pose, he should be as anxious as any man to avoid the necessity of such arduous and painful exertions; but that, under the present circumstances, a weak and timid policy could perhaps scarcely even postpone the moment when they would become indispensable for our existence, and would infallibly expose us to the certainty, at no distant period, of a similar struggle, with those means given out of our hands which we now possessed, and with the chance diminished, of finally conducting it to a successful issue-that we had not an option at this moment between the blessings of peace and the dangers of war-that from the fatality of the times, and the general state of the world, we must consider our lot as cast by the decrees of Providence, in a time of peril and trouble-that he trusted the temper and courage of the nation would conform itself to the duties of that situation-that we should be prepared collectively and individually to meet it with that resignation and fortitude, and, at the same time, with that active zeal and exertion, which, in proportion to the magnitude of the crisis, might be expected from a brave and free people-and that we should reflect, even in the hour of trial, what abundant reason we have to be grateful to Providence for the distinction we enjoy over most of the countries of Europe, and for all the advantages and blessings which national wisdom and virtue have hitherto protected, and which it now depends on perseverance in the same just and honourable sentiments, still to guard and to preserve.

were now in possession of; but the duty he had spoken of was so far transcendant, that he should consider himself as blameable, there being sufficient information to enable them to discuss what were the causes of the war, if he embarrassed the question with the consideration of any other points. The first question for consideration was, whether this coun try had a right to go to war with France? And the second, whether, having a just cause for war, there was such a want of expediency in pursuing it, that, notwithstanding the justice of the cause, it would not be politic to carry it on? Ever since the treaty of Amiens, there had been one continued system, on the part of France, to vilify and insult the British government and people, a deliberate system of ambition and aggrandizement on the part of the French republic: and when he considered whether there were just grounds of war, his difficulty consisted rather in the abundance from which he was to choose. If he took the first act, that of sending persons here with the appearance of a commercial character, in the character of peace, and claiming the rights of hospitality and protection, whilst their real views had for their object the ascertainment of the means of destroying this country, he thought it was so unprecedented and unparalleled an insult and injury, that it furnished of itself a sufficient cause for war: it was so gross a violation of public faith, that it was certainly a sufficient ground for hostilities. It was unnecessary to go through the whole of the grounds for war: he would not treat upon the annexation of Piedmont, of which country we were the direct guarantees, nor upon the subject of Switzerland. These were amply sufficient grounds for war: but alTuesday, May 24-(See Minutes, p. 817.) though he would not dwell upon the subjects of the indemnities in the German empire, the [WAR WITH FRANCE.]-Mr. T. GREN- annexation of Piedmont, the invasion of SwitVILLE said, that when a call like the present, zerland, or of the Batavian republic, yet all so superior to any other, was made upon the these were such sufficient proofs of the ambicountry, he thought that a sufficient motivetion of the French republic, as not less than for confining themselves strictly to the great and pressing duty which was then before them. His Majesty had told the House that the aggressions and insults offered to this country by France, had forced his Majesty to commence hostilities against that power. If any man could bring himself to believe that there was not a just ground for war, then he would take the side he had described. Those, on the contrary, who thought with him that it was their first duty to remove from the question every point which might prevent that unanimity which was so desirable to enable his Majesty to prosecute the contest with that vigour and energy which the occasion required, would put out of their consideration any thing except the important duty which they had to discharge. After complaining so often of the want of information, he ought to be the first to congratulate the House on the full information which they

HOUSE OF COMMONS.

at other periods to excite a disposition on the part of this country to resist the ambition and aggrandizement of France. It had been doubted how far some of these were just grounds for war; it had been said that they were not, because at the period of signing the treaty of Amiens, French troops were in Holland, Piedmont was really annexed to France, and Switzerland might be considered to be so. Could any man doubt at that period, it had been asked, that Switzerland and Holland must become subject to the power of France, whenever the latter chose to make an effort for that purpose? The great argument used in support of the treaty of Amiens was the tone and temper in which it was made, from which if any thing was to be inferred, it was that a disposition was beginning to arise in France, to act upon the principles adopted by regular governments, and a hope to find in that disposition reasonable grounds for believing that

