when he acts or makes statements he is engaged strictly in pursuit of those things provided for in the agreement, which under this agreement was the investigation of the cause of the fire or the investigation and ascertainment of the amount of loss. The contract being solely for the benefit of the insurer will be strictly construed against the insurer. In Hollis v. State Insurance Co., 65 Iowa, 454, 21 N. W. 774, the court say: unless his authority is limited, to the knowledge of the assured." Measured by this rule Cooper had the authority as an adjuster to waive any of the rights of forfeiture in the policy. He acknowledged this right when he refused to proceed until a nonwaiver agreement had been executed after having ascertained that a right of forfeiture existed. If he had authority to enter into this contract for the companies, he also had the authority to waive it and to waive the provisions of the policy under which a forfeiture could be claimed. And this he could do just as effectually verbally as in writing. Western National Insurance Co. v. Marsh, 34 Okl. 414, 125 Pac. 1094, 42 L. R. A. (N. S.) 991; Young v. Hartford Fire Ins. Co., 45 Iowa, 377, 24 Am. Rep. 784; United States Life Ins. Co. v. Lesser, 126 Ala. 568, 28 South. 646; Reaper City Ins. Co. v. Jones, 62 Ill. 458; King v. Council Bluffs Ins. Co., 72 Iowa, 310, 33 N. W. to remain silent, perhaps a waiver could not have been inferred from its silence. But if, with 690; German Ins. Co. v. Gray, 43 Kan. 497, knowledge of the circumstances, it continued to 23 Pac. 637, 8 L. R. A. 70, 19 Am. St. Rep. treat the contract as of binding force, and in- 150; Barnard v. National Fire Ins. Co., 38 duced plaintiff to act in that belief, the rule hold-Mo. App. 106; Wilson v. Commercial Union ing that it thereby waived the forfeiture is a very just one." "But we think it is not true that such waiver can be created only by such acts or conduct as would create a technical estoppel. Neither for feitures nor estoppels are favored by the law, and it follows necessarily from this consideration that the waiver of a forfeiture may be sustained by circumstances which do not present the strong equities which would be required to create an estoppel. When plaintiff asserted a claim under the policy for the loss, and defendant was informed of the facts out of which the forfeiture grew, it had the right at once to treat the contract as at an end. If it had elected In Roberts, Willis & Taylor Co. et al. v. Sun Mut. Insurance Co., 13 Tex. Civ. App. 64, 35 S. W. 955, the court says: Assurance Co., 51 S. C. 540, 29 S. E. 245, 64 "Where an adjuster, after learning of the destruction of the insured's itemized inventory, The iron-safe, book, and inventory clauses ledger, and scratch book, refused to proceed with the investigation of the loss until the insured in the policies were primarily for the puragreed that further examination into the loss pose of ascertaining the amount of the loss should not be taken as any waiver of any de- should one occur, and to prevent fraud upon fense the companies may have by reason of the breach of warranty as contained in the iron-safe the part of the insured against the insurer. clause, we having lost our detailed inventory,' If the testimony of Sinclair is true, the there was evidence from which the jury might infer a waiver of the requirement to produce the books other than the detailed inventory, particularly as the adjuster, after making an estimate of the loss, pursuant to said agreement, applied to plaintiffs, to whom the policies had been assigned, for duplicate invoices of purchases of goods." To the same effect are the following cases: Titus v. Insurance Co., 81 N. Y. 410 (Court of Appeals); Oshkosh Gaslight Co. v. Germania Fire Insurance Co., 71 Wis. 454, 37 N. W. 819, 5 Am. St. Rep. 233; Dick et al. v. Equitable Fire & Marine Insurance Co., 92 Wis. 46, 65 N. W. 742; Brown v. State Insurance Co., 74 Iowa, 428, 38 N. W. 135, 7 Am. St. Rep. 495; Corson v. Anchor Mutual Insurance Co., 113 Iowa, 641, 85 N. W. 806; German Insurance Co. of Freeport, Ill., v. Allen, 69 Kan. 729, 77 Pac. 529; Insurance Co. v. Eggleston, 96 U. S. 572, 24 L. Ed. 841; Liverpool & London & Globe Insurance Co. v. Cargill, 44 Okl. 735, 145 Pac. 1134. amount of the loss was definitely ascertained and adjusted with such books and data as was submitted. The adjuster at the conclusion of his investigation was wholly satisfied, and so expressed himself. The amount of loss having been ascertained, the proofs of loss were no longer necessary; and the adjuster by stating that everything was all right, and that upon his arrival at Oklahoma City he would turn the matter in, and if it wasn't all right would phone, and if it was all right the money would be forthcoming in eight or ten days; and all of these things occurring after the total amount of the loss had been determined, and there being no contention that the loss was not an honest loss, the evidence it seems to us was sufficient to go to the jury upon the question of