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too broadly. No man would say that the great mili- every British object had been attained, and as long as tary force of France had not great power; of that it was possible with any hopes of making an impres we must be all aware, and our measures must be sion favourable to the general interests of Europe; with reference not only to this idea, or for the de- we had continued in the contest until we were left fence and security of the realm, but also to act without alliance for perseverance in it; and then we against the enemy as occasion may occur. He thought did what, under such circumstances, it was wise in it was high time that we should shew, not by words, us to do. The right honourable gentleman, after but actions, we are not to be insulted by France, having charged us with neglecting our true interests, that we are not to be intimidated by any menace by adopting a system purely defensive, proceeded to they may throw out, that it is not their shewing them- state that the force we had hitherto proposed to adopt selves in large numbers opposite to our coasts, that is is not applicable to our case, and alluded to the mi to throw us into a panic." That they may throw a tia. Now upon this subject he must be allowed to body of men into our country is practicable," said he. lament a little that the right honourable gentleman “It may be done certainly under favourable cir- had not brought forward his objection to this system cumstances, that is, if they be not sunk in the at- at the time it was first brought before the House, be tempt; but it would not be long before they would be cause abundant opportunities had been afforded wo made prisoners; neither do I think that any of them hear the reasoning of the right honourable gentleman would return. I think that it is time to shew that we upon the subject. He was perfectly open at the are not to be taunted in this way with invasion, or time to conviction, and so he wished to be still, bet intimidated with the threat of it." There was ano- he only wanted to know what the system of this ther part of the speech of the right honourable gen- country had always been, and whether the measure tleman, which he should now shortly notice: he now proposed was not an improvement upon seemed to suppose that by the treaty of Amiens, we plan, and whether the observations of the right ho had relinquished for ever all right to consider of the nourable gentleman, if they had been made last year, affairs of the continent; and he said, that for the would have induced Parliament to vote 100,000 men last ten years we had gone very much to leeward : on the establishment. He thought not; our measures that was not so. As to the treaty of Amiens, he ap- last year, however, enabled us to set a stronger force proved of it at the time, under all the circumstances on foot than was ever known at the commencement under which it was concluded. He was satisfied, of a war, and we had at this moment a considerable even now, of the propriety of this country having body of the best troops on foot we ever had; for entered into that treaty; but it was not correct to say, which reasons he thought that government was not that by that treaty we had given up the continent; liable to reproach for negligence. He should not fol we had done no such thing; nor was it our inclina-low the right honourable gentleman through his obtion to do any think like it. If there had been any servations on the militia. He lamented that the House chance of any continental co-operations with us-if had not been favoured with the opinion of the right ho we had had the continuance of any continental alli-nourable gentleman fully on this occasion formerly, ance, then the peace of Amiens was a peace of which he should not have approved; but as we had no continental alliance left for carrying on the war, he thought that no advantage was to have been gained by the prosecution of the war; nor did he see how any one could expect any advantage to us by that continuance, under such circumstances. We therefore had agreed to the peace, and, in his opinion, we acted wisely by so doing. But the right honourable gentleman had asked, whether the last peace was not merely an experiment? Yes, it was; and whether it had not failed? Why, yes it had failed, as was evinced by our being now at war. The publication of our discussion with France had roused the indignation of the people to a pitch which he conceived to have decided the character of the cause in which we are engaged, for that it has united them, and made them, as it were, one man against France, and taught them to regard France as the oppressor of Europe in general, and one who wished to be the op

but the question now was, whether the committee would not vote a force which on consideration last session was thought necessary? The right honourable gentleman said, that a regular army invading country could be opposed only by a regular army: that was true, but it admitted of certain qualifica tions; it was true with regard to an engagement but not to a protracted war. America was a proof of this; the regular army indeed beat the Americans in every engagement, but at last they harassed, and finally overpowered the regular army. This was also the case of France herself against Prussia; the Prus sian army was composed of the best regular trop and the French who were opposed to them e insisted of the national guards or troops of that description and, he must say, that whatever character the French troops had acquired, and whatever they may now be, they had gone through a great deal of hard fighting but they did not suffer themselves to despond or to be alarmed on account of their not being regular To have this sentiment troops although they were to be opposed by regulars, thoroughly rooted in the hearts of Englishmen, was, they exerted themselves by a resolution which enabled

pressor of this country.

other occasion, a thing worth ten or twenty WestIndia Islands But the R. H. gentleman had said, that the hopes of this country were gone. He did not think SO He did not think that we were a people likely to give up our hopes. He found nothing in the history of this country to justify that idea; nor did he think there was any thing in the conduct of this country to warrant the expression that we had given up all concerns with the affairs of the continent. On the con

and it this country had the same resolution, of which there could be no doubt, because we all felt the propriety of it, we should not only get over our difficulties, but to be insulted with impunity, and if they attempt us we should teach this our insolent enemy we are not to use their own words, on our own dunghill, woebe to the assailants.

