a well-settled principle in the history of moral science, that by far the greater portion of the virtue and intelligence of this world is found only among the middling classes of society. It is from the common people,—from the masses,that nearly everything great and good among men arises. This is the nursery of great men, of great discoveries, of useful enterprise, and

valuable inventions. It is not from the general community that danger is to be apprehended, except in the extreme cases already mentioned. Kings and aristocrats are the authors of oppression and misery; it is their abuses and misrule which have caused popular insurrections, and buried so many nations in oblivion. It is the virtue, intelligence, patriotism, and democracy of the middle and lower ranks, which form the bulwark of a nation. Kings may err, ministers may be guilty of injustice; but the people-when once informed-who are in their workshops and their farms, who love their homes, their families, their country, and their God, are not disposed to ruin the nation which gave them birth, nor hazard their property, their lives, and their all, in the dangers of revolution, for the purposes of acquiring power, wealth or fame. The honest yeomanry of the country are much less liable to deception, reckless ambition, and corruptions, than princes, whose votaries are generally hypocritical flatterers and base deceivers. And the farther we extend the parallel between aristocracy and democracy, the more striking is the comparison in favor of the people, and the safety of their power. True democracy makes superiors condescending, equals courteous, and inferiors respectful; and binds together all classes with the ties of fraternity, benevolence, and reciprocity, on the wise and liberal principles of equal rights.

CHAPTER X.

SLAVERY.

Nature and Principles of Slavery-Origin and Progress of Slavery-Different Kinds of Slavery-Its general Effects on Society-Slavery of PolandThe number of Polish Slaves-Their Condition-Effects of Polish Slavery on Domestic Society.

DOMESTIC slavery consists in the right of the master to control the physical and intellectual actions of the slave, for the master's individual benefit and happiness. This right is founded on the principle that the relation between master and slave is not the human relation of man to man, but is a modification of that which exists between man and the brutes; and denies the slave the free possession and enjoyment of life, liberty, and propertythe inalienable rights of man. This institution proceeds upon the principle that masters and slaves are, by creation and Divine appointment, two different classes of beings of entirely dissimilar rights; that the master possesses all the rights of the slave, without the consent of the slave,―if, indeed, he ever had any rights. It assumes that the Creator originally intended one human being to control the physical, intellectual, and moral actions and interests of as many other human beings as he can bring within his physical power by conquest or purchase, and that one human being may thus secure a lawful right to sacrifice the life, liberty,

and happiness of any other number of other human beings for the promotion of his own,-in the gratification of the master's avarice, licentiousness, and vicious propensities."

The slave is supposed to be the exclusive property of his owner, as a physical, intellectual, and moral being. It claims the exclusive right of the master to control the physical labor of the slave for his exclusive benefit, regardless of the happiness and rights of the unfortunate victim. The amount of labor, the kind of labor, and the remuneration of labor, are wholly governed by the will of the master, without the least interference on the part of his slave. It is an indispensable assumption in the institution of slavery that, not only the physical powers of the doomed creatures are the property of the master, but, inasmuch as the slave can be held in bondage only while he remains in mental imbecility and in ignorance of his power and human rights, the master is supposed to have the undoubted right to control his intellectual powers, and deprive his slave of the blessings of education, religion, and improvement, for the worthy purpose of maintaining the more secure and servile subjection. Or, at least, if the slave have any right to use his intellect, he cannot use it for his own happiness, but only for the profit and gratification of his own master.

But the interests of slavery demand and assume still another hypothesis which is equally essential to its support. The slaveholder, not content with his firm grasp on the physical and intellectual powers of his serf, claims the supreme power over his moral interests. This assumption is founded on the principle, that inasmuch as the acquisition of the slave's knowledge of his moral and religious duties to God could not be received without * Wayland's Moral Science, 206. Encyclopædia Americana, II., 429.