whether or not the iron-safe, book, and inventory clauses had been waived. The distinction in the cases as we view it is this: Where the insurer with full knowl In Western Reciprocal Underwriters' Ex-edge of the violation of the provision of the change v. Coon, 38 Okl. 453, 134 Pac. 22, this court in the fourth paragraph of the syllabus says: policy which entitled him to the right to exercise a forfeiture afterwards requests the insured to submit proofs of loss and go to unnecessary trouble and expense in the belief that the forfeiture has been waived, the But "(a) The same rule applies to an assistant ad- forfeiture will be considered waived. juster performing the duties of a chief adjuster,' upon the other hand, if the insured comes in "An adjuster for an insurance company is authorized to waive forfeitures in an insurance policy. 64 160 PACIFIC REPORTER if to the knowledge of certain facts that may, true, result in the right to exercise a forfeiture and the proofs of loss and other data are necessary in an investigation to deter mine these facts, the request to furnish them cannot be taken as a waiver of the forfeiture. The former case is well illustrated in Rundell & Hough v. Anchor Fire Ins. Co., 128 Iowa, 575, 105 N. W. 112, 25 L. R. A. (N. S.) 29, where it was said by the court: (61 Okl. 75) FOLSOM-MORRIS COAL MINING CO. v. (Supreme Court of Oklahoma. Feb. 15, 1916. (Syllabus by the Court.) DAMAGES 132(1)-EXPLOSIVES S-MAS- had access to such cans. F.-M. was engaged in mining coal, and in "The appellant contends, however, that the plaintiffs were bound to send in their proofs of connection therewith, maintained an uninclosed ing powder. When the powder was practically loss, and that Kirkham did not therefore induce powder house, in which it stored in cans blastthem to incur any expense or trouble which they removed from said cans, the cans containing need not otherwise have incurred. The fallacy small quantities of powder were thrown on the of this argument is apparent, when we consider From said cans, D. the fact that the plaintiffs knew, as well as the ground near said powder house, where infants defendant, the condition of the contract, and and J., infants, gathered a quantity of powder, that they could not recover thereon because of yards from where said powder was obtained. J. the loss of their books and inventories, and that which D. and J. carried in cans to about 300 such being the case they need not have incurred strewed the powder carried by him upon the the expense of sending proofs of loss. Hence, ground, struck a match and applied it to said if they sent them in response to Kirkham's re- train of powder, about the time that D. attemptquest, and by so doing incurred expense or trou-ed to pick up some of said powder upon the ble, all of which the record showed they did, ground. The powder upon the ground exploded, they are within the principle of the cases in and ignited the powder in the can carried by D., which it has been held that similar acts consti- which also exploded and severely burned and pertuted a waiver of the conditions of the policy." manently injured D. Held, that although such The latter case is illustrated from the injuries be immediately brought about by the insame state in Fitchpatrick v. Hawkeye Ins. tervening cause of the striking of the match by J., such intervening cause was set in motion by the original wrongdoing of F.-M. in throwing out Co., 53 Iowa, 335, 5 N. W. 155. said cans containing said small portions of powder in a place accessible to D. and J., and F.-M. is liable for the resulting damages caused by said explosion of powder. Held, further that the "powder monkey," employed by F.-M. at said powder house, being present and not objecting to the removal of said powder by said D. and J. from said cans, his action in so doing must be regarded as the negligent act of F.-M. Held, further, that under the facts of this case, a verdict of $5,000 is not excessive. We therefore conclude that the court did not err in giving instructions No. 2 and 4, as above set out; that there was sufficient evidence to go to the jury upon the question of the waiver of the iron-safe, book, and inventory clauses in the policy; that it became a question of fact for the jury to determine, and, the jury having determined it, the verdicts will not be disturbed. The judgment of the district court will therefore be affirmed. PER CURIAM. Adopted in whole. (G1 Okl. 21) AMERICAN INS. CO. OF NEWARK, N. J., Action by W. C. Sinclair against the Ameri- see Damages, [Ed. Note. For other cases, Cent. Dig. § 372: Dec. Dig. 132(1); Explosives, Cent. Dig. §§ 4, 5; Dec. Dig. 8; Mas ter and Servant, Cent. Dig. §§ 1226-1229; Dec. Dig. 304.] Commissioners' Opinion, Division No. 1. Error from District Court, Coal County; Robert M. Rainey, Judge. Action by John De Vork, by his father and Judgnext friend, Joe De Vork, against the Folsom-Morris Coal Mining Company. ment for plaintiff, and defendant brings erAffirmed. ror. J. G. Ralls, of Atoka, for plaintiff in