MR. PITT said, that he was happy to understand, trary, the history of this country proved that our ob from his R. H. friend, that ministers did not think that ject had, since the revolution, been to preserve the the present militia was all the additional force which balance of power on the continent; we had made the public service, at this interesting moment rea glorious effort to do so in the last war-we had quires, and if they did not enter upon the subject at Continued in the contest for that purpose long atter | present, it was only because they had measures of

augmentation in view which were not mature; that ces, and tell them at the same time their duty to they had not laid before the committee the means of themselves; shew them that their representatives knowing the plan now for that reason, but that they are determined to act tor their welfare, and for their are satisfied a considerable augmentation must take glory. You cannot now go into the detail, but you place; being of that opinion himself, he should can have no difficulty about the number of men, hardly have occasion to make more than one remark, nor of the vote to cover the expence of it. My obwhich was, that in his view of the subject, on the ject, by all I have said, is, that the country should principle which ministers had adopted, that of more now be told at once that it is to prepare for measures vigorous measures than had been hitherto ever tried, of an unusual extent, to make exertions of an unto obtain that force which was of the best sort, that usual nature; that the people should be impressed of supplemental force to the army, acting under with a notion that extraordinary preparations must commissioned and non-commissioned officers in the be made, that extraordinary means must be used. regular army. It did appear that would have been Whatever circumstances of difficulty may occur in fortunate if they had rather begun by establishing in the detail of the means for carrying the matter into the opinion of Parliament and of the country the ne- effect, which I believe to be essential to the public cessity of the thing to be done, by preparing the service, I am anxious that at least as early a day as public mind by an adequate vote for that purpose, possible should be taken for this subject; that because by commencing the course and pursuing the ministers, instead of talking of what they will do, means which may be now desirable to animate the should pledge themselves, and that this House should public mind to the adoption of what may be thought pledge itself that the thing shall be done. Let each essential either for the safety of the Island, or what person do his duty. Let ministers bring this matter we should couple with it, the vigorous prosecution forward, and I am assured that every member in the of the war with France, that of carrying on war House will assist in it. Whatever degree of odium with a force which may be at once adapted either for may be endeavoured to be cast on us for not chusing offence or defence, the best effects may be expected, perhaps the mildest course that possibly might be but we are not in a state fit for war with France until found, if we had full leisure to consider it, we should we are in a situation to avail ourselves of every oppor- not mind-the thing must be done-must be done tunity which may occur for offensive as well as de- immediately."-Mr. Pitt then proceeded to observe, fensive operations.-He applauded every desire which that if he had to state here his objection, it would ministers could manifest to labour with perseverance not be that the militia was too much; he thought to consider of the best means for the safety of the that a militia to this extent we could bear, and he state; "But," said he, “do it effectually! and to was ready to say, that another force calculated for do it effectually, you must do it soon. Doing it soon offensive as well as defensive war, was superior, as a will be better, though you do it with difficulty, than force, to a militia. He thought that a large portion if you do it some time hence, and after much delibe- of regular troops might be added to 0,000 militia, ration, easily. I think it is better that the thing and must be kept at home or we should not have a should be done at once, or as soon as possible, than sufficient force for home security.-He then prothat you should delay it-that is, I think it better ceeded to make several observations on this subject that it should be voted without delay, and then that as it regarded the numbers of the militia, &c. and you should consider about the means; first vote the then said, he hoped that the additional force to be measure, and then come forward with the vote for raised was not to depend upon a system of tardy and defraying the expence, because by bringing the mat- precatious recruiting, and that the forces should not ter forward immediately you will call the spirit of the be confined to serve at home as a force necessary people into action. The question now is, will you merely for home defence, and that at all events that save your country? Save it in the best and most we should secure the advantages of the forces being prudent way, if you can; but save it! But if you under officers regularly trained. He wished the House are to take any mode for that purpose, in which you to benefit from recollection, and judge of what we may have to encounter prejudices, or in which you can do from what we have done. We knew that we may attach to yourselves a temporary odium; but had raised by ballot, without interfering with the the opinion I have of the people of England, will agriculture or the industry of the country, 100,000 not allow me to think so, if you do but inform them men. He knew, from the concurring opinion of rightly of your object: however, if any prejudice almost all militia officers, that we could not hope to should arise against you-if any temporary odium have on the militia plan officers for more than should attach to your measure-if it be for the safe- 70,000 men. He said he would not go beyond that, ty of the country, or for its honour, pursue it without engrafting on the militia officers from the pursue it, although you may have to contend with regular force. Some means ought to be applied in prejudice-pursue it, although you may have to en- aid of the army. If any better mode could be decounter odium-pursue it, even although you may vised than any which had been yet stated, he should have to subdue resistance! Do it! for the country be glad of it; he would engage to give it his support. must be saved! I am ready to take my full share of The country must be put in a proper state of military the inconvenience. If. therefore, Gentlemen con- preparation; the best means might, perhaps, not be cur with me, as indeed I believe the House does,readily seen. It must have as much time for its conthat the present force is insufficient, I wish them now to pledge themselves; to pledge Parliament, to pledge the nation too, that a strong measure shall be taken for the defence of the country without any loss of time. I must say too, that at a period when the statement of the finance of the country is about to be laid before us, it is fit you should bring this measure for our safety forward, together with an estimate of the expence of it; for it is fit the people should see the extent of their burthens; tell them their expen

