der the instruction which was referred to at the outset of this opinion, the jury found that part of the insured property was on fire before noon; but they might, under the charge, have reached this conclusion, although they were satisfied that, although at that time the stack was on fire, no spark had as yet reached either shed. Two or three of defendant's exceptions sufficiently raise this point.

As there must be a new trial, it is important that this court should express its opinion on another question which has been raised in the case, viz. What is the meaning of the word "noon"? Did the policy expire at 12 o'clock by "Eastern standard time," or at 12 o'clock by mean solar time at Iron Gate? The difference of time is 19 minutes. Apparent solar time is time measured by the actual passage of the sun over meridian. Owing to the variability of this measure, apparent time is a varying quantity, and therefore for purposes of practical convenience an arbitrary measure was long since adopted, known as mean solar time. Mean solar time is defined by the motion of a fictitious sun called "the mean sun," which is imagined to move with perfect uniformity, being sometimes behind the true sun, and sometimes in advance of it. Mean solar time changes with the longitude, and in a country of this magnitude the difference of time between places caused much difficulty in the regulation of the movements of railway trains. Therefore, about the year 1883, the principal railroads of the United States adopted an arbitrary standard for the purpose of securing uniformity in the operation and connections of their trains. Under this system, the country was divided into four sections (Eastern, Central, Mountain, and Pacific), approximately 15 degrees in width from east to west, and the time of the central meridian of each section was adopted as the uniform railroad time for the entire section. "Eastern standard time," under this system, was the actual time of the seventy-fifth meridian west from Greenwich. New York City and Iron Gate are both in the Eastern section.

What meaning is to be attached to the word "noon," as used in this policy? Is it 12 o'clock mean solar, or 12 o'clock standard time? In the first place, it may be noted that this is a question of the construction of a contract inter partes. No official action, such as the opening of a court, is involved, as was the case in Curtis v. March, 3 H. & N. 866; Henderson v. Reynolds, 84 Ga. 159, 10 S. E. 734, 7 L. R. A. 327; Searles v. Averhoff, 28 Neb. 668, 44 N. W. 872; Texas T. & L. Co. v. Hightower (Tex. Sup.) 96 S. W. 1071, 6 L. R. A. (N. S.) 1046; and Ex parte Parker, 29 S. W. 480, 35 Tex. Cr. R. 12. The rule of construction which applies to all other contracts applies to contracts of insurance-effect must be given to the intention of the parties. Ripley v. Ætna Ins. Co., 30 N. Y. 136, 86 Am. Dec. 362. What did both sides understand to be the time limits of this contract when it was made? By what measurement of time was noon of January 8, 1901 (its beginning), and noon of January 8, 1902 (its ending) to be regulated? If the contract were one to be performed here, the answer would be easy. Section 28, c. 677, p. 1491, Laws N. Y. 1892, provides

that

"the standard time throughout this State is that of the seventy-fifth meridian of longitude west from Greenwich and all courts and public offices and

legal and official proceedings, shall be regulated thereby. Any act required by or in pursuance of law to be performed at or within a prescribed time, shall be performed according to such standard time."

Business in this city has conformed itself to this regulation so uni versally that this court will take judicial notice of existing conditions. It is according to standard time that the teller's windows in every bank, state and national, open and close; that the hour of delivery is fixed for all stocks, bonds, warehouse certificates, and other evidences of ownership of property bought and sold on all the exchanges; that the vast army of labor begins and ends work; that vessels depart for every port foreign and domestic; that every business and social engagement is made and kept. It is the time according to which all clocks displayed on tower, façade, and post, and in every watchmaker's window are regulated; at which the "time-ball" on the tower of the telegraph building falls, and to which the watches in the pockets of every individual, who undertakes to keep his watch timed at all, are conformed. It would require very strong evidence to show that in a contract for a term of insurance upon property in this city the parties intended that the term should be measured otherwise than by standard time.