error. Steel, Lake & Head, Fooshee & Brunson and C. M. Threadgill, of Idabel, and Ames, Chambers, Lowe & Rich-all of Coalgate, for defendant in error. ardson, of Oklahoma City, for defendant in error. COLLIER, C. This is an action commencHAYSON, C. This is a companion case to No. 6744, American Central Insurance Co. of St. Louis, Mo., v. Sinclair, 160 Pac. 60; the ed by defendant in error to recover damages cases having, by agreement, been consolidated in the sum of $15,000 against plaintiff in error for personal injuries. Hereinafter the for trial and tried to the same jury, on the same evidence in the district court of McCurtain county. The two cases by consent of the parties parties will be designated as they were in the were briefed together. The questions of law and trial court. fact involved in this case, and the assignments of error raised, are the same as were involved in case No. 6744, American Central Insurance The conclusions Co. v. Sinclair, 160 Pac. 60. reached in that case are the same in this case. The judgment of the trial court is therefore affirmec. . Adopted in whole The material evidence in the case shows that defendant was engaged in coal mining, and in connection therewith maintained a powder magazine or powder house, located on the premises of defendant, within a few hundred feet from the mouth of the coal mine, in which was kept and stored large cases see same topic and The evidence of defendant shows that it had been in control of the mine for about a month and a few days, and that some of the cans in which powder was left had been. thrown out by the former company, and that was the usual way to dispose of said cans; that during the time it had control of the mine, it had used and thrown out about 20 powder cans a day; that defendant had a person employed at the powder house, known as a "powder monkey," whose duties were to deliver the powder to the miners; that people had been accustomed to carrying off the cans for various purposes, and that said house, as agent of said defendant, saw plaintiff and the other boys on the day of the accident getting powder, and did not in any way attempt to prevent them from so doing. quantities of blasting powder from which de-juries were permanent. Thereupon plaintiff fendant furnished its employés or coal dig- was exhibited to the jury to be examined as gers; that said powder was inclosed in large to the scars caused by said burns. black cans, each of which contained about 25 pounds of powder; that said cans were opened by defendant and the powder partially emptied therefrom and furnished to its employés; that said cans, still containing small quantities of powder, were thrown out on the ground near and around said powder house; that the place where said cans were thrown after being emptied was unfenced, unprotected, and unguarded; that plaintiff, who was at the time about 12 years of age, together with other small boys, obtained from said powder cans small quantities of powder which had been left in the cans by defendant, its agents and employés, and thereby obtain- | "powder monkey" in charge of said powder ed a quantity of powder which was placed in two cans respectively by said plaintiff and one of the other boys, and on the same day, and shortly after the boys had secured the powder, the plaintiff and one of said small boys took said powder so obtained from said Upon conclusion of the evidence of plainpowder cans from where they obtained it to tiff defendant demurred thereto, which was a distance of about 300 yards; that plaintiff overruled and excepted to. Defendant recarried one of the cans containing said pow-quested 11 instructions, which were refused der in his arms, and one of the other boys by the court. The court instructed the jury carried another can containing a large quan- as follows: tity of powder, obtained as aforesaid, and emptied said powder on the ground, stringing it along for some distance, at which time plaintiff was standing close to said powder being emptied on the ground, and attempted to pick up some of said powder so emptied upon the ground. to put it in the can carried by him; and that while so doing, the other boy struck a match and stuck it to said pow-tected, and you further believe that the plaintiff, der so emptied on the ground, and said powder instantly exploded, and a flash of the fire therefrom entered said powder contained in the can held by plaintiff in his arms, which said powder instantly exploded. The evidence further shows that as a result of said explosion, plaintiff was burned about the neck, arms, face, down on the side of his chest, on both arms, and from the forearm down through the palm of his hand; that said burns were deep and very severe; that plaintiff was burned through the skin and into what is known as the "deeper structures"; that practically all the skin was burned off; that his left hand was burned worse than the right; that the burns on the left hand were heavy enough to cause the contraction of the left wrist; that his hand was drawn almost