sideration as was absolutely necessary to understand it, but no more; for whatever was wanted for the public defence, some how or other must be obtained.

TUE CHANCELLOR OF THE EXCHEQUER said, he was very glad that the questions put by his right honorable friend had given government an oppor runity of declaring that they did not rely at the present crisis, upon the militia consisting of 70,000 * 3 E 2

HOUSE OF COMMONS.

Monday, June 13.—[Min. p. 906.]

--

OF

THE

[THE BUDGET.] THE CHANCELLOR EXCHEQUER brought forward the Budget, for which see page 906 of this volume.

HOUSE OF COMMONS.

men, great part of whom were at present in arms; that they did not rely upon the regular force of the country, which was at present greater than at any other period, except when an embarkation was about to take place; that they did not rely upon the brave and loyal yeomanry of the country, but that they were prepared to bring forward measures for the purpose of providing a large subsidiary force, to be officered in the manner pointed out by his right honorable friend. The right honorable gentleman (Mr. Windham) had complained of the large proportion of militia force, but that had been completely answered by his right honorable friend, at least that part of the right honorable gentleman's argument which related to a system entirely defensive. In looking to the population of the country, and the means of constituting a large and effective force, it was not merely an option on the part of government, whether such a force should be called out; it was not because the right honorable gentleman or government might think it possible to procure a large proportion of regular troops, but they must consider how, consistently with the feelings and opinions of the country, and the avocations of men of business, the largest and most effective force could be provided for defensive and offensive operations; it appeared to him, that those means ought to be resorted to which were calculated to provide such a force with the greatest public advantage, and the least possible inconvenience. The right honorable gentleman had adverted to the danger arising from an invading enemy; that right honorable gentleman would do him the justice to recollect that he never under-rated that danger, though he thought at the same time that it had been greatly over-rated. He begged leave to refer the right honorable gentleman to the conduct of government in the summer of 1801, and many individuals then in the House, upon whose justice he confidently relied, would attest that there was during that period no want of exertion on the part of government. The country was not generally aware of the extent of the preparations in the French ports at that period, nor of the steps taken by government to meet the threatened danger. At the time when the ships which defended our rivers were sent to the Baltic, then was the period of real danger. Government neither slumbered nor slept, but adopted all those measures which the exigencies of the moment required, with a fixed determination to call forth all the exertions of the country to repel the danger which then threatened us, but which did not happen. He was therefore entitled to refer to their conduct at that period as a pledge of their disposition. It had been stated, that a pledge ought to be given on the part of Parliament, that it would make such provision as circumstances should require. He conceived that Parliament had given that pledge; he conceived. that when it carried to the foot of the throne the address in answer to his Majesty's message, though there was no specific pledge as to any particular measure, yet that a distinct and solemn pledge was given on the part of the country, that they would make every exertion which the exi-existence of the country, depend on the firmness, the gencies of the case might require. That those exertions must be great he not only admitted, but contended; but he flattered himself that whenever he should appeal to the House either to meet financial difficulties, or to provide for increased military exertions, that such an appeal would not be made in vain. If any obloquy was attached to any such measures, he would cheerfully share it; but he trusted, that on the part of the people there would be on such an occasion but one sentiment and one opinion.