France would observe the treaties she had that, and doubt that there had been in the mind made. Now, when there was a general sys- of Buonaparté an hostile view with respect to tem of ambition and aggrandizement on the Egypt, a disposition to act directly contrary to part of France, it was said it was no subject his own guarantee of the integrity of the Turk of complaint: be it so. But should this coun-ish empire? This was even not all; but when, try not be prepared to check that ambition? in the Declaration of his Majesty, it was stated To say that the influence of France was so that the French government had suggested the great in Holland and Switzerland, that there- idea of a partition of the Turkish empire, he fore it ought not to be resisted, was so strange must suppose that it related to a regular pro. an argument, that he did not think it neces- posal made by France to a great northern sary to pursue it any further. All these acts power, for such a partition. With respect to were not only altogether, but each of them, a this point, no documents were offered; but sufficient cause for war, and such as in other if Ministers had not referred to it, they would times had been acted upon vigorously and have done less than their duty; and to have successfully. Here he wished to recur to referred to it more distinctly, would have what related to Egypt, in which there was a been more than was called for. Before he direct breach of the treaty of Amiens. By quitted this subject, he could not help advertthat treaty the French republic was solemnly ing to an expression that had been used, that bound to guaranty the integrity of the Turkish Buonaparté had a desire to possess himself of dominions, which became an important object Egypt. If it was meant to be said that there to us, not only in itself, but because of the was an abstract wish on the part of the Great great necessity which existed for it, for the Consul, possessing half the world, secretly, security of our own possessions. In that view silently, and piously to add Egypt to his do he conceived that we demanded security from minions, he could not conceive that such a France against any attempt in that quarter. simple abstract wish could be a cause for war. Egypt was evacuated by our troops, and the But putting together facts, would any man evacuation made a sacrifice to peace, whilst assert that it was a fair interpretation of those we demanded the guarantee as a security for facts, to say merely that Buonaparté had a our Eastern possessions. If any man doubted desire to possess himself of Egypt? That the insincerity of France, after reading the desire was manifested by acts so manifestly in Report of Sebastiani, it would be extremely breach of the treaty which he had signed, difficult to prove it: yet the Report was said that we were justified in saying that it was a to be commercial. Vain and idle pretext! on hostile breach of faith. Steps had been taken which the purpose of it was attempted to be by the First Consul, which clearly indicated done away. Was it possible to conceive that the means by which his designs were to be it could be a commercial mission? If any man executed. From the moment that any hostile doubted, however, upon the subject, he de- act was committed by France, we were justisired to refer him to higher authority, to Buo- fied in using every means for our own secu naparte himself, who had distinctly described rity. The best means by which the First it as a military mission; and to Andreossi, Consul could execute his projects upon Egypt the French Ambassador, who had not at were those which he thought the most netempted to conceal the purpose of the mis-cessary to the accomplishment of his desire; sion under the semblance of commerce, but who distinctly designated it as a military mission. Thus, then, the Report of Sebastiani was confirmed in all its military character. But was that all? Look at the supplementary part of the Report, view Sebastiani travelling in the republic of the Seven Islands: that republic was, however, not confined to Sebas-ence between our retaining Malta, if France tiani's Report; another supplementary account committed a breach of faith, and our right of amongst the papers on the table, informed possessing ourselves of it again after a breach them that the First Consul had granted his of the treaty of Amiens, and having previously protection to the Catholic church of the Seven given it up. In this view of the subject, he Islands, and that when the members of that would not go into a minute discussion respectcommunion prayed to God, they must praying the roth article of the treaty of Amiens. for the First Consul. Thus stood the case with respect to Egypt. If the Report of Sebastiani had merely consisted of an intercepted letter, it might have been said, that it was not a sufficient act of hostility on the part of France towards this country, though he should have contended that it was; but when, in addition to the Report, it was adopted by the First Consul, and by the French Ambassador here, could any reasonable man, he asked, read

they depended upon Malta, and if we had evacuated Malta, we should have been justified, after the Report of Sebastiani, in endeavouring to retake it. Would any man say, that if it was just to retake it, it was not also just to retain it when it was already in our possession? He could not see the least differ

He would grant, that if the stipulations of the treaty had been fulfilled, and we had then refused to deliver up Malta, a breach of that treaty might have been alleged against us; but no case had ever been made out by France, which gave her a right to demand the evacuation of Malta by us. He really thought that there never was a period in which so many and such invincible grounds of war, on the part of this country, were so clearly

one word in that amendment that he would not willingly subscribe to, yet he could not but lament that it would have the effect of preventing Parliament from speaking with an unanimous voice. The country was placed in a very arduous situation; but he was confident that the spirit of Englishmen was amply sufficient to encounter successfully the perils which surrounded them, and that there would be found means, and mind, and spirit to meet the contest in which we were engaged. If the country was true to itself, and Parliament was true to the country, there need be no fear for the issue of that contest.

