to sell at ruling prices; but when he destroys competition by a combination with others, the public can buy of no one.

In Rex v. De Berenger, 3 M. & S. 67, it was held to be a conspiracy to combine to raise the public funds on a particular day by false rumors. The purpose itself, said Lord Ellenborough, is mischievous -it strikes at the price of a valuable commodity in the market, and if it gives it a fictitious price by means of false rumors, it is a fraud levelled against the public, for it is against all such as may possibly have anything to do with the funds on that particular day. Every "corner," in the language of the day, whether it be to affect the price of articles of commerce, such as breadstuffs, or the price of vendible stocks, when accomplished by confederation to raise or depress the price and operate on the markets, is a conspiracy. The ruin often spread abroad by these heartless conspiracies is indescribable, frequently filling the land with starvation, poverty, and woe. Every association is criminal whose object is to raise or depress the price of labor beyond what it would bring if it were left without artificial aid or stimulus. Rex v. Byerdike, 1 M. & S. 179. In the case of such associations the illegality consists most frequently in the means employed to carry out the object. To fix a standard of prices among men in the same employment, as a fee bill, is not in itself criminal, but may become so when the parties resort to coercion, restraint, or penalties upon the employed or employers, or what is worse to force of arms. If the means be unlawful the combination is indictable. Commonwealth v. Hunt, 4 Met. 111. A conspiracy of journeymen of any trade or handicraft to raise the wages by entering into combination to coerce journeymen and master-workmen employed in the same branch of industry to conform to rules adopted by such combination for the purpose of regulating the price of labor, and carrying such rules into effect by overt acts, is indictable as a misdemeanor. 3 Whart. C. L., citing The People v. Fisher, 14 Wend. 9. Without multiplying examples, these are sufficient to illustrate the true aspect of the case before us, and to show that a combination such as these companies entered into to control the supply and price of the Blossburg and Barclay regions is illegal, and the contract therefore void.1

1 "Owners of goods have a right to expect at an auction that there will be an open competition from the public; and if a knot of men go to an auction upon an agree ment among themselves of the kind that has been described, they are guilty of an indictable offence, and may be tried for a conspiracy." Gurney, B., in Levi v. Levi, 9 C. & P. 239. — ED.

General Requisites of an Indictment.

2 Hawkins, Pleas of the Crown, ch. 25, Sect. 55. No periphrasis or circumlocution whatsoever will supply those words of art which the law hath appropriated for the description of the offence, as murdravit, in an indictment of murder; cepit, in an indictment of larceny; mayhemiavit, in an indictment of maim; felonice, in an indictment of any felony whatever; burglariter, or burgulariter, or else burgalariter, in an indictment of burglary; proditorie, in an indictment of treason; contra ligeantiae suae debitum, in an indictment of treason against the king's person.

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2 Hawkins, Pleas of the Crown, ch. 25, Sect. 62. rial part of an indictment is repugnant to another the whole is void; for the law will not admit of such nonsense and absurdities in legal proceedings, which if suffered, would soon introduce barbarism and confusion. Also it takes off much from the credit of an indictment that those by whom it is found have contradicted themselves. And upon this ground . . . it hath been adjudged that an indictment for selling iron with false weights and measures is void, not only because it is absurd to suppose that iron could be sold by measure, but also because it is repugnant and inconsistent that it should be so sold at the same time when it was sold by weight.1

1 Every indictment or information ought to contain a complete description of such facts and circumstances as constitute the crime, without inconsistency or repugnancy; and, except in particular cases, where the precise technical expressions are required to be used, there is no rule that other words shall be employed than such as are in ordinary use; or that in indictments or other pleadings a different sense is to be put upon them than what they bear in ordinary acceptation. And if, where the sense may be ambiguous, it is sufficiently marked by the context, or other means, in what sense they are intended to be used, no objection can be made on the ground of repugnancy, which only exists where a sense is annexed to words which is either absolutely inconsistent therewith, or being apparently so, is not accompanied by anything to explain or define them. If the sense be clear, nice exceptions ought not to be regarded; in respect of which Lord Hale (2 Hale's P. C. 193) says that "more offenders escape by the over-easy ear given to exceptions in indictments than by their own innocence, and many heinous and crying offences escape by these unseemly niceties, to the reproach of the law, to the shame of the government, and to the encouragement of villany and the dishonor of God." - Lord Ellenborough, C. J., in Rex v. Stevens, 5 East, 244, 259.

2 Hawkins, Pleas of the Crown, 8th ed., ch. 25, Sects. 118, 119, 126, 127, 128. As to the ninth general point of this chapter, viz.: What ought to be the form of the caption of an indictment. I shall take it for granted that every such caption is erroneous, which doth not set forth with proper certainty both the court in which, and the jurors by whom, and also the time and place at which, the indictment was found. As to the first of these particulars, viz.: What certainty is necessary in the caption of an indictment in respect to the court before which it was found. It is certain that every such caption must shew that the indictment was taken before such a court as had jurisdiction over the offence indicted.

As to the second particular, viz.: What certainty is necessary in the caption of an indictment in respect of the jurors by whom it was found. It seems agreed that no caption of an indictment, whether found at a court-leet, or other inferior court, can be good without expressly shewing that the jurors who found it were of the county, city, or burgh, or other precinct for which the court was holden, and that they were at least twelve in number, and also that they found the indictment upon their oaths.

As to the third particular, viz.: What certainty is necessary in the caption of an indictment in respect of the time when it was found. It seems agreed that such caption must set forth a certain day and year when the court was holden before which the indictment was found.