Nevertheless, conditions may be so different in other localities as to lead to a different conclusion as to the meaning of the word "noon." The map shows that at Pittsburgh, Pa., Eastern standard time ceases, and Central standard time begins. Of the conditions in that city this court cannot take judicial notice. One time or the other, or both, may be in common use. It may be 11 o'clock on one block when it is 12 o'clock on the other. Courts and public offices may conform to one time and business to another. Different branches of business may regulate their affairs by different times. It would seem to be the proper disposition of a case, where the court cannot take judicial notice of the conditions, to receive testimony as to what they were. Such a disposition of a similar case was approved by the Court of Appeals of Kentucky, in Rochester German Insurance Co. v. Peaslee Gaulbert Co., 87 S. W. 1115, 27 Ky. Law Rep. 1155, 1 L. R. A. (N. S.) 364. In the case at bar defendant put in testimony bearing upon this question, and contends that it is uncontradicted and controlling. We do not pass upon it now, because there will have to be a new trial, and the testimony then presented may not be precisely the same. The trial judge charged the jury that:

"In the absence of any language which indicates another intention, the law is so that by 12 o'clock noon is meant noon by solar time, which at Iron Gate, Va., occurs about 19 minutes later than the noon fixed by standard time."

To this defendant excepted, and the record discloses sufficient as to conditions prevailing at Iron Gate to sustain this exception.

Incidentally, it may be noted that the words whose meaning is in dispute "at noon"-are not words selected by the insurer. They are imposed alike upon insurer and insured, who contract in this state, by the statutes prescribing the so-called "Standard form of Fire Insurance Policy," which will be found in Richards on Insurance (2d Ed.) Append. p. 584. As to construction of a form thus prepared, see Peabody v. Satterlee, 166 N. Y. 174, 59 N. E. 818, 52 L. R. A. 956.

There is no force in the suggestion that defendant has not pleaded usage or custom as to observance of time at Iron Gate. Plaintiff is seeking to recover upon a contract, which contains what is perhaps an ambiguous term. It means one thing where the contract is made; it may mean a different thing where it was to be performed, and testimony calculated to relieve that ambiguity may be received without being specially pleaded.

We are unanimously of the opinion that the application, description, and plan did not contain a warranty or representation that at the time of the fire there would be no pile of bark elsewhere on the premises than in the bark yard.

Judgment reversed, and cause remanded for a new trial.

NOTE.1

What Law Governs Insurance Policies.

I. IN GENERAL.

[a] (U. S. 1905) A certificate of insurance issued in Illinois to a resident in New York, which, by its terms, was first to take effect as a binding obligation when the insured should execute the agreement indorsed thereon to accept it, "subject to all the conditions therein contained," is a New York, and not an Illinois, contract, where New York was the state in which the required agreement was executed. Judgments, Meyer v. Supreme Lodge K. P. (1904) 178 N. Y. 63, 70 N. E. 111, 64 L. R. A. 840, and (1903) 82 App. Div. 359, 81 N. Y. Supp. 813, affirmed.-Supreme Lodge K. P. v. Meyer, 198 U. S. 508, 25 Sup. Ct. 754, 49 L. Ed. 1146.

[b] (U. S. 1902) Laws N. Y. 1877, c. 321, § 1, provides that no insurance company shall declare a policy forfeited for nonpayment of premiums without having first given assured 30 days' notice that the premiums were due, and that the policy would be forfeited if they were not paid. An application for life insurance in a New York company, made in the state of Washington, contained a provision that "the contract of insurance, when made, shall be held and construed * * * to have been made in the city of New York"; and the policy recited, "In consideration of the application for this poley, which is hereby made a part of this contract." The contract was delivered and the first premium paid in Washington. Held, that the policy was a New York contract, and governed by the statute. Judgment, Hill v. Mutual Life Ins. Co. (C. C.) 113 Fed. 44, affirmed.-Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Hill, 118 Fed. 708, 55 C. C. A. 536.

[c] (U. S. 1903) Where an application for insurance was made, the policy was accepted, and the premium paid in Kentucky, no place of payment in case of loss being named therein, the contract was a Kentucky contract, and governed by the laws of that state. Judgment (1902) 115 Fed. 77, 52 C. C. A. 671, affirmed on rehearing.-Carrollton Furniture Mfg. Co. v. American Credit Indemnity Co., 124 Fed. 25, 59 C. C. A. 545.

[d] (U. S. 1901) Where an application for life insurance was made in Iowa by a resident of that state, and the medical examination was made, the premium paid, and the policy delivered in Iowa, the policy is an Iowa contract, and governed by the laws of that state then in force.-Kelley v. Mutual Life Ins. Co. (C. C.) 109 Fed. 56.