to a right angle; that said burns were severe enough to cause the contraction of his muscles, and may have burned the muscles, ligaments and tendons; that the skin had to be taken out of the palm of his hand and off his fingers, and on the back of "(9) If you believe that any witness has knowhis hand and arm; that the burns com-ingly and willfully testified falsely to any matemenced about even with the nipple; that rial fact in issue, you may disregard said witplaintiff's entire face was burned; that he ness' testimony, in whole or in part, or you may was confined to his bed for 5 months from give it such weight and value as you deem the effects of the burns; and that said in- "(10) You are the sole judges of the credibil "(4) The plaintiff must make out his case by a fair preponderance of the evidence. If he fails to do this or if the evidence is equally balanced your verdict should be for the defendant. "(5) If you believe from a fair preponderance of the evidence in this case that the defendant, the Folsom-Morris Coal Mining Company, negligently and carelessly threw out its powder cans with small quantities of powder therein, and negligently permitted them to remain there unproJohn De Vork, was a young boy not of mature years and discretion, and did not understand or der, and that the negligence of the defendant appreciate the dangerous condition of the powcompany, if you find that it was negligent, was the proximate cause of the plaintiff's injuries, caused as a result of said negligence, you will that is, that the plaintiff's injuries were directly find for the plaintiff; otherwise you will find for the defendant. "(6) The fact that the plaintiff was injured defendant; but you are to determine from all the does not presume negligence on the part of the evidence in the case whether or not the defendant was negligent. "(7) Negligence is the failure to do what a reawould have done, or doing what a reasonably sonably prudent man, under the circumstances, prudent man would not have done under the circumstances. "(8) In the event you find for the plaintiff, in take into consideration and allow him reasonable arriving at the amount of his recovery you may compensation for mental and physical suffering, if you find that he suffered any, and you may able effects in the future upon the health of the take into consideration the reasonable and probplaintiff and the effect, if any, upon his ability to earn a living after he reaches the age of 21 years. proper. 160 P.-5 ity of the witnesses and the weight and value to be given to their testimony. In determining as to the credit you will give a witness, and the weight and value you will attach to a witness' testimony, you may take into consideration the conduct and appearance of the witness upon the stand, the interest of the witness, if any, in the results of the trial; the motives of the witness, if any, in testifying; the opportunity the witness had to observe or to be informed as to the matters respecting which the witness gives testimony and the inclination of the witness to speak the truth, or otherwise, as to the matters within the knowledge of the said witness. (11) All these matters being taken into account together with all the facts and circumstances in evidence, it is your province to give to each witness such credit and the testimony of each witness such weight and value as you deem proper." The jury returned a verdict in favor of plaintiff for $5,000, to which defendant duly excepted. Motion for new trial was filed by defendant, which was overruled and excepted to, and an appeal perfected to this court. There are many errors assigned, a large majority of which are predicated upon instructions refused, which we deem unnecessary to set out; the material errors assigned, from our viewpoint, being the action of the court in overruling defendant's demurrer to plaintiff's evidence, and in refusing to grant a new trial. knowledge of his watchman, and that the question of his negligence in keeping the place in such condition in view of the danger of their injury therefrom was for the jury." In Miller v. Boston & N. St. Ry. Co., 197 Mass. 535, 83 N. E. 990, it is held: "In an action for personal injuries, where defendant's negligence is the proximate cause of the injury, the fact that there are other concurring culpable causes will not preclude recovery." In Mattson v. Minnesota & North Wisconsin R. Co., 95 Minn. 477, 104 N. W. 443, 70 L. R. A. 503, 111 Am. St. Rep. 483, 5 Ann. Cas. 498, it is said: "The dangerous instrumentality here involved (dynamite) is an extremely hazardous article in the hands of mature persons, and a hundredfold more so in the hands of young children. The degree of care required of persons having the possession and control of dangerous explosives, such as firearms or dynamite, is of the highest. The utmost caution must be used in their care and custody, to the end that harm may not come to others from coming in contact with them. The degree of care must be commensurate with the dangerous character of the article (Keasbey, Electric Wires [2d Ed.] 269, 270), and is greater As to such, the care required to be exercised is and more exacting as respects young children. measured by the maturity and capacity of the child. Sioux City & P. R. Co. v. Stout, 17 Wall. 657, 21 L. Ed. 745. What would constitute reasonable care with respect to adults might be gross negligence as applied to a young child. 