statute law as to binding out minors as apprentices, *264 to learn some useful art, trade, or calling, has probably been very generally adopted in this country, with some local variations, and with the settled limitation that both parent or guardian and infant (except in the case of paupers) must signify their assent by being parties to the deed. The general rule is, that male infants may be bound till their arrival at the age of twenty-one, but females only till their arrival at the age of eighteen. In Pennsylvania, though infants may be bound to apprenticeship under the usual checks,c yet, it

■ Statutes of Connecticut, 1838, p. 413. In North Carolina, under the acts of 1762, 1796 and 1800, and revised and amended in Revised Statutes of N. C. 1837, vol. i. the county court may bind out poor orphan children and illegitimate children until 21 years of age in males, and 18 in females, as apprentices, and the master is to teach them to read and write, and at the expiration of the apprenticeship, to make them an allowance. The binding must be by indenture; and the statute had in view the English regulations in the statutes of 5 and 43 Eliz. Though all the regulations be not precisely followed, the deed is only voidable by the parties. This is the general rule. Petersdorff's Abr. tit. Apprentice, B. ch. 3. 13 Johns. Rep. 245; nor does a mere abandonment of service by the apprentice avoid it. Down v. Davis, 4 Dev. Rep. 64. This is also the English rule. 6 Mod. Rep. 69. 6 Term Rep. 652. 16 East's Rep. 13. 27. 3 Maule & Selw, 189.

b 4 Greenleaf's Rep. 36. 40. Revised Laws of Illinois, edit. 1833, p. 68. This is the rule in Ohio, and the indenture of service is to be executed by the father, or, in case of his death or incapacity, by the mother, or by guardians appointed for infants under 12 or 14, or by the trustees of the town, as the case may be; and it does not seem to require that the infant should join in the execution of the indenture. Statutes of Ohio, 1824. In Connecticut, the statute requires that the minor's assent should be expressed in the indenture, by subscribing the same, when bound by the parent or guardian, as an apprentice, to learn some trade or profession. Males may be bound till 21, and females till 18. Revised Statutes of Connecticut, 1821. If the guardian, in Ohio, binds out the infant until 18 or 21, the court of common pleas must approve of the terms. Chase's Statutes of Ohio, vol. ii. p. 1318. Under the English statute of 5 Eliz., an indenture of apprenticeship, for a less period than 7 years, is voidable at the election of the parties, and not otherwise Rex v. Inhabitants of St. Nicholas, Burr. S. C. 91. Gray v. Cookson, 16 East's Rep. 13.

• Commonwealth v. Van Lear, 1 Sarg & Rawle, 248. Commonwealth

a

has been held, that an infant could not be bound by his father or guardian, as a servant to another; while in Massachusetts, their statute law concerning apprentices, does not make void all contracts binding the minor to service, that are not made in conformity to the statute. It has been held,b that the father may at common law, bind his infant son to service, and the contract will be good, independent of the statute. The doctrine is contrary to the English law, and to the construction of the statute of New-York, and to the rule in Pennsylvania; and it has been questioned in the case of the United States v. Bainbridge.c It was decided in that last case, that the father could not bind his infant son, without his consent, to military service, and that where his enlistment has been held valid, it was by force of the statute authority of the United States. In Louisiana, a minor may be bound to serve as an apprentice to learn some art or trade, with the consent of the parent, or tutor, or parish judge, and the time expires at the age of eighteen in males, and fifteen in females. The contract is made. before a notary, and read to, and signed by the parties. The master may correct his apprentice, with moderation, for negligence or misbehaviour.e Whether an indented. apprentice can be assigned by one master to ano

ther, is a *question which does not seem to *265 have been definitely settled. It was concluded,

v. Moore, 1 Ashmead's Rep. 123. Guthrie v. Murphy, 4 Watts, 80. Purdon's Dig. 58. 60.

a

Respublica v. Keppell, 2 Dall. Rep. 197. But see Contra, 1 S. & R. 252, 1 Browne, 275.

▸ Day v. Everett, 7 Mass. Rep. 145.

•1 Mason's Rep. 71.

Civil Code of Louisiana, art. 158-167.