Tuesday, June 14.—[Min. p. 971.]

[REPORT OF THE BUDGET.]-LORD FOLKESTONE. I do not rise, Sir, for the purpose of objecting to the bringing up of the report, nor to the taxes proposed, but to avail myself of this regular and parlia mentary opportunity, of entering into some consideration of the conduct of his Majesty's ministers. Of the taxes in detail, I can say nothing, at present; because, if they be liable to objections, frequent op portunities will occur, hercaiter, of stating them; but, on the general system of taxation now adopted, that of raising money for the support of the expenses of the war in each current year, by what are called war-taxes, I must say a word or two. To that sys tem, I, for one, must object, as tending to make the war unpopular.

The war in which we are engaged, is confessed, on all hands, to be one of necessity, and for the very existence of the country. Every thing, therefore, that tends towards bringing it into disrepute should be carefully avoided. Such a system may be good in theory; there may be something noble and magnanimous in the idea of a people submitting to bear the whole burden of their own wars, and not to entail on posterity any inconveniences arising from their quarrels. But the policy of putting such a theory in practice depends upon circumstances, and the circumstances of the present times are clearly such as to render it impolitic. If the people were so eager for war, as to be ready at any, the slightest affront, to rush headlong into it; then such a system would be both just and politic; then it would be certainly proper to make them bear the whole burden of a contest brought on, perhaps, by their own precipitancy, and to endeavour to check that disposition, by making them feel the whole inconvenience of it. But if, on the other hand, the temper of the people be such, as in point of fact, we know to be the case with the people of this country at present; that they are rather too backward than too eager to begin the contest, that they are rather inclined to submit to insults, than to undergo the hardships and expenses of war to repel them, then it is, certainly, most im politic to add, to that backwardness and reluctance for war, all the selfish feelings of dislike to make just sacrifices, and to undergo heavy burdens, which every one knows will be called forth by the present enormous taxes. On this ground, I, for one, think the system of war-taxes objectionable. Such a war as the present should be rendered as palatable and as popular as possible, inasmuch as the safety and very

vigour, and perseverance with which it is carried on. With respect to the mode in which ministers seem inclined to carry on that war, as far as I can judge of it, I must disapprove of it. I must disapprove of that defensive system which seems to be the one adopted. I know that I may be stopped here, in limine, and told that that is not the system intended to be pursued. But I must be permitted to ret in my opinion on that subject, as long as I see symptoms of activity and preparation than 1, a pre