As to the fourth particular, viz.: What certainty is necessary in the caption of an indictment in respect of the place where it was found. It seems agreed that if such caption either set forth no place at all where the indictment was found, or do not shew with sufficient certainty that the place set forth is within the jurisdiction of the court before which it was taken, [it] is insufficient.

STATE v. BROWN.

SUPREME COURT OF NORTH CAROLINA. 1819.

[Reported 3 Murphy, 224.]

THE indictment against the defendant was in the following words, to wit:

"The Jurors for the State, upon their oaths, present that John Brown, late of the County of Camden, shop-keeper, on the first day of February, 1817, and continually thereafter up to the time of taking this inquisition at Camden aforesaid, was, and yet is, a common Sabbath-breaker and prophaner of the Lord's day, commonly called Sunday; and that the said John Brown, on the day aforesaid, being Lord's day, and on divers other days and times, as well before as since, being Lord's day, did then and there keep and maintain a certain open shop, and on the days and times aforesaid, there sold and exposed to

sale divers goods, wares, and spirituous liquors, to negroes and others, to the great damage of the good citizens of this State, and against the peace and dignity of the State."

The defendant submitted; but the court entertaining a doubt whether the facts set forth in the indictment constituted an indictable offence as therein set forth, sent the case to this court; and

HENDERSON, J., delivered the opinion of the court:

The indictment charges that the defendant is a common Sabbathbreaker and prophaner of the Lord's day. If it had stopped here, it would certainly have been insufficient, as it would not show how, or in what manner, he was a common Sabbath-breaker and prophaner of the Lord's day. The court, upon an inspection of the record, must be able to perceive the alleged criminal act: for an indictment, as was once well observed from this bench by Judge Lowrie, is a compound of law and fact. The latter part of the indictment charges that the defendant kept an open shop and sold divers goods, wares, and spirituous liquors to negroes and others on the Sabbath. This offence, as charged, is not punishable by indictment; for if the act can be intended to be lawful, it shall be so presumed, unless it be charged to be done under circumstances which render it criminal, and be so found by a jury. For aught that appears to the contrary, this sale might have been to the lame or weary traveller, or to others to whom it was a merit to sell, instead of a crime; and nothing shall be intended against a defendant. And if this were the Sabbath-breaking spoken of in the foregoing part of the indictment, taking the whole together, the defendant well might have done all charged against him, and yet have committed no crime; and as this may have been the case, we are bound to presume it; at least, not to presume to the contrary.

The judgment must be arrested.

DAMON'S CASE.

SUPREME JUDICIAL COURT OF MAINE. 1829.

[Reported 6 Maine, 148.]

In this case the defendant was indicted for that he, having been lawfully married at Reading in Massachusetts, in 1805, was unlawfully again married to another woman, at Farmington in this county, in 1812, the former wife being still alive; "against the peace of said State, and against the form of the statute in such case made and provided." The defendant moved for a new trial, because, 4th, the indictment was defective.1

PARRIS, J. The only remaining question presented in this case is as to the sufficiency of the indictment. The case finds that the second marriage of the defendant was in this county, in 1812. Supposing it to have been proved or admitted at the trial, that at the time of the 1 Part of the case not relating to question of pleading is omitted.

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second marriage the first wife was alive (and this fact must necessarily have been established to the satisfaction of the jury), the offence set forth in the indictment was committed at that time, and consequently against the peace of the then existing government and the laws thereof. It could not have been an offence against the peace of the State of Maine, or in violation of its laws, for at that time Maine had not been invested with the sovereign power of a State. The territory was a portion of Massachusetts, and the inhabitants were amenable to the laws of that sovereignty.

Whoever commits an offence indictable either by statute or at common law is guilty of a breach of the peace of that government which exercises jurisdiction, for the time being, over the place where such offence is committed; and in setting forth the offence an omission to charge it as having been done against the peace of that government is fatal. The Queen v. Lane, 3 Salk. 199; 2 Ld. Raymond, 1034. It is even insufficient, if charged as against the peace generally, without naming the particular sovereignty, whose peace is alleged to have been violated. 2 Hale's P. C. 188. So, also, if it be an offence created by statute, as in this case, the indictment must allege it to have been committed against the form of the statute, or it will be fatal. 2 Mass. Rep. 116.

Now it would be preposterous to allege the offence to have been committed against a statute of the State of Maine; for at that time Maine had no statutes, and the statute touching this subject which has since been enacted by our legislature is materially different, especially in the penal part, from the statute of Massachusetts.

As the indictment, in this case, sets forth a statute offence committed in the year 1812, by a person subject to the laws of Massachusetts, in a place then under the jurisdiction of that government, it consequently must have been against the peace of that sovereignty and that only; and not being so alleged, the prosecution cannot be sustained. The authorities by which our opinion on this point is supported are: 2 Hale's P. C. 188; 2 Hawk. ch. 25, sect. 95; Yelv. 66; 4 Com. Dig. Indictment, G. 6, and Rex v. Lookup, 3 Burr. 1903. In the latter case, Lookup was indicted for perjury. The fact was charged to have been committed in the time of the late king, whereas the indictment concluded against the peace of the present king. After trial, conviction and sentence, Lookup brought a writ of error returnable in Parliament, when the following question was put by the lords to the judges: "whether the perjury being alleged in the indictment to have been committed in the time of the late king, and charged to be against the peace of the now king is fatal, and renders the indictment insufficient." The Lord Baron delivered the unanimous opinion of the judges in the affirmative; and upon this point the judgment of the King's Bench was reversed and the defendant discharged.

Conformably to the report of the judge who tried the cause, the verdict must be set aside and a new trial granted.