[e] (U. S. 1902) The answer in an action on a life insurance policy admitted that the defendant was legally admitted to do business in Massachusetts; that the policy in suit was issued on an application made in writing to its agent in that state where the applicant resided, and was there delivered to the applicant by such agent, to whom the first premium was paid. Held that, in the absence of other facts, the policy was a Massachusetts contract.-Albro v. Manhattan Life Ins. Co. (C. C.) 119 Fed. 629.

1 Supplemental to note to Corley v. Travelers' Protection Ass'n, 46 C. C. A. 287.

[f] (U. S. 1906) Laws N. Y. 1892, p. 1958, c. 690, § 56, which expressly prohibits the appointment of a receiver for, or the direction of an accounting by, an insurance company, unless the Attorney General makes the application or approves the same, is a part of the contract of every policy holder of a New York Insurance company, although he may be a citizen of a foreign state; and he is bound thereby.-Brown v. Equitable Life Assur. Soc. (C. C.) 142 Fed. 835.

[g] (Ark. 1903) A life policy issued by a Missouri corporation, signed and sealed in Missouri, and calling for the payment of premiums there, and payment of the loss there, is a Missouri contract, and governed by its laws.Franklin Life Ins. Co. v. Galligan, 71 Ark. 295, 73 S. W. 102, 100 Am. St. Rep. 73.

[h] (Ill. 1901) An insurance contract between a resident of Illinois and a benefit association organized under the laws of Massachusetts was solicited by a subordinate Illinois lodge. The insured's examination, his signing of the application, his making of answers to the questions propounded to him, and the payment of his dues and assessments, took place in Illinois. The benefit certificate required to be accepted in writing was accepted in Illinois. Held, that the question whether there was power in the subordinate lodge to waive a by-law of the association forbidding the admission of a liquor dealer would be determined by the laws of Illinois. Judgment, Royal Arcanum v. Coverdale, 93 Ill. App. 373, reversed.-Coverdale v. Royal Arcanum, 193 Ill. 91, 61 N. E. 915.

[i] (Ind. 1907) Where plaintiff paid the first premium on a life insurance policy when applying therefor in Kentucky, and the terms of the policy were agreed upon and the application was accepted by the company in New York, and the policy mailed there to its agent in Kentucky for unconditional delivery to plaintiff, the contract was completed when the policy was mailed and hence was governed by the laws of New York.-Equitable Life Assur. Soc. of United States v. Perkins, 80 N. E. 682.

[j] (Iowa, 1904) A policy of life insurance issued to a resident of Iowa, but providing that the premiums were to be paid at the insurer's office in New York, where payment of the insurance was also to be made, and signed at the insurer's home office in New York City, is a New York contract, governed by the laws of that state, though to take effect on delivery to the assured, in the absence of proof of the place of actual delivery.-Summitt v. United States Life Ins. Co., 123 Iowa, 681, 99 N. W. 563.

[k] (La. 1903) Where a citizen of Louisiana applied through a local agent for life insurance in a New York company, the application stating that the policy should not be binding until the premium was paid, and a policy was executed in New York under the application and forwarded to the local agent in Louisiana, who collected the premium and delivered the policy, the contract was perfected in the state of Louisiana, and was governed by the laws of that state, and not by the laws of the state of New York.-Grevenig v. Washington Life Ins. Co., 112 La. 879, 36 South. 790, 104 Am. St. Rep. 474.

[1] (La. 1905) A contract of insurance is completed at the place where the policy is delivered and the first premium collected.-City of Lake Charles v. Equitable Life Assur. Soc., 114 La. 836, 38 South. 578.

[II] (N. J. 1905) Where property insured was located in the state of New York, and the policy contained the express provision that it should not be valid until countersigned by the agent of the company in the state of New York, the company being a corporation of Connecticut, and when it was so countersigned it was mailed to the insured at his residence in Jersey City, the insurance contract was a New York contract and governed by its laws as to its validity, construction, and discharge, and the debt due insured on the policy might be garnished there.-Orient Ins. Co. v. Rudolph, 69 N. J. Eq. 570, 61 Atl. 26.