7 Am. & Eng. Enc. Law [2d Ed.] p. 441, and cases cited. The case at bar, within these rules, is There is nothing so attractive to young boys as even stronger than the so-called 'turntable cases.' articles of an explosive nature, and the greater the volume of sound that may be produced therefrom, the greater the attraction. As compared more attractive, and far more dangerous. Young children are incapable of comprehending the dangers in handling or exploding the same, and their natural instincts urge them into experiments In view of these considerations, the rule of with it whenever it comes within their reach. law imposed upon him who possesses such dangerous articles should be more exacting than in the case of a turntable; and, applying the rule to the facts before us, it is clear that the jury was justified in finding negligence upon the part of defendant. It failed to take proper "It is a well-settled rule of law that requires care of dynamite brought into this vicinity, and each person to use such care for the safety and left it exposed upon the premises where children well-being of others in and about the keeping had, to the knowledge of its servants, been in of his property as an ordinarily prudent person the habit of loitering and amusing themselves. would have used under all the facts and circumstances of the case, and the failure to use such care is negligence; and he who does, or permits, a wrongful act is liable for the consequences which ensue in the ordinary and natural course of events, although such consequences be immediately and directly brought about by intervening causes, if such intervening causes were set in motion by the first or original wrongdoer." In Peirce v. Lyden, 157 Fed. 552, 85 C. C. A. 312, it is held: The material evidence shows beyond question that the cans thrown out by defendant containing the parcels of powder were accessible to plaintiff and other boys, and therefore the first material proposition with which we are met is whether or not such action on the part of defendant was action-with an ordinary turntable, dynamite is vastly able negligence. We are unable to agree with defendant that under the facts in this case no liability attached to defendant; or, that the case of Pollard v. Oklahoma City Ry. Co., 36 Okl. 96, 128 Pac. 300, Ann. Cas. 1915A, 140, in which the facts as to the intervening causes are entirely different from those in this case, supports its contention. In that case it is said: * * ** In the case of Union P. R. Co. v. McDonald, 152 U. S. 262, 14 Sup. Ct. 619, 38 L. Ed. 434, it appeared that the railway company had been operating a coal mine near one of its stations, and was in the habit of depositing the slack upon an open lot between the mine and the station in such quantities that it took fire from the spontaneous combustion and remained in that condition, constantly burning. Plaintiff, a young boy, visited the coal mine in company with another boy, and became frightened by threats of other boys who preceded them to the "Defendant maintained a shed in a railroad mine, and, in an effort to escape from them, fell yard of about two acres near a schoolhouse in a into the burning slack, and was severely injured. city, in which he kept open barrels of oil. Dur- The company was held guilty of negligence in ing the daytime the shed was left unlocked, and not properly guarding the pit of slack, and that, for several months children living in the vicinity under the circumstances disclosed, the plaintiff who played in the yard had been in the habit of was not a trespasser. It appeared that people stealing oil from the barrels in old cans and mak-in general visited the mine at pleasure, including fires with it in the yard, which fact was ing boys of the age of plaintiff. There was nothknown to defendant's watchman. On one such ing particularly attractive about the mine, either occasion plaintiff, who was an infant, was burned and injured. Held, that defendant was chargeable with notice of such practice of the to adults or children, and certainly nothing attractive in the burning pit of slack. The court in that case cited and commented favorably up 1 Q. B. 29. In that case it appeared that defendant's servant left the horse and cart he was driving for his master unhitched in the street and unattended, while he entered a house on some business errand. Plaintiff, a boy of 7 years, and other children, discovering the horse unhitched, began playing about the cart. Some of the boys got into the cart, while another led the horse down the street. Plaintiff, in attempting to get out of the cart, fell between the wheels, the