were sufficiently covered by the instructions | for themselves and others as members and given, which we find correctly covered the on behalf of the Lin Hing Gungsha, or Joss law applicable to the evidence. House Society of Reno, Nev., against F. J. Peck and others. From a judgment of nonsuit and from an order denying a motion for a new trial, plaintiffs appeal. Reversed, and cause remanded for new trial. [10] In support of the claim that the verdict was excessive appellant mainly relies upon the fact that respondent, up to the time of trial, had lost no great amount of time from his work. But if, as the evidence shows, he has chronic and uncontrollable diarrhea, rendering him offensive to his fam- M. B. Moore and Hoyt, Gibbons & French, ily and friends, and recurrent spasms, and if all of Reno, for respondents. the jury believed, as there was evidence tending to show, that this condition is permanent and progressive, and results from eating the meat, we cannot say that the verdict is excessive. The assessment of damages in such a case is a matter peculiarly within the province of the jury. We find no warrant in the evidence for reducing it. Two juries have found for respondent on practically the same evidence. We find no error in the record now before us calling for a reversal. The judgment is affirmed. Cole L. Harwood, of Reno, for appellants. COLEMAN, J. This is an appeal from a judgment of nonsuit and from an order denying a motion for a new trial. [1] Su Lee and Charley Bi Yen, suing for themselves and others as members of and on behalf of the Lin Hing Gungsha, or Joss House Society of Reno, Nev., an unincorporated society, brought suit against the defendants to quiet title to certain real estate. The pleadings are in the usual form. At the conclusion of the evidence offered on the part of the plaintiffs, a motion for a nonsuit was interposed. The court sustained the motion, MORRIS, C. J., and FULLERTON and upon the ground that an unincorporated soCHADWICK, JJ., (40 Nev. 20) concur. SU LEE et al. v. PECK et al. (No. 2212.) (Supreme Court of Nevada. Oct. 4, 1916.) 1. GIFTS 49(4) — LAND SUFFICIENCY OF EVIDENCE. Evidence in a suit to quiet title to land occupied by a joss house held to show a gift of such land to a joss house society. [Ed. Note. For other cases, see Gifts, Cent. Dig. 95; Dec. Dig. 49(4).] 2. TRIAL SUIT. 165-QUESTION OF FACT-NON On a motion for a nonsuit, the evidence should be construed in favor of the plaintiff. [Ed. Note. For other cases, see Trial, Cent. Dig. $$ 373, 374; Dec. Dig. 165.] 3. RELIGIOUS SOCIETIES 16- PROPERTYCAPACITY TO TAKE GIFT. An unincorporated joss house society can take title to real estate in this state, under the common-law rule that land may be given to pious uses before there is a grantee competent to take, and that in the meantime, the fee lies in abeyance and vests when the grantee exists. [Ed. Note. For other cases, see Religious Societies, Cent. Dig. §§ 103-108; Dec. Dig. 16.] 4. RELIGIOUS SOCIETIES 16-GIFT PACITY TO TAKE-ESTOPPEL. -CA Where a lot was given to a joss house society in consideration that the Chinese inhabitants would locate in the vicinity of the lot, and of the society's improvements on the lot, the donor and his grantee are estopped from asserting the society's incapacity to take title to the lot. [Ed. Note.-For other cases, see Religious Societies, Cent. Dig. §§ 103-108; Dec. Dig. 16.] Norcross, C. J., dissenting. ciety cannot take title to real estate in Nevada. In denying the motion for a new trial the court adhered to its original view, and also held that plaintiffs had failed to prove a gift of the property in question to the society, but that the evidence showed only a license to occupy the premises in question without rent, and that possession under such conditions was not such an adverse possession in the society as could ripen into title. We will consider the last proposition first. Ong Chee, a witness in behalf of plaintiffs, testified: * * the location of that joss house over there? A. Appeal from District Court, Washoe Coun- thing? A. Well, he says he give-he willing ty; R. C. Stoddard, Judge. to give that piece of land to build joss house, a lot of land. Q. Who did he say that to? A. Suit by Su Lee and Charley Bi Yen, suing He say that to me first place. And then I tell him I move my store up to Carson City, and IQ. Ask him if he ever had any conversation with ain't got nothing to do with it, and then I take Mr. Manning or Mr. Haskell about the joss them up to talk to Su Lee and Quong Ah house and Chinatown. A. Yes, sir. Q. Let him Moon. Q. Did you have-did you hear what state what they said to him. A. He says since they said to him? A. Yes; I hear him. I the Chinatown burn people in Reno went-the haven't time to wait for them, and after that Chinese move out and find a new location, and they stay there and talk a long while, I sup- some fellow, white fellow, ask