Empiric and Rational systems. The philosophical systems of the Greeks continued to be examples of what might be effected, though they were no longer adhered to as models. The improvement in social habits, and the clearer views of moral duties, which Religion and established forms of Government had promoted, brought with them the necessity for a more perfect system of Ethics than was to be found in the theories of the Ancients; while the Scholastic system was found less and less capable of satisfying the demands of an increasing curiosity. The improvement effected in the mathematical sciences by Copernicus, Kepler, Galileo, and Torricelli, awakened a like enthusiasm among philosophers of another class, which the analogy subsisting between their pursuits tended to promote. 309. A want that appears to have been especially felt by the philosophic mind about this time, and which the Greeks had been unable to satisfy, was that of bringing the whole mass of human knowledge to systematic unity. Greater attention was bestowed on the questions of the Origin, the Truth, and the Certitude of Knowledge, especially as relates to the belief in God, Immortality, Free Will, Human Destiny, and the foundation and obligation of Morality. Hence arose systems differing in their consequence and in their principles, according as they admitted experience or reason as sources of knowledge. Scepticism, which had been resuscitated by the discordance of doctrines and the pretensions of the Dogmatists, became more cautious and deliberate, and confined its attacks chiefly to the sphere of false specu lation. Revelation became daily less regarded as a source of philosophical knowledge, and Reason gradually obtained the casting-vote; yet Supernaturalism was maintained by a strong party; and as soon as an exclusive system of Dialectics showed its head, Mysticism and Theosophy were sure to rise up against it. The most influential philosophers acknowledged the accord of Reason and Revelation; but positive Theology still arrogated to itself the right of summoning Reason before its own tribunal. 310. The following is a summary of the chief merits of that period. 1.-Philosophy began at length to obtain the right of occupying an independent field and domain of human knowledge. 2.-The system of knowledge began to be better studied as a whole and in its branches. 3.-Philosophy began to be freer in its relations with Theology, though the latter still maintained the right of admonition and censure. 4.-Science daily gained in depth; it passed from the material to the formal, i. e., to the examination of knowledge in its nature and origin. The same path is followed by Scepticism. 5.-The Philosophic method was applied more carefully to establish systematic unity in knowledge; and attempts were made to find the art of introduction to philosophy (Propädeutik). 311. This period may be subdivided into two: the first extending to the end of the eighteenth century, and capable of being distinguished into smaller epochs by the names of the great men who illumined it; the efforts at knowledge then made being principally of a Dogmatic character. This period also embraces the parallel movement of Mysticism and Theosophy. The second part, from the last twenty years of the eighteenth century to our times, presents the attempt by which men tried, through the assistance of the critical method, to set up philosophical Reason in its proper independence, and, moreover, the systematic movements and efforts to which this struggle has given birth. FIRST PERIOD. FROM BACON TO KANT. FROM THE SEVENTEENTH CENTURY TO THE END OF THE EIGHTEENTH. Fresh and independent Essays of Reason, with a more profound and Systematical Spirit of investigation. 312. Two great spirits, Bacon and Descartes, determined the direction of the human mind for a long period; they respectively advocated Experience and Speculation as the secrets for deciphering philosophy. This new teaching originated first in Italy; but it only obtained a fair field in England, France, and Germany. Both parties sought to establish the nature of things on a sure foundation, and endeavoured to give currency and credit to their systems by the manifold nature, the oneness, and the completeness of their results. As, however, they neglected to lay firm foundations, owing to the rapid erection of this structure, they were not able to give them that degree of perfection which would secure them universal supremacy. The Reason fell into schisms, owing to the opposite tendencies to unscientific Empiricism, or to an exaggerated love of Demonstration, through the conflict existing between the interests of the Understanding and the Reason, between Common Sense and Speculation. Philosophers had, previous to this time, a divided interest, either in favour of theory or praxis. Hence there resulted, of necessity, a onesidedness. It was, therefore, easy to find defects in the conflicting systems; and in these defects to find a confirmation of one's own system. The opponents on each side repeated the same game; and from these causes there originated struggles which resulted at last in a spiritless indifference to all peculiar philosophical researches. 