cart passing over and breaking one of his legs. Defendant, the master, was held liable for the neglect of its servant in leaving the horse in the manner stated, and that his responsibility was not overcome by the fact that the boys were trespassers." The contention that the plaintiff was a trespasser is not well taken. In City of Shawnee v. Cheek, 41 Okl. 227, 137 Pac. 724, 51 L. R. A. (N. S.) 672, Ann. Cas. 1915C, 290, it is held: . "A child under 7 years of age, or, in the absence of evidence of capacity, between 7 and 14 years of age, is presumed to be incapable of guilt of more than technical trespass, as affecting question of duty of owner in respect to dangerous condition of premises. * of the court. We therefore do not deem it of the several requested instructions propnecessary to specifically point out the vice erly refused by the court. In view of the fact that the injuries received by plaintiff are permanent, and that necessarily he must have suffered extreme pain, and must go through life terribly disfigured, we are unwilling to say that a verdict of $5,000 is excessive. careful consideration of the entire record, we Upon a most are of the opinion that the court did not err in overruling the motion for new trial. This cause should be affirmed. PER CURIAM. Adopted in whole. (61 Okl. 36) BERRYHILL v. MILLER. (No. 6381.) (Supreme Court of Oklahoma. Sept. 26, 1916.) (Syllabus by the Court.) 1. APPEAL AND ERROR 614 RECORD CASE-MADE-AUTHENTICATION. The question of whether or not plaintiff, at the time of the accident, was so matured as to appreciate the danger of handling the powder, was under proper instructions of the court, submitted to the jury; and the verdict found was a finding by the jury that plaintiff was not so matured as to understand, and did not understand the danger incident to the handling of said powder. 2. APPEAL AND ERROR 537 RECORD Whether or not there was evidence sufCASE-MADE-EXTENSION OF TIME. Where a case-made is signed by the trial judge, but is not attested by the signature of the clerk and the seal of the court, it is not sufficiently authenticated, as required by the statute, to constitute a valid case-made, and the judgment of the trial court cannot be reviewed. [Ed. Note.-For other cases, see Appeal and Error, Cent. Dig. §§ 2708-2713; Dec. Dig. 614.] ficient to show liability on the part of defending the time in which to make and serve a caseA purported order of the trial judge extendant was a question for the jury; and this question, we think, was submitted to the jury under proper instructions of the court. In Littlejohn v. Midland Valley R. Co., 148 Pac. 120, it is held: "In an action for damages for personal injury, charged to have been caused by negligence, the court should not sustain a demurrer to the evidence and withdraw the case from the jury, unless, as a matter of law, no recovery can be had upon any view which can be properly taken of the facts the evidence tends to establish." made is without force where the case-made fails 537.] Commissioners' Opinion, Division No. 5. Error from County Court, Muskogee County; Thos. W. Leahy, Judge. Action by A. J. Berryhill against Robert Miller. Judgment for defendant, and plaintiff brings error. Dismissed. Thea. E. Lipscomb and Sumner J. Lipscomb, both of Muskogee, for plaintiff in error. Crump, Bailey & Crump, of Muskogee, for defendant in error. We are therefore of the opinion that in permitting the cans containing the powder to be thrown out, as they were, that defendant was liable for such negligence; especially in view of the fact that the "powder monkey" in charge of the powder house was cognizant of the action of the boys in taking the CAMPBELL, C. This is an appeal from powder, which knowledge of the "powder a judgment of the county court of Muskogee monkey" must be imputed to defendant, and county in favor of the defendant, Robert Mildid not attempt to prevent them from taking ler. The plaintiff, A. J. Berryhill, brings the powder. It is true that the injury com- this proceeding to have the judgment reversplained of was brought about by an intervened, and brings the record to this court by ing cause, but such intervening cause was set in motion by the wrongdoing of defend[1] 1. The case-made, attached to the petiant in throwing out the cans containing the tion in error, is authenticated by the certifipowder. Pollard v. Okl. Cy. R. Co., supra.cate of the trial judge, and is attested by the We are therefore of the opinion that the court did not err in overruling the demurrer to plaintiff's evidence. The very many requested instructions refused were, where they assert correct rules of law, covered by the general instructions case-made. signature of the clerk. The seal of the court is not attached thereto. Section 5242, Re vised Laws 1910, provides: "The case and amendments shall, upon three days' notice, be submitted to the judge, who shall settle and sign the same, and cause it to For other cases see same topic and KEY-NUMBER in all Key-Numbered Digests and Indexes |