the Chinese want pose; I didn't wait for them. I tell him to go to move another way, so the Chinese don't like up there and explain it to Su Lee and Quong it. So Mr. Manning said, 'Why don't you Ah Moon. Q. When was this? What year move down here?' The same now as the Chinawas this conversation that you refer to? A. town here. Q. All right. Go ahead. A. Then That was on the '78. Q. About '78? A. In Mr. Manning and Haskell call all the China1878. Q. Do you know how soon after that men and interview the new Chinatown, view the the joss house was built that you described, the place, and all Chinese like that place, so Mr. two-story building, the first one? A. That joss Manning build two houses, one or two wooden house built in '79. I suppose on about between buildings, to rent to all Chinese. And now one April and May, I think. Q. In '79? A. In brick building, as some now occupy, and he con'79 I think; about in the summer time. Q. tract with Mr. Manning to build that store. Q. Were you ever in that building after it was All right. Go ahead. A. Since Mr. Manning built? A. Oh, yes. I was here when he build build that two house, and some Chinamen they him; they had lots of fun there, lots of people went to build some more cabin on the Chinafrom Winnemucca and Truckee and all those town by themselves, by Chinamen, and a year places come here. Q. Had a kind of ceremony? later the Chinese want to build a church, the A. Yes; had some kind of ceremony. Q. And so-called joss house. And he is with Mr. Manwere you ever in- That building you have ning to build that joss house. Q. Well, ask him said was burned. Were you ever in the build- if Mr. Manning said anything, or Mr. Haskell, ing that is there now? A. Oh, yes. Q. When about giving him or the China boys a lot for a did you move to San Francisco? When did joss house. A. Yes, sir. Q. What did they you leave Nevada? A. I leave Nevada about say? A. So he asked Mr. Manning, Mr. Has26 years ago. Q. About 26 years ago? A. kell, if he could give the lot to the Chinamen to Yes. Q. And how many times were you in that build a joss house. Then Mr. Manning take him building; say that is there now? A. Well, down to Chinatown; told him that he could have the time that he build it I think many times; the lot. He give the lot to him, and say he could many times when he build it before I went to build joss house any size he want, and he charge San Francisco, and then when I come back no rent and pay no tax, and give it to him to from San Francisco mostly 2 or 3 years time I protect all Chinese sick people; was forever Chicome up here and sometimes drop in. Many nese. Q. Ask him if Mr. Manning or Mr. Hastimes I been in there. Q. And do you know kell went with him and he marked out the lot, what the building that was put on there first, put stakes down, or anything like that. A. Mr. the two-story building, what it was used for? Manning take him down and measure and show A. Joss house. Q. Well, what do you mean by him the lot, stuck up square all of the corner that? What is a joss house used for? A. Joss and show him that is the place going to build for house, you know, what the Chinese please God, joss house. That is what Mr. Manning said. Q. see. Q. Use like a church? A. Just the same And ask him if they set up stakes, stick stakes like a church, yes. Q. Well, just describe how on the corners. A. Yes, sir. Q. Ask him if it was used? A. Well, joss house the same as that was the same place they build the joss people you people please the same, all the house. A. Same place. * Q. Ask him if same people same as church, all the same; near- Mr. Manning or Mr. Haskell, or any other perly the same. Q. Well, what do the Chinamen son, ever said they owned the property, or said do that go there? A. Well, sometimes China- anything about the property, about the title to go there, you know, please God, some the property after that time. A. He said he Chinamen, you know always please God. Any- asked Mr. Manning. Manning said give to him; thing he want to do anything he go ask God. this belong to the joss house property." And then any Chinamen sometimes have a dispute from the other, then all go there and try to have compromise make out, make him come and man decide the business there sometime. Any of the Chinamen or one of them have a dispute one to the other, you know, and they try to make compromise, settle it. anything of that kind. business men all go there to meet him, get him settle it, you know. Any poor man dead, anything of that kind, always that society they help him out. Anybody got no money to bury it, anything of that kind, they pay out money to bury them. Any sick man, anything of that kind, they try to help him. Q. Well, do they take sick men there sometimes? A. Yes; sick man in behind little place hospital before: right behind joss house. Q. Right behind the joss house? A. Yes. Q. Are you acquainted with the customs of