• Ibid. Commonwealth v. Baird, 1 Ashmead's Penn. Rep. 267. S. P. The better doctrine is, that an apprentice cannot, without his consent, be transferred or assigned by his master. Haley v. Taylor, 3 Dana's Ken. Rep. 222. But in Pennsylvania, by statute, executors and administrators, and even the master may, under certain circumstances, assign over the ap

a

in the case of Nickerson v. Howard, that such an assignment might be good, by way of covenant between the masters, though not as an assignment to pass an interest in the apprentice. As was observed by Lord Mansfield, though an apprentice be not strictly assignable, nor transmissible, yet if he continue with his new master, with the consent of all parties, and his own, it is. a continuation of the apprenticeship. The master is entitled to the wages and fruit of the personal labour of the apprentice, while the relationship continues, and the apprentice is in his service; and there are cases which give the master a right to the wages or earnings of the apprentice, while in another's service, and with or with out his master's license, and even though the trade or service be different from that to which the apprentice is

prentice. Purdon's Dig. 60. The New York statute allows the contract made by an infant coming from a foreign country, and binding himself to service, to be assigned by the master, under certain checks; and generally the contracts for service as clerk, apprentice, or otherwise, may be assigned upon the death of the master, by his executors or administrators, with the assent of the apprentice, and without it, under the orders of the general sessions of the peace. N. Y. Revised Statutes, vol. ii. p. 156, sec. 14; p. 160, sec. 41, 42. The Massachusetts Revised Statutes of 1835, (and which appear to me to be an excellent sample of clear, brief, temperate and judicious codification,) declare that minors may be bound as apprentices or servants, females until 18, or marriage, and males until 21, by the father; or if he be dead or incompetent, by the mother or lawful guardian, and if illegitimate, by the mother. If they have no competent parent or guardian, they may bind themselves, with the approbation of the select men of the town. Minors above 14 are to testify their assent by signing the indenture. The overseers of the poor may bind the children of paupers. The court may discharge the apprentice from his service, or the master from his contract, for good cause. The death of the master discharges the apprenticeship, and the right of the father to assign or contract for the services of his children during their minority, is saved.

19 Johns. Rep. 113. See, also, Caister v. Eccles, 1 Lord Raym. 683. In the case of the Commonwealth v. Van Lear, 1 Serg. & Rawle, 248, the assent of both father and apprentice was held to be requisite under the statute law of Pennsylvania, to a valid assignment of the articles of apprenticeship.

The King v. The Inhabitants of Stockland, Doug, Rep. 70.

bound. But Lord Hardwicke declared, in the case before him, that if the master had not done his duty with the apprentice, and had been the unjustifiable cause of his pursuing a different course of life, he would

grant relief in "equity against the master's legal *266 claim to his earnings. Upon the death of the mas

ter, the apprenticeship is essentially dissolved, for the end and design of it, as a personal trust, cease; but the assets in the hands of the representatives of the master, are chargeable with the necessary maintenance of the infant apprentice.b

Hill v. Allen, 1 Vesey, 83.

Barber v. Dennis, 6 Mod. Rep. 69. Lightly v. Clouson, 1 Taunt. Rep. 112. Harg. Co. Litt. 117, a, note. If an apprentice runs away, and enters into another's service, his gains belong to the master from whom he deserted, though prize money earned in a ship of war forms, in England, an exception. Carson v. Watts, 3 Doug. Rep. 350. The master of an apprentice is bound to pay for medical attendance on the apprentice, from the nature of the relation between them. It is not so in the case of hired servants, and even the father is only bound when the services have been rendered at his instance. Early v. Craddock, 4 Randolph's Rep. 423. By the English cases, the better opinion would seem to be, that the master is not liable for medical assistance to his hired servants. Newby v. Wiltshire, 4 Doug. Rep. 284. Wennall v. Adney, 3 Bos. & Pull. 247. Contra, Lord Kenyon, in Scarman v. Castell, 1 Esp. N. P. Cas. 270.

b The King v. Peck, 1 Salk. Rep. 66. Baxter v. Burfield, Str. Rep. 1266. It has been held, in Versailles v. Hall, 5 Miller's Louis. Rep. 266, that the contract of apprenticeship was personal, and not susceptible of alienation without the cousent of all parties concerned, and, consequently, that it ceased on the insolvency, as well as death of the master, inasmuch as his character and disposition entered into the consideration of the contract.

This relation of master and apprentice was, in its original spirit and policy, an intimate and interesting connection, calculated to give the apprentice a thorough trade education, and to advance the mechanic arts in skill, neatness and fidelity of workmanship, as well as in the facility and utility of their application. The relationship, if duly cultivated under a just sense of the responsibility attached to it, and with the moral teachings which belong to it, will produce parental care, vigilance, and kindness on the part of the master, and a steady, diligent, faithful and reverential disposition and conduct, on the part of the apprentice.

In taking leave of the extensive subject of the domestic relations, I cannot refrain from acknowledging the assistance I have received from the work of the late Chief Justice Reeve on that title. That excellent lawyer and venerable man has discussed every branch of the subject in a copious manner; and though there is some want of precision and accuracy in his reference to authority, and sometimes in his deductions, yet he every where displays the vigor, freedom, and acuteness of a sound and liberal mind.