[m] (N. Y. 1904) A fraternal benefit corporation, organized under the acts of Congress, issued a certificate of membership, through its officers in Chicago, to a resident of New York, on which was printed an acceptance of the certificate, subject to all the conditions therein contained, which was signed by the applicant in New York. The conditions provided that the certificate was to take effect when the acceptance was executed. Held a New York

contract, to be enforced according to the laws of that state. Judgment (Sup. 1903) 82 App. Div. 359, 81 N. Y. Supp. 813, affirmed.-Meyer v. Supreme Lodge K. P., 178 N. Y. 63, 70 N. E. 111, 64 L. R. A. 839.

[n] (N. Y. 1906) Where a policy of life insurance was signed and delivered in the city of New York, and provided for the payment of premiums to the company and the amount of the policy by the company to be made in that city at the home office after receipt of satisfactory proofs of death, it is a New York contract, though the insured resided in another state.-Napier v. Bankers' Life Ins. Co., 51 Misc. Rep. 283, 100 N. Y. Supp. 1072.

[o] (Ohio, 1899) Where applications are made in Ohio to a New York corporation for insurance, and the policies are delivered in Ohio, and the premiums are all paid there, the contract is an Ohio contract, and governed by its laws.-Plaut v. Mutual Life Ins. Co., 26 Ohio Cir. Ct. R. 499.

[p] (Pa. 1905) Where a policy of insurance must be countersigned by an agent in another state, the contract is governed by the laws of the state where the agent resides.-Hardiman v. Fire Ass'n of Philadelphia, 212 Pa. 383, 61 Atl. 990.

[q] (Wis. 1905) Where an application for life insurance was signed in Wisconsin and forwarded to the insurer's office in Pennsylvania, and there a policy was issued and mailed to the applicant, who in Wisconsin received it and mailed the insurer a note payable in Pennsylvania for the premium, the contract evidenced by the policy and note was a Pennsylvania one.-Presbyterian Ministers' Fund v. Thomas, 126 Wis. 281, 105 N. W. 801, 110 Am. St. Rep. 919.

[r] (Can. 1902) A contract of insurance, made in Ontario, where the premiums are payable, proof of death to be furnished, and the insurance money to be payable is an Ontario contract, and will be governed by the law of Ontario, although the assured lived in Manitoba, and made application there to the local agent for the insurance; but a revocation of the benefit of the wife of the insured in the policy, made in Manitoba, will be governed by the law of that province.-National Trust Co. v. Hughes, 14 Man. R. 41.

[s] (Eng. 1902) A contract between parties resident in different jurisdictions is to be construed, in respect of its national character, by the intention expressed therein. A policy of insurance executed in Jersey, and providing as a condition precedent to any action thereon an arbitration and award in accordance with the arbitration act of 1889, is an English contract, on which no action can be brought, either in Jersey or in England, until the condition is fulfilled.-Spurrier v. La Cloche, 71 Law J. P. C. 101, [1902] App. Cas. 446, 86 Law T. 631, 51 Wkly. Rep. 1.

II. NATURE, REQUISITES AND VALIDITY.

[a] (U. S. 1902) A contract of insurance, in a New York company was governed by the laws of Kentucky, where the policy was delivered and the premiums paid by the insured in that state; and therefore under the Kentucky statute insured's answers in the application were representations, and not warranties, though the application warranted the answers to be true.-Carrollton Furniture Mfg. Co. v. American Credit Indemnity Co., 115 Fed. 77, 52 C. C. A. 671.

[b] (U. S. 1902) Where a contract of life insurance is in fact made within a state between a resident thereof and a foreign insurance company legally authorized to do business therein, the parties cannot avoid statutory provisions of the state, declaring a rule of public policy with respect to such contracts made within its jurisdiction, by inserting provisions in the policy adopting the law of another state.-Albro v. Manhattan Life Ins. Co. (C. C.) 119 Fed. 629.

[c] (Miss. 1906) A policy insuring property in the state was written at the home office of a foreign insurance company and was applied for by the insured, a citizen of the state, through insurance brokers, residing in a sister state, who represented the insured. The insurer had no agent in Mississippi doing business for it. Held, that the contract of insurance was not a Mississippi contract, but a contract of the state of the domicile of the insurer, and was not void, though the insurer had not complied with Code 1880, § 1073, and Laws 1890, pp. 15, 16, c. 4, prescribing the conditions on which