Chinese people? A. This Chinatown here? Q. Do you know the customs and manners of Chinese people? A. China people here in town? Q. Yes. A. Oh, yes. Q. And are you acquainted with the customs of Chinese people in San Francisco and in China? A. Yes. Q. Then I will ask you whether this building called the joss house here was used as a joss house according to the customs of Chinese people? A. Yes." men Charley Bi Yep, a witness called in behalf of plaintiff, seemed to have given a portion of his testimony direct and some through an interpreter. In answering directly, when asked what was said by Mr. Manning, the witness replied: "Yes, I give China boy for the joss house. I tell him Mr. Peck no use lawsuit, row. No use row about that. I tell him Mr. Peck Manning tell him Mr. Peck, he say." The following seems to have been the testimony which the witness gave through an interpreter: joss house to the Chinamen. Don't bother with "Mr. Manning did tell Mr. Peck I give that it. Leave it alone." The testimony upon which it is claimed that a license was granted to use the lot in question for a joss house is that of the witness John Fraser, wherein he testified relative to a conversation with Mr. Manning, and said: "And we got to talking about old times in Su Lee, one of the plaintiffs, testified in Reno, and this China question was brought up, part as follows: "Q. Ask him if he knew a man named Manning and a man named Haskell. A. Yes, sir. and I says, 'There ain't much left down in Chinatown now except the joss house on the south side.' And he says, 'No.' He says he guessed they will keep that as long as they don't have to pay anything on the rent of the ground. He didn't tell me that he gave them the ground or anything of that kind. But he said they had never paid any rent on it." [2] We cannot see that there is anything in the testimony of the witness Fraser which is in conflict with the evidence of the other witnesses. He simply related that Manning had said that the society did not have to pay rent; but Manning did not say that he had or had not given the ground to the society. If he had given the ground to the society "forever," as testified by Su Lee, they certainly would not have to pay rent. The language used by Manning was in no way contradictory of the testimony given by the witnesses who appeared in behalf of the plaintiffs. It is an elementary rule that on a motion for a nonsuit the evidence should be construed strongly in favor of the plaintiff. McCafferty v. Flinn, 32 Nev. 269, 107 Pac. 225. [3] This brings us to a consideration of the question whether an unincorporated religious society can take title to real estate in Nevada. We think it can. Counsel for respondents, in support of their contention, rely upon the following language from 34 Cyc. p. 1149, to sustain their position: "Mere voluntary religious associations are in over charities arose solely under the statute of Elizabeth, suggesting that the statute has perhaps been construed with reference to a supposed antecedent jurisdiction of the court, by which void devises to charitable purposes were sustained. Sir John Leach, in the case of a charitable use before the statute of Elizabeth (Attorney General v. Master of Brentwood School, 1 time no legal devise could be made to a corporaMylne and Keen, 376) said: 'Although at his tion for a charitable use, yet lands so devised were in equity bound by a trust for the charity, which a court of equity would then execute.' In point of fact the charity was so decreed in that very case, in the twelfth year of Elizabeth. But what is still more important is the declaration of Lord Redesdale, a great judge in equity, New R. 312, 347 (1827), where he says: We in Attorney General v. Mayor of Dublin, 1 Bligh are referred to the statute of Elizabeth, with respect to charitable uses, as creating a new law upon the subject of charitable uses. That statute only created a new jurisdiction; it created no new law. It created a new and ancillary jurisdiction, a jurisdiction created by commission, etc.; but the proceedings of that commission were made subject to appeal to the Lord Chancellor, and he might reverse or affirm what they had done, or make such order as he might think fit for reserving the controlling jurisdiction of the Court of Chancery as it existed before the passing of that statute; and there can be no doubt that by information by the Attorney General the same thing might be done.' He then adds: The right which the Attorney General has to file an information is a right of prerogative. The King, as parens patriæ, has a right, capable of taking or holding real property in by his proper officer, to call upon the several their society name." Some of the cases cited in support of the text rely upon Trustees of Baptist Ass'n v. Hart, 4 Wheat. 