and distinctly made out, as in the moment | out allies, to those countries with whom we when he was addressing the House. It might might wish to ally ourselves, it would not be be said, that amply sufficient grounds of war unimportant to shew our readiness to repel a might exist, and yet considerations of expe- danger which was common to all, to shew our diency might render it doubtful whether Par- disposition courageously to meet the difficul liament should recommend the prosecution of ties which presented themselves, and bravely the war; but were there or not any such to overcome them. With respect to the grounds of expediency at the present mo- amendment, it appeared to him that there was ment? If they were to say that such a war at no duty more incumbent upon them, when the present moment would not be a dangerous representing the spirit and sense of the counexperiment, and that it would not press hea- try upon the present occasion, than that they vily, in point of expense, upon every man in should speak with an unanimous voice. There the country, they would be deceiving them- was no sacrifice which he would not make, selves, and disguising the truth. But what consistent with conscience and honour, to had they to consider? He lamented that their obtain that unanimity. If, then, he saw in voice upon this occasion would only be a the amendment no material difference, must choice of great evil. Before, however, they he not complain, that, without any essential agreed to a change for war, they were to con- difference, it should have the effect of weaksider what they would lose. Was it peaceening that unanimity? Though there was not that they would lose? Would any man say that it was a change from peace to war? It was, on the contrary, a change from a state of unequal truce to a state of equal war. They must look danger courageously in the face, and hope with confidence for a glorious result. Did they sacrifice, by such a change, that which was valuable, or even tolerable? Without entering into the consideration of the conduct of his Majesty's Ministers, he would ask, whether, if the wisest men in the country had been at the head of affairs, it were possible that they would have suffered the last two months of protracted negotiation, during which we experienced not a peace but a truce, in which we disarmed whilst the enemy armed-in which we were called upon to give up our conquests, whilst the enemy was pursuing a system of aggrandizement, and completing their military preparations, to be afterwards carried into effect against this country? Was it to be said, that we were to wait till they had completed all their arrangements? And were we to be taught to wait patiently the event of the attack, and not to take those means which we were called upon by God and man to take for our own security? It might be said, that even at the period of the present discussion, we had gained an advantage of vast moment, since the great and mighty republic of France had thought fit to abandon the important acquisition of Louisiana. He could not conceive that any one would be so childish as to ask, whether that was a fresh indication of a pacific spirit? What was the cause of it? The war. However paradoxical it might seem, he considered that cession as a fresh indication of a hostile mind on the part of France. It was evident, in his opinion, that it was the object of France, in this cession, to do away one enemy more, and to endeavour to prevent an alliance between the United States and this country. It had been said that we were without allies: he did not see any occasion for treating our former continental alliances so lightly as they had been treated. But however we might be with

Mr. WHITBREAD said, the Rt. Hon. Gent. had called for unanimity in the discussion of this subject, and he (Mr. Whitbread)_also called for unanimity. The Rt. Hon. Gent, had said, that there was nothing he would not sacrifice for the sake of unanimity, except honour and conscience. He put it to the Rt. Hon. Gent. under the gallery (Mr. Pitt), and to the Rt. Hon. Gent, who had just spoken, or to the Hon. Gent. who sat upon the same bench with that Rt. Hon. Gent. whether they could, with a safe conscience, vote a direct approbation of the conduct of his Majesty's Ministers, to which the present address would pledge them? He called upon them to say, whether his Majesty's Ministers had uniformly manifested a desire for the maintenance of peace? whether those Ministers had conducted themselves well, and whether they had not committed the honour of the country? The Rt. Hon. Gent. (Mr. Grenville) had distinctly admitted, that Ministers had committed the honour of the country; and if the Rt. Hon. Gent. could not approve of them, he could not approve of that part of the address which went to the approval of their conduct. Let those, therefore, who called for unanimity, vote for the amendment of his Hon. Friend (Mr. Grey), which went the full length of pledging their lives and fortunes in the support of his Majesty in the contest in which we were engaged, without pledging themselves