sent, witness. If a different sort of conduct were if the greatest expedition of this sort that we could adopted, we should undoubtedly hear of plans of of- send out were to meet with complete success, we fence, we should see greater stir and more active should not have advanced one step towards gaining preparation than are at present discernible. Nothing security for ourselves, or impairing the power of the of this kind is any where to be met with; and, in- enemy. Such a success would produce no greater deed, the universal idea amongst the public seems effect than the scratch of a pin on a man's hand. to be, that defence, and defence alone, is to be our From this mode of offence, therefore, no hope can object: that we are to stand on our own shore pre- be derived. What then remains? There remains, pared to resist any attack made on us; but that any either, to animate the continental powers to join and attack, on our parts, is wholly out of the question. make common cause with us in the contest, and so This, certainly, may not be the plan of his Majesty's to attack France externally, or to attempt to destroy ministers; but this is certain, that all their measures the government itself, and for this purpose, to raise lead one to suspect that it is, and they never have up the royalists that remain in that country to join given this House a single reason to imagine that they with us in the attempt. Now, whatever hopes might, have any other. But against this plan, whether it under these circumstances, be derived from these be theirs or not (I hope it is not), I must object in modes of operation, must be greatly weakened so toto, and for this very plain and simple reason, that long as his Majesty's present ministers direct the afof all the plans that can be pursued, this, more fails of state. For it is not to be conceived that any surely than any other, will bring on the country, set of men, who can be selected, will be so unlikely speedy and inevitable destruction; and the more to inspire confidence as the persons now in office. complete the plan, the more likely to be adequate to What confidence can any foreign power have in men, the proposed effect, the more speedy and the more who have universally, whenever it suited them, certain will be the ruin. In that case, the country abandoned and deserted the allies of the country? will perish by the weight of its own defence. It will In men who lay it down as the very basis and founthen be exactly in the case with a man, who, when dation of all their negotiations with France, and who attacked by an active enemy, should say, I do not now send forth to the world, under their own signawant to hurt my enemy, I only wish to defend my-tures, that their principle is, that they shall retain self; so I will wrap myself up in a good suit of ar- compensation out of the conquests which this counmour, in a coat of mail, that I know to be impene- try may make for the increased power and territories trable, and then I may be perfectly at ease, because of France? Now, to a man of plain understanding, I know he cannot hurt me. But what would be the this principle is no other than this-France may enevent? not only if any of the nails were to give way, rich herself by robbery, pillage, and rapine; we or if there were to be a little rust, or any weak part, will not grumble or find fault if she will but allow or the joints were to open, would the enemy be ena- us to have some share in the booty, so that we may bled immediately to thrust in his poniard, and give a in some degree keep pace with her. Will any man mortal stab; but, without any such accident, would be astonished, in case the noble secretary of state it not be certain that this man must soon fall down were to direct any of his Majesty's ministers, at the faint and oppressed, by the weight of his own arms? foreign courts of Europe, to sound the dispositions of In like manner, if this defensive system, which is so the government, and to find out whether they were popular, is to be adopted, will the country in a short willing to join with us in the present contest; in time most inevitably faint, and fall down under the such a case, would any man be astonished, or would weight of its own armour; and the stronger the ar- the noble lord himself be astonished, if he were to mour, the greater the means of defence, the more receive for answer-" We cannot trust you, we canspeedily will the necessary faintness and ruin come "not place any confidence in you. How can we be on.-Gentlemen seem to confound the idea of a de- "sure that you will not abandon us, as you abanfensive war, or a war of self-defence, with the de- "doned the King of Sardinia? How can we be sure fensive mode of carrying on war. They are things" that you will not desert us, as you have deserted perfectly distinct. In strictness, a war of self-defence "in his time of need the Prince of Orange? How against present or future dangers, is the only justi- " do we know that you will not sell us, as you have fiable war. But a defensive war may as well be car- "sold the Queen of Portugal for a colony or a sugarried on by offensive operations as by defensive, by" island?" A man might rather wonder if his Maweakening or destroying your adversary, as by repell-jesty's ministers were to receive any other answer ing his attacks on you. Does a besieged garrison content itself with repelling the assaults of the besiegers? Do they not make sallies, and, in their turn, attack the assailants? Does not every schoolboy know, that Rome was defended under the walls of Carthage? Precaution for defence, in case of attack, must certainly be made, but our views must not be directed to defence alone. We must have recourse to more vigorous, to offensive measures. Let us then consider a little what are the measures of offence that can be adopted in the present circumstances, and what means this country has for offensive operations. Now, generally speaking, the means of attacking France are threefold-1. By external attacks made by ourselves.-2. By external attacks made by the continental powers; and, 3, by internal attacks on the government of the country. With respect to the first of these methods of offensive operations, this country is pretty nearly impotent. We might attack and seize a sea-port, or destroy a fortress; but, alter all,

than this. In like manner, too, it is impossible that any royalist in France could feel greater reliance on the faith of ministers. Once betrayed by them, once abandoned by them to the cruelties of their relentless enemies, after they had been exhorted to come forward by our declarations, by our promises of suocour and assistance, by our assurances of support, without, as far as we know, a single word being spoken in their behalf, but certainly without any stipulation at all in their favour; thus betrayed and abandoned, will they, can they be expected to put that confidence in such men, as to be roused by them again to brave all the dangers, to undergo all the hardships and toils, to expose themselves to all the vengeance and cruelties from which they have now once escaped? Will they be willing to run the risk of all those calamities again, without some better security that they will not be again deserted? Or, have the published senuments of the noble secretary of state any thing in them that is likely to

me, if this plan be openly and manfully pursued,
to entertain the most sanguine hopes of success.
I will only now state what will be the immediate
effect of such a declaration and conduct. At
home, I think, it will excite a new spirit, and give
a new energy to our measures. Abroad, it will
give confidence in our plans, and convince other
nations of the rectitude of our views. In France,
it will give new hopes and courage to all the loyal
now remaining. It will, at once, bring them all
into our interests. But the most important effect
will be that which I think it will have on the
government. It will palsy all its exertions and
unhinge all its plans: so much so, that I do not
hesitate to say, that if I were asked how I would
prevent an invasion of Buonaparté, I would say,
make this declaration. If I were asked how I
would defend Hanover, I would answer, declare
for the King of France. If I were asked how I
would rescue Holland from the gripe of France;
how I would secure Portugal from her attacks, or
relieve Spain from her fraternity, I would to all
these questions answer, make this declaration.—
I find that the House is impatient: I am sorry,
and beg pardon for having detained them so long;
but this idea has pressed so strongly on my mind
for some time paft, that I could no longer re-
concile it to myself to let slip an opportunity of
ftating it. If Gentlemen's minds and attention are
directed to it, my object is in a great degree
answered, as I am convinced that the, more they
think of it, the more they will incline to my
opinion.