1, 4 L. Ed. 499, to sustain the position taken, while the case of Goesele v. Bimeler, Fed. Cas. No. 5503, 5 McLean, 223, affirmed, Id., in 14 How. 589, 14 L. Ed. 554, was not a case of a gift for charitable uses. Some of the other cases cited do not give the question the consideration which it merits. The case which most strongly sustains the position of respondents is that of Baptist Ass'n v. Hart, supra, but that case was overruled by a unanimous court in Vidal v. Girard's Ex'rs, 2 How. 127, 11 L. Ed. 205, the opinion having been written by Story, J., who was a member of the court when Baptist Ass'n v. Hart was decided. After some consideration of the common law and the statute of 43 Elizabeth, known as the "Statute of Charitable Uses," the opinion proceeds: "There are, however, dicta of eminent judges (some of which were commented upon in the case of 4 Wheat. 1 [4 L. Ed. 499]) which do certainly support the doctrine that charitable uses might be enforced in chancery upon the general jurisdiction of the court, independently of the statute of 43 Elizabeth, and that the jurisdiction had been acted upon, not only subsequent, but antecedent, to that statute. Such was the opinion of Sir Joseph Jekyll in Eyre v. Countess of Shaftsbury, 2 P. Will. 103, 2 Equity Abridg. 710, pl. 2, and that of Lord Northington in Attorney General v. Tancred, 1 Eden, 10 (S. C. Ambler, 351, 1 Wm. Black. 90), and that of Lord Chief Justice Wilmot in his elaborate judgment in Attorney General v. Lady Downing, Wilmot's Notes, p. 1, 26, given after an examination of all the leading authorities. Lord Eldon, in the Attorney General v. Skinner's Company, 2 Russ. 407, intimates in clear terms courts of justice, according to the nature of their several jurisdictions, to see that right is done to his subjects who are incompetent to act for themselves, as in the case of charities and other cases.' So that Lord Redesdale maintains the jurisdiction in the broadest terms, as founded in the inherent jurisdiction of chancery inaddition to these dicta and doctrines, there is the dependently of the statute of 43 Elizabeth. In very recent case of the Incorporated Society v. Richards, 1 Drudy and Warren, 258, where Lord Chancellor Sugden, in a very masterly judgment, upon a full survey of all the authorities, and where the point was directly before him, held the same doctrine as Lord Redesdale, and expressly decided that there is an inherent jurisdiction in equity in cases of charity, and that charity is one of those objects for which a court of equity has at all times interfered to make good that which at law was an illegal or informal gift; and that cases of charity in courts of and previous to the statute of Elizabeth. equity in England were valid independently of "Mr. Justice Baldwin, in the case of the will of Sarah Zane, which was cited at the bar and pronounced at April term of the circuit court in 1833 (see Brightly's N. P. Repts. Magill & Brown, 346, note), after very extensive and learned researches into the ancient English authorities and statutes, arrived at the same conclusion in which the district judge, the late lamented Judge Hopkinson, concurred; and that opinion has a more pointed bearing upon the present case, since it included a full review of the Pennsylvania laws and doctrines on the subject of charities. "But very strong additional light has been thrown upon this subject by the recent publications of the commissioners on the public records in England, which contain a very curious and interesting collection of the chancery records in the reign of Queen Elizabeth, and in the earlier reigns. Among these are found many cases in which the Court of Chancery entertained jurisdiction over charities long before the statute of 43 Elizabeth; and some 50 of these cases, extracted from the printed calendars, have been laid before us. They establish, in the most sat charities where there were trustees appointed for general and indefinite charities, as well as for specific charities, were familiarly known to, and acted upon, and enforced in, the Court of Chancery. In some of these cases the charities were not only of an uncertain and indefinite nature, but, as far as we can gather from the imperfect statement in the printed records, they were also cases where there were either no trustees appointed, or the trustees were not competent to take. These records, therefore, do, in a remarkable manner, confirm the opinions of Sir Joseph Jekyll, Lord Northington, Lord Chief Justice Wilmot, Lord Redesdale, and Lord Chancellor Sugden. Whatever doubts, therefore, might properly be entertained upon the subject when the case of the Trustees of the Philadel-ing donee is named, from which it results at comphia Baptist Association v. Hart's Executors, 4 Wheat. 