313. Although the basis of philosophical Science had not been fundamentally and exhaustively examined, yet the philosophic spirit received continually additions to its power and elasticity. The particular Scientific Sciences made continual advances towards a greater perfection, and philosophy received the greatest extension through the application of its form to the whole province of human knowledge. The Method was, moreover, perfected, the language more developed, and a deeper and more penetrating research was diffused. 314. Practical philosophy was long neglected, because the aim of philosophers was principally directed to speculation. Thomas Aquinas (§ 266), together with his numerous commentators, the Casuists, and (among the Protestants) Aristotle, were long the leaders during this epoch. The Theologians sought zealously to appropriate to themselves the entire province of practical knowledge as their property, and to keep down all spirit of inquiry. A leading thought had been inherited from the Scholastic age, i. e., that God, as Creator of the World, is the Ultimate Basis of all Legal Obligations which spring either from subjective or objective motives and foundations in His Will. This view, which is true in itself, found a support in the consideration attached to divine Revelation; and not only Theologians, but also theologizing philosophers, sought to develope and substantiate it in conformity with their individual points of view. Municipal Legislation, which was the farthest removed from Theology, and the juristic relations of states and peoples, gradually occasioned examinations of these matters. The spirit of inquiry was gradually guided into the province of practical philosophy, through the effort of giving a firm hold to the ruling convictions by means of rational insight and a rational faith; and also, of confirming revealed religion by rational grounds. Hence a certain zeal was awakened for exploring the moral nature of man, and for uniting theoretic and practical philosophy. 1 See Professor SAVIGNY'S Works on Jurisprudence, and the Development of Municipal Institutions in Europe, especially his Geschichte des Römischen Rechts, 3 vols. 8vo. Heidelb. 1834. ATTEMPTS TO GROUND PHILOSOPHICAL I. The Empirism of Bacon. MALLET'S Life of Bacon, prefixed to his Works. RAWLAY, the same; and R. STEPHEN, Letters and Remains of Lord Chancellor Bacon, Lond. 1734, 4to. For the services rendered by Bacon to Philosophy, see HEYDENREICH, in his translation of Cromaziano, vol. I, p. 306. SPRENGEL, Life of Bacon, in the (Halle) Biographia, vol. VIII, No. 1. FEUERBACH, Geschichte der neuern Philosophie, von Bacon bis Spinoza (1833), 1844, sec. 32-91. 315. Francis Bacon, lord Verulam, appeared in England as a reformer of Philosophy; a man of clear and penetrating judgment, great learning, great knowledge of the world and men, but of a character not free from reproach. He was born in London, A.D. 1561; attained the highest offices in the state, which he ultimately lost through his failings, and died 1626. In his youth he studied the Aristotelian system of the schools, and the Classics. The latter study, as well as the practical pursuits to which he presently devoted himself, taught him the poverty and insufficiency of the former. In his maturer age he applied himself to consider the means of reforming the Method of Philosophy, to which end he composed some works, which by the new principles they developed had even greater influence over the fortunes of philosophy than if he had completed an entire system of his own. 316. Bacon chose a new path, altogether opposed to the beaten one: he wished to see the fabric of human knowledge built not on conceptions through conclusions, but on Experience or perception through Induction, a method which had already been imperfectly attempted by Telesius (§ 298). 1 De Dignitate et Augmentis Scientiarum (Latin) 1603; (English), Lond. 1605. His Works, Amsterd. 1662, 6 vols. 12mo., with a Life by W RAWLAY: Lond. 1740, fol. 4 vols. by MALLET: and 1765, 5 vols. 4to. Novum Organum Scientiarum, Lond. 1620, fol. F. BACON'S Neues Organ der Wissenschaften, aus dem Lateinischen übersetzt, mit einer Einleitung und Anmerkungen begleitet von ANT TH. BRUCK, Leipz. |