wipe off this crime in their eyes, and to teach | by entering into all the reasons which induce them to put their trust in him! Will any man of loyalty, can any royalist in principle ever entertain that feeling for a man, who, as minister for this country, negotiating with a foreign power, has not hesitated to state, that, in his opinion, the French royalist emigrants would do well to lay aside the orders which they wear, those rewards of ancient deeds of valour, which they have received from the hands of their sovereign, and which they wear as emblems of their fidelity and attachment to him? Can the royalists confide in a man, who, without a blush, can give this to the world as his deliberate opinion? Surely not. May that noble lord never have the means of putting his opinions in practice! May it ever be out of his power to throw that disgrace on his sovereign, which, in his deliberate judgment, it would be proper for him, in certain circumstances, to do For these reasons, his Majesty's present ministers are the most unfit men in the world to apply, with effect, the means of offence which this country may have, against France. But as they are still his Majesty's ministers, as they still have his confidence, and the support of this House, it is their duty to employ those means as well as they can. Now what is the best method to exert these means? Confidence is to be gained that is the first and principal point. The continental powers, on the one hand, the loyal part of France, on the other, are to be convinced that we will not again fail and desert them. And how can they be convinced of this, but by an open, explicit, unreserved declaration, on our part, of our views and objects? And what ought this object to be? The object most likely to gain that confidence is the destruction of the revolutionary government of France. And, Sir, this object it exactly conformable to the doctrines and opinions lately held by the two noble lords on the Treasury Bench. For if it is allowed to refer, for [Dock-YARDS.]-Mr. WHITBREAD said, that one moment, to what passed in former debates, in bringing this business forward he had no dethe House will recollect that the first argument, sire to anticipate any judgment which might be used the other night by those noble lords, in de formed on the reports of the commissioners apfence of the necessity of the present war, was, pointed to inquire into abuses in the navy. A that there existed, in the revolutionary govern- right hon. Gent. opposite (the Chancellor of the ment of France, such an hostile mind against this Exchequer) had pledged himself to found a procountry, that it was quite impossible (and every position on these reports, which he had no inone, it was concluded, must be convinced that it clination even to embarrass. He had different was impossible) to be at peace with the revo- grounds for pressing his motion on the considerlutionary government of France. If this is so, ation of the House. Gent, were not unaware and my mind was fully, and long enough ago, con- that the noble lord who, with so much honour vinced that it was so, what then is the neces- to himself and so important advantage to the sary inference? What but this? Either that country, had fought our battles abroad, and who you must give up all hopes of ever having peace, with not less honour had instituted inquires into or you must destroy the revolutionary government abuses in the department over which he preof France. A third alternative there is not.-sided, had been exposed to a great deal of caNow it would be as unnecessary as insulting to the House to ask; if you would destroy the government of France, what other government would you raise in its room? None other, surely, but the monarchy in the person of the legitimate claimant of the crown. This, then, is the object to which I have been endeavouring to draw the attention of the House. This is the object to be declared and held forth to the people of France, on the one hand, and all Europe on the other. It must be declared explicitly, plainly, and decidedly. If it is not declared in that way, nothing is done; but if it is, the greatest hopes may yet be entertained of final success in our present undertaking. I will not detain the House

HOUSE OF COMMONS.

Thursday, June 16. (Min. p. 972).

lumny and abuse. In nothing more than with respect to his conduct in examining into and providing remedies for the abuses in the dockyards, had he been exposed to very gross censure. To do away any impression which these calumnies might have produced, he thought there was no better way of proceeding than by laying beforethe House a copy of the minutes taken by the noble lord, and the other noble lords, in the course of their visit of inquiry last year, and to which the commissioners in their first report alluded. In that report it was stated, that the conduct of the Admiralty Board was not only free from censure, but highly commendable. It was also stated, that cases of very flagrant delinquency

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