1 [4 L. Ed. 499], was before this court 1819), those doubts are entirely removed by the late and more satisfactory sources of information to which we have alluded." "At common law, lands may be granted to pious uses before there is a grantee competent to take. In the meantime, the fee will lie in abeyance. It will vest when the grantee exists. Town of Pawlet v. Clark, 9 Cranch, 292 [3 L. Ed. 735]. See, also, Beatty v. Kurtz, 2 Pet. 566 [7 L. Ed. 521], and Vincennes University v. Indiana, 14 How. 268 [14 L. Ed. 416]." See, also, Russell v. Allen, 107 U. S. 163-167 [2 Sup. Ct. 327, 27 L. Ed. 397]; Werlein v. New Orleans, 177 U. S. 390 [20 Sup. Ct. 682, 44 L. Ed. 817]; McCord v. Ochiltree, 8 Blackf. (Ind.) 15; St. Peter's Church v. Brown, 21 R. I. 367, 43 Atl. 642; Lewis Estate, 1 Pa. Dist. Ct. R. 423; Preachers' Aid Soc. v. Rich, 45 Me. 552; Washburn v. Sewall, 9 Metc. [Mass.] 280; Swazey v. Am. Bib. Soc., 57 Me. 523; Trenton Soc. v. Howell [N. J.] 63 Atl. 1110; Miller v. Chittenden, 4 Iowa, 252; Hornbeck v. Am. Bible Soc., 2 Sandf. Ch. 133; Paschal v. Acklin, 27 Tex. 173; Pennoyer v. Wadhams, 20 Or. 274, 25 Pac. 720 [11 L. R. A. 210]. In Schmidt et al. v. Hess et al., 60 Mo. at page 595, the rule is laid down as follows: "No doubt is entertained that the gift under consideration is a charity, and falls within the meaning of the rules of chancery. 2 Sto. Eq. Jur. § 1164, and cases cited. And although in consequence of the nonincorporation of the church for whose benefit the grant was made, there was no one in esse, at the time of making the donation, capable of being the recipient of the trust, yet, the use being a charitable one, a court of equity, having ascertained the intent of the grantor, will not allow the grant on that account to fail, but will see to its effectuation. 2 Sto. Eq. Jur. §§ 1165, 1166, and cases cited; Potter v. Chapin, 6 Paige (N. Y.) 639, and cases cited: St. Louis County Court v. Gris wold, 58 Mo. 175." In considering the question involved here, it is said in 6 Cyc. 903: "They are construed as valid when possible, happen within a life or lives in being and 21 The most recent decision sustaining our position is that of In re Upham's Estate, 127 Cal. 90, 59 Pac. 315, from which we quote: "It is contended, however, that the trust is void because the parties named as trustees are incapable of taking the property. The trustees of the orphans' home, it is true, do not constitute a corporation. It was organized under the auspices of the Grand Lodge of the Independent Order of Good Templars of the State of California, which is a corporation, and it is under the management and control of a continuous board of trustees, consisting of eight persons, one-half of whom are selected every two years by the order. These trustees seem to be appropriate persons to take charge of this charitable fund, and manage it for the purposes of the trust; but even if it should be held that in a strict legal sense they are not capable of taking, yet the charity would not fail for that reason. A court will not allow a charitable trust to fail for want of a legal trustee. Of course in this country courts of equity will not go so far in executing indefinite charities as the courts of equity went in England under the statute of 43 Elizabeth for there if it could be discovered from a deed or will that anything in the nature of a charity was intended, however vague or indefinite, the Chancellor would devote it to some sort of a charity. But in this country courts have been extremely liberal in construing charities, of cy-pres have enforced trusts far more indefiand under principles analogous to the doctrine nite and inexact than the one here involved." [4] We are of the opinion that not only is the contention of appellants sustained by the great weight of authority, but by sound reason as well, and, in view of the fact that the lot was given to the society in consideration of the locating in the vicinity of the lot in question of the Chinese inhabitants of Reno, and of the making of the improvements which were made by the society upon the lot, that equity and good conscience should for all time close the mouth of Manning and his grantees to assert the incapacity of the society to take title to the property in question. It is ordered that the judgment be revers ed, and that the case be remanded for a new trial. and are often upheld where private trusts would MCCARRAN, J., concurs. NORCROSS, O. (40 Nev. 385) MERRITT v. MERRITT. (Supreme Court of Nevada. (No. 2230.) Sept. 19, 1916.) 1. DOMICILE 5-EFFECT OF MARRIAGE. At common law, it was a well-founded rule that a woman on her marriage lost her own domicile and acquired that of her husband. [Ed. Note.-For other cases, see Domicile, Cent. Dig. §§ 24-35; Dec. Dig. 5.] 2. HUSBAND AND WIFE 3(1)-DOMICILE WIFE'S RIGHT TO ACQUIRE. A wife may acquire and maintain a domicile separate from that of her husband. [Ed. Note.-For other cases, see Husband and Wife, Cent. Dig. § 7; Dec. Dig. 3(1).] 