to the approval of the conduct of his Ma- why not make representations upon each insult jesty's Ministers. He trusted the House received, and, if no satisfaction was obtained, would indulge him, when he previously con- why not appeal to Parliament? He granted fessed that it was impossible for him to take that every individual insult was a cause for war; that narrow view of the question which was but why then not demand satisfaction, and proposed by the Rt. Hon. Gent. He thought if not granted, appeal to Parliament? What it absolutely necessary to comment upon those were the circumstances which related to the steps which Ministers had taken during the treaty of Amiens? On the 23d of November negotiation, since it was impossible to discuss last, his Majesty's speech was made to Parliathe steps ultimately taken by those Ministers, ment. He confessed that the speech of the without inquiring into the previous negotia- Rt. Hon. Gent. (the Chancellor of the Exchetion. In doing this, whatever might have quer) then made upon the question respecting been his feelings with respect to any party the address, was far from being satisfactory to with which he was connected, he acted per- him. He took the liberty at that period to fectly free from all party bias. He had hailed ask for explanation; and if he did not much the accession of the Rt. Hon. Gent. (Mr. Ad- misinterpret what was then stated by that Rt. dington) and his colleagues to power, as the Hon. Gent. it was, that there was no danger only chance of saving the country. He ac- of any breach of the treaty of Amiens. From knowledged the brilliancy of the speech made this circumstance, a grave and weighty reby a Rt. Hon. Gent. (Mr. Pitt) on the pre- sponsibility rested upon Ministers. The subceding evening, and he so much the more re-ject of Switzerland had been dwelt upon algretted the part that Rt. Hon. Gent. had ready with so much eloquence, that he should taken, for as it had been said that one person only say, that he viewed the events which had in France had absorbed the whole power of taken place in that country with as much that mighty empire, so it might be observed, horror as any man. But how did the question that if ever the fate of empires hung upon the stand with respect to that country? At the lips of one individual, it was on the lips of time that Buonaparté invaded its liberties, a that Rt. Hon. Gent. (Mr. Pitt) on the pre- Swiss deputy applied to the powers of Europe, ceding evening. He regretted the part which through the medium of their ambassadors at that Rt. Hon. Gent. had taken, and should Paris, for assistance; they were only suchave been happy if it had been otherwise, for cessful in their application to this country. no one would be more happy than himself at A note was presented from Lord Hawkesbury, the return to power of any one who was dis- remonstrating with the French government posed to restore peace, which he thought respecting that subject. A letter of instrucmight still be restored. He thought the nego- tions, dated the same day (the 22d of Novemtiation had been conducted ill, and that when ber) with that note, was sent to Mr. Moore, it was broken off, it might still have been giving him an irrevocable power to involve this brought to a happy issue. But if the Noble country in a war with France, not but that Lord (Hawkesbury) thought the experiment there was a just cause for war, but knowing of the treaty of Amiens was useful in destroy- at the same time that the Swiss were suping that spirit of enthusiasm in France, from ported by no other power than by this counwhence so much mischief had resulted, do try, under which circumstance it must be not let those who spoke upon this subject, agreed, that such a war would have been imincrease inflammation upon a question which politic. Thus, after the refusal of the other they ought to discuss dispassionately, and not powers of Europe was known, and Ministers suffer themselves to be run away with by the having, on the 23d of November, risked a war old inveterate spirit of hatred against France. with France on the subject of Switzerland, Let them recollect who were the Ministers and not then knowing the issue of the nego who called for war. He was not surprised tiation, did then in point of fact inform the that the Rt. Hon. Gent. (Mr. Grenville), and House and the country, that there existed no those who sat with him, should contend that danger of any breach of the treaty of Amiens. there were sufficient grounds for war, but did How was this to be interpreted? Ministers not enter into the consideration of any distinct sent out immediate orders, in consequence of cause for war, contending, as they did, that this dispute, not to evacuate the Cape of Good at any time since the signature of the treaty Hope and other places, which was a direct of Amiens there was sufficient ground for breach of the treaty of Amiens. Soon afterwar. But what did we now go to war for? wards they sent out orders to evacuate those Was it or was it not on account of the single places. This would serve to shew how Minipaper of the ultimatum of this country which sters interpreted their own act respecting now lay upon the table? And if France had Switzerland. It was most extraordinary that accepted that ultimatum, should we or should at the same time when they sent out orders we not be now at peace? If so, let them dis- not to evacuate the Cape and other places, miss all circumstances of aggravation from the no orders were sent out not to evacuate discussion of the subject before them. No Malta, which was more particularly the subman felt more than he did the aggravated in-ject of dispute between the countries, on the sults offered to this country by France; but importance of which so much stress was laid,