3. DIVORCE 62(5)—JURISDICTION. A complaint in divorce alleging plaintiff's residence in W. county, that defendant is within the jurisdiction of the court and can be served in W. county, gives the court jurisdiction under Act Feb. 23, 1915 (Laws 1915, c. 28), § 1, amending Laws 1861, c. 33, § 22, giving jurisdiction if defendant can be found in the county. [Ed. Note. For other cases, see Divorce, Cent. Dig. 88 200-202, 215; Dec. Dig. 62(5).] reality attempted to determine the case on its merits. In this proceeding, we are confronted with a situation that brings before us again the much-discussed divorce statute of our state. Section 1 of appellant's complaint in the court below sets forth: "That plaintiff resides in the city of Reno, county of Washoe, state of Nevada; and that said defendant is at the time of signing and filing of this complaint within the jurisdiction of this court and that service of the summons and other process may be made upon him in Washoe county, Nev." Our divorce statute, enacted by the Legislature of 1915, approved February 23, 1915, is in part as follows: may be obtained, by complaint under oath, to "Sec. 22. Divorce from the bonds of matrimony cause therefor shall have accrued, or in which the district court of the county in which the the defendant shall reside or be found, or in which the plaintiff shall reside, if the latter be either the county in which the parties last cohabited, or in which the plaintiff shall have resided six months before suit be brought, for the following causes. "Stat. 1915, p. 26, Appeal from District Court, Washoe Coun-amending St. 1861, c. 33. ty; R. C. Stoddard, Judge. Action for divorce by Evelyn Woods Merritt against Fred Charles Merritt. From a judgment that the court was without jurisdiction and an order denying plaintiff's motion for new trial, plaintiff appeals. Judg ment and order reversed. M. B. Moore, of Reno, for appellant. Hoyt, Gibbons & French, of Reno, amicus curiæ. MCCARRAN, J. This is an appeal from a judgment rendered by the district court of the Second judicial district and from an order denying appellant's motion for a new trial. The action in the lower court was one for divorce. The judgment and decree rendered by the court below was as follows: "It is therefore ordered, adjudged and decreed that the court is without jurisdiction in said cause; and it is therefore ordered, adjudged and decreed that the plaintiff take nothing by this action." By this decree as entered and found in the records, it must be assumed that the court dismissed the proceedings for want of jurisdiction. While it might appear that the court attempted to make findings on the merits of the case, it will not be presumed here on review that such was in reality the intention of the court, inasmuch as the court by its judgment and decree found itself without jurisdiction to entertain the cause. If the court was without jurisdiction, either by reason of the subject-matter of the action or by reason of the failure of the parties to bring themselves within that jurisdiction, it will not be contended, we apprehend, that the court had any power to determine the merits of the action. Nor do we assume, in view of the form of the judgment, that the court in statute, and others of similar nature, whereThe power of our Legislature to enact this in that body, representing the people of the state, seeks to regulate marriage and divorce, will, we apprehend, not be questioned. As was said by Mr. Chief Justice Talbot in his concurring opinion in the case of Tiedemann v. Tiedemann, 36 Nev. 501, 137 Pac. 826: "Generally speaking, the marital status of the citizen, the age of consent, the manner in which marriage may be solemnized, the obligations it imposes affecting personal or property rights, the time, condition of residence and within the control of the state and subject to causes required for obtaining divorce, are all her laws as enacted by the Legislature." We have here before us, then, the policy of our state applicable to the subject of divorce as that policy is framed and enacted by the Legislature, the representatives of the people. The courts have neither the power nor the right to read into that statute anything not there found, nor to strike therefrom that which is there presented. The Legislature in enacting this statute sought to prescribe certain jurisdictional prerequisites, in view of which or on the presentation of which the district courts of the state might take jurisdiction where parties sought to secure dissolution from the bonds of matrimony. Any one of five conditions presented in a verified complaint would, as we view this statute, be sufficient to give the district court jurisdiction. The district court might take jurisdiction: (1) If the cause of action therefor accrued in the county; (2) if the defendant resides in the county; (3) if the defendant may be found in the county; (4) if the plaintiff reside in the county, if such county be the one in which the parties last cohabited; (5) if the plaintiff reside in the county for a period of six months before suit be |